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This thesis deals with different aspects of the processes of production of sociability 
among the Xikrin-Mebengokre of the Catete River, central Brazil. I focus on 
ceremonies and their performance, as ways of access to Mebengokre conceptions 
concerning the morality and aesthetics of social life. I analyse the semiotics of 
`kin'-ship production, the performative aspects of emotion as a sociability tool, the 
use of song and dance for the co-ordination of collective technical tasks, and a 
Mebengokre `theory of language' as social agency. In the conclusion I focus on the 
criticism of some of the key theoretical aspects of Ge ethnology, in the light of my 
previous analysis. 
Esta tese trata de diferentes aspectos dos processos de producao de sociabilidade 
entre os Xicrin-Mebengokre do rio Catete, no Brasil Central. Centro minha 
abordagem em cerimönias e sua performance, tomadas comoformas de acesso a 
concepcöes Mebengokre concernentes ' moralidade ea estetica da vida social. 
Analiso a semiötica da producäo de `parentesco', os aspectos performaticos da 
emocao enquanto ferramenta de sociabilidade, o use de canvoes e danca para a 
coordenacäo de tarefas tecnicas coletivas e uma `teoria Mebengokre' da linguagem 
como capacidade de ac o social. Na conclusäo, critico alguns dos aspectos centrais 
da etnologia Je, a luz de minha anälise previa. 
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The idea (... ) which says that the elimination of Others provides the self with unlimited freedom, is 
psychologically false, corresponding to the physical falsehood which would have us believe that since 
shape is given to water by the shape of the vessel that contains it, the breaking of all vessels provides 
that water with `absolute freedom'. Whereas, just as water, when deprived of a vessel will spread out 
into a puddle, so, too, will a totally isolated man explode, that explosion taking the form of a complete 
deculturalisation. 
Stanislaw Lem, A Perfect Vacuum 
Introduction 
Because it's Good Fun: 
Me toro as Mebengokre Social Philosophy 
You must bear in mind that 
the language-game is so to say 
something unpredictable. I mean: 
it is not based on grounds. It is 
not reasonable (or unreasonable). 
It is there - like our life 
Ludwig Wittgenstein, On Certainty 
This thesis is primarily about Mebengokre (Kayapö, a Northern Ge-speaking 
Indian people) ceremonies, called me toro. But this is not a work on the interpretation of 
ritual, at least not in the sense the expression usually takes in anthropological discourse 
nowadays. I do not intend to produce an interpretative account of the internal universe 
of meaning of the ceremonies I observed; rather, I want to emphasise the unfolding of 
the ceremonies in the way that, I think, they appear to the Mebengokre themselves - to 
take the me toro, the Mebengokre generic term for 'festival/ceremony/party', as a 
significant experience for people taking part in it. This, I contend, is a way of thinking, 
representing and acquiring a social state among them -a social philosophy in its own 
right, although not expressed by means of rational, discursive argument, but through 
dance, rhythm, music, and story-telling, to mention but a few expressive forms. In 
accordance with this idea, I will not analyse specialist interpretations of the symbols of 
ritual, but will strive to capture the distinctiveness that the experience of the me toro 
has for `common people', the anonymous - up to a point - organisers, participants, and 
audience of the ceremonies. I will, in sum, probe into the question that first puzzled me 
when I came to the Xikrin-Mebengokre village of Pvkatingrät, or `sandy beach', for my 
first fieldwork term: why the me toro? What is the importance of ceremonies for 
1 
people's lives? 1 
In a certain way, the questions that I then posed myself were akin to that asked 
by anthropologist Anthony Seeger (1987b) with respect to a very similar issue, and in 
relation to a very similar people: Why do the Suya sing? My question, if it were to be 
formulated as a single sentence, would be: Why do the Mebengokre (their self- 
denomination) spend so much time and energy organising such intricate and massive 
performances, to the point of devoting most of their everyday lives to it, directly or 
indirectly? As will become clear throughout my narrative, the terms of the question were 
themselves misplaced, and the awareness of such misplacement is a crucial element for 
the understanding I intend to build of the me Coro and their importance for the 
Mebengokre. 
After a couple of months, having become immersed in the ceremonial 
atmosphere of the Pykatingrot (Catete) village of the Xikrin-Mebengokre, it still 
astonished me by its remarkable liveliness. People would talk incessantly about me toro, 
and accomplish their daily jobs having it always in sight. Collective tasks2 were 
accomplished explicitly because of the ceremony; individual jobs were collectively 
done, by everybody concerned all at the same approximate time, because of the me toro. 
1 This is not to say, of course, that such `specialist' interpretations are not useful and worthy in themselves 
- see, for instance, the masterly ethnography of the Catete Xikrin, written by Lux Vidal (1977) at the 
end of 1960's. Vidal worked primarily with a single informant, Bemoti, a veritable Xikrin intellectual 
who, in that same period, was busying himself with the refashioning of the Catete Xikrin, then almost 
disappearing after the establishment of `peaceful' relations with Brazilian society. Vidal's 
ethnography shows the Xikrin from the point of view of one who not only possessed specialised 
knowledge much beyond that of the `common people', but who also shaped their society through that 
very same knowledge. Indeed, Bemoti was one of the only three elders left in the village at that time, 
and has been since then the main transmitter of knowledge, ceremonial and otherwise, to the new 
generations of Mebengokre who form that village. Thus, he is, for both reasons, probably the most 
credible interpreter of their tradition for that particular village and people. Nevertheless, I have other, 
theoretical reasons for not building my interpretation of Mebengokre me toro on specialised 
knowledge, as will become clear in this introduction. 
2 
The ceremony itself had become a daily routine in the literal sense for the village at 
large: day by day, at sunrise and sunset, people would dance for a short time, and eat 
something collectively at the ngobe, the men's house afterwards, before going home. 
True, in the beginning there wasn't much of an audience. There were fewer dancers, and 
they were dancing rather poorly. But with time the performance - and the audience - 
improved, and people commented lively about the ami aprä, the culminating point of the 
ceremony, the `real me toro' , when people would dance the whole day, when `all would 
dance': me toro means, literally, `all dancing'. 
These characteristics of the me toro were all the more remarkable because they 
went against all I would expect from a ritual as usually defined in anthropological 
theory, which determined the way I first tried to understand it. A ritual is something that 
by definition is not a part of daily life3. It is something set apart from the everyday 
world, performed in a sphere of its own, which it creates by its very performance. To be 
fair with ritual theory, or with those theorists who espouse a speech act theory of some 
sort4, the me toro were conspicuously performative, but the main characteristic of 
performance, in my view, was still this visceral connection with the routine of everyday 
existence. It thus made sense to me to talk of a ceremonial season, a time when 
ceremonies are performed in succession, which roughly coincides with the dry season in 
Southwest Amazon (May to October), but starting when rains have not altogether 
2By `collective' here I mean, tasks that are accomplished by people from different households, although 
not necessarily by all people from a given village, or from a given age-grade in the village. 
3 See for instance Stanley Tambiah's (1985: 128) definition of ritual as "... patterned and ordered 
sequences of words and acts, often expressed in multiple media, whose content and arrangement is 
characterised in varying degree by formality (conventionality), stereotype (rigidity), condensation 
(fusion), and redundancy (repetition). " While I would agree that me toro includes all these 
characteristics, I would nevertheless question their adequacy for the task of capturing the lived side of 
me toro, its experience as a living rite, in the words of Hocart (1952) - its relation to everyday 
existence. This dimension is effaced by the use of Tambiah's parameters, which seems to me to work 
toward understanding 'ritual' by isolating it from the actual experience of people. 
3 
finished, and continuing into the beginning of the next rainy season, so that ceremonies 
are performed in sequence for a lapse of time that goes beyond the dry season, although 
having the latter as its core. During this time, the me toro is the main preoccupation of 
the village at large, whose people would co-ordinate their individual efforts so that they 
could accomplish similar tasks at the same approximate time, in order that the me toro 
could happen (as it involves most people in a village, they must be all free, or relatively 
free, for it to occur). 
In the same way the `internal' dynamics of the me toro produces homogeneity, 
so its `external' unfolding produces performative homogeneity in the everyday of the 
people involved in it. Homogeneity of action is highly praised by the Mebengokre, being 
seen as a social value in itself. To do the same things as others do, simultaneously, is to 
enhance their identity as a single village and, in the end, as a single people. The 
significance of the performance of the same ceremonies goes yet further, to become a 
common `marker of identity' 5 for Mebengokre of different villages. In the same way, 
small differences between, say, ceremonies from the Xikrin Mebengokre and those of 
the Gorotire Mebengokre are used as `markers of identity' between the different sub- 
groups involved. As ceremonies require specific `kinds' of people to be performed, the 
performance of a given ceremony in a particular village is also used as an `identity' 
element, distinguishing that specific village (in relation to other Mebengokre villages) 
as `the one that performs such and such me toro. ' Such homogeneity was accomplished 
despite the strong emphasis on individual autonomy that likewise characterises 
I1 refer here primarily to Tambiah (1985). 
5 The reason why I use inverted commas here will become clear throughout the thesis, which focuses on 
what this `identity' might be. 
4 
Mebengokre social life as a whole6. 
The different me toro do not happen only during the dry season, or near to its 
timing: there is at least one me Coro that happens during the rainy season - the kw yry- 
kangö, or the manioc feast - and there were others in the past, like the puru me toro, 
when married people of different age-classes exchanged spouses (and which is not 
performed anymore, at least among the Xikrin, because of missionary influence). The 
ideal `ceremonial season' for the Mebengokre is, according to them, one where one nie 
toro ends just in time to do the core activities of daily life7 that allow them to be ready 
for another one! 
The 'ceremonial season' seems to have grown organically with the population 
growth of the Catete river Xikrin over the past thirty years. The anthropologist Lux 
Vidal, who has worked among the Catete river Xikrin from the 1960s on, has described 
(Vidal 1977) the sequence of ceremonies as lasting about three to four months every 
year. She has seen them in a time when Xikrin population was slowly recuperating after 
the contact, a time when most older people had died (there were only three mebenget, or 
elders, at the village at that time) and, in consequence, when most Xikrin feared that 
their ceremonial life was not going to survive. This period was one of a reconstruction of 
their rituals, many of which had not been performed in the several previous years, and 
consequently were not fully known by the younger generation. 
An anthropologist who visited the Xikrin just after their 'pacification' in 
1962/1963, Protasio Frikel, reported (Frikel 1968) that in those years, due to the 
6 It seems that this is the very special `paradox' of Amazonia as a whole - see Overing and Passes (2000) 
for a presentation of similar cases elsewhere in Amazonia. 
7Between the 'sunrise' and `sunset' me toro, people accomplish their daily activities: gardening, hunting 
fishing, chatting, etc. 
5 
population decrease following the contact, they had all but abandoned their ritual life. 
Vidal, in her turn, documented the revival of their ceremonies, together with the slow 
reconstruction of their lifestyle (the reconstruction of the atykbe, the traditional men's 
house at the borders of the village) and of their population (the return of almost all 
young Xikrin men, who had abandoned the village in its darker period). She tells that in 
1967 the Xikrin had performed a small aruanä ceremony, and in 1971, upon the 
reconstruction of their village, they performed a longer one, that lasted more than four 
months (Vidal 1977: 180). At that time, they did not perform specific naming 
ceremonies, but only those that, by their very generality, allowed one to confirm any 
kind of (gendered) name to be bestowed upon someone8. 
Since then, they have successfully performed most of their 'specialised' naming 
ceremonies. The highly intricate Bep-yry me toro, for instance, which confirms the 
names with the Bep- ceremonial prefix, was performed in 1988,1989, and 1991, and 
again during my first field trip in 1999. The Bekwynh-yry me ungrör, which Vidal 
reports in her book (1977: 181) as having been the object of several attempts at 
performance was also performed, as well as the Panh me toro. 'Non-specialised' me toro 
are also regularly performed. The result of these joint, sequential performances makes 
up the ceremonial season that I intend to describe in this work. One of the reasons 
81t must be remembered that only now, after nearly fifty years of severe depopulation, the Xikrin are 
again living in a large village, bound by reasons of contact with Brazilian society to make it their 
permanent abode. Nowadays, the Xikrin only retire en masse from the village to collect Brazil nuts, 
when they live in small huts scattered in a single clearing, or in nearby ones, in the forest. The whole 
situation is reminiscent of that of ancient Mebengokre villages like Pvkatoti, the first known 
Mebengokre village in the Xingü basin, reported to have 1500 to 3000 inhabitants, but which only 
lodged together as a whole population for the conducting of their massive ceremonies (Posey 1979). 
In the same vein, present-day Xikrin villages stretch this ceremonial season to (ideally, at least) include 
almost the whole time the village is inhabited by its population, that is, most of the year. In a certain 
way, the ceremonial season is so stretched because they can count on material means to keep such a 
long season, that is, because they can count on the (meagre) monthly payment that they get from 
CVRD mining company, and with the later's `goodwill' towards the Xikrin , materialised in the form 
of suplements of bread, soft drinks, etc, which the Xikrin enjoy so much. 
6 
forwarded by the Xikrin for their present profligate ceremonial life is that now there are 
sufficient people to perform them. Ceremonial societies like the apieti (large armadillo) 
and the äk're ('bird', or more specifically, bird of prey - probably a kind of falcon) were 
again formed; kukrädjä ceremonial rights are again proliferating around the village, the 
acting out of which introduces difference within the homogeneity created by the 
(intense) wearing of (similar) ceremonial garments. Many children bearing names with 
the same ceremonial prefix are celebrated at the corresponding me toro; and so on. 
Nowadays the Xikrin perform their `ceremonial season' for some nine months each year. 
There are four types of me toro: naming ceremonies, which are either male or 
female (although some, coupled ceremonies9 may celebrate different-sex names); life- 
cycle ceremonies; annual cycle ceremonies; and ceremonies `adopted' from other 
peoples. In the first case, to mention just a few, there is the bep-yry me toro 10 for male 
bearers of names with the bep- prefix; and the memybiok, the `painted men' party, when 
male names with all ceremonial prefixes can be celebrated. There is the takäk-nhäk 
ceremony, different from others of this category, which can confirm both male (takäk-) 
and female (nhäk-) names. There is also the mereremei, which means literally 
`good/beautiful people', a name that refers to those who are celebrated in a naming me 
toro, and which can be applied in principle to all naming ceremonies. However, it is 
used most commonly to designate the female ceremony when all female names with 
9 That is, me toro that are celebrated as integral parts of other me toro, or together with them. The akro 
ka'oi, for instance, is part of the bev-vrv me toro, as is the panh me toro. Bep-vr-i" me toro is celebrated 
together with me kutop, and so on. The `coupling' of several me toro becomes, in its wider enactment, 
what I call here a ceremonial season. 
10 In other Mebengokre groups, this ceremony is called Benp- r. y me toro, although the prefix in itself 
remains bep- for personal names. 
7 
ceremonial prefixes can be celebrated. 11 
In the second case, that of life-cycle ceremonies, there are - again, to mention 
only some of the variegated Xikrin ceremonial repertoire- the mekukatyk and, again the 
memybiök male ceremonies, both of which are for the menörönyre (unmarried men, who 
sleep in the men's house12). There is also the mekutop ceremony, which marks the 
passage to (male) adulthood. Annual cycle ceremonies are performed every year 
(different from the others, to be performed only when there are children enough of the 
right age to be celebrated), the main ones being the kwyry-kango 13, performed when the 
manioc tubers are ripe, and the ngöre kam me toro 14, when the whole village moves to 
a spot on the so-called dry river15 to fish collectively with timbo vine's juice. Among 
the `adopted' ceremonies are the Aruanä mask ceremony (from the Karajä), the kwyry- 
kangö (from the Juruna), and the ceremony of the 19th of April, Brazilian Indian day. 
As will be seen throughout this work, even the ceremonies that are seen (by the 
external observer) as part of their `cultural heritage', are understood by the Mebengokre 
themselves as acquired from outside their own society. Even the songs sung on such 
occasions relate to the events involving the `coming' of them to their society, a 
`centripetal' tendency that has already been noted for them by Viveiros de Castro as 
opposite to that `centrifugal' one of their Tupi-speaking neighbours, the Arawete 
11 This at least is the use that people in both villages where I worked gave to the denomination; I don't 
know whether this is the case in other Mebengokre villages. 
12 Me-nör(O)-nv-re: `Those who sleep in a new way'. When boys become menörönyre, they begin to 
sleep in the men's house, remaining there until they get married and move to their wive's house. 
13 kit, I, rv-kangb : `manioc juice' . Kvti'yi1v 
is the term for sour manioc, whereas kwvrvv, djw_vnh is the name 
for the sweet. non-poisonous species. In order to make manioc meal, the poisonous juice (kangb ) has 
to be squeezed away. 
14 Ngbre kam nie torn : 'nre torn of the place of the small water'. 
15 This is not the Catete river, which is too large, but another, smaller river, which becomes almost dry 
during the apex of the dry season, allowing for this kind of fishing technique to be deployed. 
8 
(Viveiros de Castro: 1992). 
Although people may talk about the different `kinds' of me toro, on a certain 
level of their actual practice they are fused into one broad category, that of me toro or 
me kot to 16. The different me toro may be held in succession and actually complement 
each other. Such is the case of the me bi'ok 17 and the mekutop 18 both performed in 
succession as part of the initiation of young men: the me bi'ök is meant for the age- 
grades of the menörönyre-to-be, and the mekutop for the recently married men. Both are 
the ceremonies that integrate these two categories of young males to their new 
`positions' within the life-cycle. In Catete in 1999 (and again in the next season, in year 
2000), other, shorter ceremonies were also performed during this `initiation complex', 
including the ngöre kam me toro, the fishing ceremony, which was an integral part of the 
initiation of the young men. Me toro thus pertains both to the general and the particular, 
the individual ceremony and the continuous, interlacing stream of ceremonies unfolding 
throughout the year. In this broadest sense, me toro can be used to designate what I'm 
calling here the ceremonial season and the whole festive atmosphere implied by it, as 
when one shows, opening one's arms as to encompass the whole of the ceremonial 
apparatus at the men's house, the painted men and/or women, the festive mood of the 
village at large, saying: `this is me toro ` 
Me toro is also both the culminating point of a ceremony, the all-day-long 
performance, called more specifically ami apra; 19 and the integral totality, taking 
16 Me kot t6 : to dance all together'. 
17 Me bi'bk : `Those who are painted'. 
18 Mekutop is the name of a `helmet' made of bee's wax, worn by the young men undergoing this 
ceremony. 
19 People sometimes refer to the ami aprd as `me toro proper', or me toro djwynh. This categorisation is 
not held in opposition to the category kaigo, or 'false', `counterfactual', but to designate the point 
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months to complete. It is the particular, concrete dance in an ami aprä (with the row of 
dancers going either around the circular plaza or crossing it from house to house, or 
going from the centre towards specific houses and back) and also the whole ritual event 
being celebrated (initiation, naming, etc). The 'wider' significations of the term may be 
broken into pieces that become elements of the whole ceremonial `complex' being 
performed, and those elements themselves are me Coro . 
People may all choose to dance 
(me toro) a particular 'step' -a specific way of dancing - that has been taken from 
another ceremony, just because it is metx, 'beautiful/good'. Among the Djudjeko 
village's younger men, for instance, the kwyry-kangö has been highly appreciated in the 
past two years (1999-2000), and thus they usually dance `steps' of this me toro at least 
once during the ami aprä of any ceremony. Women in both villages are also particularly 
fond of the okapä 'step' (also from kwyry-kango -a me toro that has been recently 
introduced from the Xingu Kayapö, and thus a certain novelty) and would dance it 
whenever they could. 
In this way, any particular me toro (in the wider sense) being performed 
contains a formal structure that comprises all its prescribed phases (each of them 
individual me toro themselves), but whose performance involves as well recourse to a 
wider repertoire of 'elemental' me toro. Both the fragment and the whole, me toro in its 
wider meaning is a replication of me toro in its 'elemental' signification, to become an 
aggregation of pieces performed within the formal structure, within its empty spaces, so 
to speak. 
when nre taro unfolds as a whole, encompassing the whole village, the whole day. During the other 
days, me toro is one activity among others, performed at sunrise and sunset, for about half an hour 
each time. During ami aprä, me toro is the sole activity of the village. Longer me toro can have more 
than one ami aprä. 
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This is so, the Mebengokre say, because what really matters in me toro is that, 
when it is performed in this way, it becomes a vehicle for the creation of joy. This joyful 
aspect is the emphasis that the Mebengokre usually place on me toro when asked about 
why they are so prone to perform it: it is something whose explicit finality is to create a 
joyous environment among people. This is not to say that me toro is not also seen as 
celebrating the specific event, such as the confirmation of `good/beautiful' names 
previously bestowed upon children. Knowledge of the material event that generates the 
ceremony is obviously widespread, but not the knowledge of the intricate ceremonies 
themselves, which are a matter for specialisation. It is generally the case that many 
people, if not most of them, do not know the specifics of the ceremony being performed. 
If there is something widely known and agreed upon about me toro, though, it is that it 
makes all the people joyful. 
It is this stress upon the ludic, the pleasurable side of me toro, that I want to 
focus upon in this work, as well as the stress upon the need to get everybody into a 
joyful mood. As it will become clear throughout this work, this is an important feature of 
Mebengokre ceremonies. Although they are usually only performed by some of the 
people, and not by every person in a given village, and are for the benefit of some people 
only (those celebrated in them), it is expected that everyone should be `contaminated' by 
the joyful disposition they bring about. As will be seen, this is an essential characteristic 
of the Mebengokre notion of `society' and of `the social state'. 
Ceremonies of different `kinds' may be understood as elements of a 
performative complex, up to the point of each having a similar internal organisation to 
the next, and this holds for even the more recently `adopted' ones. Most of them involve 
one, or several, kinds of people who dance for other kind(s) of people, who are being 
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`celebrated' by the dancing (and through the me toro as a whole). And they all relate to 
everyday life in the same way. I was constantly told that the performers, and those for 
whom they perform, all furnish a frame of reference for core everyday activities, in the 
sense that they provide a `rhythmic frame', not only for the ceremony itself but also for 
the performance of joint social activities related to the everyday. Ritual is embedded in 
everyday life, as the British anthropologist Arthur M. Hocart has put it (Hocart 1952). 
This particular characteristic, I contend, is essential for the understanding of me toro in 
relation to - and as part of - people's lives. 
The point I wish to make here is very much a methodological one, pertaining to 
the significance of me toro for the people participating in it. Basically, for every single 
person in a given village and for many from other villages as well (as there is an 
interchange of people between villages in the attendance of specific me toro ) the me 
toro can only be understood in its relation to everyday life. I make this point to 
counterpoise approaches to what is commonly called `ritual' in anthropological theory, 
which usually centre on the relation between something called `symbols' and something 
else called `social practice' - as if `symbolization' at the start were something separated 
from social practice. 
To defend my counterpoising stance, I would like to relay to the reader all those 
amused faces and funny expressions I usually got from my Mebengokre friends when I 
ventured to ask them about the `meaning' of specific me toro, or the `reason' for them to 
be performed. They usually implied, by the most varied - and laughable - means, that 
the question in itself was misplaced. Their different reactions could be summed up in the 
expression that a friend of mine used to answer me, whose meaning would be roughly 
translated into English as something like `bollocks, it doesn't mean a bloody thing! ' 
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Other answers would, more politely, convey that it was performed `because it is 
good/beautiful/enjoyable': in sum, because it is good fun20. 
This, I think, is expressive in itself of people's attitudes towards me toro, and 
deserves a better understanding from the anthropologist's part. The Ge-speaking peoples 
in general (and also the Bororo) have always had their ceremonial lifes analysed through 
an optics that privileged the meaning of rituals in relation to the all-pervasive dualistic 
discourse that is the hallmark of such peoples within Amazonian ethnology. Fuelled by 
structuralist approaches21, these analyses have made massive contributions to the 
understanding of Ge-Bororo social life, from the abstract point of view of their 
institutional life and the symbolic meanings associated with them22, - but the issue of 
how people themselves actually live these `rituals', how they relate to them, has been, I 
believe, rather neglected. 
The Mebengokre, as the Ge- and Bororo-speaking peoples as a whole, are 
(justly) famous for their `structural thinking', being prone to always display a dualistic 
reasoning in all matters concerning social life in general. Nevertheless this `structural' 
propensity is a `surface' phenomenon, of which they are entirely aware, bearing little 
resemblance to Levi-Strauss' notion of a `deep', unconscious structure underlying 
(human) thought. In fact, the Mebengokre me toro, the way it is lived by people, has 
little to do with the interplay of dual oppositions, that is, it has little to do with the 
`meaning' ascribed to them by anthropologists (and, arguably, by Mebengokre 
20 See Driessen (1997) on the irony of anthropology taking seriously what the `natives' mean as play. 
21One must remember here that the Ge and Bororo were the initial source of inspiration for Levi-Strauss 
(1952) in the development of the earlier forms of structuralism. 
22 Scc, for instance, Melatti (1978) and Carneiro da Cunha (1978) on the Kraho, Viertler (1991) and J. C. 
Crocker (1985) on the Bororo, Turner (1966) and Vidal (1978) on the Mebengokre . 
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ceremonial specialists, when they are imposed upon to interpret them for the sake of the 
anthropologist). This practice, on the part of anthropologists, leaves one with the 
impression that me toro is an intellectual device, that is `used' as a way to produce 
meanings, thoughts. But nothing is farther from the Mebengokre view of me toro, as 
will be shown in this work. An awareness of the `living' aspects of me toro could thus 
disclose not only new, hidden (for the anthropologist, at least) dimensions of 
Mebengokre ritual life (and their social life in general), but also serve to lighten the 
over-emphasis on `meaning' in most anthropological approaches to `ritual', which 
misinterpret the reality of `ritual' as a `meaning-creative' device. 
And this is no small matter. The Sri Lankan anthropologist Stanley Tambiah, in 
his approach to ritual analysis (Tambiah 1985), makes a distinction between a formal 
sphere of the ceremonies per se and the individual interests of participants, the latter 
affecting matters related to attendance, economic outlay, etc. He thus sees ritual as 
comprising a bi-partition between formal aspects and those other aspects concerning the 
private interests of people, which are somewhat related to the ritual. This presupposes a 
partition between a `supra-individual' sphere of ritual `interest' and the sphere of 
individual interests, the later being the link between ritual and the `everyday life' of 
private, parochial interests. As I- and, I think, also the Mebengokre - see it, the me 
toro's main characteristic as lived experience is the direct link between ritual and the 
core of everyday life, the unmediated relationship between me toro and what we would 
call economic, political, productive matters. For the Mebengokre, I contend, there is, at 
the level of lived experience, no clear-cut, formal distinction between `ritual' and 
`private/individual' affairs, the same way as there is no clear-cut, formal distinction 
between these 'ceremonies' and the `economic', `political', `productive' spheres of life. 
A ceremony may be marked as distinct from -ordinary, everyday events', as Tambiah 
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puts it (Tambiah 1985: 126), but at the same time be part of the flux of the everyday, in 
fact generating it through its unfolding. As such, the me toro is a `life-giving tool' in the 
sense that Hocart attributes: it creates everyday life (Hocart 1952). This understanding of 
me toro is part of a Mebengokre theory of social action, one concerned with the 
inducement of social agency in people who are otherwise not bound by `communal' 
links that would restrict their individual autonomy. 
The me toro is performed because the ancestors, the `old people', made it, and 
that suffices to explain its existence and persistence. The me tumre23, or tradition, as the 
Mebengokre say in Portuguese (`tradigdo' ), incarnates the way the Mebengokre should 
socially be, and through ritual they can acquire this social state. This implies a notion of 
`social' that is different from that usual in anthropological theory. It is a notion that 
involves the creation of the social state, instead of assuming its ever-static presence - and 
that creation is out of different stuff than those usually considered by anthropological 
theory. 
Anthropologists have usually been baffled by how little Mebengokre (and 
other Ge) ceremonies are `metaphysical', in the sense that they do not seem to imply an 
extra-physical, para-mundane world of spirits and supra-normal beings, who would 
come into contact with `this world' through the ritual itself. Me toro are said to be 
performed only because `it is like it should be', or in a slightly more elaborated way, 
because `it is the way of the old' , me tumre. True, there is a metaphysics involved in the 
ceremonies, through references to myth that is known by anybody, as well as the more 
elaborate exegesis that points to less widely known mythical (and symbolical, in the 
more general sense) connections. But above all ceremonies are performed because they 
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should be, and that suffices for the Mebengokre. Me Coro `talks' - quite literally, as will 
be seen, about the way people should be, and in doing so, through its very performance, 
people act as they should - and things are as they should be, at least ideally. A paragon 
of the ilocutionary act, the me toro creates the way people should be: it (re)creates the 
state of things as they were for the me tumre , and of which they are said to 
be the 
expression. 
This is not to say that me toro actually 'makes things as they should be', a 
somewhat utopian idea: but it does provide the social opportunity for accomplishing it. 
Whether it 'succeeds' (and I am using here a category the Mebengokre themselves 
deploy, that of a me toro 'working' towards the creation of the situation it proclaims) or 
not in concrete settings, to create a social state, is another matter, and the history of the 
Mebengokre, full of village splits (many of them happening during a me toro, or related 
to one) shows how difficult it is, in practice, to attain such ideal state24. Me toro in itself 
is less dependent on 'tradition' to be performed than on individual action, and - as with 
almost everything involving a collective, co-ordinated effort among the Mebengokre - it 
needs someone to 'trigger' it, to arouse people to the performance and the extensive 
preparations for it, which, up to a point, tends to involve the whole of their daily 
existence. Me toro also 'speaks' literally about creating social action, and quite literally 
as well, induces people to action. This is an important aspect of Mebengokre political 
theory, which is one that deals with the inducement of agency conductive to sociality in 
otherwise autonomous people, and with the creation of joy (as well as the creation and 
management of other emotions and sentimental dispositions) in all those individual 
3 Me tunire: 'Old things', 'things of old'. Another form commonly used, me tum jarenh, means `to tell 
things of old', or `things of old that are told', that is, transmitted through discourse. 
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people living together. Me toro are about transforming a moral understanding of how 
one should relate to specific others in shared agency: it expresses, and is about, an ethic 
and an aesthetic of conviviality. 
When I say the me Coro creates a social state I mean that, although they 
constitute in themselves `moments of exception' in the usual chores of daily life, and as 
such are anxiously yearned for by everybody, on another plane of understanding they 
come to be conceived of as pertaining to everyday life. This in the sense that the very 
expectation of people, that leads to their promoting the string of ceremonies that fill the 
annual cycle (linked to the annual cycle of other, non-ceremonial activities) makes 
ceremonies intertwined with the everyday. First of all this is the expected outcome of 
some of them, but also they are responsible for generating other sets of activities. The 
me toro is a way of provoking and organising autonomous, independent people in 
accomplishing activities together, and in accomplishing individual activities to co- 
ordinate with others. 
This inducement of social agency, entailing the co-ordination of people's 
efforts is achieved through the use of vocal forms, directed to an audience 'at large' 
composed ideally by the entire village. Vocal forms - and expressive forms in general, 
including here the non-vocal ones, of body painting, corporeal adornment, etc - are seen 
as 'working' towards specific ends. A common expression to designate a tentative vocal 
performance, aini ä ngrere akre, 'to experiment/measure the ngrere'25, means trying to 
24 See Overing & Passes (2000) for a comprehensive overview of processes through which such social 
states are created, as well as the difficulty in attaining them, among other Indigenous peoples 
throughout Amazonia. 
25 The same expression is sometimes translated as `to teach the ngrere'. In the first sense it is also used, 
for example, to describe the action of checking if a cupful of water will be enough for all drinking 
from it to be satisfied. There is a relation here with the conception the Mebengokre hold of music 
'coming out' of a singer to 'till' his/her listeners. 
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move people to some end by means of the ngrere. This movement is made through the 
creation and management of emotional and sentimental states more generally, so that 
people themselves feel inclined to co-operate. Indeed, great stress is put on the fact that 
these vocal forms are seductive and not imposed. The Mebengokre promptly react in a 
rather negative fashion to any attempt at ordering or imposing. 
There are several different vocal forms (ngrere or songs, ben or formal, 
stylised oratory; formal, stylised wailing; and `cries', or me ungrör) that are used as 
tools for such ends. All of them differ in some way from kaben, or everyday, common, 
unmarked speaking. Those forms have in common the fact that they are directed towards 
a wider audience, that is, towards people that are not necessarily related to the speaker. 
The presence of a wider audience is the equivalent, in the realm of discourse, to the 
concrete situation of a Mebengokre (and other Ge and Bororo) village. Different from 
most Amazonian villages, it comprises `kin' as well as `non-kin' (or `kin-like', as the 
Mebengokre themselves would put it), that is, they comprise `known' as well as 
`unknown' people. To live in the same place with non-related people, with people one 
has not been brought up with, that is, people with whom one has no intimacy, is a 
concrete problem for the Mebengokre, and their social theory elaborates extensively 
upon it, through me toro and through the exercising of vocal forms in other contexts, 
like the one an external observer would call the `political' context. 
For the Mebengokre, the individuality of people - or, more precisely, that of an 
`intimate unit' made up by those who have the closest contact with each other, having 
been raised together (i. e., the familial group) - is a given in a certain way, as it is 
focused upon nurturance and the sharing of good feelings towards each other. This is 
something which usually obtains, in general, among people sharing the same house (or 
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cluster of houses). Larger `gatherings' of people, on the other hand, have to be 
continuously built through ongoing individual action. It is thought that people actually 
have to be moved to act, and the most pronounced (or the most displayed, at any rate) of 
a leader's abilities is to induce people to action. Vocal forms (and expressive forms as a 
whole) are seen by the Mebengokre as tools for such task: their theory of language and 
expression, if we can admit such theoretical concerns on their part, would be a theory on 
the inducement of social agency in people, to be closely allied to their building of `the 
social state'. 
The issue here is primarily one involving the assembling and co-ordination of 
people - who are different from one another - for the accomplishment of collective tasks 
(and for their individual accomplishment of other tasks). This involves more than the 
`material' sphere in the economic sense, being closer to the Wittgensteinian notion of a 
`form of life', as elaborated upon by the Swedish philosopher J. Meloe (1988,1988b): a 
production of conceptions that is at the same time a material production of life, and vice- 
versa. A production with its own peculiar logic, ethics and aesthetics, a production of 
things and of meanings, and above all a production of very different things and 
meanings, indeed from those we usually associate with productive activities, because 
these things are primarily emotions and sentiments, and their meanings relate not to 
individual psychologies, but to the fruitful relationship with 'others'. The ideas the 
Mebengokre might have with regard to something we could call "social' or `society' 
have to do with the managing of emotion and sentiment, which are thus social matters, 
rather than individual ones. Their social philosophy is a social psychology. 
The direct outcome of the me toro in this perspective is neither profit nor 
(unqualified) consumption. Rather, it is festive consumption. There is a wider 
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implication here, and is that me toro must generate the right kind of feelings and 
sentiments to be associated with it. Ceremonies `talk' about this consumption and such 
generation, that is, about what kind of consumption, and what type of sentiments, are to 
be involved in me toro, and thus they encourage people to produce, to consume, and to 
feel in specific ways - and, in the more general way, to relate to each other in specific 
ways, something that is seen as akin to having specific emotional dispositions towards 
people. These ways are seen as images, fac-similes or reflections, of the way smaller, 
`kin-based' groups of people (i. e., in the very special sense Mebengokre attribute to 
relations between relatives, as a `intimate' continuum involving different individuals in a 
nuclear family) live together. The me toro may be seen as an effort to replicate (in a 
sense), at a wider level, the sociality of people that are very closely related, thus creating 
a social relationship between people that are not related (or are poorly related) 
otherwise. 
Again, this is accomplished through the creation and management of emotional 
(and sentimental in general) states, that result in the bonding of people that are otherwise 
not related. In this way, Mebengokre social organisation, as seen by itself, is not 
forthcoming from groups but from the creation of suitable emotions. At the same time, 
their `political structure' is not one of supra-familial structures proper, but one of fractal 
replications, at wider levels, of emotional dispositions similar to those present in familial 
settings. `Society' for the Mebengokre would thus be a whole whose constituent parts 
bear to it a relation of similarity: it is, on a wider scale, similar to what the familial group 
is to those that are part of it. 
All these considerations bear a direct relation to the interpretative task itself. 
Far from stressing a meaning `behind the thing in itself, hidden in some way and 
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therefore subject to an interpretation that rejects its `superficial' meaning in benefit of a 
`deeper meaning', the me toro's meaning is explicit and evident: it creates sociality 
though the engendering of certain emotions, triggered by the use of specific vocal, and 
other expressive forms, which are managed according to the models put forward by the 
ceremonies. The Mebengokre are explicit on this point, which I believe that some 
previous anthropologists have only failed to see due to the theoretical bias informing 
their approaches26. What I intend here is not to analyse or to understand me toro's 
`hidden meanings', be they structural principles or otherwise: it is to understand the 
ways people see and experience them; to express in a meaningful way for us 
anthropologists the importance the Mebengokre themselves accord to it in their lives. 
And that means much. The Mebengokre usually refer to me toro when they 
want to express to foreign people how they live. My description of the `ceremonial 
season' intends mainly to convey why they do so. It is a description of the ways 
ceremonies relate to the everyday, how they are `life-giving' for the Mebengokre. I 
would like to contrast this characterisation of ritual by Hocart (as `living' rites, opposed 
to `fossilised' ones like those found in the books written by commentators of ancient 
rites performed by long-dead peoples) to Weber's comment on the great religions27 , 
that once they have formed their distinctive perspective, they are subject to a historical 
process of rationalisation and systematisation by religious specialists, both in terms of 
26This is quite evident, for instance, in the work of Giannini (1991), who did her fieldwork in one of the 
villages where I did mine (some ten years earlier). Her interpretation of the Xikrin naming ceremonies 
takiik-nhäk (performed together, the first for male bearers of names with takak ceremonial prefix, and 
the latter for female bearers of nhäk - prefixed names) stresses connections between symbolic aspects 
supposedly present in the ceremonies, resulting in the conclusion that the Xikrin human and social 
identity is obtained by means of an identification between humans and birds (p. 139) -a notion that 
highly amused my Xikrin friends when I was able explain it to them. Part of the problem might be 
that the author in question approached the me toro as a "... privileged expression of the way the Xikrin 
build their cosmovision" (p. 106, my translation), thus taking me toro only as a communicative 
device, while the Mebengokre themselves have a different notion of what a me toro is supposed to be 
and to build. 
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doctrine and practice. How about the `small religions', where no elite exists and where 
the `religious specialists' are not in a position detached from `the mass of believers"? In 
this context, the idea of a `living rite' is especially appealing. Just how is it, to `live' a 
rite? It is this special `quality' that I intend to describe. Ge and Bororo peoples are well- 
known by the explicit importance accorded to dualistic oppositions in their ritual life and 
otherwise. Less attention, though, has been given to the fact that this importance is a 
'surface' element, not a 'deep structure' as structuralists would have it - and this is 
particularly interesting if one considers that the Ge were among those that furnished the 
model for Levi-Strauss' structuralist theory. It is my argument that such oppositions, at 
least among the Mebengokre, are the expression of, and the vehicle for, a particular 
social philosophy, comprising a particular ethics, and a specific aesthetics of 
conviviality. This ethics and aesthetics, as well as the ways they are concretely 
produced, are what I want to disclose in this work: a Mebengokre notion of society, and 
how they strive to acquire it. 
This work will thus have as its thread the description of some elements, or 
aspects, related to the 1999's ceremonial season in Pykatingrot, or Catete, Xikrin 
village. The chapters will deal with particular elements or situations presented during the 
months it lasted, and will introduce discussions relevant to the central aim of the work. 
Initially I will set up the problem, by means of a description of the villages where my 
fieldwork was carried out, and by reviewing the recent history of the Mebengokre 
villages more generally, and of Xikrin ones in particular. Against such a background, I 
will more importantly consider the very idea of a Mebengokre social organisation, 
unfolding as well what I consider to be waywardness in the approach to the issue put 
27 See Tambiah (1990, p. 153) for an appraisal of this point. 
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forward by previous ethnographers of Ge societies. 
As I will argue, any notion of Mebengokre social organisation must take into 
consideration what I call the factional tendency of their society28, the way new villages 
are created out of previous ones, in a process set by internal strife. The way the 
Mebengokre usually represent their villages is an ideal model, the very acquisition of 
which, when attempted, brings the village to the verge of a split. This is because it is 
based on too large a populational contingent29, which has little chance of attaining the 
social quality required by the Mebengokre as an essential aspect of their ethical 
philosophy and what they would view, in our terms, as ethical practice, that is, of their 
ways of leading a good life. 
After setting the parameters of the questions that are, I contend, the relevant 
ones for Mebengokre social philosophy (or social psychology), I will move on to 
showing how they cope with them, both in discourse and practice. I will do this, as 
stated before, by depicting the ceremonial season that I witnessed in the Pykatingrät 
village in 1999. The description itself is intended as a contribution to the ethnography of 
Mebengokre (and Ge at large) ceremonial life. Although descriptions of specific 
Mebengokre ceremonies are by no means rare30, no one to my knowledge has ever 
written about the intertwining of individual ceremonies in a single, continuous flux, 
something that I am calling here the ceremonial season. This may be due to different 
factors, among them the fact that, up to recent times, many Mebengokre villages have 
28 See, for instance, the importance accorded by Maybury-Lewis (1967: 304) to factionalism among the 
Ge-speaking Shavante, proposing that it is "... a fundamental fact of Shavante life, on a par with, and 
independent of, any dualistic ideology". 
29 There is more than simply a large number of people involved in this qualification, as will become clear 
in the following chapters. 
30 Sec, for instance, Vidal 1972,1977 and Giannini 1991 for the Xikrin; Lea 1986 and Verswijver 1982, 
for the Mekragnotic Turner 1976 and Banner 1978 for the Gorotire 
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not had the opportunity - either by not having enough of a population or material 
resources - to develop a full ceremonial life, restricting it to a few short ceremonies 
every year, or even to no ceremony at all for more than one, sometimes for several 
years. As will be seen, the same happened to the Pykatingrot village during the last 40 
years. From a pitiful situation when they all but completely abandoned any project of 
having a ceremonial life - in post-contact time, when their population had dropped to 
less than a hundred people, and with the guidance of only three elders - they manage the 
performance of short, generic naming ceremonies, and then the organisation of massive, 
months-long specific naming ceremonies, which are themselves part of full initiation 
cycles. During this period, the population in the village has risen well above 700 
people, and another village has split from it, having established itself 18 km. away from 
it. Also, the Xikrin could count upon some material `help' from CVRD, the mining 
company that explores the largest iron ore open-air mine in the world, within Xikrin 
traditional territory. This `help' makes the Xikrin `better off' than most other 
Mebengokre groups, facilitating the organisation of such massive ceremonies. Another 
reason I can think of for other researchers not having described what I call here 
Mebengokre ceremonial season is the fact that, although generally with long fieldwork 
experience, most of them seem to have spent only several short periods in the villages 
they researched into, while I have myslelf endeavoured to spend longer periods with the 
Xikrin, even though the sum total of my fieldwork time, some nine to ten months 
between 1999 and 2000 (I spent shorter periods with them since 1996, both with the 
Catete Xikrin and in Pykany and A'ykre villages), is less than that of some other 
researchers. 
Besides that, I intend to use the description of Mebengokre ceremonies as a 
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means to access what I am calling here Mebengokre social philosophy. As will become 
clear throughout this work, this is not a philosophy in the discursive, argumentative way 
we usually consider the term. Nevertheless, wisdom is the stuff it is made of; it reflects 
upon it, it transmits it, and it promotes it in the most general way, being thus entitled to 
be called a philosophy, an `amity for wisdom', in its own right. The ways it is expressed 
are connected to dance, rhythm, music, (body) painting - and also some kinds of 
discursive forms, to mention just a few of its expressive means. 
This task will be accomplished by introducing data related to aspects of it that 
will be interpreted in connection to other areas of Mebengokre social life and thought. 
Thus, the description of ceremonial hunting is a chapter that will introduce the reader to 
the evening talk of one of the ceremonial specialists who, in a very significant way, 
praised the next me toro for the younger men present. This will be the basis for 
considerations relating to the character of Mebengokre' s `teaching', which, I will argue, 
is not what we would call pedagogic or informative, but seductive, in the sense that it 
intends to `win people over' to performing a given me toro, by describing the niceties of 
it and enticing people to perform it. As will be seen, the main `argument' used by the 
speaker is the promise of joy, of pleasure. Although people do `learn' (in the Western 
sense of information/knowledge being transmitted from one person to another), this 
learning is accomplished by `filling' people (and I suspect this would be a quite literal 
statement for the Mebengokre') with joy, i. e., by means of the arousal and the 
channelling of sentiments toward the end of accomplishing a collective endeavour. 
Another aspect of ceremonies to be analysed is the complex of ideas and 
practices regarding a Mebengokre theory of `value' and `exchange' - which I prefer to 
call give-and-get, for reasons that will become clear throughout this work - that springs 
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from me toro itself and is essential to the understanding of their notion of `the social 
state'. I will argue in this chapter that, although exchange is what `objectively' obtains in 
transactions between people outside the most intimate familial relations - that is, outside 
the `intimate unit' mentioned before - it cannot be understood as such, but as actions 
performed with the explicit intention of being `sharing-like', or fac-similes of the 
sharing relationship characteristic of this `intimate unit'. This characteristic is essential, 
as noted above, to understand the quality of such relationships as a basis for their social 
life, because the Mebengokre, I contend, do not situate their social philosophy either 
with the `intimate unit' or upon impersonal, economic-like, `public' transactions, but in 
transactions that, although not to be confused with those present in the scope of the more 
intimate `intimate unit', are nevertheless suitable, acceptable fac-similes of these latter. 
Another aspect of ceremonies that will be analysed will be that of language as a 
tool for agency, which will be done by means of a description of the ben `ceremonial' 
discourse. I will then endeavour to relate it to Mebengokre `political' discourse31 and to 
conceptions of language in general (ben is used both for the highly stylised ceremonial 
vocal form, and to describe `political' speech directed towards an audience, mainly at 
the men's house). I will argue that its main characteristic, that which defines it as 
comprising what a Western-biased approach would classify as different kinds of 
discourse, is the fact that it is directed towards an audience. The notion of an audience, 
which will be introduced early in the description of me toro, is central for the 
understanding of Mebengokre society. As I will argue, it implies the presence, in any 
given village, of people to whom one's relationship is that of a performer to an audience. 
31 Again, such definitions cannot be applied to the Mebengokre without severe revision. This will be 
accomplished in this chapter, where I endeavour to show the reasons for the inadequacy of the 
distinction between the `political' and the 'ceremonial' . 
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This quality, of `people at large' to whom one is not necessarily connected in 
any other way, is present throughout the whole of Mebengokre social life: one performs 
in a ceremony in order that people at large may see one; one uses relationship 
terminology in order that people at large may see one doing so; one displays one's social 
qualities - like unselfishness, generosity, or stillness - in order for people at large to see 
it. Far from being burdened with Western-based notions that value such display 
negatively (one thinks here of the idea of hypocrisy), such audience-oriented behaviour 
is an essential trait of Mebengokre sociality: to show oneself aesthetically to others at 
large is to act in a virtuous, social way, according to Mebengokre understanding of the 
term. 
The ceremonial season will have its ethnography interrupted once more to 
allow for a description of Mebengokre ways of using relationship terms to establish 
relations to people. The issue of the `nature' and character of Mebengokre kinship - as 
well as that of other Ge-speaking peoples - has been a controversial one since its 
inception. Although the initial studies, made by T. Turner and by J. Bamberger in the 
1960's (Turner 1966; Bamberger 1974), drew a picture of a kindred-based social 
organisation, with the corresponding absence of unilineal descent structures, in line with 
the general approach adopted by other members of the Harvard-Museu Nacional 
research project32, other studies have characterised the Mebengokre as possessing a sort 
of `descent system' based on the transmission of names and ceremonial prerogatives 
32This project, realised in close cooperation between the two institutions, promoted the comparative 
research into several Ge-speaking societies of Central Brazil, and also the Bororo. Carried on both by 
American and Brazilian anthropologists, its research was a landmark in Ge studies, setting the 
parameters of understanding for Ge- and Bororo-speaking societies up to the present day. Its main 
inspirations were Levi-Strauss' structuralism and Needham's review of it (at the theoretical level) and 
the ongoing revision of descent theory carried out by anthropologists working in Melanesia. See 
Maybury-Lewis 1979 for a comprehensive volume with contributions of all members of the research 
team. 
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within a matri-line33 -something that had not been entirely strange even to previous 
researchers engaged in the comparative research of the Harvard-Museu Nacional 
project34. 
As I will argue in this work, the discussion itself is misplaced, and I believe this 
is due to the theoretical bias informing its background, and this, I think, in at least two 
ways. Firstly, it allows for a confusion between analytical and substantive concepts, 
whereby the analytic categories, initially used as tools for the understanding of social 
situations, were incorporated into the discussion as facets of the social world studied, 
being taken afterwards as such. Secondly, it uses views of `kinship' and `society' that 
are not relevant to the understanding of what actually goes on in everyday life. I will in 
this chapter attempt to sort out a genealogy of the confusion stated in the first point 
above, in order to tackle the issue represented by the second point, showing how `kin- 
like' relations are produced by people's discursive practice, and how these come to be 
seen as the central basis for `society', instead of `kin' ones, a practice that defies the 
distinction between `kinship' the way it is understood by structural theory and `kinship' 
as `amity' 
Another discussion will be introduced in the ethnography of me toro, related to 
the quality of the relationship with `nature' propitiated by it. In more specific terms, I 
intend to show the Mebengokre way of getting fish from dancing. I will argue in this 
chapter - following Joanna Overing's (Overing 1992) discussion of Amazonian 
economics as aiming at the production of social relations and not to the production of 
goods - that nie toro is also a way, in our (Western) view, to produce `goods', and that 
33The main proponent of this thesis is Lea (1986; 1992), although a similar view obtains from the studies 
of Verswijver (I982a; 1983/84). 
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is accomplished, in its technical aspects as well as ideologically, through rhythm, dance, 
music. A Mebengokre economic theory would be one that spoke of the ways of bringing 
autonomous people to work collectively, and this is carried out by means of the creation 
of joy. I will argue furthermore that this is essential also to what we would have as the 
`technical' aspect of the economic activity, thus breaking the classical division between 
`ritual' and `technical' aspects of social action35. 
Finally, in the conclusion I will endeavour to present what I think is a suitable 
model of Mebengokre society. This, I assume, must be one that suits Mebengokre social 
philosophy itself, being the (ever provisional) result of a dialogue between the notions of 
anthropological theory and those of the Mebengokre. This model will question several 
points in previous models, which, I contend, were driven wrongly by the concepts that 
the anthropologists used in order to build them. It will question such hallowed notions 
(for the Mebengokre, and other Ge- and Bororo-speaking societies at least) as the 
distinction between `public' and `private', and even more generally, quasi- 
commonsensical anthropological ideas such as the one that states that the content of 
`social relations' is something unquestionably universal - `social rules', or `hierarchy', 
for instance. 
According to my view - and this, I expect, is a view that is conversant with 
Mebengokre's social philosophy itself - Mebengokre society is a fractal one, an endless 
replication, in different scales and different spheres, of relations that are seen as suitable 
facsimiles of a set of relations, which obtain in the `intimate unit' mentioned above. A 
result of people's agency, Mebengokre society is one based on the creation of certain 
emotions and sentiments, and in the administration of them in suitable ways. Me toro, I 
34See, for instance, J. C. Crocker (1976); W. Crocker (1977; 1979). 
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argue, is the epitome of such creative and administrative faculties that Mebengokre 
consciously develop and preserve: their social philosophy, or social psychology, 
reflected upon, displayed, enacted, and transmitted through the generations. 
This philosophy, as I will argue, revolves around the creation of different 
`kinds', or qualities, ascribed to people in different moments. Autonomus individuals 
may thus be similar to others in some contexts, by showing a same quality as others, 
while at the same time remaining singular beings. These two traits, far from 
contradicting each other, are necessarily intermingled in the creation of society as 
Mebengokre conceive of it. The French anthropologist Christian Geffray, an Africanist, 
when visiting an Amazonian village in Brazil, was astonished that - different from its 
African counterpart, where he would be subtly but inexorably directed towards the 
person who would mediate his access to the group, usually the head of the local lineage 
group - everybody would approach him with the same eagerness, exchanging and 
conversing freely, and usually trying to do so at the same time and place as all the 
others. This readiness to establish unmediated, individual contacts and exchanges - and I 
use the word here in its most ample, un-specialised sense - reveals the value of 
individual autonomy, indeed of the singularity of individuals not bound to social groups, 
which is pervasive in social philosophies throughout Amazonia, as well as a 
corresponding little importance accorded to social groups per se in such philosophies. 
Diverging from Geffray's interpretation of the phenomenon (but, I think, 
agreeing with the essentials of it) I assume it as a display of the `non-groupal' - even 
'anti-groupal' - character of Amazonian social organisation, also present among the 
Mehengokre (and, I think, other Ge- and Bororo-speaking peoples as well). Foreign to 
35 See Tambiah (1990) for a thorough revision of the discussion concerning this point. 
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the conception of such metaphysical entities (labeled as `social groups' and therefore as 
`society' ), which attribute an `essential' similarity to different beings, to the point of 
regarding them as an `essential' continuum through space and time - one thinks here of 
the significance accorded to the notion of `blood' in European kinship and its later 
development in such scientific notions as the human genome - Mebengokre social 
philosophy is one based in the recognition of autonomous, discontinuous, singular 
beings, whose similarity to others is created by means of human agency. Beings of 
becoming, to use the expression coined by Brazilian anthropologist Eduardo Viveiros de 
Castro (1992), the Mebengokre become `proper' beings through their own hands, so to 
speak. 
This notion is akin to that expressed by Joanna Overing in her masterly 
description of the generative quality of Piaroa everyday life. Reframing Sahlins well- 
known opposition between `prescriptive' and `performative' structures, Overing goes on 
to show how the informal, non-prescriptive, and the intimate play a crucial role in 
Piaroa social philosophy. Becoming the veritable tools for the creation of social 
engagement, such spheres of being are stressed in an elaborate metaphysics that bases 
sociality in the exaltation of individual autonomy, rather than in the submission to a 
`group', that is, to a unit comprising an `essential', innate continuity between its 
members. It is through the convivial engagement, through the ever-present, ongoing 
efforts of individual will, that such continuity is achieved, albeit always in a precarious, 
non-definitive way. It is interesting to see how she deals with the interplay between 
individual autonomy and the social order: 
The Piaroa notion of living under the `sky of the domesticated' depicts 
well the means through which they decentre social power: they `domesticate' 
power by personalising it and providing the individual actor, and not the 
group, the responsibility for this domestication. As a result, power always 
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become a matter of personal trust - or distrust. And thus, community life 
becomes deeply dependent upon the creation of individual trusting 
relationships. What is more, a good deal of social energy is directed toward 
creating new morally competent beings with the personal capabilities for living 
harmoniously (or artfully) with others: the young must learn how to trust, and 
how to become trustworthy (... ) 
(... ) Their insistence upon personal autonomy, their high evaluation of 
the social, and their affection for custom are not conflicting values, or rather 
they only appear to be from the point of view of the dominant strand of our 
own individualism that takes the superiority of the disengaged ego. The Piaroa 
individual by definition partakes of the social and the cultural (... ) By refusing 
the imperatives of institutional law, they can properly socialise personal 
power, and link it to customary action without neutralising the autonomous I. 
At the same time, by personalising power, they can further inhibit the 
development of the institution, and the hierarchical arrangements through 
which it flourishes. 
Different from the Piaroa, called `the philosophers of the Orinoco' because of 
their rich (discursive) metaphysical elaborations, the Mebengokre rely on rhythm and 
dance, on music, story-telling and other vocal forms - one could say, expressive forms, 
including here the bodily expressions through dance, painting, the use of adornments, etc 
- to convey their social philosophy. Relying on the endless elaboration of `kinds', 
collectively ascribed to people, Mebengokre place upon this notion - that could be called 
`collective qualities' -a stress very much similar to the one that the Piaroa place on 
creating individual qualities in people. 
We arrive here at a notion of the `everyday' as the locus of sociality, in the 
sense that is through the continuous acting out of such generative capabilities as 
displayed by Piaroa, Mebengokre and many other Amazonian peoples - albeit in 
different ways - that the social quality is ever-presently produced. Far from being one 
`social sphere' among others, what is being called here `the everyday' is akin, in the 
plane of concrete agency, to what Wittgenstein calls common sense, the process through 
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which we become solidly bound to (social) reality, as common sense (in Wittgensteinian 
use of the term) does in relation to cognitive reality. 
In this sense, the `everyday' is not to be distinguished from the `symbolic' - 
because if the latter means something for the people that symbolises, it can only do so 
through, or by means of, their everyday existence. I am talking here, thus, of the 
unfolding of life itself, of concrete existence in its full, the only means through which 
`meaning' obtains. 
This brings to the fore the issue of what is exactly meant by `meaning' in the 
description of me toro. When one watches it, one is confronted with (at least) three 
different possible ways of considering its 'meaning'. One of them is to take those 
oppositions that abound in the enacting of me toro, all the articulation of binary elements 
that it offers to the anthropologist's eye, and build them into a system. Whatever its 
intrinsic merits - and much has been said about Mebengokre's and other Ge-speaking 
peoples' institutions by means of such an expedient - this `meaning' tends to ignore one 
of the most striking characteristics of me toro, and this is the prolific, exuberant, 
essentially a-systematic ways in which the many ceremonial elements that make up the 
materia prima of me toro arrange and re-arrange themselves. Any attempt to reduce 
such process to a `system' would only succeed at the expense of a reasonably large part 
of the mentioned ceremonial elements, which would scarcely fit in the picture thus 
traced. 
Such elements - ngrere songs, adornments, ben vocal forms, kukradja 
ceremonial rights, and other ceremonial roles - although highly `structured', possess a 
degree of mobility materialised in manifold legitimate (i. e., traditionally sanctioned) 
ways of being used, so much so that the sheer multiplicity of possible associations in 
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itself prevents (meaningful) systematisation. 
Another way of ascribing `meaning' to me toro is through the deep insight of 
ceremonial specialists, present in relative profusion in both the villages in which I 
worked. This `meaning', when taken isolated from concrete unfolding of me toro time 
and space, although having its merits - not the least of them the deepening of linguistic 
significance of that which happens during the me toro - also misses something of the 
very quintessential nature of the unfolding of me toro as concrete practice: its capacity 
of encompassing the whole of people's lives, and of making it enjoyable. 
The two latter characteristics suggest the `meaning' that I seek in my 
description of me Coro: the presence it has, as process, in people's lives. Or, in other 
words, the capacity it has to create, validate, and fulfil as a `language game', the very 
unfolding of Mebengokre social life, and the way they conceive of it. 
I thus adopt here an approach that strives to acquire a dialogue with 
Mebengokre views of what we would call `social organisation', without imposing upon 
their notions our own metaphysical load inherited in such concepts as `social groups', 
`kinship', or `society', to mention only a few. I strive to establish what the German 
philosopher Karl-Otto Apel calls a hermeneutical language-game, a `translation' of life- 
forms as a dialogical process: 
".. The specific function of the hermeneutical language-game would be to 
mediate the human interpretation of the world and the associated outline of existence in 
the continuum of discourse, or, to put it in largely Wittgensteinian terms, a mediation 
between one life form and another. " (Apel 1985: 31) 
The reference to Wittgenstein brings to mind the Norwegian philosopher Jakob 
Meloe's (1988b) stress on the practicality of the understanding of a life-form, whose 
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meanings can only be grasped when understood within the context of the practice with 
which they are associated. In this vein, it is through a description - an ethnography - of 
the practice of me toro that I mean to arrive at an understanding of it, which is 
conversant with the meanings the Mebengokre accord to it. 
In adopting this view, I am trying to avoid the deficiencies of an structuralist 
approach, still very much en vogue in Amazonian ethnology, that treats Amazonian 
worlds of meaning and practice as so much `data' to fit into an `universal' descriptive 
language. What is necessary is that the anthropologist's `translation' of Amazonian (and 
of elsewhere, for that matter) worlds of meaning and practice into the world of 
anthropological theoretical meanings and practice be a learning process, as Joanna 
Overing (1987) stresses, whereby we chose, through our own experience of these 
worlds, the appropriate ways of representing it within our anthropological 'subculture'. 
The `suspension of disbelief', as Overing puts it, is a way to recognise, and deal with, 
the different worlds of meaning and practice in a way that purports to be conversant, or 
dialogical, with them. 
This aim is directly associated both with my choosing to represent the `common 
people's' understanding of me toro instead of the `learned' exegeses of them; and with 
my theoretical stress on the `everyday' as the medium through which meaning is to be 
obtained. In fact, anthropologists (as all other intellectual professionals, academics, 
scientists, etc) are used to complicating the worlds they research by bringing into them 
the preoccupations of their discipline, in the form of analytical concepts, burdened with 
inevitable metaphysical assumptions, which are imposed upon the worlds being 
scrutinised. In so doing, we take a further step and assume that such complications arise 
from the worlds themselves, which thus become represented as subjects of problematic 
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interpretation by the 'natives'. But worlds are not necessarily interpreted in such a way 
in the everyday flow of people's lives. Thinking about (social) worlds is problematic 
only because our specialised, academic sort of thinking makes it so. Ordinary people do 
not at all see it as `problematic' and having to do with such issues as `meaning' and 
'interpretation'. This is something that struck me most when I was in the field, as I have 
already had occasion to mention. It is we who ascribe a `problematic', `interpretive' 
character to it. What I mean here by `everyday', following Wittgenstein, is this 
unproblematic36 fruition of daily life. This is what I want to represent in this work in 
relation to me toro. Wittgenstein, writing about this very same issue, has given a clear 
picture of the way we (scholars in general, I mean) represent the world as 'problematic': 
I am sitting with a philosopher in the garden; he says over and over 
again `I know that that's a tree', pointing to a tree that is near to us. Someone 
else arrives and hears this, and I tell him: `This fellow isn't insane. We are 
only doing philosophy'. "37 
The American anthropologist, Mark P. Whitaker (1996: 7-8), looking for a way 
out of the dilemma placed by post-modernist critiques of representation, and thus of the 
place accorded to ethnography in the anthropological discipline (critiques that would 
have all ethnographical representation as a form of violence against those represented), 
found Wittgenstein's approach useful to do away with what he portrays as an artificial 
dilemma: that which proposes the need to choose between a universal yardstick as the 
ruler of any description of different worlds of meaning and practice, or instead 
36 Of course, I do not assume it to be unqualifiedly `unproblematic'. It is relatively so, and the kind of 
problems that `natives' are likely to have are different from those we usually attribute to them in 
ethnographies (that is, `meaning' and `interpretation' issues) . 
37 Wittgenstein (1967, § 467). I give here the number of the paragraph, and not that of the page, to keep 
with the scholarly convention regarding Wittgensteins's works. 
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completely refusing to describe them38. He makes the distinction between what he calls 
`representations in general' and `terrorist representations', on the grounds that the better 
`representations in general' are, the more they lead to interchanges between the worlds 
of the represented and that of the representer, whereas the better `terrorist 
representations' are, the more they limit these interchanges. The former teach, while the 
latter oppress, or resist oppression. In this sense, the first are what Wittgenstein would 
call `primitive language-games', attempted descriptions or `tries' that bring one closer to 
the form of life one wants to master in thinking. Wittgenstein would have this approach 
as a solution of the dilemma depicted above, as Whitaker puts it: 
Wittgenstein, as was so often the case with him, chose to opt out of this quandary 
rather than directly confront it. Why, he asked in effect, should one have to choose 
between epistemic capture and meta-linguistic misapprehention? Why not instead 
back up the whole process of philosophical debate into the process of learning 
which normally precedes it? One could do what (he believed) a child does when it 
wants to understand something: engage in `tries', act experiments of gradually 
increasing complexity that move one ever closer to simply living a form of life (... ) 
It would grant an observer what it gradually opens up for the investigator: a clear 
view, a `perspicuous representation' (... ), of the form of life one is trying to learn, 
and of its similarities and differences, its family resemblances', to other related, 
sometimes muddingly intermingled, but different forms of life. (Whitaker 1996: 08) 
Whitaker thus arrives at the notion that, rather than being in the need for 
universal tools to be applied to every world of meaning and action, or worse, of having 
to abandon their representation altogether, as some of the postmodernist critiques would 
have it, the anthropologist must learn his or her way around a different form of life, and 
represent such learning processes by means of `trial representations' usually suppressed 
in ethnographies. The adequacy of ethnographical representation would then be not 
(wrongly) measured against such universal yardstick - that is, by its relationship to `the 
38 The volume edited by Overing (1985) deals with these very same issues, arriving at similar 
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truth' it supposedly represents - but by the degree it brings different worlds of meaning 
and practice into purposeful, `lucid' contact with one another. Ethnography as such is no 
longer seen as an epistemological relationship to an `object' of knowledge, but as a 
learning process in itself (Whitaker 1996: 8), and here, one might add, ethnography in 
both its senses: as experience and as writing. Anthropology becomes an `investigation' 
in the Wittgensteinian sense, when it gets itself rid of any `universal logical language' 
claims. 
This is what I have endeavoured to do in the present work: to represent my 
learning of traits of Mebengokre life form by means of a description of such a process of 
acquiring knowledge. This was not only the process through which I came to learn 
something of such traits, but also more or less the process through which Mebengokre 
themselves learn their own form of life. It is precisely this characteristic - of learning a 
form of life through successive `trials', as Wittgenstein would have it - that I chiefly 
intend to convey in my representation. That is why it has the form I described in this 
introduction, that of a process unfolding in time, with reflections - `translations', as it 
were, to our way of understanding - concerning aspects of it. 
A basic strategy for the apprehension of such process is, as stated above, what 
Overing has called the `suspension of disbelief', and what I called `methodical 
innocence' when in the field. Exercising it, I could thus not agree with those who 
approached ethnographic experience from a purely `textual' point of view, either 
reducing it to `textual production' - presuming that anthropology `produced' only 
academic texts, ignoring that anthropology is also a way of acting, besides a way of 
writing - or else expanding the meaning of `textuality' to embrace the whole of 
conclusions and proposing alternatives that are quite similar to those put forward by Whitaker. 
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ethnographic experience, and thus producing a sort of `literary criticism' of one's form 
of life. The first position misses the entirety of experience by turning its gaze to the other 
side, so to speak; the second undermines it by explicit denial, by applying literary 
categories to it - again the Western yardstick, in a new version39. 
The exercise of such `methodical innocence' implies, above all, placing oneself 
in the position of a learner by means of ethnography, and I mean here both the in-the- 
field experience and the writing-up experience. This is why I want to convey such a 
form of life in a description, as a means to share with the reader what I have learned of 
Mebengokre form of life, through the placing of successive fragments of it. This is also 
why I have chosen the `everyday', as I described above, as the privileged medium of 
such description. Because it is the only means through which we, both myself and the 
reader, can gain a glimpse of the fullness of the unfolding of Mebengokre life. 
0 wa ne, as the Mebengokre say at the end of a story: and this is it. 
39 See, for instance, Overing's (1985: 152-79) critique of the unreflective use of the notion of `metaphor' 
in the understanding of other forms of life, similar to the remark put forward by Barley (quoted in 
Hobart 1985: 106) of the anthropologist's common use of the term `symbolic', as opposed to 
rational', to anything that is not immediately understandable by the anthropologist. 
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Chapter One 
By Way of Introduction - On the Mebengokre 
Men come and go as leaves year by year upon the trees. Those of autumn 
the wind sheds upon the ground, but when spring returns 
the forest buds forth with fresh ones. Even so is it with 
the generations of mankind, the new spring up as the old are passing away. 
Hippolocus to Diomed, Homer, The Iliad, book VI 
The Mebengokre, or Kayapo as they are more commonly known, a Northern 
Ge-speaking people40, occupy a region in the Southern side, and in the Northern side of 
the Brazilian states of Para and Mato Grosso, respectively. Its territory is circumscribed 
to the East by the rivers Araguaia and Tocantins, and to the West by the Jamanxim 
river, a tributary of the Tapajos. 
The term Mebengokre means `those who came from the hole in the middle of 
the waters'. Other possible translation refers to a `place between the waters'. Some 
authors41 speculate that the latter translation could possibly refer to the Mebengokre's 
historical origin from a region between two different rivers42. Apparently both 
explanations (and others) are placed by the Mebengokre themselves, in a speculative 
form, when questioned about it. 
Although they are commonly represented as a single Indigenous society, the 
diverse Mebengokre subgroups present a series of differences between themselves on 
40 The Northern Ge are the Timbira, the Mebengokre, the Suwä, and the Panard. The Ge linguistic family 
comprises also the Central Ge (Sherente and Shavante) and the Southern Ge (Kaingang and Shokleng). 
41 See, for instance. Vidal (1977 ), Verswijver (1985) and Turner (1991). 
4" The term ngo may refer equally to a river or ngo rats-, `large water'. 
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the level of their institutional structure43, similar in degree to those present among the 
different Timbira groups44. It is thus more profitable to view the Mebengokre as a 
complex unit, comprising internal differences of varied scope, and tending to present 
themselves (sometimes) as a group of peoples that share the same language and cultural 
core. This would be, for instance, the case with the Xicrin, considered by some other 
Mebengokre groups as a distinct people45. The Xicrin, by their turn, although 
considering the Xingu Mebengokre (that is, all other Mebengokre groups, as the Xicrin 
are the only ones that live out of the Xingu region, in the Tocantins basin) as 
Mebengokre, say they are `other Mebengokre', calling them `Kayapö', a name they do 
not apply to themselves. 
To see the Mebengokre as a complex unit also implies recognising as 
problematic a series of differences presented by them at the institutional level. This, not 
as a minor issue, as some would have it46, nor as something irrelevant for the 
understanding of their social organisation, as others would have it47, but as essential for 
43 Among the Xingu Mebengokre, for instance, men (adult men with children, that is) are usually part of 
men's societies, or tchets, which work as `political' groups and in ceremonial life. Among the Xikrin, 
whith whom I did my fieldwork, this is usually done by age groups. Also, some authors (Verswijver 
1982; 1984; Lea 1992) argue that the Xingu Mebengokre's social organisation has a `matrilineal' twist, 
whereas the Xikrin-Mebengokre (Vidal 1977) would have an agnatic tendency. For Lea (1986: 40), the 
Mekragnoti (who are Xingu Mebengokre' consider as `real relatives', ömbikwd kumrentx, those who 
are linked by uterine ties. For Vidal (1977: 54-55), on the other hand, the group of `real' brothers 
would be emphasised in Xikrin-Mebengokre social organisation. There are also other differences, 
related to the `institutional' organisation of ceremonies, and the `transmission' of names and 
ceremonial prerogatives. I have dealt in some depth with such differenes in my masters thesis (de 
Oliveira 1995). 
44 The Timbira are Northern Ge-speaking groups, sharing the same language. Despite this, they are 
represented by anthropologists, government agencies and NGOs alike, as different 'peoples'. They are 
the Kraho, the Krinkati, the Ga%'iäo or Pyrkataje, the Canela (Apaniekrd and Ramkokamekrd), and the 
Apina\'c. The latter, speaking a different language (but very similar to that of the Mebengokre') are 
called Western Timbira, to differentiate them from the previous ones, all classed under the label of 
Eastern Timbira. 
45 See, for instance, Lea (1986) to this effect. 
46 Turner (1966; 1991) 
17 For V. Lea, for instance (1986), the differences do not concern the Mebengokre but only the Xikrin, 
which she, following the representation commonly made of them by the Mekragnoti, with whom she 
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the understanding of their social life. This constitutes a `problem' only in so far as 
Mebengokre social organisation is seen as static, immutable, and homogeneous 
throughout all different Mebengokre groups48. 
The Mebengokre pose a challenge to Amazonian ethnology as a whole. In 
Amazonia, most Indigenous peoples are homogeneously treated as intrinsically 
homogeneous by virtue either of their sheer smallness or of the lack of deep historical 
data that could co-relate different peoples in a larger whole. The Mebengokre on the 
other hand - and, in varying degrees, all other Ge-speaking peoples and the Bororo as 
well - are a large, thriving people, with quite well-known historical relations between its 
different groups. In such a situation, any understanding of their social organisation that 
does not take into account such complexity is not only artificially built, but also 
misleading. It would imply taking any one specific concrete configuration of 
Mebengokre society as `the Mebengokre model', forgetting that other ways of being 
Mebengokre also exist, this existence alone being sufficient proof of their changing 
according to time and circumstance. To understand Mebengokre society implies 
understanding both these histories and these circumstances. 
The term `Kayapö' does not originate from the Mebengokre language itself. 
Some researchers say that it is of Tupian origin49; but this seems to be doubtful50. The 
term was originally utilised by the Portuguese to designate other Indigenous people that 
worked, does not consider `real Mebengokre' but a different people. This simply evades the problem 
posed by the difference within the Mebengokre `unit' in favour of a static picture of their social 
organisation. 
48 I dealt with this issue in my Master's thesis (Oliveira 1995). 
49 Turner (1966). 
50 Aryon d'Aligna Rodrigues, the renowed Tupinologist, has told me that, although the word `kaya' can 
he found in several Tupian languages, the whole term `Kavap6' has no evident meaning. He himself 
does not give credit to the version that the name has a Tupian origin. (Aryon Rodrigues, personal 
communication). 
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lived far to the South. This people would be that from which the present-day Panara 
have come. The mistake was initiated by the Portuguese administrator and writer Cunha 
Mattos, in his 1824 book Chorografia Historica da Provincia de Goyaz ('Historical 
Description of the Province of Goyaz'). He was the first one to say that the Indigenous 
people until then called Gradaus by Portuguese and Brazilian settlers was of Kauapo 
extraction. The Gradaas were a people who inhabited the margins of the Araguaia 
River and the sertäo51 between there and the Tocantins river. Cunha Mattos' opinion 
concerning the Kayapö affiliation of the Gradaus was followed by the French naturalist 
Castelnau, who in 1844 said that they were a single people, speaking the same 
language. This conjecture, created by Cunha Mattos and popularised by Castelnau, 
became a tacit assumption on the part of those who busied themselves with such matters 
from then on. An example of this can be seen in Couto de Magalhaes' Ensayo de 
Anthropologia (Essay on Anthropology), published in 1874, where he states that the 
Cayapö lived then "... in the forests of the Province of Parana, Matto Grosso, Goyaz, 
Maranhäo, up until Para, where, under the name of Gorotires, they possess powerful 
strongholds at the banks of the Xingu river"52. The confusion was only undone on the 
20th century, by the Brazilian ethnographer Curt Nimuendaju, the first ethnographer of 
the Ge-speaking peoples, who called the Mebengokre Northern Kayapö, to distinguish 
them from the ancestors of the Panarä, or Southern Kayapö (Nimuendaju 1952). 
Mebengokre language, or Mebengokre kaben, is common to all Mebengokre. 
The Mebengokre themselves seem to establish different categories for linguistic 
classification, which can, for instance, state the difference between the languages of the 
Mekragnoti and that of the Xikrin, or the similarity between the latter and the language 
51 The term 'sertäo' has the general meaning of deserted, wild land. 
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of the Apinaye. The Mekragnoti are the Mebengokre living farther South of the 
Mebengokre territory, while the Xikrin are the Northernmost group. The Apinaye are 
not Mebengokre, by all accounts, although they speak a language that is perhaps the 
closest to that of the Mebengokre from the linguistic point of view: they can understand 
each other in their own languages with no great trouble53. 
According to Mebengokre, to speak Mebengokre kaben is one of their 
distinctive features as a people; this is possibly why statements on the limits of the 
mutual intelligibility of their respective kaben (or kapen in Apinaye') have always a 
flavour of politics. For them, the linguistic competence is important in other areas than 
that of a functional mutual intelligibility. For instance, oratory is important in male 
social life, being cultivated by the elders. Also, linguistic competence as conceived by 
the Mebengokre implies not only the publicly spoken word but that of the song, ngrere, 
sung in most ceremonies, by men as well as by women. Specific people, the ngrere 
djwyhn and ngre nho djwyhn or ceremonial specialists, memorise the songs and other 
vocal forms (re-creating them in the process) that are sung or related during ceremonies. 
There is also the ben, the name applied both to formal ceremonial discourses but also to 
other, less linguistically marked forms of public speech. As a formal ritualised 
discourse, ben is performed by people during certain ceremonies. Ben is a form of 
speech that is used only by males. There are other forms, used only for females, such as 
the public wailing performed by women when someone dear to them has returned after 
a long absence. Finally, linguistic competence implies not only a formal but also a 
52 Couto de Magalhaes (1873: 447-78). 
53 Bemoti, the elder and old leader of the Pykatingrät village, told me of his encounter with an Apinaye 
leader, when they spoke to each other in their own languages. Bemoti was really astonished that `other 
Mebengokn ' as the Apinayc could have been away for so long (from other Mebengokre, that is) and 
still speak Mebengokrc kaben. He meant that the differences - always interpreted as historical, that is, 
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specific moral dimension: the `good' and the `beautiful' are not distinct dimensions for 
this people whose language expresses both notions by the same term, metx. 
As in other spheres of social life, language also implies gender differentiation. 
Men and women have each specific sets of terms and expressions.. The latter possess a 
style of speech strongly laringalised, used on some occasions. This is the female 
equivalent of the rhetoric style of men, not laringalised but marked by a peculiar 
intonation54 
The so-called `female language' - and here one wonders why no one has ever 
called its counterpart `male language', that is, the specific style of male speech as such - 
is `language' in the sense of `parole', as the social practice of speech. In this sense, it 
has some characteristics worth noticing. One is the `roundness' of vocalic sounds in the 
end of some words, whereas male speech tends, to my knowledge, to produce them in a 
more nasal form. This coheres with the distinctive intonation of female and male 
speech, as men tend to project the sound from the frontal part of their mouths55. 
Another interesting aspect relates to the specific uses of terms describing 
movement. Several of my Mebengokre friends gave me the use of the terms to and mo 
(both roughly equivalent to the verb `to go', in English) as examples of male and female 
'language'. Women, they would say, say `mö', while men say 't-e'. Some confusion 
arose from the fact that older men also say `m5' instead of `t-e', and that some animals 
`t-e' and others `mö', disregarding their sex. In fact, the rationale behind it has no direct 
as a product of an ancient fission that separated a Mebengokre group from the other(s) - were not 
enough to dissolve the common understanding between them. 
54 I mean by this that both `styles' are deployed as performances The meaning of such `performativity' 
will be discused in this thesis. 
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relation to the gender of the speaker, but to different kinds of movement: `t-e' refers to 
a faster, direct, straight movement from one point to another, while `m5' refers to any 
kind of non-direct, vacillating, slower, less direct movement. Men usually walk 
unaccompanied while in the village, straight from one point to another - men actually 
cross the village circle when going to a point on the other side of it, while women tend 
to go around it, to avoid proximity with the men's house, it seems. So men usually 
`t-e'. Women, who walk with their small children and usually in groups while doing 
their everyday chores, `mö'. In the same vein, older men `mö', because they do not walk 
fast any longer, as well as a snake, which does not goes straight from one point to 
another but sneaks around, `mö'. Larger groups of people always `mö', disregarding 
their gender, implying that their movement is slower, less direct, prone to interruptions 
and changes of direction56. 
Longer journeys are also referred to by the term `mö', implying here the 
generally slow pace and the several stops involved in such movement. Journeys by bus 
or by plane are always `mö', thus, not only because people do not apparently move, 
being seated most of the time, but also because it takes long to get to the final destiny. 
The terms `mö' and `t-e', thus, may also denote the duration of the movement, along 
55 Both styles are highly performatic. People do not deploy them all the time, but only when there is an 
audience involved - that is, when one is, or intends to be, the object of public attention - and even so, 
not every time. 
56 See, for instance, the several forms for the sentence referring to `going to the garden': 
puru-mä ne ba t- e (1st person, singular) 
puru-! nä ne ga t-e (2nd person, singular) 
pure-mä tie bari [banh] t-e (Ist person, plural, exclusive, small group) 
pure-mä ne ba mö (1st person, plural, exclusive, large group) 
puru-ma ne ba ni-e mö (Ist person, plural, exclusive, very large group) 
pure-mä ne gari t- e (2nd person, plural, inclusive, small group) 
pure-inä ne gars'nö (2nd person, plural, inclusive, large group) 
punu-ina ne ga mö (2nd person, plural, inclusive, very large group) 
As one can see, the size of the group described determines the use of the term. Larger groups, which 
usually take more time to go from one point to another and do not walk in a straight fashion, always 
mö instead of t-e. 
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with its characteristics and the size of the group performing it. As a `marker of sex', the 
use of the term `mö' to describe women's movement (by themselves and also by males) 
means only that women move about both slower than men and in larger groups. This is 
what fits well to them, as they - and also men - tend to do both things in conformity 
with linguistic usage. 
Presently most of the Mebengokre also speak Portuguese, with varying degrees 
of proficiency. In villages where the contact with the rest of national society has been 
going on for longer, as is the case of Gorotire village, male non-elder population tends 
to bilingualism. In villages where contact happened later in this century, like the two 
Xikrin villages of Catete river where I did my fieldwork, only the younger (and some 
mature) men speak Portuguese with some frequency and fluency. Women generally do 
not speak Portuguese, although they do usually understand it quite well. The fact that 
the contact with national society - indeed with the rest of the world outside the borders 
of Mebengokre world - is seen as a mainly male affair contributes to this effect. 
The history of Mebengokre territorial occupation in this century is somewhat 
sui generis in the national scenario in Brazil (and the Americas in general): it is not only 
extremely successful, but also has taken place largely after the first contacts with 
national society. It was after contact that they came to occupy, or to consolidate 
territorially their previous occupation of, the territory they live in now. More 
importantly, it is a history that tells as much about their social organisation as it does of 
their origins and whereabouts. In fact, as will be seen in the following brief excursion 
through the history of their territorial occupation, Mebengokre society has in 
factionalism and village fissioning a major `total social fact'. During their known 
history, Mebengokre society has not only undergone many village fissions. It has also 
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occupied its present territory by means of them. A quick survey through the literature 
will show us that the Mebengokre have had, as registered through their oral tradition as 
well as in reports about them and contemporary anthropological studies, at least 35 
major village fissions in the past two centuries (not counting the temporary, non- 
permanent ones). These fissions generally lead to the formation of new villages. 
Alternatively, the group leaving joined other, already existent villages, contributing to 
the Mebengokre's historical trend of inter-village migration57. Such major village 
splits almost always had to do with internal strife, usually to be `translated' as a 
personal conflict between two leaders, with people taking sides according to their 
personal connections with one of them (including here those that happened between 
people from different age-grades). When they occurred usually either one group left the 
village and fled to the most distant place available, or both groups left at the same time, 
completely abandoning the village site. Even nowadays, as Mebengokre became settled 
in their villages due to medical care and education services provided to them by public 
agents, splits still occur, and people still move to another site to start new villages58. 
This characteristic must be taken into account if one is to understand 
Mebengokre social organisation. It suggests that Mebengokre villages have a temporal, 
diachronic dimension, somehow linked to relations between individual people that have 
57 The data were collected by myself in my master's thesis (de Oliveira 1995), from the literature on the 
Mebengokre. Major village fissions are accounted for from the beginning of 19th century until more or 
less the end of 1980s. From then on, many others have taken place. See appended charts of territorial 
occupation in the past two centuries for further information. 
58 T. Turner (1991: 08-16) would have it that factionalism is a trend caused by the presence of national 
society. While my own description below seems to show some evidence to this effect, I would not 
reduce it to a 'foreign' trend' in Mebengokre social organisation - because I do not conceive of their 
social organisation as something `pristine', `pure', to be `corrupted' by contact or by anything else. I 
am interested in the way they live today, and leave speculations on the way they lived before the 
presence of national society to others. 
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the ability to catalyse other people around them when they move out of a village59. I 
will thus give a quick overview of the factional/territorial history of the Mebengokre, 
which is indispensable to understanding where they are, and how they are there - and 
why. 
Mebengokre unanimously claim to have originated from places to the East of 
where they are now. Some researchers identify the Mebengokre as the so-called 
Norocajes, people that inhabited the region between the Araguaia and the Tocantins 
rivers until the XIX century. In 1810, a merchant built a small village on the right bank 
of the Tocantins and tried to establish good relations with the Norocajes, bringing back 
to their village two women who had been captured during a Kraho raid. This same 
merchant availed himself of Kraho help to attack other indigenous groups in the region, 
capturing their members to sell as slaves in the state of Piaui. Mebengokre oral 
tradition60 has it that their ancestral village was visited several times by white men, 
who returned two women prisoners back to them. This seems to establish a connection 
between present-day Mebengokre and the XIX century Norocajes. The word 'nhyrkwa' 
(from where the name Norocaje most probably comes) can be either Mebengokre or 
Timbira (with slight variations), having the same meaning in both languages: house, 
dwelling. 
Mebengokre stories about the first contact with white men tell of their fear of 
firearms. They also tell about the way they looked for a new place for their village, in a 
distant place, `there where there are no white men'. A place where they would not again 
be struck by the strange diseases that white men brought with them and that killed so 
de Oliveira (1995). 
60 From some of their villages. 
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many of their people. The stories61 tell how this place was searched for to the West of 
where they lived. Other stories tell about the conflict between the leaders of two 
different Mebengokre villages that ended with the death of one of them and the flight to 
the west of his followers, crossing the great Kökati river in the way. They were 
followed afterwards by people from the other village, who also crossed the Kökati62. 
This river would be the Araguaia-Tocantins63. 
The Mebengokre originated probably some 400 years ago, from the fission of 
an earlier group from which also came the contemporary Apinaye and Suya64. Historical 
evidence has it that, as far as it is known, the Mebengokre inhabited both the region 
between the Araguaia and the Tocantins rivers, and that to the west of the Araguaia by 
the beginning of XIX century. It is there that Cunha Mattos, in 1824, localised the so- 
called Gradaus, calling them for the first time `Kayapö'. According to this author, the 
Gradaas inhabited not only the sertäo between both rivers, but also the region of the 
left bank of the Araguaia, to the north of the village of Santa Maria do Araguaia. Before 
that time they would have lived by the banks of the river; but, afraid of the arrival of 
white men, they had gone to a region to the west, away from the margins of the great 
river. 65 
61 Wilbert (1978), Banner (1957), Dreyfus (1963), Verswijver (1985), Vidal (1977) have collected/edited 
such stories ('myths' or otherwise), which I used in my reconstruction of Mebengokre history. 
62 The Xikrin, amomg whom I did my fieldwork, call it Byti. 
63 The Araguaia and the Tocantins rivers are the Easternmost of the Amazon basin. They run parallel to 
each other for a long way, until the Tocantins meets the Araguaia. From the confluence on, the river is 
called Tocantins by a historical mistake, since the Araguaia has the greater volume of water. 
64 Turner 1991. The author based this statement in glotochronological research. In case this estimate is 
right, the Mebengokre, Apinaye and Suyd came to existence a little before the Portuguese began the 
exploration of that part of Brazil, departing from the lower course of the Tocantins. The Mebengokre 
would probably be living in that region in 1665 when father Cristoväo de Lisboa explored the 
Tocantins up until its first rapids, writing the first known text about that region (Moraes Jardim 1915: 
14). 
65 Cunha Mattos 1875: 18-19. This town is Santa Maria Velha, some 50 km. away from present-day 
Concei45o do Araguaia, in southern Para. 
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Migrating to the West: Occupation of the Araguaia-Tocantins and the First 
Contacts 
The history of the occupation and consolidation of present-day Mebengokre territory is 
connected to the factional fissions of villages that were on-going over the last two 
hundred years. The first ones to move away were certainly the ancestors of the Xicrin 
Mebengokre. Mekragnoti oral tradition speaks of such fission, which happened in the 
context of the changing of Mebengokre villages to the left margin of the Araguaia66. 
After this fission, the Mebengokre that remained by the Araguaia installed themselves 
in two different villages, which become united again when the leader of one of them 
died (Verswijver 1985: 24-25). Meanwhile, the ancestors of the present-day Xikrin 
moved up north, establishing themselves first in a region of savannah, and later in the 
forest, to the west of the Vermelho river in the Itacaiunas river basin. They would split 
again along the first half of XIX century, continuing a more or less constant war against 
other Mebengokre. 67 
In 1844, Castelnau revealed the existence of villages of the Gradahns in the 
left bank of the Araguaia river. This people had been pushed up north by the coming of 
Brazilian settlers to the region, settling in a series of small villages between the 
Araguaia and the Xingu. A year before, Prince Adalbert of Prussia, travelling through 
the region, had obtained from the Juruna Indians information concerning the 
Ticuapamoin, a name given by the Juruna to the Mebengokre, later to be popularised as 
Txucarramäe. They lived then near the middle course of the Xingu. The beginning of 
the decade of 1840 thus encountered the Mebengokre already established in the Xingu 
66 (Vidal 1977: 25). Frikel (1962: 145-46; 1968: 07) mantained that the Xikrin were Gorotire from the 
Xingu before they split and migrated to the Tocantins region. But Vidal, who has more reliable data, 
mantains that the Xikrin split from an ancestral group from which the present-day Gorotire also came. 
This group would be also called Gorotire. Verswijver (1985: 29-30) speculates that the split of the 
'proto-Xikrin' group occurred around 1800, before the split that originated the Xingu Mebengokre. 
67 See chart 1 in appendix. 
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basin. These Mebengokre groups are those that were to be later known by the name 
Gorotire, living then in the village of Pykatoti68. Those who remained in the Araguaia 
region were then called by the others Iraamraire, or `those who walk in the clear', a 
name that has to do with the fact that they remained in a region of open fields and not in 
the closed forest. 
The migration of a part of the Mebengokre to the region of the Xingu basin, as 
well as the earlier migration to the Tocantins basin, is directly related to the occupation 
of the region by colonial and national societies. The occupation of the margins of the 
Araguaia River by Brazilian settlers, already under way in the 17th century in an 
incipient form, was reinforced in 1806 by D. Francisco de Assis Mascarenhas, colonial 
Governor of the province of Goias, who built several ships in the port of Santa Rita at 
the Vermelho River69, farther down south, sending them to Para in May of that year. 
He sought thereby to establish the navigation of that river on a regular basis. Together 
with this enterprise, the Governor conceded official favours to those who founded 
agricultural establishments along the margins of the Araguaia. Those measures, 
however, were not enough to create viable economic activity in the area, or, indeed, the 
proper navigation of the river. Thus the region within a few years became once more 
economically stagnant. It remained so, at least from the point of view of the colonial 
economic and colonising enterprise, until the mid-1840s, at which time it gained new 
impetus from the re-establishment of commerce with the state of Para, through the 
Araguaia River. In 1847 and 1848, another expedition went along its waters to transport 
68 Pvkatöti is the ancestral village of all Xingu Mebengokre groups. 
69 This is not the same Vermelho river where the Xikrirn were establishing themselves by that time, but a 
tributary of the Araguaia. 
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merchandise between Goias and Para70. We can see that the moments of greater 
colonising effort on the part of the national society roughly corresponded to the fission 
of the Mebengokre village along the Araguaia River and their territorial expansion to 
the Northwest into the Tocantins basin, and to the West into the Xingu Basin. 
The results of the commercial expedition of 1847-48 combined to strengthen 
the projects of regular navigation of the Araguaia River, having in sight the commerce 
with Para. Nevertheless, they were jeopardised when, in the following years, the 
Tocantins River displayed itself as a more reliable channel for such enterprise. The 
advantages offered by the latter river were due basically to the region being occupied by 
a pastoral `colonising wave' coming from the State of Maranhao, creating settlements 
much more prosperous than the rather squalid one that existed along the Araguaia. The 
latter had against its success the great difficulty of navigating large ships along certain 
of its courses. So, while the Northeastern pastoral `wave' quickly occupied the region 
between the Araguaia and the Tocantins Rivers, the colonisation of the margins of the 
Araguaia River, coming basically from the south of Goias, was barely able to occupy 
the margins of the river, the settlers in fact preferring to occupy the right margin of the 
river.? 1. Thus the migration of the Mebengokre to the left margin of the Araguaia 
placed them for some time safely away from the national expansion in the region. The 
1847-48 expedition placed the Gradahüs on the left margin of the Araguaia, three days' 
march to the West of the confluence of the Gradaus stream with the Araguaia. They 
were, thus, placed safely away from the national expansion in the region for some more 
70 Moraes Jardim 1915: 421; 1880: 05. 
71 Moraes Jardim 1880: 06-08. The Araguaia River is the natural limit between the (then) provinces of 
Goias and Mato Grosso in this place. The colonists remained preferentially on the right bank. 
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time72. 
While the colonisation enterprise came and went according to the tide of 
colonial policies towards the region, the Mebengokre underwent several 
transformations. In the Paraopebas Forest, where the Xikrin had established themselves, 
the group then inhabiting the village of Kokorekre fissioned, giving birth to the so- 
called Djöre. The Djöre moved to the region of Vermelho River (re-labelled since then 
by the Mebengokre as "Djöre nhö ngö ", or the `River of the Djöre') With this move, the 
Djöre became the easternmost of the Mebengokre groups of the time. Making a similar 
choice as had been made by other Mebengokre groups of the region (the Kokorekre and 
the Pyt-kargt), the Djore established themselves within the tropical forest, and not the 
savannah. 
The relation between Xikrin groups were at that time in a state of intense 
conflict, warfare that was extended to the Gorotire (who dwelt in the Xingu Basin) and 
the Iräamräire (who dwelt in the Araguaia Basin). By this same time, the Gorotire had 
re-established their war against the Iräamräire, and also, in order to acquire firearms, 
began to attack the few settlements of non-Indians which existed in the region of the 
Xingu (Verswijver 1982: 306). 
During the same period, between 1870 and 1880, the above-mentioned 
Gorotire established pacific relations with the Juruna, in an attempt to acquire glass 
beads from them. The Gorotire no longer had access to beads from the Iräamräire, 
because they had become engaged in war with them. This new alliance of the Gorotire 
with the Juruna, with whom they had previously been in conflict led to pacific relations 
7" Table I in appendix shows the territorial expansion of the Mebengokre during the XIX century. Rivers 
and mountain ranges that are mentioned in this chapter have been stressed in blue. 
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between the two groups until the first decades of the XX century (Verswijver 1982: 
306). 
During this same time frame, the Iräamräire were to suffer profound 
transformations. In 1859, during the first attempt of the Capuchin missionaries to 
establish the mission in Santa Maria in the Araguaia region, contacts had been made 
with the Iräamräire, who then had a village on the left bank of the river73, close to the 
recently created mission. At that time, the Iräamräire were involved in a war against the 
Karajä, a group allied with the Xikrin against them74. After a particularly successful 
attack of the Karajä against the Iräamräire village, the Iräamräire abandoned their 
settlement to migrate slowly into the interior of the country, moving southwest, close to 
the Arraias Stream (Coudreau 1897: 136-37,196; Krause 1911: 162). In 1868, steam 
navigation on the Araguaia was established between Leopoldina and Santa Maria (a 
trajectory of 960 km without obstacles) by Couto de Magalhäes, Governor of Goias 
(Turner 1991: 09-10). This journey crossed Iräamräire territory. 
Little or no information is to be obtained on the Iräamraire of this period. In 
the beginning they seem to have had no trouble with their `civilised' neighbours. During 
his journey to the region in 1863, Couto de Magalhäes persuaded the Iräamräire to send 
some of their children to the school founded there by him (Turner 1991: 10). In 1878, 
the commander of the military garrison of the fort of Santa Maria gave them a couple of 
pigs, and they were soon transformed into pig farmers. As domesticators of pigs, the 
Iräamraire became inserted into the local economic life through the selling of their pigs 
to colonists in exchange for tools and other metal products (Coudreau 1897: 138). The 
73 In its middle course, the Araguaia is the limit between the (then) provinces of Para and Goias; in the 
lower course, between Maranhao and Para. 
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Brazilian explorer, Joaquim Rodrigues de Moraes Jardim, who navigated the Araguaia 
down to Santa Maria, related that the Iräamraire lived close to the village, but a few 
kilometres inland. He also reported that, after a period during which the Iräamräire 
mantained good relations with the colonists, they began instead to engage in some 
skirmishes with the settlers, and were then trying once again to establish good relations 
with the village of Santa Maria (Moraes Jardim 1880: 34). At that time, the increase in 
the navigation of the river and the colonisation of its margins could only have funereal 
consequences for the Mebengokre. In 1882, after being attacked by a group of colonists 
to the south, in the region of the Claro river, the Iräamräire moved to a site fifty 
kilometers away to the northwest, between the Pau d'Arco and Arraias Rivers75. 
At the turn of the century, the Mekragnoti made their first appearance as a 
people who had fissioned from the Gorotire village in the Xingu. In their consequent 
migration to the western margin of the Xingu River they continued the Mebengokre 
march to the west, and away from the centres of colonisation by the national society. 
The Iräamräire, in their turn, were at this same time fully affected by the `pastoral 
colonising wave' forthcoming from the Brazilian Northeast (Moreira Neto 1960: 09-10, 
13-16). The first non-Indian village, Barreira de Santana, situated in the left margin of 
the Araguaia River in that region, was built close to one of the Iräamräire villages. The 
Iräamräire already spoke Portuguese and had already become accostumed to the 
presence of white people, due to the presence of the mission of Santa Maria, which was 
74 Coudreau 1897: 136-37. Turner (1991: 09) states that the Iräamräire were by then repelling a joint 
attack by the Xikrin and the Karajd, but he does not indicate where he got the information. 
75 Turner 1991: 07-08. The insistence in the colonisation along the banks of the Araguaia was due not 
only to commercial but also to strategic interests. The Araguaia would be a way to allow access to the 
Northern provinces of the country through the interior, always useful in the case of a war against a 
foreign power that could block coastal navigation (Moraes Jardim 1880: 19-29). This is why Moraes 
Jardim gave so much importance to the establishment of colonising nuclei along the banks of the river. 
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situated on the other side of the river. In fact, a few months before the arrival of the first 
colonists in the region of Barreira de Santana the work of the mission had been 
increased through the efforts of Father Gil de Villanova who had arrived in 1891. The 
Iräamraire, who had previously lived within a single village, had split into several 
smaller ones. These splits coincided with the restart of their war against the Gorotire 
(CEDI 1987: K/02-03). 
The Western segment of the pastoral `wave' of colonisation from the Brazilian 
Northeast that reached the Iräamräire had a peculiarity. This was the virtual absence of 
a market on the left margin of the Araguaia (and the right margin of the Tocantins) for 
cattle. This irregularity contributed to the rapid occupation of the natural grazing fields 
on the margins of the Pau d' Arco and Arraias Rivers by ever-present hordes of cattle. 
The ranchers used the tracks made by the Iräamräire as cattle trails, and their villages 
as posts for their journeys (Moreira Neto 1960: 11-12). Between 1896 and 1897, the 
French explorer Henri Coudreau journeyed through the Tocantins-Araguaia on a 
mission for the Brazilian government. He described the fast occupation of the `general 
fields of the Caiapos', as due to the absence of market for the cattle (Coudreau 1897: 
139,190,237). Some time after Coudreau's visit to the colonist village of Barreira de 
Santana, another site was chosen for it, along with a change of name, Conceicäo do 
Araguaia. Close to this new site there was an Iräamräire village, whose chief 
volunteered to open a trail between it and the future town (Coudreau 1897: 64-68,190, 
221-22). In the next few decades, this cohabitation was to prove fatal for all the 
Araguaia Mebengokre. 
In 1896, a little before Coudreau's voyage, the steam navigation of the 
He also suggested the creation of another fortress, by the mouth of the das Mortes river (Moraes 
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Araguaia River finished. In conditions of complete isolation, the pastoral `wave' of 
colonisation would close in upon itself in the years to come. This was the last breath of 
the multi-century colonising enterprise that departed from the sertdo of the Sao 
Francisco River to occupy a great portion of the country, and which had as its extreme 
reach the territory of the Araguaia Mebengokre. This closure of the colonisation was 
due to the practical impossibility of transporting cattle to markets. Ironically, this 
economic stagnation provoked a more rapid colonist occupation of the Iräamraire 
territory, and indeed the extinction of the Iräamräire in the first decades of XX century 
(Coudreau 1897: 139,190,237). 
The end of the XIX century brought to the fore a new regional economic 
potentiality, the extractive industry of Brazil nuts and of rubber, the latter having the 
more deleterious effect of the two. To a certain extent, the history of the Mebengokre in 
the first half of the new century was moulded by the two periods called the `rubber 
booms', the first beginning at the end of the nineteenth century and lasting until the 
mid-1920'S, with the second lasting during (and a little after) World War two. It was in 
the interstitial times between both periods that the Mebengokre proceeded to a territorial 
expansion that has rarely been accomplished by any other Indigenous people at war 
against national society. Village fissions occurred several times during this endeavour. 
Meanwhile the Iräamraire continued their ambivalent relationship with 
national society, with which they engaged in commerce, and by whom they were 
periodically attacked. During the same time the Gorotire split in two groups, with one 
group (called the Mekragnoti) crossing the Xingu River and settling in a site between 
Jardim 1880: 34-36). 
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the Xingu and the Iriri Rivers76. In 1908, when the German explorer Kissenberth 
travelled through the Xingu, the Gorotire were installed along a tributary on the right 
margin of Fresco River. Later, in that same year, they moved westwards, to establish 
themselves between the Riosinho and the Vermelho Rivers. They had lived up to then 
in relative peace with the Brazilian settlers, but that very same year they had their first 
conflict with rubber-gatherers who were beginning to occupy the region. The Gorotire 
were attacked twice by the `caucheiro' 77 Antonio Firmino and his men. In the second 
raid, the village and gardens of the Gorotire were burned down to the ground, and they 
then moved above the Fumaca Waterfall in Riosinho, arriving back to the site of their 
ancestral village in the Xingu region (Nimuendaju 1952: 428). 
The Xikrin of the Kokorekre village, along the River Branco, were also 
contacted by non-Indian settlers who had come upriver. With this contact, the Xikrin 
were infected with several illnesses, which diminished their population to a dangerous 
point. In 1910, during a particularly dry year, they established a camp along the River 
Branco, and were there physically attacked by a seringalista. After this massacre, their 
remnants left to rejoin one of the other Xikrin groups (Vidal 1977: 27). 
By the mid-1910s, the drop in the price of rubber in the international market 
had already broken the thrust of the extractive enterprise along the middle course of the 
Xingu River. The Gorotire began then to extend the range of their own expeditions, 
widening the scope of their attacks to seringueiros and to other Indigenous peoples. At 
the time the region still had several thousands of non-Indians working in its seringais. 
76 Verswijver 1982: 31 1-12. 
77 There are two different ways to extract rubber in the region. One is from caucho, which has to be 
chopped down in order to extract it. The other is from the seringueira, which is scratched in its bark 
and the latex that pours out `gathered in a small tin fastened to the tree. A caucheiro is someone who 
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Owners of seringais had small private armies to protect their enterprises (Nimuendaju 
1952: 429,436). The Mekragnoti also began to extend the range of their attacks against 
settlers along the Iriri Novo River in the beginning of the decade of 1910. They 
inhabited then the region between the Iriri Novo and the Jarina Rivers, on the left 
margin of the Xingu, where the Brazilian ethnographer Curt Nimuendaju represents 
them in his ethno-historical map of Indian peoples. (Verswijver 1985: 165-68). 
The Xicrin also moved during this period, due to repeated attacks from the 
Gorotire. In 1926, they settled in the Pacaja River, to the north of their original area. 
Just after this migration, a group split from the new village and returned to the 
previous. In 1928, a punitive expedition composed by some sixty settlers attacked the 
group which returned to its former village, reducing its population to half. The Xikrin 
then took refuge on the border of the forest, close to the open fields, in the site of the 
(then abandoned) old village of Kokorekre. They remained for several years78 in this 
place, less harassed by colonists. 
In the beginning of 1930s the Pau d' Arco region was inhabited by a single 
village of the Iräamräire, described by Ribeiro da Silva in 1932 as having a `mixed 
population' (Ribeiro da Silva 1935: 193-203). Meanwhile, in the region of the Xingu 
River, new defections occurred in the Gorotire village (which was close to the site of 
the old Pykatöti ancestral village). A group called Kararao, tried to join the Mekragnoti. 
The bellicose disposition of its leader, though, had travelled before him. Having 
encountered a group of Mekragnoti trekking for game and joining them, the Kararao 
explores caucho; the equivalent for the seringueira is a seringueiro. The seringalista is the owner of a 
seringal (or rather, the holder of a concession to explore it). 
78 Vidal 1977: 30-36; Turner 1991: 1/19; Frikel 1968: 146-48. While the P. W-Karöt retracted to the 
border of the forest, close to open fields, to stay away from the extractivist expansion, the Mekragnoti 
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leader was murdered during the night by the Mekragnoti. His group fled to the north 
and built a village between the rivers Iriri and Curuä (a tributary of the former), where 
they remained for many years79. The defections from Gorotire village continued 
throughout that decade, not due to the presence of white settlers in the region but to 
internal strife, inevitable in that huge village. The following year another group left the 
Gorotire village to head South, away from white settlers. This group succeeded in 
joining the Mekragnoti, who then built another village to accommodate the newcomers 
together with them (Verswijver 1985: 177-78). A little after their departure from the 
Gorotire village of Pykatoti, it split again with one of the resulting groups trying to 
establish contact with the nearby town of Nova Olinda, building a camp in front of it 
(Arnaud 1987: 85). In 1938, the American Protestant missionary, Horace Banner, built 
his mission along the confluence of the Riosinho, and the group that was camped in 
front of Nova Olindabegan to go there, moving away from the town. One year after that, 
a group left the mission due to bad health conditions there, moving eastwards, to the 
Araguaia grazing fields, only to be there attacked by settlers, and thus losing most of 
their population. The survivors returned to the mission (Verswijver 1985: 179; Turner 
1991: I1/05; Nimuendaju 1952: 430-31). 
The Kararao also split in two different groups, shortly after having established 
themselves between the Iriri and the Curuä rivers. One of the groups headed North, 
crossing the Iriri and going down the Jaraucu River to the place called Furo do Aquiri, 
at the confluence with the Amazon river as it flows through the region of the Lower 
Xingu, between the towns of Altamira and Porto de Moz. The other group of Kararao 
attacked by the Kren-Akrbre (Panard). This was relatively new in recent Mebengokre history. So far, 
they had been attacked only by other Mebengokre. 
79 Verswijver 1985: 177; Turner 1991: II/04: CEDI 1982: KAR/01. For many years, the Kararab were 
occasionally mistaken for other Mebengokre groups in the region. 
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remained where it was. At the end of the 1930s, members of the first group settled in 
the margins of the Penetecaua River, trying to establish peaceful contacts with white 
settlers. Shortly after that, the Mayor of Porto de Moz, together with the SPI (the Indian 
Protection Service), tried to bring this group of Kararao closer to the town. This moved 
provoked an epidemic where most of the Kararao perished. The survivors, reduced to a 
small group, fled to the forest but returned, pacifically, into Itapinima, on the left bank 
of the Xingu, where they made a temporary camp. After some time there the Kararao 
returned to the forest (CEDI 1982: KAR/03-04; Turner 1991: I1/22; Nimuendaju 1952: 
431). 
The 1940s began with the occupation of the Xingu region by seringueiros, but 
much less disastrously than had been the case in previous years. However, the town of 
Conceicäo do Araguaia did begin to promote the occupation of the grazing fields of the 
Pau d' Arco and Arraias rivers by cattle, as a form of compensation for the decline of the 
extractive industry. This was the territory previously occupied by the Iräamräire, who 
had arrived at the year of 1940 with only forty individuals. In the same epoch, the 
inhabitants of the town of Conceigdo do Araguaia were 4715, seventy percent of which 
dwelt in the rural area. It is significant that in some ten to fifteen years there were over 
20,000 cattle occupying the grazing fields, and not a single Iräamraire to be seen 
(Arnaud 1987: 72,75-76,83; Moreira Neto 1960: 16; Nimuendaju 1952: 436-37,439- 
42). 
In the beginning of that same decade, a dozen Kararao survivors of the 
Penetecaua River epidemics camped near Altamira, trying to establish peaceful relations 
with the settlers. In the beginning nothing happened to them. Afterwards, though, when 
the Mebengokre thought they had gained the confidence of the population, disaster hit 
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when they tried to go to Porto da Vitoria, another nearby town. On the way they were 
attacked by seringalistas and labourers of the road that was being opened in the region. 
Only one of the Altamira Mebengokre escaped alive: all others were gunned down and 
their bodies burned to ashes with gasoline. When this happened to the Kararao in 
Altamira, the Kararao group that had remained between the Irin and the Curua rivers 
split into several smaller groups, which scattered all over the region. These groups were 
contacted, with great difficulty, During the next decades. At least one of these groups, 
however, has never been seen again (Turner 1991: I1/22). 
Still in the beginning of the 1940s, the Mekragnoti (among whom there had 
also been a split) were attacked by the Kubenkrankegn and moved north, dividing 
themselves in two groups. One of them attacked seringueiros to obtain weapons and 
ammunition, while the other settled temporarily in the Cachimbo hills, moving 
afterwards to the Jamanxim river. The purpose of the new move was the same as that of 
the other group: to obtain weapons and ammunition. Attacks against white settlers were 
becoming more frequent, not only due to the increase of the seringueiro population, but 
also because of the never ending need of the Mebengokre, who were involved at that 
time in inter-group conflicts of which firearms already played a part (Verswijver 1985: 
185-87,259). 
In 1942, the group at the Riosinho mission, the Djudjetykti, had settled in A 
place called Sobreiro, provisionally ceded to them by the government of Para state. 
They participated in the local labour market in the extraction of caucho and Brazil nuts. 
Their internal disputes, though, remained intense, which provoked the death of several 
persons within the village. Equally strong were the internal disputes among the 
Kubenkranrkegn, even though their village divided into several smaller groups during 
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most of the year in order to attack white settlers in various neighbouring places. In the 
mid-forties, a new, more permanent split occurred in this group (Arnaud 1987: 87-88). 
More or less in the same epoch the Mekragnoti split into several groups, after a 
period of violent internal conflict. According to them, one of these groups were never 
seen again and would be living up to now, in the forests of Altamira, west of the lower 
Xingu region (Arnaud 1971: 08; Verswijver 1985: 188-89; Turner 1991: II/08-09). The 
two larger groups settled on opposite banks of the Xingu River. Internal strife within the 
group on the left bank led to yet another split, with the fissioning group, a small one, 
settling in the region of the Tapajös river. The group on the right bank of the Xingu 
river, established itself along the Iriri Novo river, where they procedded to attack 
neighbouring seringueiros - while being attacked, in turn, by Kren-Akrore Indians80 
Although these Mekragnoti continued to attack the other Mekragnoti on the right bank 
of the Xingu, the two groups eventually rejoined. Nevertheless their internal strife did 
not end. Thus, the village quickly fissioned yet again, this time definitively. One of the 
groups headed north, to the region know as Mba "y, or Bau, in Portuguese (Verswijver 
1985: 190-95; CEDI 1982: J/08-09; Turner 1991: I1/10-11). 
The end of the 1940s found the Mekragnoti inhabiting a village on the West 
bank of the Xingu, near the Iriri Novo River. The Djudjetykti, on their part, had been 
transferred by the SPI, with help of the missionary Horace Banner, to the (non-Indian) 
village of Novo Horizonte, by then deserted. This was the last of a series of transfers of 
the Mebengokre in that region (that is, the Gorotire, the Djudjetykti, and the 
Kubenkrankegn see 2 in appendix), made by either State agency of SPI or missionary. 
Such transfers had formerly all been motivated by the inevitable epidemics that had 
64 
erupted among the Indians. By the end of the 1940'S these Mebengokre, the Djudjetykti, 
were reduced to 89 individuals. They were settled in this new site as a 'regional village', 
that is, with a `street' of houses instead of the traditional round village. As this site was 
relatively distant from other non-Indian villages, the Kubenkrankegn (who tried then to 
remain away from the presence of white people) became their frequent visitors 
(Verswijver 1985: 190-98; Arnaud 1971: 06-12,1987: 88; Turner 1991: II/05-06). 
The beginning of the 1950s is marked by the appearance of another 
Mebengokre group: the Kokraimöro, who emerged through the fission of the 
Kubenkrankegn village. It split into two groups for the purposes of attacking white 
settlers along the courses of both the Xingu and the Iriri rivers. When they got back 
together, internal strife led both groups to once again fission. The Kokraimoro left to 
build a village along the Iriri river, west of the Xingu, close to the confluence with the 
Xinxin river. They attacked their former villagers, the Kubenkrankegn, in the rainy 
season of the following year, driving the latter (then some 400 people) to seek refuge 
with the Gorotire in Novo Horizonte, who then had a population of between 90 and 100 
people (CEDI 1982: K/15-16; Verswijver 1985: 229-30; Turner 1991: 11/22-23). 
In the Gorotire village, assisted by the missionary Banner, the population grew 
rapidly, thanks to his medical care. However, during this time, the political life of the 
Gorotire suffered from the external intervention of both the missionary and the SPI. The 
missionary even set fire to the men's house (a political and ceremonial institution81. ) 
The officer in charge of SPI's `Posto Indigena' meddled by `impeaching' one of the 
young leaders of the Gorotire in 1950 after the latter murdered a man. The agent also 
80 Kren-Akrore is the name the Mebengokre give to the Panara. 
81 The meanings of these terms (`political' and `ceremonial') will be the central object of discussion in 
this thesis. 
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chose two successors for the 'post'. Both initiatives by these outside agents had no 
continuity, for the men's house was re-built and the two new leaders followed the 
`traditional' style of leadership82. 
During the dry season of 1953, the Mekragnoti were again divided into two 
different villages, one near the Von Martius waterfalls and the other to the North, close 
to the left bank of the Xingu. In that season, they were united again in an old village's 
site. Thios union, however, did not last long: in the following dry season there were flu 
epidemics which led the village to split again. These groups, later united, did not remain 
so, splitting again a few months afterwards. One of the groups then moved to the region 
of the Igarape Galca, between the Xixe River (of which the Galca is a tributary) and the 
Curuaes river (Verswijver 1985: 208-09). 
In the beginning of that same decade, the Xikrin, who had been installed for 
over two decades in the region of the Kokorekre village, waging war against the 
invaders of their territory, were contacted by the SPI. This happened in 1952, when a 
group of young warriors, after a feud with the older leader of the village, came abruptly 
to the Las Casas Post of the SPI. At that time, the Kokorekre village was waging war 
against the Pacajä Xikrin, and was isolated from other Mebengokre villages. Some time 
after the defection of the warrior group, a group of older warriors from their former 
village came to the post, led by its older leader, Bep-Karoti, who was the father of 
Benioti, one of the young leaders who had earlier left the Kokorekre village. This older 
warrior harangued the group, persuading them to return to the village. He did this to 
prevent the young warriors from attacking them. All of the young warriors returned 
together, and along the way were joined by a group of Xikrin refugees from the Pacaja. 
82 Banner 1952: Turner 1991: ii/22. Banner's article narrates the burning of the men's house. 
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But instability persisted, as the same group of young warriors left again to return to the 
Las Casas post. The older group moved south trying to recover the dissidents, but 
epidemics at the post led them to move on to the site of an old village. Some twenty 
Xicrin remained in the place, being transferred later to the Gorotire village in Novo 
Horizonte (Frikel 1968: 148; Arnaud 1971: 10; Vidal 1977: 36-37). These Xikrin would 
return to Las Casas region later, in 1997, establishing themselves there, now a deserted 
place, and claiming it as Indian Land83. 
The Kokraimoro also fissioned in the mid-fifties, due to internal strife caused 
by an adultery case, involving people from internal groups that already had experienced 
a long history of mutual feuding. One of the resulting groups left in the rainy season of 
1954 to move South to the upper Xinxin River region. The two villages continued their 
hostile relations afterwards (Verswijver 1985: 232). 
1950s: The Pacification Years 
In 1952 the federal government began a `concentrated effort' to contact those Indian 
peoples who remained hostile to the non-Indian population in Southern Para. This 
governmental initiative was developed due to pressure from seringalistas of the Xingu 
region. In 1954, the SPI officer Hilmar Muck visited both of the Xikrin villages in the 
Catete region, in the company of some of the Xikrin who had remained in Las Casas 
and then transferred to the Gorotire village. In that same year, the brothers Villas-Boas 
`pacified' the Mentyktire in the upper Xingu region. During the same year, the 
Kubenkrankegn of the Fumaca waterfalls were contacted. In the following year, the 
work of the SPI group in charge of attracting other Mebengokre (and other Indian) 
groups was interrupted due to lack of funds, with the result being Mebengokre groups 
83 The administrative process to identify the Las Casas Indian Land (or Tekredjätire Indian Land, as they 
seem to want it to be called so far) is presently (April 2003) under way. 
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more to the west intensified their attacks against seringueiros. This was as a response to 
the advance of the seringueiros into their territory. This new wave of attacks was 
responsible for the continuity of the 'attraction' program by the SPI. In 1957, four other 
Mebengokre groups were contacted, with funereal consequences for all. The history is 
as follows. The Kokraimoro were contacted near the Preto stream, and these people 
then helped the SPI team to contact another group during the rainy season of that same 
year. The two groups - with 97 and 137 people respectively - were joined by SPI into a 
single village, in the middle Xingu, during the dry season of the following year. After 
the transfer, the total population of the village added up to only 117 people, the others 
having died of epidemics before and during the journey. In 1959 the Kokraimöro village 
was transferred further away from the town of Sao Felix do Xingu, and remained there 
up to the 1980s. The new village was built in the form of a `street', in keeping with the 
local non-Indian villages, on an island that was periodically inundated by the rains It 
was also a meeting point for seringueiros (Dreyfus 1963: 20; Arnaud 1971: 14; CEDI 
1982: K/15-16; Verswijver 1985: 233-34; Turner 1991: 11/23-24). 
Still in 1957, the same SPI team contacted in the Igarape Limäo one of the 
Kararao groups that had split in 1940. Shortly after the contact, three Kararao, 
including their leader, accompanied the team to the Mekragnoti village along the Bom 
Futuro stream, an affluent of the Curuä River. This village, with some 150 people, had 
already been object of a pacific approach from a group of local settlers in the previous 
year, and as a result fled into the forest. This time, though, contact was made with its 
leader being convinced by the team to bring his group to the Curuä Indian Post in the 
middle course of the river of the same name, some 80 km away from the present-day 
P. I. Bau, and close to the town of Bom Futuro. There was, however, a tremendous lack 
68 
of planning for the journey on the part of the attraction team. They were moving the 
Mekragnoti to a place full of white settlers. In this new area they also lacked gardens, 
which should have been available to them at that time of the year. Thus, due to both 
hunger and the inevitable epidemics, the migrating group of Mekragnoti became rapidly 
depopulated. 
Between 1958 and 1959, the Kararao that had been contacted previously were 
joined with the Mekragnoti at the Curuä Indian post. These Kakarao were some thirty- 
odd individuals, who were the sole survivors of epidemics, forthcoming from the 
contact. Together they formed some 75 people, who were again to be transferred in the 
following year to P. I. Bau. This move was due to political pressure upon the SPI made 
by seringueiros and other settlers, who did not want them in their area (Dreyfus 1963: 
21-22; Verswijver 1985: 198; Arnaud 1987: 108; Turner 1991: I1/11). 
In mid-1958, the SPI began a new `pacification' expedition, having as its main 
objective contact with one of the Mekragnoti groups, which was then installed in the 
village of Pi'y djam. At least at the start, this contact did not greatly change the 
everyday life of the village. The Mekragnoti received many `gifts' 84, including firearms 
and ammunitions, which were distributed on the supposition that the attacks upon white 
settlers, the main purpose of which being to acquire firearms and ammunition, would 
then cease. However, during the rains of 1959, the village suffered an attack by the 
Kren-Akrore. The Mekragnoti retaliated, and then moved to the SPI's `attraction Post' 
on the Candoca stream. There were, however, no medicines or medical assistance in 
that Post, and during their wait for medicine, a nurse and more presents from the SPI, 
84 Gift-giving was a form of 'attraction' of Indian groups by the SPI (and later, FUNAI). As I will 
discuss in this thesis, both 'gift' and 'giving' have different meanings for Mebengokre, as they are part 
of a moral and aesthetic configuration of values quite different from Western ones. 
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many older people and children died after a few weeks from contact epidemics. Those 
who remained at the Post began to gather Brazil nuts, handing their production over to 
the officer in charge of the Post, who then gave them medicine and ammunition as 
payment. In 1960, they returned to the village where they had been contacted, moving 
again in that same year to another location along the Iriri Novo river85. 
A the end of the decade, the influence of contact was to be felt also by the 
Xikrin of the Catete and Pacajä rivers. In 1959, the year of the last wars between these 
two groups, the Pacajä Xikrin were contacted near the Golosa stream, close to the 
embankment of the Pacajä river itself. Shortly after the contact, an epidemic killed 
many, and forced the survivors to return to the area of their old villages in the Itacaiunas 
valley. They were contacted there again by another of the SPI attraction teams, which 
installed them in the region of the Carapanä stream, on the right bank of the Pacajä 
river. 
The 1960s were a decade of intense inter-village migration. These were 
facilitated, of course, by the peace brought about with the cessation of wars between the 
Mebengokre groups engendered through the process of contact and pacification. The 
migratory flux came basically from the Mekragnoti and the Xikrin, who had only 
recently been contacted, and had as destiny the villages of the Djudjetykti and the 
Kokraimöro. By the mid-1960s the majority of the population of these villages was 
composed of in-coming migrants, i. e. of Mekragnoti and Xikrin. 86 In 1965, the Kararao 
of the region of the Guajarä River were contacted along the Penetecaua stream. They 
were immediately transferred to an Indian Post that was built at the confluence of the 
85 CEDI 1982: K/12: Verswijver 1985: 210; Turner 1991: I1/11. A few people remained in Pi'y Djam 
village, although both leaders had left. 
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Jaraucu and Penetecaua rivers. Some time afterwards, they were hit by an epidemic of 
flu, which killed many and debilitated the survivors to such an extent that they were 
unable to either hunt or garden. They managed to then return to the site of their old 
village, where they lived from the remnants of their old gardens. When they were 
sufficiently recovered, the Kararao headed back to the P. I. However, the story goes on. 
In 1967, a new epidemic, this time of measles, killed almost all of the survivors. Only 
eight people remained, and they were transferred to the region of the middle Pacaja. In 
1970, they were divided between the two Xikrin villages of Catete and Pacajä (CEDI 
1982: KAR 15-16; Arnaud 1987: 110; 1971: 06; Arnaud & Alves 1974: 09). 
Among the Xikrin and the Mekragnoti, who sat at the opposite pole of the 
migratory movement (the Xikrin being the Northermost, and the Mekragnoti, the 
Southernmost), contact resulted in new schisms and migrations. Shortly after the visit of 
Brazilian anthropologist, Protasio Frikel, to the Catete village of the Xikrin, a group of 
young men travelled to the confluence of the Catete with the Itacaiunas, founding the 
village of Boca87. They did not build houses in the traditional circular pattern but in a 
straight line, with half a dozen shabby huts sitting alongside the river. Unfortunately, 
this location had a continuous traffic of non-Indians, and thus two epidemics ensued, 
killing over a dozen people. In 1965, the inhabitants of this village were convinced by 
the catholic missionary in the Catete village to return. Their village still remains 
(roughly) in the same spot88. In the same year, the Pacajä village was re-built in its 
present site. 
86 Arnaud 1971: 12. In 1962, the population of P. I. Gorotire was some 200 people, more than half of 
them coming from Kokraimöro, Mekragnoti, and P. yt-karöt. 
87 Boca: `mouth' in Portuguese. The term is used to designate the confluence of two rivers. 
88 Actually, as it will be seen later in this chapter, two other kri or village circles were built since then, 
each just beside the old one. 
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In the Mekragnoti village, the creation of the Xingu National Park in 1961 also 
precipitated a series of migrations and village fissions. One of the Mekragnoti villages 
remained outside the Park's borders, and the brothers Villas-Boas convinced its 
inhabitants to move to another spot to the south of Jarina river, within the limits of the 
Park. In 1962 their village was built, and began to attract Mebengokre from other 
villages, in part due to the high reputation (and to the direct agency as well, as he visited 
several villages inviting people to join his own) of one of its chiefs, Rop-ni (Verswijver 
1978: 63). 
Similar luck was not to be that of the Menokane of P. I. Bau. In 1968 they were 
reduced to 32 people, a small group that had given up any attempt at ceremonial 
activity. So bad was their situation that they no longer considered themselves to be a 
`real' village. In that same year, one of the groups that had split from the Mekragnoti 
years before was contacted and installed in the P. I. Bau. However, one year after that, 
seven of them had perished. After this last epidemic, during which the leader of the 
village also died, the group began to once again increase in number, albeit slowly. 
The building of roads during this period also had their effect upon migrations. 
In 1969-1970, a road that was being built in southern Para (BR-80) had its original route 
changed to cross the Xingu National Park, to pass between the P. I. Diauarum and the 
Mekragnoti village of Porori. The road, then, became the new limit of the park. Tension 
grew within the Mekragnoti village, due to the expectation that the village would be 
within the limits of the Park. The village then fissioned into several groups. One set of 
people moved away from the Park to a region to the North, called Kapot, along the 
middle Jarina River. Another group, lead by Rop-ni, moved further south, so as to be 
within the new limits of the park. Yet a third group tried to remain in situ in order to 
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attack the labourers building the road, though this was with small success. In 1972 this 
third group joined those who had moved south with the leader Rop-ni (Turner 
1991: 11/16; Verswijver 1985: 220-21; CEDI 1982: K/13-14). 
1970's: The `Golden Age' and Its Drawbacks 
From the beginning of the 1970s on, with the building of roads crossing the region, the 
Indians of Southern Para 'suffered' the increase of economic activity in the area, which 
resulted in an immense influx of Brazilian settlers from other states into Southern Para. 
A major incentive for such migration were the discoveries of extensive new sources of 
gold and other minerals, and the growth of the extraction of mahogany. Gold-mining 
spread all over the region. The unhappy Mekragnoti reacted with vigour to this new 
invasion of their territory, and in 1972 and 1973 several conflicts with workers of the 
BR-161 road and also with settlers resulted in many deaths. During the same period, the 
attacks of the Mekragnoti within the limits of the Xingu National Park against those 
who entered it illegally became frequent. Both `anti-colonisation fronts' continued 
throughout the decade, and were so successful that by 1981 no white man was to be 
found within the limits of the Park. From then on, the two Mekragnoti villages in the 
region enjoyed a new period of prosperity. Such wealth and health was not only due to 
the medical assistance of FUNAI89, but also to the Mekragnoti having expelled all the 
white settlers of the area. In 1984, the part of the Xingu National Park that had ben left 
outside the limit due to the building of BR-161 was returned to them and in the same 
year the Kapöt Indian Land was incorporated into the traditional territory of the 
Mekragnoti (Turner 1991: 11/17; Verswijver 1978: 10-15; 1985: 215,221). 
By 1970, The Gorotire village began to enjoy increases in its population. The 
89 FUNAI, the National Indian Foundation, replaced SPI as the federal agency for Indigenous affairs. 
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main factors encouraging such a trend were the continued work of the FUNAI medical 
team and the immigration of other Mebengokre into it. The village contained only 265 
people in 1963, but by 1976 the village numbered more than 600 people, with all of 
them being in good health. At the end of the 1970'S, a new circular `section' was built 
in the village, which had until then the non-traditional plan of two crossing 'streets'. 
This return to a former style of village building did have its consequences, for in the 
next couple of years a conflict errupted between the leader who had initiated the return 
to the circular village structure with another leader. The result was that the former left 
the village, along with his 'followers'. This group initally moved into the 
Kubenkrankegn village, and later to a place called Kikretum, in the vicinity of the 
confluence of Fresco river and of Riosinho, near the town of Tucumä. This region was 
near several large gold-mining fields. Deciding to take advantage of the fact, the leader 
(known as Tutu Pombo, or Tut, in Mebengokre language90) reached an agreement with 
gold-miners to explore gold in the lands of the Mebengokre. This pact began a rather 
pernicious relation that continued until the 1990s, when all Gorotire (including here 
those from Kikretum village) expelled the gold-diggers from their lands which by then 
were heavily contaminated with chemicals. However, in the beginning of the 1980s, the 
affluence of the village of Kikretum, due to the `tax' charged by them on (illegal) gold 
production, attracted several immigrants, mainly coming from the Kokraimöro village. 
The population of Kikretum increased in 1984 to 270 people, 170% more than its 
original population when they had left Gorotire. Two years later, in 1986, the village of 
Kikretum had grown to 316 inhabitants. 
The Gorotire village, similarly involved throughout the 1980's with gold 
90 Tut means dove, or pombo in Portuguese. 
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extraction, and also with (illegal) timbering of mahogany on their lands, experienced, as 
well, a populational increase, despite the factional split that had led to the creation of 
Kikretum. In 1981, after the defection of Tut and his followers, the village had 541 
inhabitants. Their numbers increased to 655 by 1986. By February, 1987, the Gorotire 
village had grown to 693 people, which were divided into 96 dwellings. It had become 
by far the largest of the Mebengokre villages. 
The Kubenkrankegn, who were similarly in an area of gold-mining and 
mahogany exploitation, also experienced a sharp increase of population, one that had 
begun in the early 1970's. However, in 1979 a group split from the village, to found the 
village of A'ykre, on the right bank of the Fresco River. Its population grew throughout 
the next decade, but at the expense of the population growth of the Kubenkrankegn 
village. In 1982, A'ykre already had 112 inhabitants, and by 1984, they had increased to 
165 people. The population of the Kubenkrankegn village, on the other hand, had 
diminished from 263 to 185 individuals. Three years after that, A'ykre had 250 people, 
with the Kubenkrankegn village comprising half of that number (Turner 1991: I1/24-25; 
CEDI 1982: K/05-06; Arnaud 1971: 123-24). 
The Xikrin of the Catete river began the 1970s in a village containing 32 
nuclear families, and a total population of 126 inhabitants. By 1972, the population had 
reached 140 individuals, living in 13 separate dwellings. In 1976, with by then a 
population of 187 people, one group began building a new village in a place called 
Kamkrokro, which was 20 to 30 km south of their Catete village (CEDI 1982: XC/10; 
Vidal 1977). This group, composed mainly of people who had historically come from 
the village on the Pacaja river many years before, did move to their newly built village, 
where they had already been growing their gardens, but a malaria epidemic, in which 
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one person died, lead them to return to the village along the Catete, where they would 
have access to medical assistance. For awhile, a group of unmarried men occupied the 
site of the new village, but soon returned to the Catete village. 
Meanwhile, another change affected the physical space of the village of Catete. 
Its village circle was `moved' to a place a few hundred metres away from the previous 
one. Another physical `move' was to occur in 1991, when CVRD, the giant mining 
company that explores minerals in the Xikrin traditional land, built several brick houses 
for them just beside the new village circle. The population of the village continued to 
grow steadily, coming to 262 individuals in 1982. The village of Catete split once again 
in 1993, giving rise to the village of Djudjeko, 18 Km away from the former. 
The Last Contacts - So Far 
In 1971, during the works on the Transamazonica highway, some of the Kararao 
groups that had split in 1940 from the `parent' village were contacted in the region of 
the Igarape Mossoro and Igarape Bem-Bom, both tributaries of the Iriri, some 230 km 
from Altamira. When they had split, they numbered 17 men with their families, and 
they had moved up North into the forest out of fear of the attacks from other Indians in 
the region. When contacted by the FUNAI team, they were 29 people altogether, who 
lived within a single house. They had also married within their own (matri-lateral) 
family, something that is not supposed to happen among the Mebengokre. Shortly after 
the contact, they were joined by a Mekragnoti man who had lived among the (non- 
Mebengokre) Kamayura (and was called by that name), who eventually became the 
leader of the group when the old leader died, taking seven of their women as spouses. 
Due to the contact, all of these people were transferred - with the exception of two 
young men, who preferred to go to P. I. Bau, with the intent of finding women to marry - 
to a place that was then called P. I. Kararao, built for them by FUNAI at the confluence 
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of the Iriri with the Xingu River. In 1982, this latter group moved to the Xikrin village 
along the Catete, having returned (almost all of them) back to their original place in the 
region of the Iriri River. In 1981, they numbered 22 people, a number increased to 25 
by 1984. 
In May, 1981, a second Kararao group was contacted in the county of Prainha, 
near the town of Porto de Moz, when its members were trying to abduct a young 
woman. This group was formed exclusively by young male teenagers, between 16 and 
18 years old, who were originally part of a Kararao group living along the banks of the 
Jaraucu river. They had become lost in the forest as children, and wandered now in 
search of women to marry. They were transferred to the P. I. Kararao (Arnaud & Alves 
1974: 03; Verswijver 1985: 200; Arnaud 1987: 110-11). Up to now, this was the last 
Mebengokre group to be contacted. However, the existence of at least two further 
Kararao groups is taken as certain by FUNAI and by the Mebengokre themselves, as 
well as that of two other Mekragnoti groups. Some attempts to contact them have been 
periodically put forward, mainly by the renowed Mebengokre leader, Rob-ni. 
Since their territories came to be recognised as Indian Lands by the state, 
several other Mebengokre villages have been created over the past fifteen to twenty 
years. The population dynamics of today appears to privilege smaller populational 
nuclei, in contrast to the enormous villages of old, of which Pykatöti, the ancestral 
village of the Xingu Mebengokre, with its three concentric circles of houses and more 
than 1500 inhabitants, is the best example. A main factor may well be the changes in 
annual settlement patterns. Nowadays people stay in their villages for most of the year, 
whereasd formerly they would trek most of the year, coming back to the village only for 
their massive ceremonies. Today, most Mebengokre villages have between 200 and 400 
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people, with the Gorotire, the first to be contacted and `settled' in a single location. 
having over 1000 inhabitants. 
The importance of factional activity is clearly seen in this quick description of 
the recent history of the Mebengokre. There is something to be learned from this. First 
of all, the very idea that we can speak of an `historical' dimension is interesting, and 
that we can view the Mebengokre as a society with a significant diachronic dimension - 
by Amazonian standards, at least. This dimension comes not only from the great 
amount of information amassed by - literally - generations of anthropologists, but from 
the Mebengokre as well, who retain the memory of such events, incorporating them (to 
some extent, and following their own order of relevances) to the narratives that 
compose their collective memory. Another thing is the role of personal agency in the 
building of a village. History has shown that villages are born out of a particular 
leader's agency. It is he who gathers different people around himself, making each 
village a conglomerate of people who are sometimes poorly, if at all, related to some of 
its other co-habitants. 
When questioned by the anthropologist where they have lived, the memory of 
their growing with their friends of the same age-grade - especially, if male, of fellow 
menoronyre (unmarried men). It is against this background that one's reminiscences of 
the history of one's whereabouts are set: the place one has undergone the ceremonies 
for his introduction into the men's house, or when such and such nomination ceremony 
was held for a specific person; and, taking this as a clue for other recollections, as an 
index of other facts that happened during that time. People's memories - men's 
memories at any rate - stress the significance of the village for people's lives. One 
remarkable characteristic of Mebengokre social life (as well as that other Ge-speakers) 
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is that it is spent, for most of the year, in a village where not everybody relates - in the 
wider sense of the term - to everybody else. This placed the Ge-speakers in stark 
contrast to other Amazonian peoples. A village is a concrete entity which seems to have 
ontological precedence in Mebengokre thought over the family - the most intimate 
group - in their relfections upon social life per se, in the sense of what it is like to live 
with other people in a distinctively Mebengokre way. It is village life, with all its 
`consequences' (of which the most frequently mentioned, by far, is the possibility of 
realising ceremonies), that defines what is it to be a Mebengokre. Theirs is a rather 
Aristotelian concept of living in the polis that allows for the realisation of the potential 
humanity within them. However, as will be discussed in the next chapters, it is not 
through the taming of passions by their submission to reason that this humanity is 
brought about within Mebengokre village life. Rather, it is through the harmonisation of 
passions and appetites by means of emotional knowledge, of social affectivity (which, 
as will be seen, coincides with personal well-being). 
From the Part to the Whole: Fieldwork Settings 
Gadamer (1988) says that every interpretation is dependent upon the history of past 
interpretations of the same phenomenon. Nevertheless, there are interpretations and 
interpretations. Whitaker (1996: 08) takes an important step towards an anthropological 
approach to interpretation when he makes the distinction between different kinds of 
interpretation, according to the interests that generate them. But, although interest is so 
obviously important for the interpretive task, not much has been written about how 
interests are formed, and questioned (by the anthropologist himself or by his/her 
`natives', or both). I have already given an account, in the introduction of this thesis, of 
how Mebengokre questioning me changed my interests and perspective about my 
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research subject. I would like here to say a few words about my own self-questioning 
concerning my research interests, and its consequences for my research as a whole. 
When I arrived at Catete Indian village for my first fieldwork term91, I 
intended to do research somehow related to Mebengokre factionalism, a subject which 
had been the focus of my Masters thesis92. But reality proved itself impermeable to my 
attempts. What I had called "factionalism" was in fact a non-issue, and but a shadow 
image - and as such, one devoid of reality - of village conviviality. I realised that to 
talk of "factionalism" amounted in fact to attribute some sort of `positive' reality to 
something that was itself defined as pure negativity: as the lack of conviviality, that is, 
of the skills that make life in the village possible and desirable. 
That "factionalism" was pure negativity was made obvious to me by people's 
reaction whenever I talked to them about the village fission that had led to the origin, a 
few years before, of the village of Djudjeko, 18 Km away from Catete. No such thing as 
a `village split' had occurred, according to people I talked to. It was simply a question 
of some people wishing to move away, due to several different reasons. The village 
started as a garden site, plotted further away from Catete village than usual for the 
gardens in that village. The garden was made by Boitie, an old leader who was highly 
critical of the `ways of the young', specially of their playing football in the village 
rather than working in their gardens, as Boitie frequently complained. Some of Boitie's 
companions of his age-grade followed him and plotted their gardens in the same place, 
out of companionship. They all built a single hut, where they spent days on end during 
91 My research lasted during (roughly) 9-10 months, which I spent in two fieldwork terms, in 1998 
(around 5 months) and 1999 (around 4 months). 
92 My Masters thesis was based on the ethnological literature (and other written sources) on the 
Mebengokre. I used them to re-analyse the Mebengokre factional process, and to question some of the 
assumptions of Ge ethnology concerning Mebengokre social organisation. In fact, some of the insights 
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the time of the year when the gardens are cleared. In the following years, as their 
gardens flourished and yielded much produce93, other houses (inhabited by their sons 
and daughters, and their families) were built in a roughly circular fashion, and the future 
village of Djudjeko, then still called a `garden site' began its history. When Karangre, 
Boitie's son and leader of the married men's age-grade in the Catete village, moved to 
Djudjeko, several people of his age-grade also followed him, and the village started to 
be considered a `proper village' by people from Catete94. Karangre had several 
`brothers' 95 in Catete, who followed him out of fondness for his company. 
That this fondness did include personal interests on the part of each was clear, 
and no one seemed particularly concerned in hiding it. Actually, individual interests 
were at the very heart of their description of the formation of the village of Djudjeko. 
There were, in Mebengokre accounts of the formation of the village, no groups of 
people involved that could be called 'factions'. Village formation was an individual 
rather than a collective process, a process of individual people moving away from one 
village and into the other according to their personal interests96. There was not `a 
process' going on but a multitude of individual processes. Far from being a Derridian 
`non-said', something that is conspicuous by its very absence, `factionalism' was a non- 
that I had when analysing the ethnological literature on the Mebengokre (and the Ge) were very useful 
for my fieldwork - but are not the central theme of the thesis. 
93 Older (mebenget) people are said to cultivate much better gardens than young people -a belief that, as 
far as I could ascertain, corresponds to fact. 
94 This can be, of course, a highly political statement, depending on who utters it (and the circumstances 
of such utterance). A person I met in Catete, for example, who is on bad terms with both Karangre and 
Boitie, used to say that he considered Djudjekb to be `a garden', never a village. Many people from 
Catete, although not so outspoken as this particular person, used to call Djudjekb `pe de cobra', or 
`snake's foot', a rather pejorative denomination that appealed to the very impossibility of Djudjekö 
being coinsidered `something that existed' as a village. Nevertheless there is a daily transit of people 
between villages (as it can be done by foot), and relations between people in both villages are 
generally good. 
95 Ka, nv kack, or 'brother facsimilar'. See chapter 2 on the creation of the kamt kaäk relationship. 
96 In fact, according to a certain consensus among the personal interests of the male and female heads of 
nuclear families. 
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issue, something that was conspicuous (when I enquired about it, that is) by the sheer 
absence of its palpable reality. 
When I realised the imponderability of my research subject, my first reaction 
was to try and find a common denominator in the manifold stories concerning the 
reasons why people had moved to Djudjeko. The more stories I collected - and there 
were many of them, always told in private talks, never when other people were present 
- the more I realised that, although there was no common denominator, there was 
certainly a Wittgensteinian `family resemblance' amongst them. The manifold 
narratives composed a mosaic of village sociability, of how life should be lived in the 
village, and of how concrete, specific attempts to sociability had failed, leading to 
individual people leaving the village for another. 
I realised, after two or three months of doing fieldwork in both Catete and 
Djudjeko villages, that `sociability' obviously had the positivity which `factionalism' 
lacked as a research subject. If village splits were so conspicuous (for the 
anthropologist, that is) in Mebengokre history, it was only because sociability, the skills 
to relate well with one's co-villagers, was, like Poe's purloined letter, too obviously at 
sight to be conspicuous. My focusing on village conviviality was an approach that was 
designed to make the `obviousness' (for the Mebengokre, that is) of village life visible 
to anthropologists and other readers. If village life can be understood according to what 
Mebengokre seem (to me) to think of as an issue of conviviality, then inter-village 
relations (which are always couched, even the conflictive ones, in terms of individual 
interests and relations) can also be understood as a matter of conviviality - even if it be 
understood as the failure of conviviality, as in `factional processes'. 
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Life in the village is what this thesis is about, this polis that gives a 
distinctively Mebengokre shape to life. When setting foot for the first time into a 
Mebengokre village, the stranger's first impression is that of the fullness, the 
completeness of it. The Pykatingrät (Catete) village circle was in 1999 composed of 39 
brick dwellings (built by Vale do Rio Doce, the mining company that explores mineral 
ore within Xikrin lands), comprising 142 nuclear families and 565 people. Djudjekö, the 
more recent of the two villages, had 22 dwellings in 2000 comprising 50 nuclear 
families, with 144 people97. It is a population that has a degree of heterogeneity, as 
some of its members have come from the Xikrin village of Pacajä and others from the 
Gorotire village. Those coming from the Gorotire were originally from the Catete 
Xikrin, having moved to Gorotire shortly after the contact , mainly out of 
fear of the 
(then) young leader Bemoti. Ropkrori, a renowned shaman who made his career in 
Gorotire was the first to return to Catete (and to Djudjeko afterwards, as he is a `formal 
friend', krabdjw_, of Boitie, the older leader of the Djudjekö village) in the mid-1980's, 
followed a few years later by several other men and their families. They were later 
followed by several sons-in-law (originally from Gorotire) and their respective families. 
The choice of where to live, although done according to time and 
circumstance, is always a matter of individual concern. For example, one chooses 
whether to follow this or that leader, according to one's personal relations to him, or to 
her. It is not uncommon for men who married outside their own village to `bend' the 
uxorilocal `residence rule' and bring their wives to live in their own original village. 
That is, if the wives agree, of course. Those who returned from Gorotire generally did 
so because of their longing for their companions of youth, and for their relatives/friends 
97 11 of the nuclear families which I counted, in the year before, as inhabitants of Pykatingrät had by 
2000 moved to Djudjekb. Two other nuclear families had moved to other places. 
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(ömbikwä). This sentiment of `longing for'98 is tremendously important in the choosing 
of a village to live. Most of those who returned from Gorotire to Catete, for instance, 
have moved on to Djudjeko due to their own personal attachments to Boitie. How does 
this sentiment of `longing for' come to play such an important role in these individual 
choices? This was one of the elements upon which I focused in my research, always 
trying to make explicit the positivity of Mebengokre definitions and categories, instead 
of imposing a `sociological' viewpoint, that would run the risk of explaining away the 
positivity of what Mebengokre themselves found relevant in the `factional' issue. 
On the other hand, another reason/motive frequently stated by Mebengokre 
individuals for moving to Catete (and ultimately to Djudjeko) from outside the region99 
was the sheer affluence of the Catete River Xikrin, both Catete and Djudjeko villages. 
This affluence was forthcoming from their financial relationships with the mining 
company that uses their lands. Well-being also comes from the very good medical 
assistance, and the schooling available to its residents. What is the part played by 
personal interest in all this processes? How much is personal interest in material matters 
and how much is personal longing for particular types of affective relationships? These 
questions framed my approach to Mebengokre village life, and through them I was able 
to uncover the complex of moral and aesthetic ideas that challenged the morality of my 
own distinction between `material interests' and `affective ties'. I thus found in my 
approach to `economic life' - or rather, in collective endeavours at the level of the 
village - an important way to analyse questions of utmost 
importance, I believe, for 
Mebengokre village life. 
98 See Lagrou (2000) on the sociability of `longing'. 
99 That is from other villages. either at the Xingu basin or from the Bacajä Indian Land. 
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And, finally, most important of all, my approach led me to the question of how 
does this mixture of private, individual aims and drives act towards inducing a set of 
heterogeneous people to live together? How are such aims and drives shaped and 
steered? It is this multi-layered heterogeneity that typifies the gathering of individual 
Mebengokre into villages that I propose to analyse in this thesis. What are the roots of 
their differences and the building of their similarities? Such a task entails understanding 
how people deal with (what we call) their `institutional structure', so as to live with it 
according to time and circumstance. It also implies understanding what is the nature of 
this `structure' according to the Mebengokre's views of what it is to live together as 
Mebengokre - that is, as `proper' human beings 
This short historical introduction was meant to suggest that individual agency 
is an important element in the shaping of Mebengokre ways of living together, even if in 
ever-changing ways. A leader's individual agency is responsible (although not solely 
responsible, as there are many other agencies involved) for the formation of new 
villages, of any new `polis'. But what is behind such a process? What sort of 
conceptions - and I mean here explicit, self-acknowledged conceptions - drives these 
different people to join together? It is, I believe, the qualities of individual agency itself 
that must be understood, the way Mebengokre conceive of personal agency, which, as it 
turns out is at the same time tantamount to understanding what I called in this thesis 
their social philosophy. Mebengokre always stress that, among other things, each and 
every Mebengokre village has its ceremonies and language in common (to different 
degrees and aspects of communality - this is the discussion of the following chapters). 
These are the essential elements of life within a Mebengokre village. This is something 
that speaks of that polls that moulds them into being - into being Mebengokre, or a 
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`human' being. In the next chapters I will analyse some of the aspects and qualities of 
the processes of `shaping into human beings' that are a part of village life. 
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Chapter Two 
Of Kin and Matters Akin: Village Life as Semiotic or 
a Mebengokre Philosophy of Sensus Communis 
After all, kinship is a matter of flesh and blood, the result of 
sexual passion and maternal affection, of long, intimate daily life and 
of a host of personal intimate interests. Can all this really be reduced 
to formulae, symbols, perhaps equations? (... ) A very pertinent question 
can be asked as to whether we should get nearer the family life, 
the affections and tender cares, or again the dark and mysterious 
forces which the psycho-analyst banishes into the Unconscious 
but which often break out with dramatic violence - whether we 
could come nearer to this, the real core of kinship, by the mere 
use of mock-algebra 
Bronislaw Malinowski, in Man 16-17,1930 
All friendship is desirable in itself, but begins with the necessity of what is useful 
Epicure 
This chapter is about Ömbikwa, the term that Mebengokre translate as 
`relative' (as well as `friend'), and its place and relevance for Mebengokre life. I want to 
give a picture of how the notion is an element of a wider Mebengokre social/political 
philosophy that is centred in issues along the lines of what we would call both morality 
and ethics. 
In Amazonia (or lowland South America100), kinship studies have emerged in a 
time when the `wave' of kinship studies was already succumbing to criticism in 
anthropological theory. In effect, as Viveiros de Castro (1995: 7-8, my translation) 
remarks, 
100 The distinction - or the coincidence - between both terms is apparently a matter of personal choice 
and is linked to the scope of the approach adopted by researchers. Joanna Overing, for instance, who 
searches for the similarities between different Amerindian social philosophies, speaks of Amazonia in 
broader, inclusive terms, not necessarily restricting herself to South America, but including portions of 
central America as well, that is, the tropical forest area that is a continuation of (South American) 
Amazonia into Central America; Eduardo Viveiros de Castro, by his turn, concerned with `Dravidian- 
type' kinship terminologies, which do not encounter parallel, for instance, in Central Brazilian Ge and 
Botoro-speaking peoples, talks of a lowland South America that comprises `Amazonia and Central 
Brazil' (Viveiros de Castro 1995: 11. my translation). 
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(... ) there was mainly a historical mis-encounter between the trajectories of South 
American Indigenous ethnology and anthropological theory in general. During 
the time when kinship was the great anthropological issue, good ethnographies 
were lacking in the region. When, in the seventies and the eighties, there was a 
massive flourishing of ethnographic research in South America, the diminishing 
interest on the questions allowed by such research was already beginning to make 
itself felt. South American kinship systems started to be able to be analysed in all 
their richness and complexity in a conjuncture where the issue was coming to a 
theoretical hibernation. 
The `rise' of kinship studies in Amazonia, then, was made in an atmosphere 
where that critique demanded an answer, which was to be either the reformulation of 
traditional categories, as mentioned above, or their refinement'0' 
This chapter intends to question some of the established ways of understanding 
what is called `kin' and `kinship' for the Mebengokre. In order to do so, I will 
intentionally use `kinship' to speak of different things, something, I contend, which 
would not sound strange for Mebengokre themselves. I will mainly speak of what I call 
the semiotics of individual relatedness, that is, of the ways the Mebengokre see the 
101 Viveiros de Castro (1995: 9, my translation) again aptly describes the state of affairs regarding this 
last option: "(... ) the crisis of the classical paradigms of the field [of kinship] - the `descent theory' and 
the `alliance theory' - has been expressing itself in the sophisticated reformulation of such models, 
which seek to go beyond the original segmentaristic and mechanistic versions. Beyond the unilineal 
and the elementary, a whole universe of structures has opened up to us, waiting for conceptualisation. 
The recent developments on `non-elementary' systems of alliance, which benefit from reflections on 
the notion of `complexity' coming from other sciences, redefining, among other things, the famous 
dichotomy between the `mechanic' and the `statistic'; the refinement of the analyses of empirical 
matrimonial networks, aided by computers; the algebraic generalisation of elementary structures of 
exchange; the elaboration of new graphic notation systems; the production of new analytical categories 
(as the notion of `maison', last and most decisive contribution of Levi-Strauss to kinship theory); a 
better comprehension of realities that rebel against traditional segmentary models, like cognactic 
societies; the rigorous categorisation of terminological configurations, together with the dissolution of 
simplistic correlations between terminology, norms and matrimonial practices; the incorporation of the 
concept of strategy into the concept of structure, making room for a non-transcendental functioning of 
the latter - all that has been giving a new alent to this 
field of studies, which veritably awakes from its 
long hibernation. " The refinement of anthropological categories applied to Amazonian settings had as 
one of its most important steps the volume (Overing 1977) organised with the papers of the 
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referential relation between `kin' term and its recipients102. My basic argument here is 
that Mebengokre, far from postulating a unidimensional relation between sign (or 
relationship term) and referent, have a sophisticated semiotics that posits different forms 
of similarity between them. 
I will build my argument by means of a critique of some approaches to 
Mebengokre and Ge kinship, mainly 1) to the analytical cleveage of a `public' and a 
`domestic' spheres of social relations in Mebengokre social life; and 2) to the tendency, 
manifested in much of the recent discussion on Mebengokre kinship, to talk of `groups', 
`grades', `categories', `sets', `houses', `kindred' etc, without first considering how 
actual personal relationships are built .I contend that these approaches are not helpful to 
understand Mebengokre social life, marked by a very high degree of individual 
autonomy in the relationships established in daily life. This autonomy is in fact the 
other side of the very possibility to establish such relations, since the Mebengokre (as 
all other Ge) live in large villages, in which people are not necessarily related to all 
others. If one considers the description, in the previous chapter of the territorial 
movements of the Mebengokre in the previous centuries, one will notice that the 
frequent village splits and regroupings have created (or reinforced) a historical trend in 
which people living in any on village were most probably from different places and 
backgrounds - having much in common with some of the others, something in common 
with many, and even little in common with others. The Mebengokre, like the other Ge, 
seem to have lived in commonalties for centuries, and still do so. This situation, quite 
symposium `Social Time and Social Space in Lowland South America', in the Americanist Congress, 
Paris 1976. 
102 I am not speaking here of reference terminology as opposed to address terminology, but of the ways 
the Mebengokre use it to create relateness between individuals. 
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uncanny in present-day native Amazonian ethnological scenario, is the focal point of 
my analysis in this chapter. 
But before going into this, I will give a rapid retrospect of the state-of-the-art 
of Ge- and Bororo-speaking peoples' kinship studies, in order to clarify the background 
against which I will be placing my own understanding. The field is marked by an 
ongoing discussion whose very terms, I believe, are misplaced, something that comes 
from an original mistake represented by the adoption of certain traits of some of these 
peoples as analytical categories for the understanding of others. This has been 
particularly harmful for the Mebengokre, whose ways of relatedness have been 
relegated to second plane by a rather byzantine discussion born from this very mistake, 
and feeding from it. 
Genealogy of a War of Categories 
Comparative endeavours in anthropology usually pose a subtle, but quite concrete, risk 
to the anthropologist. Concerned with the diversity and the particularity of individual 
forms of life, the ethnographic description produces as a result equally singular, 
individual descriptions that are not commonly intended for `application' outside the 
very particularity that gave rise to them. Such descriptions, thus, do not generally 
produce analytical concepts, that is, which can be generalised to other realities, but 
rather one could say, substantive percepta, or the rendering - always mediated by the 
anthropologist's eye - of that which is believed to be singular, unique to a particular 
ethnographic experience. The transit from one to another, from percepta to concepts103, 
is not accomplished, if hardly at all, without difficulty, and usually the anthropologist 
has to focus on the reflection, upon the adequacies of the transit, rather than on the 
103 Or from "substantive" to "analytical" concepts. 
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comparative stance that it supposedly makes possible. The reflection involved in the 
process becomes itself the centre of the stage, being more revealing, and interesting, 
than the rendering initially intended'04. 
This was not the feeling prevailing among the participants of the Harvard- 
Museu Nacional research project'°5, who studied several central Brazilian Ge- and 
Bororo-speaking peoples in the 1960s and early 1970s. But our genealogy does not 
really begin there. It starts several decades earlier, with the works of Curt Nimuendaju, 
first ethnographer of the Ge and one of the founding fathers of Brazilian ethnography. 
Nimuendaju worked with several of the central Brazilian Ge106, as well as many other 
Indigenous peoples, while working as a researcher for Museu Goeldi, in Belem do Para, 
northern Brazil, and for the (then called) Indian Protection Service, the Brazilian agency 
of Indigenous affairs. He opened up the whole ethnographic area of Ge studies to 
speculation by anthropologists, mainly because of his descriptions of the massive 
ceremonies (and institutional apparatus in general) that the Ge and the Bororo seem to 
produce with so much gusto. This was thought to be incompatible with their highly 
104 Such is Joanna Overing's (1987) notion of `translation' as creative process: the decentering of the 
focus of interest to the process of focusing on another life-form, so to speak. 
105 The project, which became known in the English-speaking anthropological community as the 
Harvard-Central Brazil Research project, was jointly conceived by Roberto Cardoso de Oliveira, then 
from Museu Nacional, and David Maybury-Lewis, from Harvard University, and involved researchers 
from both institutions. Museu Nacional developed then three different research projects, this being one 
of them. The other two were the Comparative Study of Brazilian Indigenous Societies and the Areas of 
Inter-Ethnic Friction, both coordinated by Roberto Cardoso de Oliveira. Researchers participating in 
the Harvard-Museu Nacional Research Project also participated in one, or both, of the other projects. 
The Indigenous societies researched in the former were the Krahö (Julio Cesar Melatti, who also 
participated in the other two projects), the Apinaye (Roberto da Matta, who also participated in the 
Comparative Study of Brazilian Indigenous Societies project with research among the Ge-speaking 
Gaviäo), the Krikati (Jean Carter Lave), the Bororo (Jon Christopher Crocker), the Shavante (David 
Maybury-Lewis), and the Mebengokre (then called Kavapö), the latter with two researchers, Terence 
Turner and Joan Bamberger. Another researcher, William Crocker, had already intiated research 
among the Ge-speaking Canela, and became a sort of `honorary member' of the project later on. For 
further details on these projects, see Melatti (2002). 
106 He conducted research among the Sherente, (central Ge), the Eastern Tinibira, the Apinaye (both 
Northern Ge. the later being also classified as Western Tinibira), and the Gorotire-Mebengokre, having 
also worked among the now-extinct Pau d'Arco Mebengokre (the Mebengokre are also Northern Ge). 
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`unsophisticated' material lives107. With his studies also emerged a picture of Ge 
kinship, as it was then defined, that puzzled anthropologists. In fact, the Ge, and also the 
Bororo, despite displaying a striking similarity in their social life generally, were 
described by Nimuendaju as having several distinct rules of descent: the central Ge 
(Shavante and Sherente), and also the Mebengokre, would be patrilineal; the northern 
Ge, theTimbira and the Bororo would be matrilineal, whereas the only western Timbira 
group, the Apinaye, would have a parallel descent rule. 
Nimuendaju's description, thus, posed serious ethnological problems. In 
relation to `kinship' issues, it became one of determining how peoples who are so 
similar in almost every other respect would have such different systems of descent? 
And effectively many anthropologists did ask the question, and tried to answer it 
from Nimuendaju's data. However, his data were not sufficient to the task, and the 
mystery remained 1 08. This was to be dealt with by the researchers of the Harvard- 
107 The Handbook of South American Indians (edited in 1944) represented a reaction to earlier studies 
that defined the Ge by what they lacked: pottery, canoes, agriculture, intoxicants, basketry press, etc., 
in an evident comparison with the more well-known Tupian peoples. The study on the Ge linguistic 
family, on the volume of the Handbook dedicated to the `marginal tribes', written by Robert Lowie 
(1946, Vol 1, pp. 477-520) , 
draws extensively on the ethnographies written by Nimuendaju on the 
Apinaye (1939), Sherente (1942), and Eastern Timbira (1946). Lowie was then able to correct earlier 
assumptions, as can be seen in the statement that" [c]ontrary to widespread notions, the majority of the 
Ge have been farmers, especially the Apinaye, with evidence for extensive manioc plantations going 
back to 1793. However, all the better known groups described in this article raise bitter and sweet 
manioc, maize, sweet potatoes, and yams. It is entirely improbable that this is due to Tupi example. " 
(idem, p. 480). However, a feeling of a certain incongruence between ceremonial/institutional life and 
material/technical life still obtained among the researchers of the Harvard-Museu Nacional two 
decades after the Handbook had been released, as may be seen by Maybury-Lewis, remarks in the very 
beginning of the preface of the volume that summarised the project's works (1979: 1-2): "How could 
peoples whose technical ability appeared to be so rudimentary have developed such cultural 
complexities? Had we underestimated their technology, or perhaps been overimpressed by their social 
institutions? Perhaps the anomaly could be explained by claiming that the Ge and Bororo were 
degenerate remnants of a higher South American civilisation... ". His statement was meant, of course, 
to be denied, and the contributors to the volume from the Harvard-Museu Nacional Project (Dialectical 
Societies, published in 1979) duly criticised such a notion. But the concern with the `anomaly' posed 
by a highly developed ceremonial life and a `poorly developed' material life was present from the very 
outset, as Maybury-Lewis' statement shows. 
108 One of the `mysteries', for instance, was the so-called "Apinaye anomaly". Nimuendaju described the 
Apinavc' as comprising four exogamous groups, the kije, whose members would marry only within 
another group, so that men from kije A would marry women from kije B, whose men would marry 
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Museu Nacional research project, who went to the field having precisely this aim. 
The project was thus commited from the outset to a comparative approach, and to the 
answering of the questions posed by Nimuendaju's data, concerned mainly with 
descent systems and the radical - as it seemed to them - discrepancies between the 
`material/technical sphere' and the `institutional/ceremonial' one. As will be seen 
throughout this work, the very distinction between the `material/technical' and the 
`ceremonial/institutional' must be questioned if we are to understand Ge and Bororo 
social life at all, and thus the musings of previous researchers concerning the subject 
were misplaced from the outset. 
The works of many of the project's researchers had as a common motive the 
questioning of the `African models' deployed up to then in the description and analysis 
of the Ge and Bororo, in the wake of the revision of kinship studies put forward by 
anthropologists working in Melanesia109. Their conclusions were broadly inspired by 
the conclusions of Melanesianists: they found no descent system among the northern Ge 
(and patrilateral lineages among the central Ge). The matrilineal tendency previously 
accredited to the northern Ge by Nimunedaju, according to them, was a result of the 
cummulative effects of uxorilocality, common to all Ge peoples' lo. Moreover, the 
exogamous moieties described by Nimuendaju for the northern Ge were not 
exogamous, having nothing to do with the regulation of marriage. Among the central 
women from kije C and so on. But he also described the Apinave as having a parallel descent rule, 
which evidently poses a serious problem, as the kije in any given generation would be composed of 
siblings of the kije that were supposed to be intermarrying in the previous generation. 
109 Maybury-Lewis himself was concerned with recent developments in British kinship theory by 
Rodney Needham, which can be seen in his use of the term "relationship system" instead of the more 
common "kinship system". This usage had also some backing in the so-called Ge institution of "formal 
friendship", which is explicitly posed as a `non-kinship' one by Ge -speaking peoples. 
110 See Maybury-Lewis' introduction to the volume Dialectical Societies (Maybury-Lewis 1979) for a 
detailed account of the theoretical strategy adopted by the contributors. 
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Ge and Bororo these moieties were present, but even there the regulation of marriage 
was related to clans and lineages, and not to the moieties proper' 11. 
Thus, the researchers of the project accorded little importance to the notion of 
descent, which was seen as irrelevant for the understanding of the Ge. They focused on 
the `native' ideologies regarding the institutional life and procreation. The main theme 
of the whole project was then shifted from descent to the pervading dualism that would 
obtain as an ideology in all Ge societies. But that was not the only shift to occur in their 
perspective. Another, more subtle one, linked to their concern with dual ideologies and 
institutions, occurred at the same time. Some of these ideologies, as well as particular 
configurations of social institutions, were generalised as analytical, comparative 
concepts, to all Ge peoples. 
In particular, one notion was to prove dear to the members of the project. This 
was the radical distinction, described by Melatti for the Kraho, between a `public' and a 
`domestic' spheres, the former associated with ceremonial life and the latter with life 
within the familial group, that is, respectively, with the centre of the plaza, where all 
rituals take place, and with the residential segments, the place of abode of uxorilocal 
families. This division was expressed by the radical distinction between relations 
derived from the Kraho ideology of conception, which poses the familial group as a 
`substance' unit' 12, and the conceptions related to the transmission of names, which are 
1lI Among the western Shavante, the moiety system actually regulated marriage, according to Maybury- 
Lewis (1984), because two of the clans that composed that moiety did not exchange wives, but married 
only in the clan of the opposite moiety. Among the Bororo (J. C. Crocker 1976), marriage would be 
regulated by lineages rather than by moiety. 
112 "According to Krah6 ideas on the subject, both man and woman contribute with substances that form 
the organism of a new human being. Such substances come from the food ingested by the genitors. (... ) 
Even after birth, up until adult age, every individual keeps a biological link with those who generated 
him or her. It is as if the organism of the genitors continued in the organisms of those generated by 
them, in such a way that, if any phenomenon was to harm the genitor's body, it would harm also the 
body of his or her child. (... ) When an individual becomes gravely infirm or when he or she is bitten by 
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associated with the ceremonial moieties and to ceremonial life in general (Melatti 
1976). 
According to Melatti, Kraho consanguineal kinship terminology can be divided 
in two groups. One is composed by the terms for people implied in the procreation, 
which ego applies to those who generated him or her, or to those that could have done 
so' 13. His/her liaison to the people referred to by these names would be mainly 
`biological', something which is implied not only by the procreation ideology but by the 
fact that parents are responsible for `... [the] aliment that is needed to feed the 
children 114 (1976: 145). The other group of terms would be constituted by the terms 
implied in the transmission of names, used by an individual to designate people who 
have effectively transmitted his/her names, or to those who could have done so' 15. Other 
terms are those for `brother/sister', either `real' or `classificatory', which can be 
included in both classes above, as same-sex siblings can have (but not necessarily) 
identical nominators and genitors. 
The transmission of names entails also, among other things, the transmission of 
ceremonial roles, as well as the transmission of the affiliation to a pair of moieties 
concerned with ceremonial life. If the persons involved are males, the transmission also 
entails the affiliation to another pair of moieties. The nominated also tends to use the 
a snake, even being an adult, both the individuals that generated him or her, and those who were 
generated by at least one of his or her genitors, must follow together certain taboos, mainly alimentary, 
until the sick person is well again. (... ) In sum, each individual, together with his or her genitors and 
with other individuals generated by at least one of such genitors, form a biological unit. " (Melatti 
1976: 144-45) 
113 Int. au: F, FB, FZS, etc. Imre: M, MZ, etc. The reciprocal is ikhra (Melatti 1976: 145). 
114 Melatti (1976: 145). It is interesting to note that Krah6's understand ing of this'biological' link also 
includes the nurturance aspects of the relationship established within the intimate sphere of familial 
relations. 
115 Keti: MB, MF, FF, and all the later's parallel cousins. Tui: FZ, FZD, FM, MM, and all the later's 
parallel cousins. The reciprocal is itamtxua. When one effectively transmits one's names to his/her 
tamtxua, he/she calls him/her ipantu (Melatti 1976: 144-45) 
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same set of relationship terms used by his nominator to refer to his relatives that are not 
part of the intimate group defined by substance ties (Melatti 1978: 60). This distinction, 
though, does not imply that the Kraho do not generally recognise their being linked to 
their relatives in both ways. As Melatti (1976: 145-46, my translation) puts it, 
This distinction between the biological and the social is of course somewhat 
artificial. But it does not mean that the Kraho do not recognise the social ties that 
link children to their genitors, or the biological ties that link the ipantu [that is, 
those that receive one's names] to their nominators. The Kraho simply emphasize 
the image of a bifurcation in the transmission of biological and social ties - 
although recognising that they are linked by both to their relatives - through the 
rule that stipulates that it is impossible to be the genitor and the nominator at the 
same time. 
Kraho notions of a clear-cut distinction between both aspects of relatedness 
were used by da Matta, in whose hands it underwent its first metamorphosis into an 
analytical tool for the description of other Ge peoples. For da Matta, the distinction 
would be for the Apinaye a way to avoid that the relationships present in the `domestic' 
domain `contaminated' those of the formal, `public' domain (1976: 153). This became 
part of his explanatory scheme of the bilaterality of the Apinaye (and northern Ge more 
generally) `social system', which was, according to him, more of the Melanesian type 
than of the African, i. e. lacking descent groups. The original division, then, described 
by Melatti as part of Kraho social thought, became a tool for the discussion of 
theoretical issues among the participants of the project. It was made into an analytic 
concept, one that was suited to `explain' how the northern Ge could exist without 
descent systems. Instead of notions of the building of the person by means of 
`substance' links and of names and ceremonial roles, as described by Melatti, there were 
the dynamics of the functioning of the `social system'. 
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For da Matta, the focus of the relationships in the `domestic sphere' is the 
nuclear family, which is made `one' through a community of substance. These 
relationships become weaker the more distant one is from the nuclear `focus' of this 
communality of substance. This biological foundation of social relations has two 
meanings for da Matta. Firstly, it expresses the gradations between social ties in 
everyday life, `relativising' the terminological classification through the categorisation 
kuoia/kumrendyl 16 (1976: 152). Secondly, it bisects the relationship system into two 
classes: those biologically linked to ego, and those non-biologically linked, in other 
words, those who have weak, distant `blood ties', but who have ceremonial obligations 
towards ego, replace the mutual obligations defined by the biological relations. As da 
Matta (1976: 152) puts it, " [w]here blood (or the biological dimension) ceases to be 
fundamental and begins to allow for the establishment of discontinuities in the bilateral 
network of relationships, a continuity is created by means of public and ceremonial 
ties. " 
This `biological distance' is based on the distance between the generations and 
the separation of sexes. Contiguous generations are strongly linked. Between non- 
contiguous generations, the ties become weaker, and those of the parents' siblings that 
are of the opposite sex as the parent (FZ and MB) become identified with the 
grandparents, forming the class of geti/tui, opposed, both biologically and socially, to 
the class of genitors. The geti/tui class, biologically distant from ego, give ego their 
names, becoming thus mediators between ego and the ceremonial sphere. Both 
dimensions thus allow for the establishment of continuities, in different ways - and 
1 16 These terms were taken by da Matta as applying to `fictive' or `classificatory' and `real' relatives. 
These terms (kuoialkumrendy) are the Apinave equivalent to the Mebengokre terms kaakfkunrenx, 
which will be analysed in this chapter. As the reader will 
have occasion to appreciate, these terms are 
(at least for the Mebengokre) rather more complex than da Matta's rendering would suggest. 
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more than that, in mutually exclusive ways. This dualism in the relationship system 
prevents the development of unilineal descent groups from the uxorilocal residences 
and the extended families. 
One can see here how the idea of kindred became the focal point of the 
analysis in da Matta's description of Apinaye form of relatedness. What had been 
described for the Kraho as an emphasis on different aspects of an idea of a Kraho 
being, had its Apinaye equivalent represented as the sorting out of classes of people. 
Da Matta interprets the idea of `blood' as a metaphor for social relations, and the 
whole picture becomes one of the relationship between "classes" of individuals. 
Matta clearly has the concept of `descent' in mind when he writes of the Apinaye 
`divided world'. The two dimensions, as described by him, of Apinaye social life 
break the link between biological and jural relations, common to (African) unilineal 
descent groups as described by classical kinship theory, where biological affiliation is 
the element through which rights and duties are transmitted between people. For da 
Matta, bilaterality avoids unilineality, as the system imposes a distinction of people 
and groups according to their position within ego's kindred, that is, according to what 
they transmit to ego: either names or physical substance. The relationship system 
does not transmit rights and duties as in unilineal groups. It is just an operator of the 
distinct forms of classification that exist in Apinaye ideology. This formulation, of 
course, begs the question of why the Apinaye would `prevent' a unilineal conception 
wholly strange to them. But da Matta is speaking here of an internal logic of the 
Apinaye `social system', which, I believe, is one of the problems at the root of the 
contemporary imbroglio in which Ge kinship studies find themselves. 
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The transformation of the `tune' of the ethnographical description was still to 
go a long way. T. Turner, working with the Mebengokre, developed one aspect of da 
Matta's model into the very cekernelntre of a functional-cum-marxist theory of the 
production and reproduction of society. According to him, Mebengokre male elders, 
married into their wives' houses, would dominate their sons-in-law and, through their 
capacity to produce social value, gain status within Mebengokre society. Institutional 
life would be a way to mask the fundamentally hierarchical, asymmetric nature of their 
society. Moreover, the way this fundamental structuring of society reproduced itself 
would be through an age-set system and uxorilocality, which made men leave their natal 
households and move into those of their wives, allowing for elder men (or, in more 
recent versions, for elder couples) to dominate them' 17. What was accomplished by 
uxorilocality at the level of the individual household, was generalised by the plaza 
institutions, which would thus provide a `symbolic' (in the sense of `deceptive') means 
of reproducing hierarchy. 
T. Turner was highly critical of Maybury-Lewis' `idealism' in formulating the 
`ideology of dualism' as the basic principle for the understanding of Ge peoples. 
Maybury-Lewis in fact regarded the dualistic ideology as the central aspect of Ge 
organisational forms, together with uxorilocality. For him, the concept of `descent' had 
no significance as an analytical category to describe Ge peoples. The theoretical 
controversy initiated by Nimuendaju's descriptions had been one of how peoples that 
were so similar in every other aspect could be so different in relation to descent, having 
1 17 T. Turner (1979). Incidentally, he reproduces here an argument by Levi-Strauss, albeit in a different 
way. Levi-Strauss (1985) states that Ge dualism is nothing more than a way to mask asymmetry and 
hierarchy, in scenarios where symmetric dualism, essentially represented as non-hierarchical, masks a 
deeper, concentrical dualism. Turner stated the same for the Mebengokre, saying that their views of the 
world as comprising concentric circles 
having the ngobe, or centre of the plaza, in the middle, and 
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matriliny, patriliny and parallel descent as descent principles. The research of the 
participants of the Harvard-Museu Nacional project emphasised that that was not 
exactly the case; but even so the whole subject of descent was secondary, according to 
Maybury-Lewis, because deeper organisational features were at work, shaping Ge 
social life. These were an ideology of dualism, the distinction between the `public and 
the private spheres', and uxorilocality. 
Maybury-Lewis' description of the Central Ge118, curiously enough made 
essentially through the categories of traditional, Africanist ethnology, stated that descent 
was sociologically less operative than the division between two conceptual, ego- 
centered fields of we-them, which coincided with the division between consanguineal 
relatives (that is, from the same patrilineage as ego) and affines. He understood 
exogamy itself to be the expression of a deeper principle of dualism, which he saw as 
the pervasive theme in Ge social structure and social life more generally. The 
opposition, forthcoming from a dualistic ideology, between the `public' and the 
`private' spheres of social life served then as a structural operator of the specific 
institutional arrangements of distinct Ge peoples. Among the central Ge119, a 
`patrilocal' ideology masked uxorilocality as a principle, through the practice of male 
sibling groups marrying `into' a same uxorilocal household. 
According to Maybury-Lewis, among the central Ge the real organising 
principle of social life was the bisection, effected by the use of relationship 
terminology, between the ego-centered fields of `we' and 'them'. This would be the 
specific Shavante/Stierente realisation of the dualistic ideology pervasive among the Ge. 
expanding into the circle of houses and the periphery of the village, towards the forest and the 
unknown, was a display of a consciousness of concentric dualism among them 
1 18 He did fieldwork among both the Sherente and the Shavante. 
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The relationship terminology was taken as the organising element of social life. 
associated with the distinction between `public' and `private', which became thus 
generalised to all Ge through Maybury-Lewis' interpretation of their social life as an 
expression of such `driving forces'. Following the work of the researchers of the 
Harvard-Museu Nacional project, the field of Ge studies became `moulded' by a series 
of analytical concepts, that were centered in assumptions about human relatedness as 
having to do with `classes', `sets', `groups', etc, of individuals. 
It is precisely because of such past theoretical history, I think, that the question 
of descent was to come back with a vengeance, as can be seen in the work of Aracy 
Lopes da Silva (1986) among the Shavante. Her work was centered in the investigation 
of the what could only be defined, given the background of Ge studies, as a relation 
between the different `spheres' of the social life, as set out by Maybury-Lewis. She 
investigated how name-givers- who are defined as `others', being primarily from the 
mother's lineage - posit themselves between the fields of `we' and `others'. Name- 
givers are not marriageable. Upon nomination, a male name-giver is called `father', 
which is the name given to someone from one's own lineage (including the genitor). 
The relationship between name-giver and name-receiver is always symmetrical. It is 
also important to note here, that Lopes da Silva dealt with the individual relationship 
between a person and his name-giver, and not between classes of individuals, in stark 
contrast with the approach adopted by Maybury-Lewis. Her work thus questioned the 
radical distinction between the `social fields' of `we' and `others', proposed by 
Maybury-Lewis for the central Ge. 
1 19 The Shavante and the Sherente. 
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It is clear that the relation between name-giver and name receiver was 
described as crossing two different `domains' of social life because the domains were 
postulated as a radical, all-pervasive distinction in the first instant. It was not only there, 
though, but also in her reappraisal of Shavante `lineages', that Lopes da Silva disagreed 
with Maybury-Lewis' approach. Lineages had been described by Maybury-Lewis as 
`fluid' and politically-based, as the kernel of political factions in the village, lacking the 
permanence that is a characteristic of a corporate group (that is, they are not `classical' 
African lineages)120 
. For Lopes da Silva, this was an evidence of the ambiguity in 
which the term `lineage' had been applied to the Shavante (Lopes da Silva 1986: 169). 
She described the `lineage' as based on sets of certain `wealth', which included 
ceremonial roles, knowledge, etc. This `wealth' was recognised as the collective 
`property' of the group of that lineage, the memebers of which used it as a means of 
exchange, donation and lending between the lineages. There were, according to her, two 
types of wealth, one set that could be exchanged and another that was inalienable. The 
former was the means for establishing numerical balance and political alliances between 
lineages, a process leading to the development of political factions (1986: 177-78). 
Lopes da Silva understood the `flexibility' of the clan system, generated by 
such traffic of wealth and political alliances, as part of the possibilities allowed for by 
the strucuture of society itself. They would be `institutional' opportunities, structural in 
themselves, and not part of the `context', as Maybury-Lewis had described them in his 
appraisal of the Shavante (Lopes da Silva 1986: 171-72). 
To be precise Lopes da Silva's discussion can hardly be called a return of 
`descent' to the discussion on Ge social organisation, insofar as it had never been totally 
120 Maybury-Lewis (1984 ) actually described how a man would be able to change his clan affiliation 
102 
absent from it. William Crocker, for instance, discussed the idea that the Canela were 
evolving toward matriliny, a process frustrated when contact with national society 
began to act as a deculturalising factor (W. Crocker 1977: 269). W. Crocker depicts a 
system for the Canela very much similar to that of Lopes da Silva for the Shavante. He 
states that "... an underlying notion of the Canela relationship system is that uterine 
lines, the matrilines, continue through time, their members being equivalent to each 
other" (W. Crocker 1977: 266, his italics). `Longhouses' are constituted along lines of 
females living together. They are `balanced' by lines of males, whose continuity, 
however becomes broken by other aspects of the social system, in contrast to the matri- 
lines, which preserve their continuity. 
Some rites are associated with matrilines, while others are transmitted to 
people outside them, through the process of name-givingl21. The term haakat refers to 
ego's living ascendants (sometimes also to dead ones), but it can also refer to the 
matriline, the locus of `ownership' of a named festival rite. Crocker understood 
`haakat', or `-tsaakat' to be close to the notion of `matrilineal' local descent group, 
which was, according to him, a corporate group, named and (ideally, at least) 
exogamous. This group also displayed common functions for its members, it was 
ancestor-orientated (at least to living 'ancestors'), and had festival `property' in 
common. But some of the matrilines, or even whole longhouses, may not have haakats 
upon moving to another village. 
121 He sees it as a degenerescence of the incipient `matrilineal system', but even so, " It is of particular 
importance that some rites (and festival groups and men's societies) are passed on along name 
transmission lines (... ) and that other rites and festival rites are transmitted within a `ritual matrilineal 
descent group' (... ). The trend, especially among the younger generations, is to pass on rites through 
the naming process, rather than within `lineages', but the very fact that many rites still have `lineage-' 
related personnel, houses and village locations and that these are `matrilineally' transmitted within the 
'lineage', must cause Ge specialists to think again about the extensiveness of the matrilateral and male 
ascendand's matrilateral kin group - ego's `M's longhouse' and ego's "GM's/Gc's longhouses'. " 
(1977: 267). 
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(1977: 267), that is, they would be `de facto matrilines' without the distinctive diacritic 
signs of a 'matriline'. 
W. Crocker, however, is clearly uneasy about the exact relevance of the notion 
of `descent' with respect to Canela society. One can see he is unhappy with (what I 
have been calling) the metaphysical load of notions of `group', as implying relations 
between `classes' of individuals. His stress on the likeness between people within a 
same matriline - or as he puts it, the equivalence between them, a notion that I will seek 
to expand in my description of Mebengokre ways of relatedness - points to a different 
direction, that is, not to the constitution of `classes' of individuals but to the constitution 
of likenesses, or equivalences, between beings. That is, it points not to a sorting out of 
individuals in classes, but to a semiotics of the creation of individual relatedness. 
Another sort of uneasiness, I think, obtains for Vanessa Lea in her picture of 
the Mebengokre. According to her, the Mebengokre have Houses, in the Levi-Straussian 
sense of personnes morales, organised along `uterine ties', as she calls them, thereby 
avoiding the use of such terms as `lines' 122. Houses have, among other characteristics, 
the `property' of several types of ceremonial `wealth', both ritual regalia and ceremonial 
rights, as well as of personal names, both of which transmitted through the `uterine 
line', that is, through women within a House, or from men to their sisters' sons. Such 
`transmission' is actually from ngret/kwatyi to tabdjwy, that is, from people in a 
category as name-givers to that of name-receivers, (which include not only MB-to-ZS 
and FZ to BD, but also MM/FF to CC, and `classificatory' ones). This gives evidence to 
the existence of a bilateral or cognactic kindred involved in the process of 
`transmission' of names. This `bilateral' aspect has an uneasy relationship with the 
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`uterine' ideology, according to which a name transmitted `outside' the House must 
return to it in the following generation. According to Lea, the fact that grandparents of 
both `sides' can transmit their names and nekrex to their grandchildren (even if only as 
a `life usufruct' from the paternal side, as she puts it), softens the tension between both 
forms of classification (that is, the `house-` and the `kindred-` based classifications) 
(1985: 271-71). 
I suspect that the tension I refer to in the previous paragraph is centered in 
Lea's use of concepts rather than in their relation to any reality they seek to unfold. 
Anthropologists studying Ge peoples apparently have been struggling against implicit 
notions and the whole metaphysical burden implied by them - as with the notion of 
`descent', for instance. The same can be said of the notion of `social relation', as 
implied by these very notions, which are seen as realising themselves through `classes', 
or `groups' of people. 
A related uneasiness, is, I think, espressed by William Fisher in his reappraisal 
of the (in his terms) flexibility of `strategic' manipulation of kin ties among the 
Mebengokre. He reckons that `kin' is not a useful label to understand "... the specific 
way people in a village experience a common unity or define themselves as a 
community" (1998: 54, his italics). He proposes to describe this experience of common 
unity from the point of view that is stressed by the Mebengokre, i. e., the importance of 
acheving certain emotional states as a significant basis for the achievement of 
community, of living together (1998: 54). Also, according to him, 
We cannot assume that the very existence of corporate groups or communal 
institutions produce something like a shared sense of units' or purpose. The kinds 
122 Apparently she has lately abandoned the notion of `House' as explicative of Mebengokre social 
organisation (Mdreio Goldman, personal communication). 
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of institutional mechanisms that organize production, reciprocity, ceremony, or 
the public and domestic domains are not thought to link everybody in the village 
to one another. (1998: 54). 
Although Fisher clings to such concepts as 'kin', 'group', public and private', 
to understand Mebengokre ways of relatedness, his goal is one of understanding 
collective ways of creating and managing emotional states from the `mould' provided 
by the feelings one has for those one shares a similarity in being. As he puts it, 
To be effective, group activities must produce combined physical/social states 
which are correlated to certain emotions. These sentiments are powerful because 
they are social, public, and collective expression of sentiments that, when 
experienced in the domestic domain, are felt to be natural outgrowths of feelings 
of close kin for one another due to their sharing common physical substance. 
(1998: 54) 
I propose to do something similar in this thesis. But in contrast to those who 
have retained the concepts, and the baggage disclosed in this `genealogy', I propose 
instead a humbler approach, where I will try to convey what I was able to learn about 
how Mebengokre share their existence with those they call their ömbikwä. I intend to 
unfold this understanding through a description of some specific ways the Mebengokre 
use (some) relatedness terms, as I shall call them. This, not because I assume that this 
specific trait of social life has some autonomy, or any sort of epistemological or 
ontological preponderance over other aspects of Mebengokre social life, but because I 
think it useful to disclose some essential aspects of the ways the Mebengokre conceive 
of their relatedness to other people. In sum, they are an excuse to speak of manifold 
aspects of their form of life. 
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I will focus in this chapter upon what is usually called `classificatory kinship' - 
but with stress being upon the way Mebengokre create `kinship' among themselves 
through convivial and discursive practices. Rather than assuming that this kinship is a 
reflex, or extension, of `actual' genealogical kinship, I shall focus on what I call the 
semiotics of relatedness involved in the creation of 'kinship'. I maintain that this 
practice involves a process essentially similar to the creation of similarities among 
people living in close intimacy ('actual kinship'). Similar, but not identical. And the 
differences are not in the fact that one is an `extension' of the other, but in the different 
values that the Mebengokre attribute to such similarities. The unfolding of such values, 
which I intend to do in this chapter, amounts to a Mebengokre semiotics of relatedness. 
I will begin, thus, by describing the field situation where I first encountered such a 
notion, and its explanation by my Mebengokre friends. 
This happened during a ceremony, during which men sorted themselves out in 
groups (and I use the word in a loose sense here) of kamy, or brothers, in order to 
collectively hunt down game that was then given to the sponsors of the ceremony 
(fathers of the children being named in the ceremony, in this specific case). Most 
ceremonies involve such creation of "kamy-ship", as ceremonies usually include a 
ceremonial hunting expedition to get game for its culminating point. Ceremonial 
hunting expeditions involve amassing people who go hunting for their kamy in order 
that the latter may feed the former during the all-day (or all-night) dancing that marks 
the culminating point of the ceremony. Nowhere were the values of intimacy made 
clearer to me than during this ceremony, and in the explanations given to me by my 
friends with whom I became a brother to several of the ceremony's sponsors. It is in the 
subtleties of Mebengokre evaluation of the similarities between brothers created in 
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ceremonies and those created by means of togetherness, by means of shared intimacy in 
a daily basis (as is the case of those who are born from the same mother and have lived 
together since their early childhood), that their complex social philosophy of similitudes 
unfolds itself in Mebengokre village life. This social philosophy's reflexions are based 
on the experience of intimacy of the domestic group, as Fisher indicates above. Thus, I 
believe that a focus on such social philosophy furnishes an adequate vantage point from 
which one can see the values attached to "kinship" as well, to living together in close 
intimacy with those one has being raised with. 
Of a Kind: A Ceremonial Creation of Togetherness 
I came to Catete Indian village for my first period of fieldwork in May, 1999123. The 
village was quiet that day, no movement could be seen related to the ceremony which, I 
was told, was then happening. The elders had decided some time before that they were 
going to have a mereremei women's ceremony. Mereremei means literally "important 
people", and it is a ceremony performed either by all men or by all women of the 
village, in which female personal names begining with any ceremonial prefix can be 
confirmed. 
Mebengokre personal names often include a ceremonial prefix that can be 
either male- or female- specific, or common to both female and male names (depending 
on the prefix). These are called "beautiful names", and people with such names must 
undergo a ceremony to have their names confirmed. These names do not entail any 
special mark of distinction for their bearers, neither do those with names beginning by 
the same "beautiful" prefix pertain to a group of any sort. Their only "corporate" 
activity is to dance together in the ceremony related to the ceremonial prefix, something 
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which is done when their names are confirmed. The percentage of people with 
"beautiful" names varies from one Mebengokre village to another; Lea (1986) states, for 
instance, that among the Mekragnoti-Mebengokre roughly a third of the people have 
"beautiful" names. Among the Xicrin-Mebengokre, every male has a "beautiful" name 
(with the prefix Bep-), and may (and usually do) have many other names, "beautiful" or 
otherwise. The name by which any person is called in everyday life varies according to 
the speaker. During a naming ceremony, though, those with names that have the prefix 
of the ceremony being performed are usually addressed, and referred to, by that name. 
Also, during the ceremony, those whose names are being confirmed are always 
addressed and referred to by that name. After the ceremony they may or may not be 
called by that name by their companions or by others. One of the long-standing puzzles 
of Mebengokre ethnology concerns these "beautiful" names: why are they "beautiful" at 
all? I expect that this work will provide an answer to that question, by looking into the 
specific aesthetic and moral dimensions of "beauty" for the Mebengokre. 
During the days I came to Catete village, people were busy with their 
individual and family affairs: men went hunting (individually, or with a companion), 
and went about choosing the best spot for their wives' garden that year; women were 
busy harvesting products of their gardens, and children in general were amusing 
themselves. On arriving at the village in any morning or afternoon of those days, the 
unaccustomed eye would meet no trace of the ceremony people so vehemently insisted 
they were performing. 
123 I had been there before, in 1996, on a short visit, when I had made the acquaintancy of one of the 
leaders of the village. As things turned out, 
he had by 1999 moved to a new village, Djudjekb, the year 
before. 
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A few days before my arrival, men and women had prepared manioc flour. 
their staple food without which there is no way of performing any ceremony. As a 
virtually non-perishable food, manioc flour allows people to go through the months- 
long performances involved in ceremonies, some of them requiring that people for long 
periods do not leave the village. During this time there is little opportunity to hunt or 
even to go to the (at times fairly distant) gardens to get food. Manioc meal is a product 
in whose preparation both men and women are involved: the latter to dig up the tuber in 
their gardens and grate it, either back at the village (where there is a 'manioc house') or 
at the gardens themselves, some of which have their own 'manioc houses' 124. The 
women also gather dry wood for the fire, bringing back to the village impressive back- 
borne baskets filled with heavy loads of both products, the manioc and the wood. The 
men squeeze the grated manioc in regional-style presses and toast it over the large 
ovens built for this purpose. 
If mornings and afternoons displayed no trace of ceremony, nights and early 
mornings were filled with it. Every night, around 3 a. m., an elder would come to the 
men's house in the centre of the village to instruct the sleeping unmarried men 
(menoronyre). In one particular night when I was sleeping in the men's house I 
remember Beb-djö, one of my fathers, coming to speak to us in his loud, powerful 
voice. The speech was meant to reach the ears of those sleeping at their houses, and as 
such was delivered in a thundering fashion (the kri or residential circle is some 50 
metres away from the men's house, located in the centre of the village), awakening even 
124 A "manioc house" (casa de farinha, in Portuguese) is a very common outfit in the interior of Brazil, 
and was quickly adopted by the Mebengokre after contact. 
It consists of a electricity or diesel- 
propelled machine to grate the manioc, a press to 
dry it from its poisonous juice, and open ovens, 
usually wood-fueled, to transform the dry paste 
into manioc flour. Atebengokre commonly refer to it 
by its Portuguese name. 
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the most resistent boys who, although not leaving their hammocks, were all well awake 
a few minutes after he had started. 
A man's prestige is enlarged by his speaking mex, or good/well/beautiful, that 
is, by his possessing oratory skills, talking according to tradition both in form and in 
content. To do this, a speaker addresses himself directly to a certain audience, while 
addressing himself indirectly to yet another, which makes his speech to the boys 
something he displays to the wider (indirect) audience. To the latter, he is not showing - 
or not only showing at any rate - his lore: he is also demonstrating his teaching of the 
boys; he is showing himself as one that does what tradition, me tumre, says an abatäri, 
an adult, should do. A second-order performance, this 'showing off to the village 
exemplifies much of the Mebengokre approach to the issue of one's relationship to 
those in the village at large (instead as only to his close kin): it is the relationship 
between a performer and an audience, mediated by third elements. 
Beb-djö spoke that day in the dark about the old times, people told me in the 
morning, times when the Mebengokre did more than play soccer everyday, all day (an 
obvious exaggeration, but one that is frequently mentioned by older people). Close to 
dawn (more or less one hour before it), older women began to arrive, an initial group of 
some half-dozen before the others. They had come to sing, and sat on the floor at the 
southern corner of the men's house in a sort of circle, from where they sang for some 1 
1/2 hours, until dawn. Beb-djö appreciated the 'rehearsal' from his corner of the men's 
house. He had confided to me that he was very fond of women's singing. Actually most 
men are, as women's singing is deemed sexually appealing, the same way women in 
ceremonial dressing - with their garments, their body paintings and all - are the 
prototype of female beauty. Ceremonies create beauty, and in many different ways. This 
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is an inherent characteristic of them, explicitly stated by people whenever they talk 
about ceremonies. 
That morning the women sang several short ngrere, or songs, always initiated 
by an older woman and soon followed by the others. Several women alternated in this 
'leading role' - from the musical point of view - as various songs were sung by the 
group, in a sequence involving the performance of an individual song only once before 
moving to another one, until their repertoire (or one of such repertoires, as I came to 
know afterwards) was completed. Not all songs were sung in that single night, both 
because not all women went to the gathering (which is fairly common in such 
'rehearsals'), and because the repertoire is always tailored according to the timing, that 
is, singing invariably stops at sunrise. Specific women are responsible to keep, and to 
sing, specific songs during ceremonies. These women then teach the songs to their 
nieces/granddaughters (tabdjwy) - as well as to other people, occasionally - and in this 
way they say they 'own' the song. 'Owning' here implies above all a moral commitment 
to keeping alive the song, both by performing it on the appropriate occasions and by 
teaching it to other, younger people, so that it may go on forever being performed. For 
the ceremony, all women should ideally know all songs, and sing them while dancing 
together in a single row of dancers, as they do in the initial part of the ceremony, but the 
real stress on learning is given to a woman's nieces/granddaughters' 'own' songs. 
The routine of the ceremony was changed at the beginning of the month. On 
the morning of June 4th, around 11 a. m., the women cleared the plaza for their 
ceremony , which would start125 
that very same evening. Most men had left, having 
125 That is, the actual performance of the ceremony, as opposed to the `rehearsals' that had occurred 
during the previous month and before. Mebengokre call both the actual performances and the 
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gone hunting or fishing specially for the ceremony. Some youngsters, unmarried 
adolescents menoronyre and several children were at the men's house at the centre of 
the plaza, playing marbles and chatting, and watching the women do their job. The 
latter finished working in a few minutes, gathering together in one of their houses to 
rehearse once again the songs which they would sing in the ceremony proper. Around 
11: 30, a half-dozen women left for their gardens, some of them taking along their small 
children in their arms, with huge woven baskets held on their backs by means of a wide 
tree bark string crossing their foreheads. The body and cheeks of all women and 
children were painted with annato. 
The adult men returned that same afternoon. From 6 to 7 p. m., the women 
danced around the kri, the residential circle of houses. These were mostly young 
women, painted and adorned with bracelets and necklaces made with glass beads, as 
well as small feather adornments. They went around the men's house in small `rows' of 
4-6 people, each led by a couple of older women. They danced in pairs, each double 
row leaving from the men's house for its turn around the plaza. The men's house, 
usually a male space, was taken by women, mostly female children watching the dance. 
From the front of their houses, a few men watched at a distance. The central plaza had 
been entirely cleaned, a perfect circle delineated around the men's house. Most men had 
gone hunting and fishing again, as some game and fish are better hunted in the 
evening ' 26. Several women had also gone collecting wood in the afternoon, to prepare 
djwy-kupu, the cooked manioc paste 'cake'. These women (mostly older, with many 
children and tabdjwy) had come just before the ceremony, bringing wood and banana 
`rehearsals' ine toro, as explained in the introduction, and distinguish the main performance (which 
actually closes the ceremony), the culminating point of it, with the name ami apra. 
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leaves to cook and wrap the djwy-kupu. Some older couples had also done the same. 
These - and most older women as well - were the mekrareremei, the `good/beautiful 
people with children', the parents of the children to have their names confirmed in the 
ceremony. The djwy-kupu manioc cakes were meant for the hunting expedition, soon to 
leave the village. 
The djwy-kupu is a sort of 'bread', prepared with raw manioc paste and cooked 
at the ki earth oven. It can be prepared with several different fillings, such as game, fish, 
and green bananas. A djwy-kupu that takes only manioc paste is a most 
characteristically female food, not in terms of its consumption but of its production: 
only women ever prepare it. This sort of djwy-kupu is always made at the village by the 
women, and is an essential provision for hunting expeditions, as they can be preserved 
and are edible for several days. The women bring the manioc from their gardens, as well 
as the wood for the fire of the ki (earth oven), grating the manioc and pressing it to 
squeeze away the poisonous juice. The paste is then 'folded' (kupu means 'packet') in a 
packet of clean banana leaves, two layers of them, and placed on the hot stones of the 
earth oven to cook. The result is a hard 'brick', easy to transport and ready to eat. They 
are produced in large amounts and there is always plenty of them on a hunting 
expedition. A meal by a hunting party in the forest is never complete without some 
'shots' exchanged in play by the men with hardened chunks of their djwy-kupu. As with 
meals back in their houses, meat should always be accompanied by the djwy-kupu or by 
any other sort of vegetable food. 
126 The most used hunting strategy seem to be the 'waiting': one finds oneself a place at the bank of a 
river, where game comes to drink. One then waits until some animal turns up, something that may take 
most of the evening. 
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This particular women's ceremony was a naming ceremony, or, more 
specifically, a ceremony for the confirmation of names that one has received as a baby. 
Any woman's name - names with any ceremonial prefix - can be confirmed at that 
ceremony. The mereremei, the celebrated children (the name means `those who are 
good/beautiful', sometimes translated by them as 'important people'), have ages which 
range from older children (around 8-9 years old) to pre-pubescent adolescents (12-13 
years old). 
In old times people used to have their 'beautiful' names confirmed earlier in 
their lives, around 4 to 8 years old, a pattern closer to that of the Xingu Mebengokre. 
The change came in the last decades, when contact made the Xikrin population so small 
that they had to give up for a while performing their ceremonies altogether. When 
ceremonial life began to be performed again, during the stabilisation of their situation as 
'contacted' Indians, the generation of youngsters that had not had their ceremonial 
names confirmed was introduced at a later age to the ceremonial system, and the habit 
was kept from then on to celebrate children's names at that older age. 
Another important alteration due to depopulation was the concentration of 
ceremonially-prefixed names within a reduced number of name-bearers, something that 
made of the whole of the male population, for instance, bearers of a Bep-prefixed name. 
In this way, a Bep-yry me toro is a ceremony in which all children of the appropriate 
age can take part, and in fact do (or almost all of them do anyway). Actually, it is not 
depopulation as such that is responsible for such contingencies, but a small population, 
and there is a crucial difference: a small population can be a result of other processes 
than the loss of people. Small population can be a direct consequence of a factional 
process, that has lead to the formation of a new, smaller village. The result is that it is 
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more difficult to perform the more 'specific' ceremonies, like those that celebrate a less 
common ceremonial prefix, for want of enough sponsors (that is, parents of the 
celebrated children) to feed the entire village during the celebration. 
While singing, the older women are also `transmitting' their songs to the 
mereremei behind whom they stand (their tabdjwy) in the rows of dancing women. 
Mebengokre say the kwatui dancing with the mereremei sponsors are their FM, while 
the nget dancing with their male mereremei tabdjwy are their MF. This is a stated 
preference that is rarely strictly followed due to contingencies, either of the 'objective' 
sort - when, for instance, someone has to transmit one's kukrädjä or ceremonial right to 
someone, and has no one to receive it, something that happened quite frequently in the 
depopulated Catete village in the early 1960's - or due to 'subjective' factors - personal 
preferences of people, for instance, in terms of the transmission - that both delineate a 
practice more complex and 'anarchic' than that expressed by the Mebengokre ideal. 
One of the most noticeable characteristics of Mebengokre ceremonies is that 
they always involve an audience. Although they are called 'parties', as the Mebengokre 
usually translate me toro into Portuguese ('festas'), there is always a high measure of 
performance involved that presupposes an audience for whom the dancers perform. The 
performatic excellence is openly praised - and appraised - by the audience. 
Performance is intimately related to the creation of joy and of a general elation in the 
performers and the village at large. In fact, the production of such feelings as those of 
joy (and, in specific occasions, of o'amak, to miss, and others, even of anger) is one of 
the very raisons d'etre of ceremonies. People explicitly state that me toro are a way to 
make people happy and gay, and that it is good/beautiful (mei), and performance is the 
way of achieving that status. A ceremony should always have enough food for the 
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dancers to eat (and also for others at the residential circle, who in a variety of ways get 
their share of the game hunted for the ceremony), as well as people for whom the 
dancers dance. These are, of course, the mereremei, the good/beautiful people, those for 
whom the ceremony is being performed. But in another, more subtle sense, the 
performers have another public in mind: those watching them dance. 
When one dances in a ceremony, one has in a certain way a threefold (at least) 
audience. In concrete terms, the audience is quite simply (and ideally, of course) those 
who are not dancing. On the other hand, the 'formal' audience (i. e., that openly voiced 
by the participants of the dance) is composed only by those for whom they are dancing 
(the dancer's nephews/nieces/grandchildren, the tabdjwy, in most ceremonies - but not 
in all). And, last but not least, there is the audience that is the centre of attention for 
young performers at any rate, as individuals: the opposite sex. This desire to attract the 
opposite sex is, of course, a major difference between the approach of younger and of 
older people to ceremonies. Older people will tend to perform in a 'stronger' way on 
their tabdjwy's behalf. Younger people also do it, or say they do it, but they are also 
concerned with causing the right impression on persons of the opposite sex (something 
much commented upon by young men at the men's house gatherings every evening). 
Ceremonies are above all occasions when people amuse themselves, and sex is a central 
part of amusement in Mebengokre social life. 
The sexual freedom enjoyed by people of both sexes during ceremonies is 
much stressed during the ami aprä, the culminating point of a ceremony, when couples 
can be seen furtively leaving the kri for deserted spots behind the circle of houses. The 
mothers of the children being celebrated, for whom the kamt' kack of their husband 
hunted, are held to be sexually accessible to those that hunted for their children during 
117 
the ceremony, and in fact they are frequently sexually sought for by men during the 
dance. If a young woman is dancing (in the women's ceremony, for instance, or when 
they dance in men's ceremonies), a man would come from behind, dancing, and take her 
by the arm when close to a deserted, less lit spot in the residential circle. They would 
leave discreetly for a short stay in the bushes around the village, and subsequently 
discreetly returning to the dance. Although this is done openly (albeit discreetly), people 
pretend they do not notice anything - it is never proper to call attention to such matters. 
Ceremonies are thus fundamentally performative, in the sense that they have 
audiences involved. This is essential for the purported reason, or goal, of the ceremony, 
which is to create joy. It is, among other things, through dancing and singing that people 
create joy in others and in themselves, and the right way to create joy is not to create 
solely one's own joy, but but to create it for another. This, as will be seen, is related to 
the general social theme of giving and getting from others, and a major theme of 
Mebengokre social philosophy. 
The next day, in the mid-afternoon, the mekranyre (the younger married men's 
group) brought some meat to the men's house, where it was roasted and eaten by them. 
The atmosphere was quite relaxed , as the men had played soccer 
in the morning. The 
men displayed a remarkable comraderie, always close together, joking and teasing each 
other. Their physical propinquity would be considered proper, in many Western 
societies, only between people of different sexes. Friends hold each other's hands while 
chatting, and hug each other freely, in a very explicit display of closeness. The 
atmosphere of intimacy and closeness is directly related to the meal, people remark with 
open smiles: to eat together is mei, is good/beautiful. Only friendly people eat together, 
is what is implied by their remarks. Of course, the archetype of commensality - of the 
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condition of eating together with other people - is the nuclear family. and people say 
they are 'like relatives' (a better translation would be fac-similar relatives'), öbikwd 
kaäk, when they want to stress this friendly atmosphere. The term also translates as 
'friend'. 
The whole friendly atmosphere is associated with the ceremony itself: `that's 
how our `party' (me toro) is', one of the age-class leaders explained to me, referring to 
the men eating. He was referring both to the friendly atmosphere and to the act of 
eating, a very important activity indeed among Mebengokre. To eat together is a 
hallmark of one's willingness to live well with others. Ceremonies most evidently relate 
by similarity those eating together at the men's house and families, groups of people 
that share food and eat together. Mebengokre social philosophy can in this way be 'read' 
in ceremonies: people that participate in the celebration are as close to each other as 
those that were brought up together, and to those that raised them. 
In the afternoon127, around 5 p. m., men painted the Jaguar marks on their faces 
with black ashes: three vertical lines from the middle of the forehead down, the middle 
one coming down the nose; and three inclined lines in each cheek, from the lips up to 
the middle of the cheeks, in line with the ears. They painted their feet with py (annato) 
and oi1128. Their py body painting made large `collars' over their chests and backs, with 
red strips going down from it over the belly and back, and down the arms. 
127 Between the events described in the last paragraph and those described below several events 
happened in the village, related to the ceremony. The most important one was the krabdjwy japror, 
when children are taken by their `formal friends' (krabdjwy) around the village circle, and the 
latter are 
fed by the children's parents. I have not included those events in this description, as they are not 
directly related to the general theme of this chapter. 
128 The annato is mixed with oil extracted from a small coconut and rubbed against the skin, leaving a 
bright red colur that is easily washed away 
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The painted men gathered at the centre of the men's house, in an ipök position 
(that is, in circle, with the younger ones at the centre), upon the palm leaves that 
covered the floor, diligently brought in and laid down by the unmarried young men and 
by children129. After listening to a speech from an elder, the group moved to the me 
toro djä the `place of the party', just beside the men's house, to the west. They sat again 
in an ipok position, with the children (me ok-re, `the painted ones') at the centre and the 
older men around them in concentric circles roughly sorted by age. The leaders of two 
of the men's groups, the younger married men and the older married men ('those with 
old sons/daughters'), sat on small banks, on opposite sides of the outer circle. 
The men observed the women dancing around the plaza. Small groups of 
women went dancing around the circle of houses, one group at a time, singing and 
moving their arms in the characteristic movement of the women's dance: swinging both 
arms back and forth at once, elbows bent 90°, hands stretched and fingers held close 
together. 130 
Each time a group of women went around the plaza, the elder who harangued 
the men earlier called a group of kamy kaäk to stand facing the men's house, in front of 
the group of seated men, for what is called the mry kadjy djä, or 'place (of those that) 
want to go for game'. The kamy kaäk (`brother(s)-fac-similar') are formed by those who 
see themselves as such in relation to a father of one of the celebrated children. Men 
participate in several of these groups; to stand beside one of the `sponsors' of the 
ceremony (inekrareremei ) means that one is going to hunt for him, that is, one is going 
129 During ceremonies these (male) children, as well as those of the same age, being celebrated or not, 
are called me 6k-re, `the painted ones', a reference to the body paintings they all wear during the 
ceremonies. One of the stated aims of ceremonies 
is to promote the beautification of people - to make 
all people 'beautiful', in different ways. 
130 This is a characteristic female dance movement; men would do it only when seated, singing. 
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on the ceremonial hunting expedition to hunt game and give it to his kamy kaäk, so that 
the latter can bring it back to his house where his wife (and daughters, etc) will prepare 
it131 as a djwy-kupu and feed the dancers after the ceremony. Under the particular 
system of sharing existent in these ceremonies, people stress that food coming to the 
men's house after a dance should not be seen as a 'payment' to some but should be 
shared by all. 
Men would stand by several kamy kaäk groups when called by the elder. What 
is at stake here is not that one must be a 'classificatory brother' of the child's father, as 
conventional anthropological wisdom would put it, but that one chooses to behave 
towards the mekrareremei as a brother would do. In practice, it is the very act of giving 
game to the mekrareremei that is the realisation of such 'brother-ship', as well as the 
general easiness of interpersonal relationship acquired during collective hunting 
expeditions. When people say that they are going to stand beside a kamy kaäk at the mry 
kadjy djä ('the place of those who want to go after game', beside the men's house), they 
usually point to the building of a relationship, not to the acknowledgement of a pre- 
existent one. 
This can be clearly seen in the way I myself became `brother-facsimilar' to 
several of the sponsors of that particular ceremony. When the first sponsor stood 
there at the mry kady djä, one of my friends pulled me by the arm: "let's go 
become 132 brothers, Bep-kadjoroti 133«, he said, with a large smile, "he is a nice 
131 Or will conclude the preparation; as it will be seen, men cook the meat in the forest when they hunt 
it, to preserve it. Traditionally, meat should not enter the village raw. Even nowadays, when custon has 
been somewhat relaxed, meat (when it is in large amounts, in which case it is shared with others) is 
carved at the periphery of the village, and distributed among women by a male elder, during 
ceremonies. In a certain sense, it is considered improper for dead gae to enter the village in one piece. 
132 He actually addressed me in Portuguese, saying "vamos ser irmäos", literally "let's be/become 
brothers". 
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guy, good to be brothers with", he complimented. And there we went, standing in line 
with the other `brother-facsimilars' not only of that particular individual but of most 
of the other sponsors too. To stand by someone in this context is more of a statement 
of an intention, and thus two 'real' brothers do not stand by each other at the mnv kady 
dja. As two 'real' brothers have piaäm, shame/respect, towards each other, and as the 
spouses of those men sponsoring the ceremony are to be sexually accessible to his 
kamy kaäk, a man placed in the kamy kaäk row of his 'real' brother would be a sort of 
contradiction in terms. The point of the whole ceremony is to create kack-ships, 
'similarities' with others, and 'genealogical kinship' does not pertain to this context. 
As one of my friends then put it to me, "what's the point to be (become) brothers if 
they are already brothers? ". This clearly shows that what is involved here is not a 
display of an estabished relationship but an actual creation of one. To stand by the 
sponsor of a ceremony in this way is to actively create a bond between the sponsor 
and another man, and even people that already treat each other as `brother-facsimilar' 
will make it a point to stand by one another in such occasions, as this bond is never a 
definite one, but is actually created in an on-going way through the conscious 
intentions of actors. 
When a sponsor of a ceremony stands in the plaza and addresses the people at 
large - that is, the men at the me toro djä and people in the village circle, he simply 
states that he and his `brother-facsimilars' are going to hunt for his child. The statement 
is simple, but its stating not so: to address the whole village is a heavy performative 
load, and some men, too shy to speak up, ask one of their brother-facsiliars' to perform 
that piece of oratory for them. When the groups of `brother-facsimilars' are called, an 
133 Bep-kadjoroti is the name that was given to me by my Mebengokre mother the day I came to the 
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elder instructs the men about how to proceed, if they are too inexperienced. Then the 
sponsor stands apart from the row of `brother-facsimilars' and tells the audience that 
those standing by him are his kamy kaäk, who will bring game for him to feed the 
dancers. Each `pronouncement' lasts but few seconds. The whole thing lasts only for a 
few minutes - two or three - for each sponsor and his 'brother-facsimilars'. 
Virtually all men participated in more than one kamy kaäk group; many men 
took part in more than half of the groups. The whole ceremony met with a most cheerful 
mood from the men's part. There was no tension involved: men made jokes all the time, 
even when harangued by the elder. The women were more solemn, and some bore tired, 
matter-of-fact faces, without much enthusiasm for their own performance. Younger 
women stayed at the men's house watching the ceremony. In all, eight brother- 
facsimilar' groups were delineated from the group of men gathered at the me toro djä 
that evening, one for each sponsor of the ceremony. The general impression - one 
confirmed by the Mebengokre themselves - of the ceremony of the mry kadjy djä is one 
of 'generalised brother-ship', of a situation where all are 'brothers' to each other - an 
ideal social state that the Mebengokre seek, in a certain way, to attain. Not that of 
people being all brothers to each other, but one where all behave `like brothers'. 
This `likeness' has very specific meanings that are unraveled by the 
ceremonies themselves. The main point here seems to be one related to nurturance: 
`brother-facsimilars' are in charge of providing food, which is given to the sponsors of 
the ceremony, brought back to the village by them and the `brother-facsimilars', who 
take turns helping them carry food back to the village - and then prepared by the 
sponsors' wives so as to be served to the dancers. The dancers are themselves the 
viiiaýzc. 
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`brother-facsimilars' of the several sponsors, and are dancing for the celebrated 
children's sake. There is here a circularity: food is amassed by the `brother-facsimilars', 
who give it to the sponsors, who bring it to be prepared by their wives, who feed the 
`brother-facsimilars' (as well as other dancers) who have danced for their children. This 
circularity gives a clue to another characteristic of `kaäk-ship' : there is a generalised 
state of sharing involved in the relationship thus created. In fact, people explicitly state 
that all food ends up by being eaten by all the dancers. The same way the impression of 
`generalised brother-ship' is created by men becoming brothers of many of the sponsors 
during the ceremony, an impression of `generalised commensality' is created by the 
unfolding of the ceremony. 
To eat together is an actual part of the ceremony, and not its aftermath, as one 
could think. I have seen, in other occasions, people refusing to dance in the `rehearsal' 
performances of a ceremony because there was no food available134. Nor is it a matter 
of exchanging food for performances: when questioned about why not dance if there is 
no food, the usual reaction of those to whom I asked was to point out the pointlessness 
of it, and a friend of mine once remarked, "if there is no food to be eaten, it is not a me 
toro". The culminating point of a ceremony must not only provide an occasion for 
people to eat together, it must also provide plenty of food, enough for everybody to eat 
liberally. This is part of the joy created by the ceremony, and people actually have so 
much food in those occasions that it is not uncommon for one to be hit by projectiles 
improvised out of potatoes or bits of djwy-kupu when eating together with others in the 
men's house, in friendly `battles' that add to the general merriment of the occasion. 
134 Every `rehearsal' of a ceremony - that is, of the actual dancing - is followed by the consuming of 
some food from the gardens of the sponsors. 
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The general principle behind ceremonies should be clear by now: people act 
`like brothers' because they help each other, because they eat together, and because they 
create joy in each other. Ceremonies create a state where the whole village acts as if it 
were a family. I stress here this `as if, because ceremonies do not actually mirror the 
state of affairs that obtains within those circles of people that live in the most intimate 
terms with each other, having been raised together: it creates a state of affairs that is 
similar to it. Similar, but not identical. And it is the specific quality of such similarity 
that I am going to address in the next section. In order to do so, I will address myself to 
a contemporary discussion in Amazonian ethnology, where I intend to link my previous 
critique of analytical strategies utilised in the interpretation of data in Ge ethnology with 
what I call a Mebengokre semiotic of relatedness. 
The Value of Mebengokre Autonomy and Social Life 
In an article recently published in JRAI (2002: 347-65), anthropologist Aparecida 
Vilaca argues that Amazonian kinship cannot be understood without recourse to data on 
cosmology. Despite the apparent obviousness of the statement, it conceals a theoretical 
standpoint which bears upon the issues discussed here. Vilaca makes the point that 
Amazonian kinship studies, concerned with the creation of intimacy and relatedness 
among people living together, are incomplete because they do not take into 
consideration the relationship of predation between humans and non-humans (animals, 
spirits), which are constitutive of peoples' bodies. Kinship in Amazonia, according to 
her (following the viewpoint expressed by Seeger, Matta and Viveiros de Castro 1979), 
has to do with the creation of the human body rather than the creation of social groups. 
Kinship, she claims, has to do with living together, and the very fact of shared 
livelihood creates a shared substance among people, who are assimilated into a 
homogeneous whole. In her words (2002: 352-54), 
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... this is not a purely formal or terminological assimilation, but a true process of 
consubstantialisation, generated by proximity, intimate living, commensality, 
mutual care, and the desire to become kin (... ) This `substance' contains not just 
memory and affect, but above all agency (... ) the important point to note is that 
this social process of fabricating consubstantiality is strongly valued as a 
constitutive attribute of humanity and as a site of agency. 
Despite stating herself that what is called `kinship' in Amazonia has to do with 
the mutual creation of a human nature by those who share a common existence, as the 
quotation above shows, Vilaca goes on to state that the understanding of Amazonian 
kinship is hampered by a focus on domestic life at the expense of relations outside the 
`inner circle' of those who share an existence. Her analysis actually tends to identify the 
so-called `domestic level' with consanguinity, and the `outside' domain with affinity, 
thus producing a sort of oxymoron: if social life in Amazonia has to do with the creation 
of consubstantiality through living together, and with the mutual moulding of human 
nature by people's agency, and not with the sorting out of people into social groups, the 
analytical tools that she deploys to criticise the so-called `equivalence of domestic life 
to the social universe' (p. 349) seem to me to be rather inappropriate, as they are 
concerned with relationships between groups/categories and the sorting out of people 
into social units - something she brushes aside as irrelevant to Amazonian 'kinship'. 
This discussion bears upon the general theme of this chapter, as Vilaca 
identifies the approach that seeks to identify the determinants of social living with 
`sociability', and her own approach with `sociality' (following here M. Strathern's 
distinction, 1999), the latter being wider as it "... concerns social relations in a general 
sense, including for example warfare(... )" (p. 362, footnote 10). We are thus left with 
the rather curious paradox, that in order to understand a social reality of relatedness 
based on the mutual creation of humanity into individual beings, the anthropologist has 
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to recourse to an analytical language of social relations, rather than the creation of 
ontological qualities. 
I would like to suggest here that this formalist approach mis-represents the 
social reality it purports to understand. Vilaca departs from the principle that the 
recourse to data related to other spheres of `social life' (her conception of social life, 
that is) provides a better, more fundamental - and thus more amenable to comparison - 
understanding of `native society', as if `society' could be taken as a sort of universal 
accessible to the anthropologist and as such providing a transcultural ground for 
comparison. Her whole `pan-Amazonian' endeavour seems to me to be guided by this 
principle, that one can find a safe ground for comparison in a refined, finely tuned set of 
analytical tools that can extract from diverse social realities the essentials of a general 
model - maybe an Amazonian ontology in the singular - in relation to which particular 
social forms could be seen as so many transformations of the model. 
Perhaps the term `understanding' is misplaced here, with its suggestion of an 
interpretive task, of dialogue with another's conceptions in order to try to grasp its 
contextual truth. Vilaca's curiously `arithmetical' interpretative endeavour, adding up 
predetermined layers of a formally defined `kinship' to different peoples' conceptions 
of what it is to live with others, so as to make them amenable to comparison, seems to 
me to fall in the same category of mistake pointed out by Overing (1985), of taking 
`kin' and `social life' as `natural kinds', as if they were universals of the human 
condition. If Amazonian peoples state that `kin' are those with whom one lives in 
intimacy, and that this intimacy has to do with the creation of a common substance (and 
this not necessarily, or exclusively, `physical' substance) among them (although I 
127 
would rather say that this is a creation of similarities) by means of one's agency, it 
seems to me rather pointless to try to find `kin' (and social life) elsewhere. 
I would like to suggest here that, if any sort of comparison is to be established 
between the different ways that Amazonian peoples have to experience `kin' and `social 
life', this can be done not by distancing oneself from `native' conceptions, but by 
getting closer to them. In my view, the point of departure should be, as in any 
interpretative endeavour, the examination of the taken-for-granted assumptions lurking 
in the background of our analytical concepts. This, however, should not be a random 
endeavour, but rather enacted in relation to those aspects of our assumptions that 
produce that curious feeling known to many a fieldworker, of something that is not 
quite in the place where it should be when we try to apply them to understand what we 
experience in the field. It is there, in our experiences of trying to cope with ways of 
experiencing the world that are different from our own - before it gets transformed into 
`native conceptions' in our writing - that one should look for the clues for an 
interpretation that can aspire to be conversant with other ways of experiencing the 
world. In Vilaca's article, there is a moment (2002: 352-53) when she expresses such 
perplexity: 
To become kin, it is necessary to desire to be kin and to act as such: for example, 
by living together, respecting alimentary taboos, not eating dead kin (specifically 
in the Wari case), calling people by kin terms, and so on. Without doubt, it was 
this idea that my Wari' father, Paleto, wanted to pass on to me when he asked in a 
surprised tone, after a two-month stay in my house in Rio de Janeiro, why white 
people did not simply make themselves into kin, too? He seemed to imply it was 
enough to want this. I quote him verbatim: `Among ourselves we are kin. We are 
not like yourselves - you are related only to your younger brother, Eddie, and to 
your father and mother. You just like one another for no reason. Why don't you 
make yourselves into kin as well? ' 
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`Kin' has thus to do with individual agency, and one becomes kin out of a 
desire to relate to others, to live with others in a proper way, because one likes them. 
These are ideas that echo in a great measure my own experiences in the field, and I 
would like to develop them from the angle that seems to me to be self-evident: what 
Vilaca's father was exposing to her is what are usually called moral issues in Western 
philosophies. And the perplexity felt by one when confronted with such ideas (or the 
perplexity that I felt during my fieldwork when confronted by issues not at all unlike 
those described here, at any rate) goes beyond the rather trivial point of whether 
`kinship' is `genealogical' or not. They touch the very core of anthropological concepts 
of social life and society, which are not conceived of as moral issues at all. Or are they? 
Curiously enough, James Laidlaw, in an article published in the same volume 
of JRAI as Vilaca's article (2002: 311-332), makes the point that the difficulty 
anthropologists have in analysing freedom and moral/ethical issues in general is due to 
the pervasive influence of Durkheim's collectivistic conception of society as the moral 
good par excellence. As he states (p. 312-13), 
Durkheim's `social' is effectively, Immanuel Kant's notion of the moral law, with 
the all-important change that the concept of human freedom, which was of course 
central to Kant, has been neatly excised from it. The category of the moral has, 
accordingly, almost invariably collapsed in the hands of anthropologists into 
whatever other terms we have been enthusiastically using to explain collectively 
sanctioned rules, beliefs, and opinions (... ) The questions that then get asked are 
ones that are appropriate for these other concepts. If these are the rules, how and 
by whom are they formulated? How are they re-inforced and transmitted through 
time, and how and by whom are they challenged? Who gets to say what counts as 
a breach of them ? And so on. In this situation the concept of moral means 
everything and nothing. 
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Laidlaw's point that Durkheim "(... ) has left us (... ) with Kant with the freedom 
taken away" (p. 313) is tailored to account for the difficulty that anthropology has to 
deal with issues of freedom and free will - which we usually term individual agency. 
But his argument may be pushed to its logical conclusion: that the Durkheimian `social' 
is in itself a moral standpoint, one that sees 'society' as a moral being in and by itself, 
the source, as Durkheim said, of the `best part of' the individual and therefore felt as an 
authority over the individuals themselves (p. 313). 
I mention these issues here because my own work among the Mebengokre calls 
into question such notions. For Mebengokre, human-ness - that is, Mebengokre-ness - 
can only be realised in the village. A village is a concrete entity which seems to have 
ontological precedence in Mebengokre thought over the family - the most intimate 
group - in their reflections of social life per se, in the sense of what it is like to live with 
other people in a distinctively Mebengokre way. It is village life that defines what it is 
to be a Mebengokre. Theirs is a rather Aristotelian concept of living in the polis that 
allows for the realisation of the potential humanity in them. Life at the wider, village 
level has to be constructed as a fac-simile of the state of affairs that obtains within the 
circle of people with whom one is in most intimate terms. 
Ge-speaking peoples' social life has usually been analysed as bi-sected 
between a `domestic' and a `public' levels, the latter comprising village life in the wider 
sense. I would like here to propose an alternative explanation that takes into account 
Mebengokre's moral outlook as to what it is to live together with other people. 
When asked about who is the epitome of the ömbikwä, or friend/relative, a 
Mebengokre man will usually answer it is one's sister (kaniktivvnh). Asked about the 
rationale of such statement, he will point out that she will always feed him whenever he 
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needs it. In fact, there is hardly a day in the village that one does not see small children 
going to and fro carrying food, from their mother's house to where the child's nget 
(uncle/grandfather) lives. It is also fairly common to see men going to their sister's 
houses (as people live mostly uxorilocally, one's sister's house is also the house where 
one's parents live, if they are alive) to eat there135. The notion of living together implies 
first and foremost to feed each other and to eat together, and it is not suprising, 
considering this context, that one of the `markers' of relatedness among people is the 
practice of avoidance of certain foods when one's child is ill. As Melatti remarked for 
the Kraho, there is a notion of a shared common substance behind such practice. But 
this `substance' should not be understood solely in physical/physiological terms. A 
powerful idea of caring for each other is operative here, and that involves more than 
simply a commonality of physical substance. It also implies a general psychological 
feeling of elation and well-being - one could as well call it happiness - that obtains 
within this most intimate circle of conviviality. The hallmark of life in this context is the 
fact that an ömbikwä does not create ill-feelings in another by his or her acts towards 
them. Much of the restraint (piaam, `respect/shame') that obtains among male members 
of a same household can be understood in this context. The idea of commensality, thus, 
has a strong psychological dimension as well as a physiological one. Togetherness can 
be seen as both the cause and the effect of feeding and eating with others. The creation 
of joy, that Mebengokre so insistently pose as the raison d'etre of ceremonies, can be 
seen as something suitably similar, at village level, to the general state of elation and 
well-being that should obtain in the relationship of those living in close intimacy. 
1 35 Lea (1986) actually states that among the Mekragnoti-Mebengokre where she did her fieldwork, it is 
more common for a man to be fed by his sister than 
by his wife. 
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The sharing of food thus bears a direct relationship with the creation of 
similarities among people, among the Mebengokre as elsewhere136. It should be clear by 
now that Mebengokre ceremonies are concerned with the creation of an all-inclusive, 
village level similarity between people by means of reproducing at that level an 
appearance of the state of affairs that (ideally) obtains within the circle of people living 
together in close intimacy. But the former only appears to be like the latter: there is no 
identity between both states of affairs. Eating together in the men's house only looks 
like eating with one's close relatives; brothers-kaäk only seem to be like brothers- 
kumrentx. What is the status of such likeness? What sort of equivalence can be said to 
obtain between both terms? This thesis will be mainly concerned with answering these 
questions with respect to several different spheres of Mebengokre life. In order to do so, 
I shall deal now with what it means to establish a "kaäk-ship" with someone. 
Ethnographic descriptions of kin relationship usually lapse into focusing upon the 
`thing' to which the kinship term refers. I suggest here that it would be more profitable 
to investigate how the sign signifies. 
A Mebengokre Semiotics of Likenesses 
The term kaäk is only one of a set of terms that are used by Mebengokre to denote a 
likeness between two or more things, persons, events or states of affairs. These terms 
are kaäk, kaigö, and kakrit. each one establishes a likeness, but in different senses. All 
three terms can be said to be the opposite of katät (or kumrentx, or sometimes djwynh, 
although the latter has some slightly different connotations, being more a sort of 
emphatic assertion of the something). Katät is usually translated as `real', although 
there are, to my knowledge, no ontological connotations involved in this assertion. 
136 See Mennell, Murcott & van Otterloo (1992) for a through review of the role of commensality in the 
creation of equivalences and similarities 
between people. 
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Katat, and the three terms that are opposed to it are not forms of classification either: 
something can be either one of these terms, depending on the perspective one wants to 
stress when using them. They define qualities, rather than classes of things and events. 
Furthermore, whereas the first term denotes aa quality of a thing/being/event in itself. 
the other three denote a quality of a thing/being/event in comparison with another. In 
this comparison, that to which the thing/being/event is being compared with is 
invariably katät, and it is in this sense that kaäk, kaigo, and kakrit are opposed to it. 
Katät expresses the possession, by the thing, being or event to which it is 
applied, of the full qualities relevant to it in a given situation. One of the best examples 
I got of the meaning of katät was when, coming to my second fieldwork stint, I brought 
back some money for my brother kaäk who had given me some ceremonial adornments 
(he is a ceremonial specialist, and as such he is also an expert adornment-maker) to sell 
in my home-city. These adornments can be sold for a much higher price in faraway 
places than in the towns closer to the Mebengokre's Catete Indian Land, or even than in 
Belem, where FUNAI137 keeps a shop that sells handcrafts made by Indigenous peoples 
of the region138. In spite of that, Mebengokre, as well as most Indigeous peoples in the 
region and elsewhere, do not usually ask other people to sell their artefacts because it is 
unlikely that they will ever see the money back, or when they do receive it, they always 
suspect that the person has sold it at a much higher price and kept most of the money for 
oneself. I felt thus quite honoured when my kamy asked me to sell his artefacts, and 
obviously brought back to the village all the money that I had got from the selling of the 
pieces. It proved to be a fairly large amount of money by Mebengokre standards. As it 
137 National Indian Fundation, the federal bureau of Indigenous affairs. 
138 ARTINDIA, FUNAI's shops, display the artefacts sent to them by Indigenous artists, paying them 
the exact price reached by the artefact when sold. 
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turned out, he had forgotten that he had given me those artifacts to sell, and was really 
astonished that I gave him so much money `for nothing'. When he got his money, he 
exclaimed, astonished, addressing those with him: kamy katät ne ja! Panh ket! Kamv 
katät! "A real brother! No exchange! A real brother! ". 
The meaning of what it is to display the full qualities (katät) of a brother 
(kamy) were made quite clear on that occasion, when my brother explained minutely, as 
is his fashion, what had happened. A brother is one that will give and not ask anything 
back in exchange for the thing given. This is the full quality of a brother, as well as of 
any close relative/friend, bikwa katät. another facet of this full quality was taught to me 
in further occasions, when I learned that katät relatives/friends can - and are actually 
expected to - get things from one another without creating any ill-feeling among them. 
Katät is also translated as `simple', or `in a simple way', and this meaning 
becomes clear when we consider how the terms kaäk, kaigö and kakrit are opposed to it. 
Kaäk expresses an equivalence. Something kaäk can replace that which it is 
being compared to. Kaäk is a fac-similar, or a simile, of its referent. In the same way 
that a fax can be taken as the thing faxed for some purposes, a `kaäk' can be in the place 
of its referent for some purposes. If we think of a picture, say, Leonardo's Mona Lisa, a 
kaäk could be a poster of it, that is, something that, although evidently not the picture 
itself, can be hung on a wall and appreciated as correspondent to the original in relation 
to the image depicted, for instance. Kaak thus denotes something which has some of the 
qualities of the `original' (katat), in a context where those qualities are deemed relevant 
for the comparison being established between them. 
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Keeping to the same example, a kaigo object would be a fake picture of the 
Mona Lisa: something that pretends to be taken as the original, but is not it. It is a 
simulacrum. Both kaäk and kaigo, thus, are not the original, but while kaäk implies a 
likeness of differents taken in the positive sense, meaning that one can replace the other 
for specific purposes, kaigö implies a likeness in the negative sense, a likeness that does 
not entitle one to replace the other for any purpose. Kakrit, in its turn, implies a 
comparison that is made only to be denied. Something kakrit is not quite comparable to 
the original, although presenting some resemblance to it. The Mebengokre usually 
translate kakrit as `not serious', meaning that the comparison implied by it cannot be 
taken seriosly. Sticking to the example above, a kakrit of the Mona Lisa would be, for 
instance, a poster of it with a goatee beard: a grotesquerie, an aberration. A kakrit is 
something whose qualities being considered approximate those of the thing to which it 
is being compared, but not quite so. 
It is thus understandable that kat'at be also translated as 'simple': the likeness 
here is complete, a point-to-point correspondence, implying that there aren't different 
facets to be considered in the comparison. Both kack and kaigö, as well as kakrit, imply 
a sort of correspondence where specific qualities are singled out for comparison, 
making it a complex, selective process. Katät, by its turn, as a comparison, is much 
simpler, as there are no different qualities to be singled out for comparison. 
Comparisons established by this set of terms can be either between sensible 
qualities in the Lockean sense, or else between intangible qualities, like moral and 
aesthetical ones. In both cases, the singling out of qualities is contextual, and do not 
define bounded 'classes'. An example of this was given to me when discussing these 
matters with my Mebengokre friends. One of my friends pointed to a tuff of a herb used 
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to make herbal infusions, which had been brought by a nurse to the village and planted 
near the infirmary. Mebengokre did not know the plant before. "We call it bon (grass) 
kack", my friend told me, "or bon kaigo". And explained: "see how it looks like grass? 
But it doesn't spread out everywhere, like grass". The plant actually looks like giant 
blades of grass, but grows in a tuff. Kaäk and kaigö are applied here, respectively, to the 
similarity between the plant and common grass (its blades look like grass blades) and to 
their dissimilarity (it doesn't spread). 
Another example, related to intangible qualities, sheds light on the theme 
discussed in this chapter, namely, the moral dimension of food-sharing and eating. 
Mebengokre usually qualify game as either mr'y kumrentx 139or mr'y kakrit. A kumrentx 
game is a large one, which is usually divided between several people140. Small game, 
which is not shared with anybody (or only with closest relatives) is deemed kakrit, that 
is, "not serious game", as it was translated to me sometimes. Mr'y kakrit also applies to 
non-edible game, the general meaning of the term being thus one of `animals that are 
not seriously hunted'. The same applies to other edible things. Small, forest fruits are 
called pidj'y kakrit141, as they do not easily fill one's stomach . Ba 
kam djw'y kakrit is 
the term applied to edibles that are not from the garden, that is, forest edibles. Djw'y 
kakrit is also applied to industrialised food that is not very nutritious, like cream 
crackers (bä kam means `from the forest'). 
139 This term is used more commonly than katät in this context. Djwynh is also used, especially in 
exclamations. 
140 Some parts of specific game are held to be the kukradjä ('wealth', or `knowledge'). The term, in this 
case, refers to a `right' certain people have in relation to specific parts of the dead game. This is 
usually, albeit not necessarily, followed by hunters, who upon hunting down a large animal would call 
people to go get their portions from the animal. There is, of course, a pragmatic side to this practice as 
well as a moral one: large game, like tapir, or wild pig, or even the forest deer, cannot be transported 
back to the village by one (or even two) people alone, as hunting spots are usually fairly distant from 
the village. Historically, the game that has the most defined repartition of kukradjä parts is the largest 
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Applied to food, kakrit seems to denote a low capacity of nurturance, both in 
the physiological sense (non-nutritious food, or food which is not enough to nurture 
one), and in the social sense, of food that is not enough to be shared. The use of kakrit 
to designate food that does not come from the garden is quite revealing, as gardens are 
the prototypical basis of nurturance. Kakrit can also be used interchangeably with kack 
in some contexts, especially those involving the qualification of inanimate things: a 
home-made broomstick, for instance, made by Mebengokre with forest materials can be 
said to be either a kapön djä kakrit or a kapön djä kaäk. In the first sense it implies that 
it is just a grotesque imitation of the `real thing' (industrialised broomsticks, which 
came to be known by Mebengokre before home-made ones in the villages where I did 
my fieldwork); in the second case, it denotes something that keeps a resemblance to the 
`real thing' so that it can be used in its stead. Kaäk (and kaigö, depending on the context 
of the comparison) can be used for objects instead of kakrit, but kakrit is seldom, if 
ever, used in place of kack (or kaigo) when applied to people. Or at least to people with 
whom one mantains some sort of contact. Non-Mebengokre Indians who have adopted 
the ways of whitemen are called kuben kakrit142 
In terms of people's relationships, kaäk, kaigo, and kakrit denote a comparison 
with those relationships that obtain within the circle of people with whom is in most 
of all, the tapir. Nowadays, even the relatively small deer (which was held to be an alimentary taboo 
for men in old times) has its kukradjä parts. 
141 pidj'y is a general term for fruit (pi means `tree' or `wood'). 
14? Kuben is a term used to denote all non-Mebengokre, including other Indigenous peoples, as long as 
they do not resemble Mebengokre in their ways of living, aesthetics, etc. With the intensification of 
contact with the national society, though, the term came to be applied primarily (although not 
exclusively) to whitemen. It is used also to denote those peoples a particular Mebengokre group is at 
odds with, and in this sense it has been applied by some of the Mebengokre groups to other, enemy 
Mebengokre (the Mebengokre-Mekragnoti, for instance, used to be called Kubenkragnoti by their 
enemies Mebengokre-Gorotire, during their internecine wars until the 1960s). Today the term is 
applied, unqualified, to whitemen more than to other Indigenous peoples (black people are called 
kuben t'yk, after the word for `blue-black', and white foreigers - usually European or North American, 
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intimate terms. The qualities being compared are those of sociability, i. e., basically the 
capacity to nurture one another and the capacity to live with each other without creating 
any unsuitable emotional state. In one sentence, they are compared in terms of the 
capacity to live well together, in Mebengokre terms. Accordingly, the qualification 
attributed to any particular person by another will change according to the state of their 
mutual relationship. One of my friends once referred to a bikwä of his (a nget, or 
`uncle/grandfather') as an ombikwä kaigö. He explained to me that his family had 
fought with him, because of a love affair between his sister's husband and the man's 
daughter. When my friend's sister found about the affair she beat the other woman up, 
and the latter's mother retaliated by cutting her fingers with a machete. Retaliation 
brought more retaliation, and my friend's family moved to the other village. "I used to 
call him my nget", my friend explained me, "but not any longer. He is kaigö, he is 
punure (bad/ugly). He is not my true (kumrentx) nget, he is a nget kaigo". A nget should 
be convivial in certain ways; once this particular nget ceased to be convivial, he became 
a kaigö. The term kaigö is used in the case of relationships between people in a highly 
pejorative sense. 
Another important aspect of such qualifications is related to giving and getting 
things from each other. Vidal (1977: 54-55, my translation), who did research in Catete 
village from 1969 to 1972, says that: 
The adjective kumren, `true', has also another connotation. Kumren relatives are 
those that give, `kook relatives do not give anything', they exchange (aben-payn). 
Thus, a man will consider a classificatory sister, kanikwoi kaok (by opposition to 
a `real' sister, kanikwoi djuoy) as a kanikwoi kumren, true sister, when she gives 
hint beiju and bananas and applies to him fumigations in case of sickness. 
are called kuben kä aka, the latter two ter 13m8eaning 
'white skin'). Indians that mantain their 
Vidal points here to a fundamental characteristic of Mebengokre sociality: to 
be a kumrentx relative/friend is to be able to give and to get things from one another. 
One important aspect of giving and getting things from other kumrentx relatives/friends 
is that the person who thus behaves wants to show to other people either one's 
generosity or one's access to other people's material things. One gets from another not 
because one has given to him/her, but to show that one is on good terms with that 
person143. This was illustrated to me by children in Catete village, always looking for 
something for me to give to them, no matter what, as an expression of affect - even if it 
was something I had just thrown away, something perfectly useless, both to me and to 
them. They would get this perfect useless object, and bring it back to me so that I could 
give it to them. Then they would proclaim to the whole village that I liked them so 
much - and would throw the object away. 
Despite those distinctions, ömbikwa can be used as an all-inclusive 
qualification: in its most inclusive use, all Mebengokre (even those that live in faraway 
villages, with whom one has no contact) are ömbikwä to one another. At this level, it 
denotes the theoretical possibility of conviviality with all people that knows, at least in 
potentia, how to live with one another (that is, all Mebengokre')144. A less inclusive use 
has as ömbikwä all those living in the two Mebengokre villages of Catete and Djudjekb . 
The term here expresses a concrete possibility of conviviality, as people are always 
moving back and forth between both villages, and are always engaged in activities 
(ceremonial and otherwise) involving their inhabitants. Those with whom one is in 
friendly terms - that is, with whom one is able to get things in exchange for others - are 
distinctive aesthetics and ways of living are frequently called Mebengokre kaäk. 
143 It goes without saying that this is besides one's desire for the thing itself being gotten. 
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ömbikwä in a stronger sense, and for those the term ömbikwä kaäk is more frequently 
used: they are `like ömbikwä'. But `real' (kumrentx, katät) ömbikwa are those with 
whom one does not exchange, but rather gives, and gets from, without creating any ill- 
feeling between them. This is, as people would stress repeatedly, the `true way' of being 
human - that is, of being Mebengokre. To strive for humanity is to create conviviality, 
and in this respect, Mebengokre political philosophy can be aptly described as one 
whose main concern is to create a unity out of people that are not `real' ömbikwä but 
who find a way to live together by creating a state of affairs that is suitably similar to 
`the real thing'. One can say that the central political issue is to create a single group out 
of a multitute of smaller, familial groups. The group thus created, that is, the village, 
`looks like' the familial groups that compose it. The village is conceived as an icon of 
familial groups, as well as composed by it: it is a fractal of the familial groups that are 
comprised by it. The same way that, at village level, relations between people are 
continuously created by people's agency, the village itself has to be continuously 
created, and ceremonies are a way to do so. This is, I believe, why Mebengokre 
`ceremonial season' tends to expand so as to encompass the whole time that people 
actually live together in the same village. Through ceremonies, people create a state of 
affairs at village level that, although qualitatively different from the conviviality within 
familial groups, can stand in its place for all intents and purposes of village life. 
Mebengokre semiotics of relatedness - or kinship, if one wants to use this 
rather self-contradictory term - thus goes against Levi-Strauss' notion that it is the 
possibility of exchange that establishes and expresses relations between groups of 
people. As Vilaca (2002, and before her Overing 1996, and others) has stated, agency is 
144 Those with whom one has not even the theoretical possibility of conviviality - such as other 
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an essential component of kinship, in the sense that people may become kin by 
engaging in certain sorts of relations with another. Relations performed in the context of 
Mebengokre ceremonies involve feeding each other, acting together with others, 
amusing one another - in other words, acting towards one another in a way that's 
suitably similar to that which obtains within the domestic group. The Mebengokre state 
that `kin' (ombikwä, also meaning `friend') should be able to get things freely from 
each other, without causing any sort of undesirable feeling. This is usually the practice 
among those that have been brought up together. At the level of `fac-similar' relations, 
though, what is expected is that people act towards each other not in the same way - 
which would be unrealistic - but in a suitably similar way. Thus, an ombikwä kack 
('fac-similar' ombikwä) will be able to get things from another, but will give away 
things in the place of those he or she got. This classical `reciprocal' relation is 
considered suitably similar to the `real thing' that obtains among ombikwa katat, not 
because it places something in the place of the thing got by one, but because one is able 
to get things in this way from people that one has not been brought up with, people that 
are not from one's circle of intimacy. In sum, this is morally and aesthetically 
`good/beautiful' (and also useful, the three notions coming together in Mebengokre 
thought) not because it involves reciprocity but in spite if it. 
But there is another, more subtle aspect to this dialectics between familial and 
village convivialities. Mebengokre stress that ceremonies are the kernel (or rather one of 
the kernels, together with names and language - both of which are related to 
ceremonies) of Mebengokre-ness, or human-ness. It is because they have ceremonies 
that they are fully human, and ceremonies are essential for the continuous production 
Indigenous peoples - are somethimes referred to, jokingly, as ömbikwä kakrit: a grotesque of the 
ömbikwä. 
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and reproduction of such humanity in people. Village life is essential for the ongoing 
production of humanity, and without villages Mebengokre humanity would slowly drift 
away towards non-Mebengokre forms of life, which, as such, are not fully human145 
One's humanity is no safe haven. If village life is but a fractal of multiple familial 
groups, and village conviviality but a suitable substitute for familial conviviality, it is 
nevertheless village life that allows for the continued existence of familial groups. The 
former may be a kaäk of the latter, but it is one without which the latter would not be 
katät. In other words, `kinship' would not exist without `polity', even though the latter 
cannot be distinguished from a morality and aesthetics: the morality and aesthetics of 
living together. In order to understand kinship, one needs to understand, first and 
foremost, Mebengokre political philosophy. 
Ceremonies, and the relationships they establish, constitute icons of the 
relationships that obtain within the circle of people in most intimate terms with each 
other. But, as is always the case with icons, the elements of the latter that are picked up 
as similar to the former are a particular choice among many possible alternatives. In this 
sense - and only in this sense - ceremonies can be said to be a comment on the 
relatedness between individuals in intimate terms with each other. This `comment' is 
not intellectual abstraction but social practice, in the form of performance. There is a 
distinctive element of performance in kack relations as constituted and expressed in 
ceremonies. Ceremonies provide moments when familial-like relatedness prevail in the 
village, something which is expressed in the pervasive drive towards harmony that are 
me toro, from bodily and vocal rhythm (songs and dances) to the harmonisation of 
145 In this sense I think that Viveiros de Castro's () opposition between human, animal and spirit 
beings, if applied to Mebengokre, would mis-represent the process of ongoing creation of humanity 
propitiated by ceremonies, as it does not contemplate the flux-like aspect of humanity, portraying 
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individual efforts into collective tasks. In this sense, ceremonies are a blueprint for 
everyday sociality. Using Nelson Goodman's (1967) discussion on denotation, one can 
say that ceremonies effect a transit from label-denotation to sample-denotation. 
Now, if the anthropologist looks at this relationship through the analytical lens 
of reciprocity theories, and by means of analytical cleveages such as that between the 
`domestic' and the `public', s/he will be able to build a very tidy, neat theory of 
sociality from the data - and will also be missing the important point about it. This is not 
that reciprocity should obtain in social relations, but that the relations should not cause 
ill-feeling in the individuals involved. Mebengokre social philosophy is a social 
psychology, in the sense that relations between individuals are thought of from the point 
of view of the feelings and emotions involved. They do not relinquish their individual 
autonomy for the sake of a `common good' epitomised in social relations involving 
reciprocity. Rather, they develop technologies (of speech, etc) to harmonise their drives 
and appetites in order to realise them - individually. Relations between persons, in sum, 
are not social but individual. But the feelings and emotions involved in them are 
collective, and are moulded as such, as it will be seen in the following chapters. This is 
the concern of their ceremonial life. And to be able to perform ceremonies together with 
other people is a synonym with living in the same village with other people. The 
emphasis of their philosophy is not on the individual will to evaluate and decide based 
on one's apprehension of the world, but on ways to make one's aims, drives, and 
appetites resonant with others', in order to accomplish each individual aim, drive and 
appetite. In this sense, reciprocity, the way we anthropologists understand it, would be 
considered morally (and aesthetically) `bad', as there is no common good to appeal to. 
`human', animal', and 'spirit' as definite ontological categories. Mebengokre see human-ness as a 
process, for whose achievement one has to strive restlessly, or else drift away towards non-humanity. 
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No rational social contract is involved in the creation of social life, but the search for 
technologies that educate one's emotions, feelings, and sentiments towards others so 
that they can find life with others enjoyable and beneficial. This whole process is one of 
becoming Mebengokre, that is, of becoming fully human. Emotions, feelings and 
sentiments, thus, are the object of technologies which build them in a collective whole. 
As such, they can not be distinguished from thought and cognition: they are the stuff 
Mebengokre social philosophy is made of, a techne of socialisation of affect. 
Life at the village level is thus seen as a fac-similar of life among the most 
intimate group of conviviality: something that, for some intents and purposes at least, 
can be in the place of the original state of affairs that obtain within this most intimate 
circle of people. One can see here how misleading a distinction between the `domestic' 
and the `public' can be in this context. Mebengokre conceive life at the village `level' as 
a fractal of that within each individual's most intimate group. Village life is ideally an 
icon of life within the manifold intimate groups that compose it. A whole that resembles 
(in many ways) the manifold wholes `of lesser order' that are comprised in it. 
It should be clear that the picture I have tried to show here can only be arrived 
at by taking into consideration the specific value of Mebengokre individual autonomy 
and conceptions of `the social state', and by confronting it with our anthropological 
concepts, permeated as they are by the Machiavellian cleavage between morality and 
polity. By using a set of analytical categories that do not reflect the specific values of 
Amazonian socialities, Vilaca (quoted in the beginning of this section) has actually 
relegated her own data to the outskirts of her analysis, as if she was in fact addressing 
the concerns of anthropologists rather than Amazonian peoples'. The theory thus 
constructed can be rather coherent according to anthropological theory, that is, if 
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Amazonian peoples' concerns are not played out dialogically against anthropological 
theories as philosophies in their own right, but simply regarded as representations 
discernible through the analytical lens of the anthropologist. The problem here, of 
course, is that such coherence does not necessarily translate itself into relevance for the 
`subjects' of the analysis. If one is in search of the latter, one has to concern oneself 
with the specific hue of Amazonian social lives - with the values they accord to living 
together, and with ways to make them conversant with our anthropological theories. 
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Chapter Three 
Public Mourning and O'amak: Creating Relatedness 
Through Emotion 
The knowledge of good and bad is simply the emotion of joy 
[laetitia] or sadness [tristitia], in so far as we are conscious of it. 
A true knowledge of good and bad cannot, in so far as it is true, restrain 
any emotion; it can do so only in so far as it is considered as an emotion. 
Spinoza, Ethics, part IV, props. 8 &14 
A Performance of Sadness 
While the men are dancing, the nget (`grandfathers/uncles') of the children being 
celebrated in the ceremony go to the men's house, soon followed by the latter's 
mothers, who are now beginning to paint the children for the female ceremony. It 
is about lunchtime, and the dancing rows of men already show the strain of 
several hours' dancing in quick pace. Now, most women, old and young, go to the 
men's house as well, wearing their anatto body paintings, and arm- and leg- 
bands. They are all painted red with urucu, their bodies covered with orenökre 
(the tick layer of white fibre that covers the kernel of some palms) and their heads 
white with äk ärä (white vulture's down). They bring now their nekrei (ceremonial 
regalia) to the men's house to adorn their daughters for the dance. While the 
celebrated children are getting ready, diligently adorned by their mothers with a 
profusion of feathers and urucu, the older women sit in the floor in a circle and 
sing several songs, one after the other. They sing for some ten to fifteen minutes, 
and now Bemoti, the old ceremonial leader, who has been sitting on the men's 
house's wall, appreciating the women's songs, rouses as if to speak - and starts to 
cry. He does so in the high-pitched tune characteristic of women and elders, a 
pungent lament during which he mentions several people that are long dead. 
Almost instantly, the older women, loosely gathered in the men's house, start 
crying with him, and some younger women follow them. The high-piched wailing 
fills the silent plaza, where all men have already stopped dancing and approached 
the men's house. They do not cry; nevertheless they are all greatly touched by the 
collective show of grief, most of them bearing faces visibly on the verge of tears. 
They all stay still, as the younger women do, each one of them avoiding eye 
contact with others. No other sound is to be heard in the plaza, as indeed in the 
whole village, which seems to be all here, in the centre, each person grieving 
one's dead. This goes on for some quarter of an hour, during which many a man 
discretely sweeps away the tears that flow down his face. They now stop and the 
older women, a deep sorrow stamped in their faces, sing again their songs, which 
seem to ring more sad this time. After some ten minutes, when they stop, Bemoti 
stands again in the centre of the men's house, his powerful voice, now in its usual 
baritone pitch, filling the plaza with a ceremonial discourse. He spoke for some 
time, addressing the women now and them about practical matters of the 
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ceremony. He also addressed people at large occasionally. He spent some 2 hours 
in that. 
The extract above, taken from my field notes, displays both the ethnographic 
and the theoretical subjects I will explore within this chapter. It aims at describing the 
way emotions - and more especifically `grief and `longing' - are created and managed 
among the Mebengokre, along with discussing the issue of legitimacy in the 
anthropological appreciation of what we call Mebengokre 
emotions/feelings/sentiments/moods. In relation to the former, ethnographic issue, I will 
argue that it is through this process, and others similar to it, that bonds are established 
among people, something that, I contend, is conversant with their conceptions of what 
we would call `the social', or society. It focuses on the public wailing for dead relatives, 
something that occurs during the chain of ceremonies they perform every year, and is an 
integral part to them. The lament described above is only one instance among the 
several ways the Mebengokre have to create and maintain emotional states that are 
collective in nature. Their ceremonial life is actually very much concerned in explicitly 
creating such emotional states, which are seen as links binding autonomous individuals 
to each other. 
The legitimacy issue I want to discuss in this chapter is also closely related to 
the one above. I shall maintain that the Mebengokre material unfolded here provides the 
basis for a critique of traditional anthropological approaches to ritual which dismiss 
emotion as a private, internal reality which is to be opposed to the external enactment of 
ritual. This position, to my knowledge, springs from Durkheim, for whom "... mourning 
is not a natural movement of private feeling, wounded by a cruel loss; it is a duty 
imposed by the group... It is a ritual attitude, which [one] is forced to adopt out of 
147 
respect for custom, but which is, in a large measure, independent of his affective state" 
(Durkheim 1915: 397). A similar position can be seen in Victor Turner's opposition 
between inward, sensory and outward, behavioural `poles' of the ritual symbol, of 
which only the latter is relevant for anthropological analysis. 146 The core assumption of 
these approaches, to my view, is that `duty', `custom', `obligation' are the basic stuff of 
which the social state is made of, so to speak - and that they are both distinct and 
(relatively, at least) independent of `internal' emotional states. 
I will argue here that, although Durkheim's, and Turner's (and, generally 
speaking, most ritual theorists') insights on the close relation between people's 
emotional states and social states in the enactment of ritual are in principle applicable to 
Mebengokre data, analyses based in their theoretical outlook are seriously hampered by 
the metaphysical background (both moral and aesthetic) of those theories. They have as 
their cornerstone twin ontological notions of human being and of society, which are 
heavily dependent on each other. On one side we find `human beings' who are bounded 
universes of inner experience; on the other side, we find `societies' that are, in the 
classical Durkheimian definition, `outside and above' the individuals that constitute it, 
and which sets and reinforces rules for their (outer) behaviour. 
146 Turner (1967: 28; 33; 36-37). Levy (1982: 216) elaborates on this point, stating that, according to 
Turner, for the anthropologist analysing rituals " (... ) it is enough that the symbols should evoke 
emotion. [Turner] is interested in the fact that emotion is evoked and not in the specific qualities of its 
constituents (... ) In other words, the anthropologist treats the sensory pole of meaning as a constant, 
and the social and ideological aspects as variables whose interdependencies he seeks to explain. " 
Turner himself (1967: 33) is clear enough about the (supposedly) universal referential relation of ritual 
symbols to `society', when he states that for the anthropologist "(... ) the ritual symbol is primarily a 
factor in group dynamics, and, as such, its references to groups, relationships, values, norms, and 
beliefs of a society are his principal item of study". As it will be seen in this chapter, I contest this 
statement in full, beginning with the notion that `society' has necessarily to do with such things as 
`groups'. `relationships'. etc, down to the very referential relationship between `symbols' and 
`society'. 
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To my view, this distinction is nowhere trickier than when it is applied to the 
experience and expression of emotions in ritual. Here it establishes a sort of 
schizophrenia between inner and outer, experience and expression, feeling and 
performance, which, when brought together in the enactment of ritual, produce 
`collective effervescence' (Durkheim) or `communitas' (Turner), characteristically 
temporary states (not unlike schizophrenic fits) when both terms of the equation are 
brought together to their further mutual reinforcement. 
In the light of what I was able to learn in my fieldwork, both `universals' 
('human beings' and `society') seem rather unsatisfactory as such, and nowhere this has 
become clearer to me than in the ceremonial enactment of emotion, which I describe in 
this chapter. I had my attention called to it due not only to the obvious importance that 
Mebengokre accord to it - as their ceremonies are explicitly about creating emotional 
states - but also due to the strangeness that this specific part of the ceremony - the 
ceremonial show of sadness - provoked on me. After all, although fieldworkers usually 
start their fieldwork (in a cultural setting different from one's own, that is) more or less 
expecting to find strangeness in the general field of cognition and intellect, having been 
trained for years to expect it (and sometimes inoculated against it by their training), one 
more or less expects one's emotions to be conversant with those of other people, even 
though both their causes and their outcomes may differ. But the time I spent with the 
Mebengokre taught me otherwise. They have taught me that both Mebengokre 
`individual' and Mebengokre `society' cannot be taken for granted as ontological 
realities, the way we usually take them to be. I believe that the contact with Mebengokre 
world of emotions was fundamental to my grasping this diverse reality. As I said before, 
one can be reasonably inoculated against the strangeness of other's thoughts by 
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anthropological theory, to the point of easily finding place for it in one's analytical 
chest of drawers. But this is much harder in relation to emotions. In this chapter I will 
describe the result of my being confronted with the strangeness of Mebengokre feelings, 
emotions, and sentiments, trying to convey, in the form of theoretical critique, those 
glimpses of Mebengokre humaness and sociality that I was able to achieve in the field. 
I deliberately chose not to expose it as an existential journey because - as every 
anthropologist who has done fieldwork in a cultural setting different from one's own 
more or less intuitively knows - the journey from one's feeling of strangeness to its 
description is not accomplished solely on the road of feeling and experience. This is a 
two-way road, and one needs to go back and forth in it, through both lanes of feeling 
and of intellect , of experience and of cognition, 
from oneself to others, as many times 
as necessary to be able to grasp some of the significance and distinctiveness of the road 
itself. Experience is no more one's own experience, divorced from one's engagement 
with the world and with people in the world, than being is in itself, without the world 
with which this being engages itself. As anthropologist, a large part of my experience of 
the strangeness that I described above consisted of my questioning key theoretical 
pressuppositions of the discipline. No narrative of such experience would be honest if it 
did not include such questioning. To represent it as a purely `existential' quest in the 
narrowest sense of the term - that which posits an `existence' divorced from the world 
in which such existence exists: for instance, my existence as an abstract human being 
divorced from the fact that this human being happens to be an anthropologist doing 
fieldwork, concerned with matters such as anthropological theory, and actively engaged 
in a quest for the understanding of another people's ways of being in the world - does 
not enrich one's description. Rather, it makes it poorer. 
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I mention these issues here not (only) as a theoretical parti-pris, but (also) 
because it bears strongly on the matter being dealt herewith. What I am set to question 
in the following pages is the universal ontological status of human experience of 
emotions, feelings, moods, and sentiments. I will do so neither by means of a wide- 
range comparison drawing from bibliographical ethnographic sources, nor by playing 
different theoretical sources against each other. The comparison affected here is that one 
constituent of fieldwork as such, where one tries to engage one's existential outlook (in 
the broadest sense of the term) with anothers'. This is a process motivated by one's 
sensation of displacement related to some particular aspect of one's engagement into an 
unfamiliar world, and propelled by one's desire of coming to terms with such 
displacement, in the form of a quest for the understanding of the strangeness behind 
such displacement. The way I have conceived for my particular quest involved the 
questioning of Western theories on the status of emotions, feelings, and sentiments. It is 
in this sense that I have introduced such discussion below. My intention is not to 
compare `non-Western folk theories' on emotion with `Western specialised theories' on 
the same subject. Rather, it is to convey for an anthropological audience how I came to 
understand something about Mebengokre emotions, sentiments, and feelings. This 
process involved a re-examination of my own `folk' presupositions concerning 
emotions, as well as a critique of current theories on the subject, and it is in this sense 
that I want them to be understood in the discussion below. In fact, the terms of the 
above opposition are rather ill-defined. Mebengokre emotions are object of highly 
specialised knowledge - ceremonial knowledge like that described in this chapter being 
essentially complex tekne for the production of emotions - and the degree to which 
Western `folk' and `specialised' knowledges on emotions can be distinguished (and 
even the very unity of `Western' knowledges on the subject, be they `folk' 
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or'specialised') is rather obscure. Both points should become clear in the discussion 
below. 
To put it in a nutshell, I intend here to question the universality of the idea that 
`to feel' and `to express' emotions are distinct processes, linked by a privileged relation 
which establishes the authenticity of the emotion being expressed. I mantain that this 
idea is linked to a large number of diverse (and not always mutually consistent) 
metaphysical presupositions, both moral and aesthetic, that are typical to Western ways 
of thinking. I contend that for Mebengokre, experience and performance of emotions 
should not be analytically distinguished, lest one intentionally misrepresent Mebengokre 
ways of being-in-the-world to suit one's own ways of being-in-the-world. As 
performance, Mebengokre experience of emotions is primarily a collective affair, 
shaped into meaningfulness (in the strong sense of being made available to one's 
existencial grounds as both authentic and relevant) by ceremonies, by which reason 
ceremonies constitute a privileged way of access to Mebengokre emotions. Different 
from the `classical' Durkheimian approach to the issue, though, performances of 
emotions in ceremonies do not constitute indexes of a being called `society', both 
distinct from and above individuals, but icons of individual relationships, interwoven so 
as to create (quite explicitly) a feeling of encompassing elation amongst those 
participating in the ceremony. Thus, inverting the Durkheimian paradigm, I maintain 
that relationships between people involved in the ceremonies are individual, whereas 
the emotions involved are social. 
I am well aware that I am diving into muddy waters here, and that there are a 
few easy ways out of them. The reasons why I chose this specific way to convey what I 
have learned about Mebengokre emotions will be made clear throughout this chapter. 
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On the other hand, it may not be altogether clear for the reader the reasons why I have 
not chosen one of the easier ways out of such discussion. Accordingly, I will briefly 
sketch a few arguments concerning two of these most obvious ways out before starting 
off my main argument. 
Probably the easiest way out of this discussion would be to silence about the 
collective quality of Mebengokre emotion and focus solely on its individual side. True 
enough, as the experience/expression of emotions presuppose individuals that 
experience/express them, one could easily describe them from the point of view of the 
individual alone. One could thus produce a truthful description of them, but such 
description would be lacking relevance. One cannot ignore the tremendous importance 
that the collective shaping of emotions has for Mebengokre social life. Ceremonies are 
explicitly described both by ceremonial specialists and by Mebengokre in general as 
dealing with the production of collective emotional states. A description of Mebengokre 
emotions that deliberately ignored this point would not be a honest account of the 
phenomenon. 
Another way out would be to treat Mebengokre's descriptions of emotions and 
their connection with ceremonies as 'local representations' of a universal phenomenon 
whose truth would be given by Western theories of emotions, and compare them with 
other `folk theories' on the subject (Western or otherwise). This project would meet 
with a myriad of serious objections, not the least of them being the critique of such 
representational artifice as a modernist device that prevents the engagement in real 
dialogue with other peoples' worlds 147. This approach is also likely to fall into a 
Wittgensteinian-like bug-in-the-box trap, since it would have to define previously (or at 
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least to presupose the possibility of such definition) what is an emotion in itself, 
independent of the language(s) that describes it (I expand on this topic in the discussion 
below). 
It should be clear by now that my concern here is not `what are emotions', or 
`feelings', or `thoughts', or `moods', or `sentiments', or any other Western category 
related to the issue. To start with such definition is to attribute to these categories a form 
of universality, an strategy which is always risky in an ethnography. The issue of 
whether, or to what extent, these categories can be said to hold true universally - or in 
relation to some non-Western peoples at any rate - does not concern me here. What 
concerns me is how a Mebengokre notion such as o'amak , the longing 
for an absent 
relative/friend, can be accessed by means of a discussion of the Western categories 
previously described, that is, how one set of notions can be conversant (or not) with the 
other. In my fieldwork, I have assumed that what the Mebengokre held to be the 
manifestations of o'amak are, loosely speaking, 'emotions/sentiments/feelings/moods'. 
The Mebengokre themselves usually deployed the latter in relation to my own 
emotional states. But, as both the Mebengokre and myself frequently noticed, the 
correspondence was not an unproblematical one. It is in the discussion of the minutiae 
of such correspondences that I hope to convey a sense of what it is to be (or to have) 
o'amak . 
This, I believe, can only be (meaningfully) done by means of a description of 
the use of such notion in the situations where it arises. 
147 Sec McGrane (1989: 133-29) for a through critique of these rhetorical strategies. 
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Wearing their Hearts on their Sleeves: A Topology of Authenticity 
Anthropologists and philosophers alike have increasingly questioned the 
received wisdom of both philosophy and psychology which sees emotion as something 
that is to be understood only in relation to the individual's internal disposition. The 
mainstream critique has been mainly concerned with the `cultural' - that is, the 
`constructed', as opposed to the `innate' - character of emotions (Strathern 1977; 
Rosaldo 1982; Lutz 1988), the distinction and interrrelation between emotions and 
cognition/thought (Solomon 1978,1982; Greenspan 1980; Levy 1982; Leavitt 1996); 
and the linguistic expression of emotions (Rosaldo 1982b; Irvine 1993; Channell 1997). 
But very little or no thought has been given (to my knowledge) to actual processes of 
the social construction of emotions148. I maintain that, for the Mebengokre, the process 
of creation and maintenance of emotions is, at the same time, a process of creation and 
maintenance of social life. For them, there does not seem to exist any opposition, or 
indeed difference between what we call by the names `emotion' and `social relations'. 
Furthermore, I shall argue that the issue is a moral/aesthetical one for the Mebengokre, 
which again sheds light on anthropology's own conceptions of `social organisation' as 
based upon specific, Western moral outlooks. Indeed, it was through the analysis of 
Mebengokre aesthetics and ethics of emotion that I came to see the Durkheimian 
emphasis on `role', `duty', `obligation', etc - which has become embedded in British 
social anthropology though Radcliffe-Brown's appropriation of Durkheimian thought - 
as related to a Kantian-style deontology, which has been emptied of its moral content 
but whose categories and basic notions - that is `rules and obligations', basically - have 
been maintained by generations of anthropologists as the basic stuff of sociality. 
148 Harrison (2001) discusses seasonal patterns of mood and their significance against the background of 
Papua New Guinean Indigenous cosmology, although he does not describe the actual processes of 
creation of such seasonal moods, 
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Such approaches are dependent upon a (cultural) theory of emotion which is 
based on a distinction between inner experience and outer manifestation, relegating the 
former to the realm of physiology. Solomon (1982: 235), in his critique of the so-called 
Jamesian theory of emotions, makes the point that, according to this theory, "[t]he 
interpretation of emotions (including the basic interpretive act of naming and 
identifying one's emotion) is quite distinct from the emotion itself, thus leaving the 
emotion proper outside the realm of anthropology. " One can see reflections of this 
theory both in Durkheim's appraisal of mourning as a social constraint, and in Victor 
Turner's conception of the bi-polarity of symbols, with the sensory pole characterised 
by emotional states, also outside easy reach of -and indeed not of interest for - 
anthropological analysis. Both approaches thus seem to be dependent upon an 
assumption that does not hold true for the Mebengokre. 
In fact, I became interested in this subject in the field, when I realised how 
important it is for the Mebengokre to make clear, all the time, their emotional rapport to 
each other and to other, non-Mebengokre people. Although I come myself from a place 
where emotions are very easily expressed in everyday life, I was impressed by the 
extent to which the Mebengokre wear them on their sleeves. Emotional rapport is 
present in everyday talk and attitudes, such as in smiling, laughing together, holding 
another's hand while speaking, showing concern for the other's emotional states. 
Whenever I expressed longing for my daughters in the field, for instance, my friends 
would gather around me, ceaselessly elaborating through emotion talk my state of 
longing: how sad I was for being away from them, how long I had been without seeing 
them, how happy I would be when I met them. People would counsel me to bring them 
with me when I came back to the village, so as not to miss them so much, or that I 
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should bring more pictures of them (I had a couple of them, which I had difficulty to 
hold on to, as most people wanted to have them). 
Mebengokre attitudes were easily noticed by those non-Indians working in the 
village, who would comment derisorily that the Mebengokre were like children, always 
begging for emotion, for emotion is always at the surface of their social life, shown in 
facial and bodily expression, as well as in everyday discourse. A connection was 
usually established (by the non-Indian staff) between such `superficiality' and the 
(frequent) sudden lapses in the friendly mood of Mebengokre in their relations with the 
non-Indian staff, caused whenever something coveted by the former was denied to them 
by the latter. Here the issue of authenticity would always be brought in, the Mebengokre 
being deemed `false' and laden with self-regard in their show of emotional rapport 
towards the non-Indian staff and other Mebengokrel49. Outsiders would also comment 
on the peculiar Mebengokre reaction of anger, very familiar to them in general: when 
any Mebengokre happened to be angry with one of the non-Indian staff working in the 
village, he or she would go the the Indian Post and `throw' his or her anger over one, 
marching back to the village afterwards. Most of the time, he or she would return to the 
Indian Post after some time (usually on the same day), behaving in an absolute friendly 
way towards the object of his or her earlier anger. The general comment by the non- 
Indian staff about such attitude was that people's emotions were `not really felt deep 
within'. As similar attitudes were also easily observable in the relationships between the 
Mebengokre themselves, the general conclusion (of the non-Indian staff, that is) was 
that all Mebengokre are inconstant, superficial and false towards everybody, always 
moved by egoistic reasons. 
149 Similar attitudes could also be observed in their dealings with other Mebengokre. 
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By defining Mebengokre emotional reactions as `superficial', the non-Indian 
staff in the village were engaging in their own folk psychology that distinguishes 
between an inner experience of emotion and its outer expression. According to this folk 
psychology, there exists an `inner self that is the seat of `authentic' emotional 
experience. The distinction between experience and expression is a key feature of such 
a folk psychology, where authenticity becomes a specific relation between both 
domains, one in which there is an overt indexical correspondence between inner 
experience and outer manifestation of such emotion. Emotive reacting, being an 
expression of an `inner self', is also viewed as an expression of self-interests, and as 
such morally repproachable. One can easily find here, lurking in the background of such 
folk psychology, an assumption with regard to the innapropriateness of the display of 
emotions in social exchange, although this was sometimes controversial in their 
appreciation of their own relations with the Mebengokre. 
The judgements of authenticity put forward by the non-Mebengokre staff of the 
Indian post connected the issue of the display of emotions with issues of morality. 
Indeed, not only their `folk' theories of emotions connect the issue to moral outlooks. 
The connection between Western notions of emotion and moral judgements has been 
noted by Lutz (1988: 70, emphasis ommited): 
To say of individuals that they are acting emotionally is to say that they are acting 
on the basis of a personal interest which is inconsistent with the wider interest 
they ought to consider (... ) Emotion (... ) blinds the individual to judgements that 
she or he ought to make, causing thereby both a failure of perception and 
potential social disruption. As bias pushes individuals to pursue goals that accord 
only with their own views, the emotional, subjective person may thwart the 
attainment of more global, social, objectively determined, and valid goals. 
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In this conception, `to be emotional' - i. e., `subjective' - is to act on individual 
interest. One ought to act regardless of one's own interests and aims, if one is to live in 
society. Individual goals are less valid than social ones. Impersonal goals are more 
objective, and thus more valid, than private ones. All these assumptions are in stark 
contrast to Mebengokre views of both emotions and morality. For them, sociality can 
only be attained if one pursues one's individual goals. One acts when moved by one's 
desires and cravings, in order to satisfy one's appetites, and only if this is (ideally) 
achieved for each individual can the state of sociality be attained. Emotion, as a 
collective state, indicates individual desires and drives aim towards identical goals 
individually pursued by all, which are pursued not because one ought to, but because 
one so desires or craves to do so. There is no common goal as such in this metaphysics - 
or, in other words, no `common good' towards whose accomplishment one ought to act 
regardless of one's individual goals. The measure of communality between individuals 
is provided by the emotions themselves, and it is not surprising that the creation and 
management of emotions is seen as the primary goal of Mebengokre ceremonies, and 
not as their by-product. 
There is yet another Western popular view of emotion/affect, which deems its 
centrality to morality, being in this sense opposed to the deontological view exposed 
above. Quoting Lutz (1988: 77) again, according to this Western view (forthcoming 
from romanticism), "[t]he centrality of affect to morality derives from the role of 
feelings in indexing the true self. If one's heart is in the right place, one's behaviour 
(however damaging to others) can be portrayed as justifiable and moral". This romantic 
view suggests again the problem of authenticity in Mebengokre emotions, being in fact 
exactly the same expressed by the non-Indian staff in the village. According to the 
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latter, it is because Mebengokre lack a (causal) connection with an `inner experience' - 
that is, because their emotions lie `at the surface' of the self, and not `deep within' it - 
that such emotions are 'inauthentic'. The problem here is the location of the authenticity 
of emotion in the indexical relation with an inner state. I want to argue in this chapter 
that this location misses the point of the authenticity of Mebengokre emotion, which 
should be seen from the point of view of performance rather than that of inner 
experience. As such, it makes no sense for the Mebengokre to place authenticity in a 
relation with an `inner self', the same way that it makes no sense to require from an 
actor, as a measure of the authenticity of his or her performance, that he or she indexed 
the performance in his or her inner experience of what is being performed. Which, of 
course, does not mean that they are not 'felt'. Rather, one could say that their affective 
life is felt through performance - or, inverting the terms, that their performance of 
emotions is felt. But authenticity lies in the performance itself. 
Authenticity does not need to be located in the indexical relation with an inner 
state, as can be seen in the role of the Wolof griot in expressing another person's 
emotions (Irvine 1993: 154-55): 
In the Wolof communicative system, the displayer of affect (or the person who 
expresses an idea) need not be the same person who supposedly possesses it. A 
griot may display emotion on behalf of a noble, to whom the emotion is attributed 
but who sits by impassively (... ) the songs and wailing of the griots who serve as 
public mourners when an important person dies also expresses the family's 
feelings in the same way (... ) Again, although the discourse is charged with high 
affect, the speaker's own feelings are not the ones being expressed (... ) 
In Irvine's example, the disjunction between expression and experience - the 
one who expresses is not the one who feels - does not emasculate the authenticity of the 
display. The equation `self = inner' does not hold for the assessment of the authenticity 
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of emotions in the Wolof griot case, as an indexical relation between inner and outer self 
is not relevant at all for such assessment. 
This equation is common to both moral standpoints in the folk psychology of 
the non-Indian staff in the village. Whereas the deontological standpoint stresses the 
inauthenticity of moral action as index of self-interests, the sensationalist one stresses 
the authenticity of moral action as index of inner feelings. From this comparison a 
second opposition obtains, between reasoned interests and experienced feelings. This 
brings to light a second sense in which Mebengokre emotions were deemed `false' by 
the non-Indian staff in the village. In their view, it is not only because Mebengokre 
expression of emotions did not index internal experiences that they were `false'; it is 
also because they indexed (reasoned) self-interests. The absence of an indexation to 
inner experience ('superficiality') was in itself an index of their indexation to reasoned 
self-interests ('egoism'). I want to call attention here to the heavy metaphysical burden 
present in them, which among other things pressupose a whole Western conception of 
self in order to be stated. 
I want to show here that, for the Mebengokre, what we would call `the surface' 
expression of emotions, understanding it as an index of inner experience, is in fact much 
more complex - `deeper', as it were - than our folk psychology would be willing to 
accept'50. This `surface', which is in fact what is perceived by the observer in others, as 
well as what is shown by one to an observer, is, I believe, an index of the intersubjective 
relationship between individuals and that of the individual-in-the-collectivity. They 
presuppose as background a specific aesthetic as well as an ethic. The same way we 
would represent someone having an emotion as someone experiencing it within, for the 
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Mebengokre, I believe, such representation would be of one performing the emotion for 
an audience. In fact, we should not speak here of `expression of emotion', as this 
representation presupposes an expression that is an index of an inner experience; and 
therefore I will refer to it as simply `emotion' from now on. 
Western conceptions of emotion and self pose considerable problems to the 
ethnographic description of Mebengokre emotional life, which, I maintain, is akin to 
what is usually called in anthropology their `social organisation'. Emotions are seen, in 
Western societies, not only as internal to individuals but also as not very controllable by 
them. One is prey to one's emotions, as the latter happen more or less independent of 
one's will. To describe emotions as created and maintained successfully at will could 
sound strange against the background of Western theories on the issuelsl. One of the 
main points of strangement here has to do with the implicit value of emotions as more 
authentic than other forms of interaction, something that springs from the very 
conception of emotions as a non-controllable manifestation of the individual's internal 
life. The analyst tends here to split the phenomenon into an internal experience and its 
external manifestation, attributing maximum authenticity to the former while putting the 
latter under suspicion, because tinted by reason and will and, as such, less authentic152 
What is at stake here is the (Western) analytical distinction between `inner experience' 
and `expression', where the latter is viewed as (potentially) less authentic than the 
150 I owe this point, and others in the past paragraphs, to a discussion with Mark Harris on a previous 
version of this chapter. 
151 Westerners, in fact, seem to have a folk notion of such control (which, to my - rather impressionistic 
- knowledge, is much more articulated 
in Anglo-Saxon countries than in Latin ones), which is not 
handled well on the theory side. 
152 Again, this is actually very strong in British `folk' notions of emotion and authenticity, but not only 
so: one has only to remember that the whole of psychoanalytic therapy is based on the access to 
unreasoned external indexes of inner emotional and affective processes. `Rationalisation' in 
psychoanalysis is synonym to inauthenticity. 
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former' 53. Lutz (1988: 56), in her analysis of Western understandings of `emotion' and 
'thought', notices that 
... the essence of both emotion and thought are to be found within the boundaries 
of the person; they are features of individuals, rather than of situations, 
relationships, or moral positions (... ) thought and emotion also share the quality 
of being viewed as more authentic realities and more truly the repository of the 
self in comparison with the relative inauthenticity of speaking and other forms of 
interaction. 
One can see here how the issue of authenticity is closely connected with that of 
conceptions of the individual and the self. Both emotions and thoughts are seen as more 
authentic because they are internal to the individual. The `inner self' is regarded as a 
source of authenticity, in opposition to expressive forms, which are subjected to one's 
volition and thus open to manipulations and to falsehood. The problem here is that this 
division does not apply to the Mebengokre, who seem to conceive of emotions as that 
which is shown to the eye of the beholder. Emotions, for the Mebengokre, are a 
primarily aesthetic phenomenon, not in the sense that they are neo-platonically roused 
(from the inner self, as it were) by the contemplation of beauty, but because `to feel' is 
`to express' to the eyes of others 154. 
It is important to note here that such an aesthetic outlook also implies a moral 
judgement for the Mebengokre: The display of longing (o'amak) is also morally good 
(mex), and this is an important aspect of the authenticity of the ceremonial 
lament/wailing. It is moral precisely because it shows itself as such. This is in stark 
contrast to common Western conceptions (both `folk' and philosophical conceptions) of 
153 Levi-Straus, of course, has a completely opposed view on this issue. 
154 Michelle Rosaldo (1982: 142) seems to make a similar point in relation to the Illongot of the 
Philipines, when she states that, for them, there is no distinction between an autonomous inner life as 
opposed to life in-the-world. 
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the authenticity of moral agency, whereby the moral character is preferentially 
attributed to actions that do not display the intent of being primarily moral in 
themselves. The philosopher Flint Schier (1987: 123) makes this point clearly: 
In fact we display a marked preference for what we might call `natural' moral 
beauty, for the display of excellent character as an unintended side-effect of 
actions with other aims (artistic, moral or whatever). Indeed the key feature in the 
appreciation of moral excellence is admiration for the motive displayed in the act. 
So inevitably the perception of histrionic intent dilutes rather than strenghtens our 
aesthetic delight. An act can hardly be, for example, an expression of benevolence 
if its main purpose is to dazzle the onlooker with the actor's benevolence. 
This appreciation offers a happy double contrast with the Mebengokre outlook 
of the aesthetics of the moral agency, as, I believe, it is precisely because their aesthetic 
perception of the display of emotions is not based on the contemplation of beauty of the 
act as unintended (in terms of the display of morality), but rather on the appreciation of 
the showing of `goodness' itself in the act - in Schier's rather biased terms, not on its 
`naturalness' but on the `histrionics' of it - that the locus of its authenticity is not in the 
relation with an inner experience but on the propriety - one might say, on the seemliness 
- of its performance as an example of 'goodness'. In Schier's understanding, a moral 
action must be one that is performed without regard for the agent's private aims. Thus, 
moral beauty can only be aesthetically contemplated in agency when the latter is not 
intended as a show of such moral quality. Aesthetic contemplation comes from seeing 
such moral quality as an outer, unintended manifestation of an inner moral character 
that do not show itself in the action but rather reveals itself (unintentionally, as it were) 
through it. Thus, if the explicit intention of the agent is to display morality in the action, 
the action cannot be, ab definitio, a moral one. Contrariwise, in Mebengokre aesthetic of 
moral agency, a moral action is beautiful because it explicitly shows itself as such, in an 
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effective way155. Morality here is not seen as an index of qualities of the inner self, but 
rather as performance, that is, it is placed within the display itself. Authenticity is thus 
not in this indexical relation to an `inner self , but in one's intention to display the 
morally good, as well as the aesthetically beautiful, in one's performance. 
This is present not only in the display of what we call 
`emotions/feelings/sentiments/moods' but is a pervasive quality of the aesthetics and 
morality of agency in Mebengokre social life. Upon arriving in a Mebengokre village 
one is immediately impacted with the `performatic' character of Mebengokre everyday 
life. Apart from the intimacy of family dwellings, actions are, as it were, enacted for an 
audience, in a non-stop string of performances that dazzles the outsider by its insistence 
and recurrence. It is as if one's whole life, at the village level, was not only lived but 
played out. In this sense, ceremonies (me toro) are an epithome of social life, or, to use 
philosopher Nelson Goodman's jargon, exemplars of everyday life, as they are actively 
and explicitly performed for audiences. 
Goodman (1976: 53) defines exemplification as the possession of a property 
plus a reference to what is being exemplified. Exemplification differs from simple 
denotation by being a two-way process, implying reciprocal reference between the 
example and that of which it is an example (1976: 59). 1 think this applies nicely to 
Mebengokre ceremonies as examples of sociality. When enacted, ceremonies not only 
155 Jamieson (2000: 92, footnote 25) states that for the Kakabila inhabitants of whom he describes a 
ceremonial wailing, what is important in the lament is the production of an appropriate aesthetics. He 
then goes on to state that, in the performance, the performers are aware that it Is a performance, 
although they don't show it to the audience. I will develop this point further below in this chapter in 
my discussion of Urban, but I would say here that, for the Mebengokre, although they are aware that 
the lament is a performance, they do not need to show it to others, as everybody is equally aware if it. 
Furthermore, as will made explicit below, this does not imply that the performance is less authentic as 
an emotional experience because of that. I would nevertheless agree with Jamieson, for slightly 
different reasons, that what is important (for Mebengokre ceremonial wailing at any rate) is to produce 
an appropriate aesthetic manifestation. This will become clear below. 
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refer to a moral good in terms of the way people should live together with each other; 
they also are referred by it, as this very same social state is created by ceremonies. To 
understand Mebengokre ceremonies, one has to dive into what they exemplify, instead 
of simply into what they denote. 
Ceremonies are over-beautifications, as well as over-'moralisations' of an state 
of everyday being-in-the-world , attained 
both by a maximisation of aesthetic agency 
(visual and auditive) in the form of adornments, songs and dances; and by the 
maximisation of moral agency, in the form of the acting out of the moral performances 
of giving and getting. As such, they create the very reality they exemplify. It is in this 
frame, I believe, that the intensification of the moral/aesthetic performance of emotions 
should be understood. 
Emotion and Reference: From Ontology to Language 
I would like to make clear here that my use of the term `emotion' does not 
intend to assume the universality of the phenomenon. Rather, it is an easy way to 
identify what is being talked about, both by myself here and by the Mebengokre when 
we discussed the issue. Leavitt (1996: 516-17) touches this point when he states that 
Anthropologists (... ) sometimes criticise what they see as the Western concept of 
emotion (... ) but, interestingly, they do not cease to use the word or the concept 
itself (... ) While anthropologists in their role as theorists have tended to produce 
models that assimilate emotion to either feeling or meaning, anthropologists as 
practising ethnographers continue to rely on the unstated assumptions of 
everyday usage. While it goes against the hyperreflexivity of recent years, this 
may not be a bad thing. 
The real interest of such identification, in my case, is to let Mebengokre lived 
experience pose challenges to the theoretical standpoints of anthropological (and 
philosophical, and psychological) theory. Going back to my main point here, how can 
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we understand `emotion' as conflating experience (for oneself) and performance (for 
others)? In keeping with this conception, the main focus here will be on the visible, 
aesthetic aspects of the creation of o'amak, or longing, in collective mourning, and I 
will make some considerations related to their `authenticity', as I think the very issue, as 
it is put in Western thought, does not make sense to the Mebengokre. I believe that, for 
the Mebengokre, a true emotion is one that is truly displayed. In this sense, emotion is 
performance, and it is as such that public mourning will be treated here. There is 
implicit here the idea that the authenticity of the emotion is in the authenticity of its 
performance, an idea that also involves moral notions related to the `goodness' of the 
emotion, that is, to the moral value of the emotional performance. Moreover, collective 
0 'amak has a constructive side to it. As Leavitt (1996: 527) states, "affective or felt 
associations, like semantic ones, are collective as well as individual; they operate 
through common or similar experience among members of a group living in similar 
circumstances, through cultural stereotyping of experience, and through shared 
expectations, memories, and fantasies". For Mebengokre, collectivelly felt o'amak 
actually creates the group that feels - that is, that performs - together, by means of 
shared memories, experiences, and emotion itself. 
The point here is that , to my view, the terms we use to 
describe `emotion' are 
not vocabularies applied, as descriptive terms, to `something out there' (or `within 
there'). This latter is an approach which is itself connected with Western metaphysical 
views of the self. Making the issue one of referentiality in this sense, implies the 
assumption of a cultural model of emotions and of the self. One example of this is 
Needham's (quoted in Lutz 1988: 67) view of `vocabularies of emotion' as inherently 
wrong about the way they describe them, because emotions are `natural' (and thus 
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`universal'), being unaffected by culture-specific descriptions. His statement is 
dependent upon an ontology of the self which attributes to emotions an ontological 
reality in and of itself ('natural and universal'), independent of the `culture-specific' 
notions used to `describe' them156. The English writer, Aldous Huxley (1953: 131-33), 
has expressed (more elegantly) essentially the same view when he takes `love' as a 
descriptive term applied to internal realities: 
... people will write in the existing language, and their writing will be, in 
consequence, more or less completely misunderstood by most of their readers. 
Inevitably, because the words they use don't correspond to the things they are 
talking about. Most of them are words taken from everyday language (... ) Let's 
take the commonest word in all religious literature: `love'. Love on the human 
level means - what? Practically everything from Mother to the Marquis de Sade 
(... ) We don't even make the simple Greek distinction between erao and philo, 
eros and agape. With us everything is just love, whether it's self-sacrificing or 
possessive, whether it's friendship or lust or homicidal lunacy. It's all just love 
(... ) Idiotic word! Even on the human level it's hopelessly ambiguous. And when 
you begin using it in the level of eternity - well, it's simply disastrous. `The love of 
God'. `God's love for us'. `The saint's love for his fellows'. What does the word 
stand for in such phases? And in what way is this related to what it stands for 
when it's applied to a young mother suckling her baby? or to Romeo climbing 
into Juliet's bedroom? or to Othelo as he strangles Desdemona? or to the 
research worker who loves his science? or to the patriot who is ready to die for 
his country - to die and, in the meantime, to kill, steal, lie, swindle and torture for 
it? Is there really anything in common between what the word stands for in these 
contexts and what it stands for when one talks, let us say, of the Buddha's love for 
all sentient beings? Obviously, the answer is: No, there isn't. On the human level, 
the word stands for a great many different states of mind and ways of behaving. 
Dissimilar in many respects, but alike at least in this: they're all accompanied by 
emotional excitement and they all contain an element of craving. 
156 Lutz (1988: 68-69) says, about what she calls the romantic conception of emotion, that "... the natural 
(including emotion) is depicted as synonymous with the uncorrupted, the pure, the honest, the original. 
Nature and emotion are seen as fountains of high truths, while culture, conscious thought, and 
disengagement are all viewed as disguise, artifice, or vice (... ) When emotion is seen as natural in this 
positive sense, thought and its offshoot, social speech, come to be seen as less authentic and less 
'really real' (... ) It is only uncognised, unexpressed emotion that is truly natural, then, as it has not 
been reached and disturbed or warped by cultural conventions for the conscious experience or display 
of emotion. " Thus, in this version of the Western conception of emotions, they are authentic because, 
different from speech (and expression), they are placed in the inner self, being closely associated with 
nature. To express emotion is to `corrupt' its naturalness with cultural codes: that's why the 
expression of emotions is suspect, because it misrepresents something that is out of itself: an inner 
reality. It is clear here that such conception - Needham's conception in a nutshell - only makes sense 
against the metaphysical background of Western conceptions of self, as possessing an inner reality 
closely associated with nature, and thus pressupposing an experience that is different from its 
expression in speech, that is, a `thing' that is different from the ways words are used to describe it. 
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As with Huxley's character, perpetually in search for a `clear language' rid of 
the ambiguities of everyday language, approaches that intend to get clear definitions of 
emotion terms do so only to the extent that they distance themselves from everyday uses 
of these notions, towards abstract notions that, precisely because far away from the 
everyday, reflect poorly the richness of their multiple usages, which may actually 
include ambiguousness as a characteristic trait. The search for `clear' definitions is also 
prone to end up with the analyst establishing his or her own linguistic categories as the 
yardstick against which other peoples' notions are measured. Levy (1982: 219), for 
instance, treats emotions as `concepts' and finds that some peoples have no 
unambiguous terms to `represent' them, which he calls `hypocognised emotions'. 
According to him, "[o]ne of the consequences of hypocognisation is that ... [the feeling] 
can be interpreted both by the one who experiences them and by others around him as 
something other than `emotion"'. It is clear in his argument that English language - 
contemporary English language - is being used to provide a set of unambiguous 
categories (or `concepts') to describe some `thing' external to it (or rather, internal: 
`internal experiences') as 'emotions'. He poses `emotion' as an ontological reality 
independent of language, a reality which is clear and rid of contradictions, and 
`language' (in fact, his own language) as a tool to describe one's `awareness' (that is, 
cognition of an internal process with an ontological reality of its own) of one's 
emotions. Now, when other peoples' notions are found to be different from his (Levy's) 
own, they are either `hypo-' or hyper-cognised', that is, either one's culture has too 
much `culturally provided schemata for interpreting and dealing with it', or it has too 
little. The point here is that, by distinguishing between `emotional feeling' and 
`emotional response', Levy is able to deal with the latter as culturally constructed, while 
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he himself (culturaly) constructs the former as universalfbiological, that is, as a process 
with an ontological reality of its own, independent of language. 
To see emotion in language (in the wider sense), instead of through language, 
implies here to part with the idea that it refers to something other that has an ontological 
reality in itself, independent of language. It is nothing else than criticising the tendency 
that we ('Westerners', also in the broader sense) have to represent emotional experience 
as a reference to a state of things within ourselves, as noted by German philosopher 
Ludwig Wittgenstein in his well known statement that `joy designates nothing at all, 
neither any inward nor any outward things' (1967, § 487)157. His argument does not 
deny that `joy' has some content; rather the emphasis is in the fact that `joy' does not 
`designate something', that is, that it does not refer to inner states, be they `mental' or 
`emotional' events. According to Wittgenstein, emotions are not `caused by' (or, in 
other words, are not `an index of) internal states/experiences. Emotions are not 
understandable through causal concepts of this sort. As Miyashita (1978: 451-52) puts 
it, Wittgenstein's core theory of emotion is one that states that 
(... ) an emotion is no inner process and (... ) the most essential feature of an 
emotion is that it has a characteristic expression. He [Wittgenstein] thinks that, 
since an emotion is not anything like a physical object or a sensation, it has to be 
expressed in some form of human activity in order that it can enter into a 
language-game (... ) [Wittgenstein] contends: `I can f tnd no answer if I try to settle 
the question `What I am referring to' when I say `I'm frightened? ', and that `the 
question is : In what sort of context does it occur? ' And the context, in turn, is 
decided by the relation of the object to the person concerned, as he says, `the 
language-game `I'm afraid' already contains the object'. This is how the object of 
an emotion is regarded as essential by Wittgenstein, while he rejects the attempt 
to introduce causality into the explanation of mental events (... ) Wittgenstein 
attacks the cartesian view that relates sensation to physical objects. he does the 
same in relation to emotion, when he denies that `causes' may define emotions, 
suggesting that the grammar of emotion is in the `phenomenon of human life' 
157 Following the tradition in quoting Wittgenstein, I will give here the paragraph to which the quotation 
belongs, instead of page number. 
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Many anthropologists and philosophers have dealt with this issue, but the result 
is usually a fallback in a referential approach to emotions, seen as expression of inner 
states. The opposition itself, as I mentioned earlier, is bound to produce the very effect 
that they try to avoid in their approaches, namely the return - through the back door, as 
it were - of the ontological categories that lie at the core of (some) Western folk 
psychologies. Solomon, for instance, despite stating his suspicions about the distinction 
between `emotion' and its interpretation (1982: 239), states further on in his article 
(1982: 241) that 
The names of emotions clearly vary from culture to culture (... ) But this obvious 
point hides a subtle and troublesome one; how do we know whether it is only the 
names (i. e. phonetic sequences) that vary rather than their reference? The 
problem here is what W. T. 0 Quine calls `radical intranslatability': do the words 
`anger' in English and riri in Tahitian refer to `the same' emotion? How would 
we tell? Even if the causes are commensurable and the behaviour seems to be 
similar, how do we gauge the similarity of emotions? Names of emotions are 
clearly cultural artifacts, even `arbitrary' (... ) But the identities of the phenomena 
that those names name are yet an open question, not obviously the same 
references for quaintly different vocabularies but clearly not entirely different 
either. We are, after all, identifying a shared reference to something. (... ) A 
similar point can be made about the various expressions of emotion. Clearly some 
expressions at least differ from culture to culture as learned gestures and more or 
less `spontaneous' actions (... ) And the verbal expression of emotions vary not 
only along with the language (of course) but also according to the familiar 
images and metaphors of cultures (... ) [T]he more fundamental question - of what 
are these expressions expressive? - will have to wait for an account of the 
emotions themselves. 
Solomon here poses the problem as one of referentiality: names of emotions 
refer to something `out there', that is, outside language itself. But this `something' 
cannot be accessed intersubjectively, so there is no way to know whether two names in 
different languages refer to the same emotion (i. e. to the same ontological reality). He 
seems to slip here into the same point he criticised before: by presuposing a distinction 
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between `emotion' and its expression, he has to accord to `emotion' an ontological 
status, that is, a `thing out there' 158 rather than social practice. Solomon is concerned 
here with criticising the distinction between `emotion' and `cognition', that is, he is 
dealing with general categories and the way they are seen - or not - in other peoples' 
lives. See, for instance, his critique of Rosaldo, who, according to him, "(... ) has argued 
that Briggs [writing on Utka Eskimos] confuses lack of anger with fear of anger, the 
sense (... ) that anger is dangerous and can even destroy a society. But here again, we 
meet that suspicious and too neat distinction between the essence of the emotion and the 
talk about emotion, as if it can be assumed that the emotion remains more or less 
constant while our thoughts and feelings about the emotion alter its expression and its 
representation. " (1982: 244-45; his emphasis). The problem here, I think, is not that a 
distinction between `emotion' and cognition' is being postulated, but rather that he (and 
Rosaldo, apparently) are speaking of `emotion' in general (that is as a universal 
category), which has an essence, a materiality of its own, instead of social practices in 
speech and agency. 
Solomon's characterisation of `emotion' as not a feeling but an interpretation 
(1982: 248), transposing it from the `felt' to the `cognitive pole', in my view, does not 
render it more approachable or easier to understand, exactly because he assumes the 
ontological reality of emotion as something outside social practice, that is, as distinct 
from the happenings that give people the sense of it. A good question here would be: 
what makes such different `things' as those that alter one's physiology; those that create 
a specific disposition towards the world; those that configurate specific qualities of 
relationship towards people; those that alter one's attitude towards oneself; etc - what 
158 In fact, judging from his description of `naming an emotion' as a `rudimentary psychological 
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kind of similarity makes us give to all those distinct happenings similar/related names, 
of emotions/feelings/moods/sentiments? The central point is, of course, that it is us who 
attribute to such things a similarity, and not the `things in themselves' that are similar. 
One's concern here should be not whether `emotion' is observable, but how it is 
construed - as `inner experience' or otherwise. 
Although Solomon's conclusions, referring as they do to `emotion' as a 
universal medium, do not interest me here, either as a `system of concepts and attitudes' 
or otherwise, his assumption that most of such `system' " (... ) is built right into our 
immediate perception and conception of the world, seeing things, events, people, and 
actions as ugly or odious, offensive or enviable, lovable or admirable"(1982: 252) is 
interesting, as it pairs aesthetic and moral judgements with emotions. The interest here 
is not, of course, that all are judgments - something that, I suppose, is to be found (or 
not) in each specific ethnographic case, and not posited a priori - but that they can be 
paired at all. The first step here is to recognise that we are not dealing with a reflexion 
on the universality of `emotions' (as cognitions or otherwise), but with a Western 
discourse which tries to overcome a (Western) distinction between `reason' and 
'emotion'. My interest here is how such discussions can be made to dialogue with 
Mebengokre theories of `emotion', that is, how they can be used to shed light on what I 
have been calling the conflation between experience and performance. 
With these considerations in mind I shall now return to the description of the 
ceremonial lament which opened this chapter, and situate it both within the context of 
the discussion and of a general picture of Mebengokre social life and ceremonial. 
activity' (1982: 242), he seems to accord them the status of an inner ('psychological') experience, thus 
going back to Western representations of 'emotion' as 
inner processes. 
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The public mourning I witnessed happened during a Mereremei female naming 
ceremony. This ceremony, like many others, last for several months, during which 
people gather to dance every sunrise and sunset. As most ceremonies, it has a 
culminating point, or ami aprä, when (in the case of this specific ceremony) the women 
dance throughout the whole night until sunrise. In the afternoon of that day, while the 
celebrated children were getting ready for dancing, the older women sat on the floor in a 
circle and sang several songs. After they ended, Bemoti, the old ceremonial leader of 
Catete village, who was there seated on the men's house's wall facing the women, 
listening to the songs, roused as if to speak - and started 
to cry. 
One point worth stressing here is that this happened during a ceremony which, 
like other ceremonies among the Mebengokre is supposed to bring joy, merriment and 
general elation, for those participating in it and those watching it alike. How is it to be 
understood within this context? For our own cultural conception of emotions hold that 
joy and sadness are antithetical and are kept separated in any `true' expression of 
emotion' 59. William Fisher (1998,2001) has noted this general character of elation to be 
expected from Mebengokre ceremonies, and has also puzzled over this strange mixture 
of joy and sadness (2001: 27): 
Ritual conjoins the memory of family and deceased ones (the ones one longs for - 
"ö'ama ") with the feelings of well-being felt by all participants. Friedrich (... ) 
points out that mood may be employed as a trope. Happiness and experience of 
beauty are not merely the products of a ritual successfully performed but this 
mood is itself thought to be an expression or index of a certain social state 
[footnote 11: I am tempted to go further and describe the modal trope in this case 
as a juxtaposition of moods, the proximity and segregation of elation/sadness 
indexing not only the presence/separation of the dead and the living but also 
159 To be sure, this `mixture' is not completely strange to (some) Western conceptions of `legitimate' 
expression of emotion. For instance. in Northeastern Brazil, as well as in traditional Ireland, a party 
would follow a funeral, with liberal consumption of spirits. But mainstream Western folk conceptions 
do segregate the spaces and times of merriment and sadness. 
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representing the basic irresolvable tension necessarily created by the 
requirements of sociality] 
His interpretation of the mixture of joy and sadness is a referential one: 
emotions are indexes of social states that are external to the emotions themselves. As 
ceremonies involve the presence of the deceased as well as the living - and as the 
former's presence is at the same time a segregation, because the dead do not participate 
in a communion with the living - sadness would be an index of the presence of the dead, 
and joy, of the communion with the living. But this interpretation falls short of giving 
an account of the legitimacy of such emotion, as displayed during the ceremony. I 
proposed that such may be seen in the ethical and aesthetic character of emotions: in the 
fact that they are meant to be displayed as such, that is, in their seemliness. If we 
consider who participates in the ceremony, who watches it, and how, this point becomes 
clear. 
During the ami aprä, the culminating point of the ceremony, women dance all 
night in a long queue around the central plaza, watched by all others (that is, men and 
children, even female ones, when they are too young to dance themselves) in the 
village. The general atmosphere is one of intense merriment, something I hope to 
convey through my fieldnotes of the ceremony, from the moment the activities related 
to the ceremonial lament finished until the end of the dance (but not of the ceremony): 
After eating, around 2 p. m., they danced within the ngobe. Two rows of women 
were formed alongside the ngobe: on the eastern side stood the merememei, all 
with their big krokroktire head adornments, all with their face adorned with 
grounded atoroti eggshell. on the western side, the other, older women faced the 
celebrated ones. The general feeling among them is one of merry excitation, 
specially among the young celebrated ones, who are dancing ficlly adorned for the 
first time. They are all smiles and excitation, some of them frowning with intense 
concentration. The women in both groups turned synchronically north and south 
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in their two-step, syncopated dance, while singing several songs. After some 10- 
15 min. proceeding in this way, the older women got behind the celebrated ones, 
forming a not-so-ordered third row. They danced some 15 min. more in this way, 
after which they left the ngobe through the Southern entry in a single row, going 
around the plaza. They went around it for some time, then concentrated on the 
eastern side of the men's house (that is, outside it, opposite to the metoro djä, or 
`place of ceremonies'). From there, groups of women left to dance around the 
plaza, the celebrated ones going in front of each row. The younger went in front; 
the older, behind. The older ones held their arms over the heads of the younger 
ones, in a sort of `roman greeting'. Each woman had both arms held over the 
head of the younger woman in front of her, and that one, by her turn, had her own 
arms held over the head of the celebrated one in front of her. They were not in an 
ordered row, as the dancers had been up to then. Now, they gathered in a loosely 
ordered group of people, sorted out by age. In this way, several groups went 
around the plaza, singing. The women behind the celebrated ones are their 
kwatui, that is, their `aunts/grandmothers', and were ceremonially teaching the 
celebrated ones the songs they would now sing in women's ceremonies from then 
on. After all groups had gone around the plaza at least twice (some went more 
times), they gathered again on the same spot outside the men's house, leaving in a 
single row to dance together around the plaza. They started close to Bemoti's (the 
old ceremonial specialist) house. His house is in the position of the village circle 
behind which the sun raises, and this is a ceremonially significant place, where 
many ceremonies start, or finish, or have significant stops. The celebrated ones, 
easily distinguished from the other women due to their more elaborate make-up 
and adornments, mingled in the row, going in front of their own kwatui. It was 
already getting dark, and men had made fires in front of their houses, from where 
they appreciated the performance. Some had brought mattresses, and some others 
served coffee, food and drink to the women who individually stopped close by. The 
village looked strangely beautiful, a circle of fires under the moonlight. I installed 
myself at the men's house, from where I watched the women dance and sing all 
night long. Some 6 or 7 unmarried men, as well as some recently married ones, 
did the same, and all commented about the performance and how the young 
celebrated ones (and other women) looked beautiful and sexually appealing. One 
of my friends, recently married (he has two small children), commented gaily that 
he was going to `sleep away' that night, and made clear what others seemed to 
me to be implicitly assuming: that this was a night to enjoy oneself, also in terms 
of sex. Actually, there was a merry coming and going of men from the men's 
house as well as from the audience around the plaza during all night. I noticed 
that some men - and some women - disappeared for some time in the spaces 
between the houses, where there was less light. Upon their return, their comments 
on the beauty of the women dancing was redoubled. Individual women did not 
dance the whole night, stopping now and then to get coffee, food and water (and 
occasionally `disappearing for some time')while the row of dancers went on. In 
this way, the women as a group danced the whole night until sunrise, around 
06: 30 in the morning. They stopped 15 min. after sunrise, already under full 
daylight and heat. 
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All this joy and merriment followed suit, immediately after the procedures that 
ended the lament. It was, as in all ceremonies, meant to be shown as such, that is, as 
creating joy and merriment, to the audience as it is to the dancers themselves. The 
audience was a mixed one, though: the deceased also watched it, from within the houses 
or (in other accounts) from the outskirts of the forest160. Some would say that they were 
also watching the lament; some wouldn't. But the performance itself was also meant for 
them, as well as for each other. The pervasive seemliness of the emotional performance, 
the fact that it is made for the eye of the beholder (who, in this specific case of the 
lament, is also a participant, at least the living one) is nevertheless clear here as well as 
in the dance itself. They cry to show each other their longing for their departed ones, 
and in this sense it is not at all contradictory to state, as they do, that although joy and 
merriment is the very point of the ceremonies they perform, the display of grief in the 
lament itself is mex, 'good/beautiful'. This is because, among other things, the very 
form of the moral and aesthetical agency implies its display for an audience. As with the 
Homeric kalös, it implies an aesthetic judgement as well as a moral one, which are 
interwoven in a single judgement. They are pleasant to look at, and so they are good in 
the moral sense. But the analogy goes further, as also in the Mebengokre case the 
`good' implies some usefulness161 in the object or situation thus characterised. We shall 
now look closely into this usefulness in the case of the lament. 
Public wailing is done by people when mourning a dead relative, or when 
acknowledging the arrival of a long absent one. People also mourn those who are going 
160 See Lea (1986) and Fisher (2001). 
161 For a discussion of the moral and aesthetical aspects of kalös among the Homeric Greeks, see 
Yamagata (1994; 225-238). I took from him the use of `seemly' and `unseemly' to characterise the 
moral/aesthetical attitude among the Mebengokre. Yamagata also notes (1995: 227) that this same 
characterisation can be applied for the sense of hearing for the Homeric Greeks as well as to the sense 
of sight, but not to other senses. This is also the case among the Mebengokre. 
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away in a journey, when they intend to stay away for a long time, or when their health 
condition is bad, as in the case of those going to town for health treatment162. The 
wailing is an acknowledgement of the intimate relationship between the one that 
mourns and the mourned. Sons, daughters, parents, brothers, sisters, grandchildren and 
spouses are usually mourned in this way, as well as formal friends (krabdjwy) and old 
friends in general (for a man, they would mostly be called kamy, or `brother', anyway). 
Also people called by `affinal' terms can be mourned. The point here is not one of 
structural positions but one of friendship: people with whom one has shared life 
experiences in the past, of whom one has fond memories of close personal attachment 
are liable to be wailed in this way. 
Public wailing is directly related to ceremonial life through o'amak. This is a 
feeling of longing, which the Mebengokre show freely during ceremonies. Ceremonies 
provide occasions when it is common to see women, young and new, mourning their 
parents, brothers and sisters, children, or husbands163. Wailing is less common among 
men - at least, young, adult men. Male elders show their o'amak in a much freer 
manner. But it is much more a female form of vocal expression than a male one. 
Women would cry, loudly, from their houses when they see a long-gone relative 
entering the village circle again. This is always done in a public manner, that is, for an 
audience. Urban (1988: 392) would have it different for the Southern Ge-speaker 
Shokleng: 
162 The general scope of Mebengokre lament seems to be broadly similar similar to Urban's (1988: 391) 
account of lament among the Southern Ge-speaking Shokleng, as well as to Graham's (1986: 87) 
account of wailing among the Central Ge-speaking Shavante. For the Northern Ge-speaking Canela, 
though, Crocker (1990: 301-02) mantains that the lament is intended basically for deceased people. 
163 They do so as they remember them wearing the same adornments, and dancing and singing the songs 
and dances of the ceremony being performed. 
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Wailing is a process of making public the feelings of the person who is wailing. It 
is intended not to be heard, in the ordinary linguistic sense, but rather to be 
overheard. Ritual wailing purports overtly not to engage an addressee, but to 
allow anyone within earshot access to something that would otherwise be private. 
Whereas I would agree with Urban that wailing is not a one-to-one linguistic 
exchange (or rather a linguistic transmission, as the one being wailed does not answer 
linguistically to it), I mantain that for the Mebengokre at least wailing is not to be 
overheard by others but primarily to be heard (and seen) by them. Urban states that it is 
to be `overheard' by people at large because it is `something that otherwise would be 
private'; but the reasoning does not make sense in the Mebengokre case. One wails in 
public only; there is no sense in wailing when there is no one to witness. `Private 
crying' is not confounded with public wailing. The form of the wailing itself bears 
testimony of this primarily aesthetic character: while crying in a high-pitched tone, the 
mourner speaks - rather, shouts - about (for instance) how long the wailed one has been 
absent; on (for instance) how close they were when they were children, when they grew 
up together; on the o'amak the wailer has had all this time. It is a rather touching 
discourse, and indeed some of those present to the mourning (those that are more 
intimate to both the wailer and the wailed) are visibly moved by it. The wailed one, if 
present, stands not far away from the wailer, silent, eyes turned down, for as long as the 
wailing goes on. I have seen more than one adult man being brought to the verge of 
tears (and sometimes to actual crying) in this way. Wailing does more than profess the 
relationship, publicised as o'amak, between two people (or some people): it also creates 
an emotional response in those that are the subject of it, as well as in some of the 
listeners. A group (in the loose sense, here) of people that feel o'amak for each other is 
clearly delineated in these occasions, as people that were brought up in intimate 
179 
relationship. When I asked one of my research assistants about this, he replied by 
pointing out to me how o'amak was 'transmitted' from a mother to her sons and 
daughters, i. e., those living together in the most intimate way. 
Wailing is held by the Mebengokre to be caused by, or a part of o'amak. They 
point out the the presence of the person who is the `repository' of o'amak is not the 
cause of wailing, only a sort of `catalyst' for the unleash of o'amak that comes when 
they are seen by their loved ones, after a long absence, for instance. In this sense, 
wailing is an index of o'amak for the Mebengokre. If one wails, it is because one has 
o'amak. If one has o'amak, one will wail on the appropriate occasion. This implies that 
if one doesn't wail, one does not feel o'amak. The connection between wailing and 
o'amak is not one between an `outer' expression and an `inner' feeling: o'amak is in the 
performance itself, so to speak, in the sense that the actual display of o'amak is the 
cultural way to feel it. Urban (1988: 392) makes a distinction that, I believe, cannot be 
apllied to Mebengokre o'amak, between `overt' and `actual' function of ritual wailing: 
The overt or represented function of ritual wailing, however, must be 
differentiated from its actual function for the person who engages in the wailing. 
The purpose of the individual's action is understandably communicative - to let 
other members of the community know that the individual has the proper 
orientation to the dead person, visitor, or whatever life situation occasions the 
wailing - whether or not it is expressive. In other words there is a disjuncture 
between how the ritual wailing represents itself and how it is actually being used. 
It is a kind of calculated accident, or action designed to appear spontaneous. 
Urban's remarks bring to the fore again the question of authenticity of emotion. 
For him, ceremonial wailing `shows itself to be the expression of ('inner') emotions, 
but `in fact' it is used to show one's orientations towards the one being wailed. He 
expresses here a conception reminiscent of Durkheim's vision that mourning is a duty 
180 
imposed by the group, not a `natural movement of private feelings'. The problem with 
this conception is that it does not make sense, in the case of o'amak, to speak of 
emotional experience divorced from emotional performance. Whether or not the feeling 
is private is not the point here. The point is that its legitimacy comes from its aesthetical 
character, that is, from the fact that it is performed for an audience, and not from claims 
that the performance corresponds to anything `inner' to the wailer. Urban seems to see a 
contradiction here between experience and performance, one being private while the 
other, public. `Expression' - what I call here `performance' - seems to be the crux of the 
dillema for him: either it is the expression of inner feelings or it is an expression for an 
audience - but not both. I propose that the difficulty here is created by the application of 
a model that holds that feelings are inner experiences, being thus distinct from their 
outer manifestation. 
The distinction has actually propelled Urban to postulate a `desire for 
sociability' (very much in the volitional sense, it seems to me) as the drive behind the 
public wailing, in opposition to the feelings that are `private' to the individual (and thus 
not social). This would constitute a meta-signalling behind the signaling of individual 
feeling in the performance of wailing, indexing one's desire to act in the socially correct 
way (Urban 1988: 396-99). As he puts it (1988: 386-93): 
(... ) ritual wailing contains within it the secret of social order, how culture comes 
to exercise control over affective processes. The secret is in the alchemy whereby 
affect becomes `meta-affect'. That is to say, one emotion (sadness) points to or 
`comments upon' another emotion (the desire for social acceptance). Seen in the 
context of social action, ritual wailing involves the signaling by one actor of a 
feeling of grief. But the signal is emmited in a way that other actors consider 
appropriate. Hence the sadness itself is rendered intelligible, and it is through 
this intelligible sadness that the basic intelligibility and acceptability of the social 
actor emerges. Thus, an actor's own affect must be controlled as a means of 
signalling who one is. In short, affect becomes meta-affect (... ) It may be proposed 
that ritual wailing represents not simply the feeling of loss but, in a more complex 
'sway, the desire for sociability that is the inverse side of loss. Loss occasions the 
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wish to overcome loss through sociability, and it is this sociability that is 
signalled through adherence to a culturally specific form of expression of grief. 
One wishes to signal to others that one has the socially correct feelings at the 
socially prescribed times 
Now, there are several problems with this definition. First, it conceives of 
`affective processes' as independent from culture, or as external to it. Second, a 
`substantive' character is accorded to a supposed `desire for social acceptance', as if it 
were an emotion in the same plane as `sadness', for instance. Third, it presupposes the 
possibility of an un-intelligible emotion - that is, one that is displayed in ways in which 
it would be not recognised as such, which is contrasensual - while at the same time 
mantaining that emotions are fully cognisable; and fourth, in stating that one's affect is 
controlled in order for one to show who one is, he is establishing a universal mode of 
legitimacy in which `expression' must gain control over `experience' in order to 
`mean'. In his interpretation, death is accompanied by `deep' feelings of loss - but 
feelings of loss do not necessarily need to be signalled to others. As the feelings of loss 
in the ritual wailing are definitely signalled to others, there must be something else 
involved. The problem with this reasoning is that it assumes that feelings of loss are a 
private experience everywhere - one may choose to show them or not. Thus he proposes 
that there is a `desire for sociability' which is distinct from the expression of grief, as if 
it were superimposed upon it. It is clear that the `desire of sociability' is conceived as a 
separate entity because he needs to find a justification for the fact that grief is publicly 
expressed, and not the other way round. All these difficulties spring, most evidently, 
from the distinction between `inner experience' and `outer expression', which also in 
Urban's case reflect an specific moral outlook (1988: 398-99): 
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The function of the meta-signals ought not to be discussed or put into words, lest 
their force be diminished. Bringing them into the arena of reflection would make 
them appear less genuine, more contrived as part of a strategy. Despite the fact 
that actors in some sense `know' what they are doing, they must not let on that 
they know (... ) For an actor - whose interests lie in getting along with other actors 
- interpreting the signal through its meta-signals, the question of genuineness or 
falseness of the underlying expression of affect becomes irrelevant, since the 
meta-signal itself simultaneously indexes another subjective state: the desire to do 
or to show the socially correct thing. In short, the meta-signal itself indicates a 
desire for sociability. Whether or not the underlying falseness' is detected, 
therefore, there is a truth about the meta-signal that is more important to the 
interpreter. 
It is easy to see here that the `desire for sociability' was postulated as an 
attempt to come to grips with the contradiction posed by the use of a `folk theory' of 
emotions, based in the `inner experience-outer expression' distinction, to understand 
ritual wailing. To acknowledge a pragmatic aspect in the expression of `feeling' is to 
challenge its authenticity. This is the point where `expression' and morality touch each 
other. The distinction between `inner experience' and `outer expression' parallels that 
other distinction between altruistic and egoistic agency, in the sense that wailing, as 
expression of `inner feeling', implies (for Western morality, that is) forgetting oneself in 
the grief for the other, whereas wailing as expression for an audience implies centering 
in oneself - in one's self, actually - as that which is to be shown to the audience. The 
former implies affect; the latter, calculation. The distinction that Urban tries to draw 
here does not apply to the Mebengokre case, for whom there is no opposition between 
individual goals and sociality - or, in this case, between pragmatic performance and 
emotional experience. For Urban, what matters socially is the non-emotional aspect of 
the expression (as distinguished by him): the desire for sociability. This is precisely the 
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distinction that the Mebengokre do not do, as for them `to do the socially correct thing' 
in terms of emotions is to feel - that is, to perform - them164. 
But emotion - o'amak, in this case - do have a `pragmatic' character for the 
Mebengokre. In order to access it, a few other aspects of it have to be mentioned 
here. O'amak is also at the base of the act of naming itself. A young couple has their 
children named by their parents. When people get older, they begin to name their 
children themselves. By that time, their parents are likely to be dead, and the couple 
`keep in mind' (the expression is used by the Mebengokre themselves) their parents' 
names to transmit to their children - because they have o'amak for them. One usually 
has o'amak for one's children, for one's uterine relatives, for one's parents, for one's 
grandchildren, for one's spouse. One has also o'amak for one's friends and companions 
of the same age, specially those with whom, as an unmarried youngster, one has shared 
many experiences in the past. The unmarried men (menöröryre) have a life oriented 
towards collective affairs and activities, in a way that is not kept when they get married 
and settle to live (usually) in their father-in-law's house. 
O'amak `covers', in a sense, a variety of Western feelings. When young people 
refer to having o'amak for their spouses, the usually translate it as `to be in love', or to 
long for in a sexual way, to have sexual craving for. A child would have o'amak for its 
parents; an unmarried youngster, either male or female, would have more o'amak for his 
mother than for his father. O'amak is not necessarily coextensive to the uxorilocal 
household: one has no o'amak of one's mother's sister, unless she created him as a son. 
164 M. Strathern (1979: 243) seems to be stating something similar when she says that the New Guinean 
Hageners "(... ) do not believe that decorating the body hides the inner self. I would argue that the 
physical body is disguised in decorations precisely because the self is one of their messages". Here she 
argues that 'the self' is actually 'in the surface', and not in an `inner being'. In the same way, I argue 
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In such case, the o'amak would be that of a nä kack (a `mother fac-similar') who is in 
the place of the nä kumrenhh. O'amak is thus related to the people one lives or has lived 
with in the most intimate way, and who have not been immediately present for some 
time. 
Public wailing is a display of o'amak, as the Mebengokre state themselves. One 
wails because one has seen someone one has not seen for long; one wails because one is 
witnessing the departure of someone; one wails because one has been remembered a 
dead person, usually in the context of ceremonies but not in the least restricted to them. 
It goes without saying, of course, that this `someone' must be a suitable `subject' - in 
the sense of `repository' - of o'amak. But the ceremonial lament described here, as a 
display of o'amak, has a distinctive characteristic: it engages people at large - virtually 
every adult - in similar displays. In the ceremonial lament I witnessed, this engagement 
was propitiated by the agency of Bemoti, the old ceremonial leader. 
Bemoti wailed for several people, as he is an öbikwa ('relative' as well as 
`friend') of many a dead ancestor of most people in the village. But he didn't wail 
alone: most women gathered at the centre of the men's house - that is, most of the older 
women in the village - and some of the young ones cried together with him, each one 
for their own dead. Bemoti's wailing seemed to `trigger' the women's wailing, to 
unleash a bulk of o'amak from them165. Their high-pitched cries, repeatedly mentioning 
their relationship to the mourned, filled the silent plaza. Around the men's house in a 
that Mebengokre emotion (and in some measure, their self as well) is in the performance, and not 
'behind' it, in an `inner self'. 
165 Irvine (1993: 154-55) mentions the role of the Wolof griot in relaying other's emotions, acting thus 
as a sort of `channel' through which these emotions can be voiced. This is not the case here, where 
Bemoti himself mourned people he himself felt o'amak for; but he did act as a `catalyser' of other 
people's o'amak. The interesting point here is that in both cases emotions were not seen as inauthentic, 
even though they were voiced by other than the one feeling them (in the Wolof case) or although they 
were 'catalysed' by someone else's agency. 
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less central place, some younger women also mourned their dead, in a more silent way 
and without the high-pitched cries that characterise old people's crying. Indeed, the high 
pitch is a characteristic of the elders' way of crying, something that is jokingly 
commented by youngsters. Elders are the mourners par excellence, as young people 
would be too `ashamed' to call attention upon themselves by mourning someone 
publicly. 
Women did not seat at the centre of the men's house, they were more to the 
southern side, seated on the floor, Bemoti facing them from the wall were he sat. Many 
women were outside the men's house, preparing their grandsons or simply watching the 
older ones. Many sat on the wall like Bemoti, around the women on the floor. The men 
that were present sat on the northern side, away from the women, except for Bemoti 
himself and by the `painters' of the young celebrated children, the later sitting on the 
floor, closer to the old women. Except for Bemoti, men did not cry. Nevertheless, they 
were greatly touched by the collective mourning, most of them visibly on the verge of 
tears. While the mourning went on, no other sound was to be heard in the plaza. Men 
and (younger) women stood still, avoiding eye contact, each one concerned with one's 
own o'amak. In this way, the `collective mourning' was `collective' only in the sense 
that it was enacted in a group. At that particular time at least, o'amak was an individual 
performance to be played out collectively. 
But the joint performance of these individual o'amak has another, more subtle 
effect: it creates a commonality of emotion/sentiment, not by including all subjects of 
individual o'amak in a single group, mourned by all, but by interlacing the repositories 
of o'amak (that is, dead people in this case) in such a way in the actual mournings of 
individual people that, albeit two people do not mourn the same dead, they tend to 
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mourn some of them in common; albeit no one is mourned by all, every one is mourned 
by some, or by several. They are interlaced in such a way as to delineate individual sets 
of repositories of o'amak, composed each one of them of several elements, that find no 
point-to-point correspondence with similars' 66, but who are not completely strange to 
others as well, finding fragmentary correspondences with other, specific such sets, 
which by their turn find other correspondences with other sets and so on. This 
synchronisation of individual emotional states accords them a collective, social status, 
which is explicit recognised by the Mebengokre. As Harrison (2001: 259) puts it, 
One way (... ) in which an anthropological approach to the understanding of 
everyday moods might be developed is by focusing on the way in which these 
moods can acquire shared, interpersonal temporal patternings through their 
engagement with social processes. Synchronicity, in short, represents a distinctive 
way in which moods can become social phenomena and, potentially, thereby be 
amenable to anthropological study as any other sort of social behaviour. Mood 
dynamics strongly synchronised and shared collectively in this way are perhaps 
also especially likely to be cognised culturally and explicitly recognised. 
The interesting point here is not only how they are synchronised but also why 
they are so. Emotions/sentiments, the Mebengokre contend, are the expected outcome of 
ceremonies. On the whole, although people are not brought all together by any 
encompassing familial feelings, a veritably Wittgensteinian air de famille obtains 
between people at large, as the effect of collective o'amak. O'amak was the expected 
outcome of Bemoti's intervention, an emotion that builds an ethos of commonality in the 
ceremonial context. The comprehension of Mebengokre feeling is thus more of a 
sociology than a psychology: one needs a sociology - and an aesthetics - of emotions in 
order to understand Mebengokre manifestations of feeling and sentiment. 
166 Except for full siblings that were brought up together, who may even so feel o'amak for different 
people. 
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This point was made by Fisher (2001: 28-9), but he insists - contrary to 
Mebengokre's own statements, I believe - that such sentiments are indexes of social 
states: 
For the Kayapo, among whom sentiments are symptoms of social states (that is, 
an indissociable expression of the state of affairs they represent), disharmony can 
falsify the truth affirmed in ritual. That is to say that the feelings of participants 
may impede the successful realisation of ritual in quite a different sense than the 
way a disgruntled congregation can always prevent a service from taking place 
through desultory non-cooperation and foot dragging. One can say that, for the 
Kayapö, emotions themselves are reflections of what is held to be a canonical 
order. (his emphasis) 
Fisher is concerned with the analysis of Mebengokre ceremonial as a way to 
promote the differentiation between what he calls members of a group of substance 
(2001: 29). This perception - that ceremonial differentiates people - arises, I think, from 
his deploying Western metaphysical views of sociality as based in group-building and 
the establishment of `social ties' which imply the presence of a system of rules and 
obligations to sort out and bind together their members. Curiously, though, the (explicit) 
emphasis of Mebengokre social philosophy is in the creation of similarities between 
people, by means of song and dance and the building of shared emotional states. 
Musical harmony is an apt description for such attempt, and the Mebengokre state so 
themselves: people should get similar to each other in the same way as they dance and 
sing in harmony. The very ceremonial process in fact creates such harmony by means of 
shared emotional states, as noted by Fisher himself. I would propose that, for the 
Mebengokre, emotional states are not symptoms - that is, indexes - of a canonical order, 
but that they are the canonical order itself. If rituals can be falsified when they do not 
create a suitable collective emotional state, it is because ceremonies are meant to create 
sociality, and sociality itself is seen as a shared emotional state. Ceremonies are 
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thought of as beautiful/good by the Mebengokre precisely because they create such 
states, that is, because they create sociality. I mentioned earlier that for Mebengokre 
moral agency, `good' has the double meaning of morally good and useful for some 
purpose. Ceremonies are useful in creating a social state that is seen as a shared, 
collective emotion. This is why, I think, Mebengokre social philosophy stresses the 
creation of similarities, even though if seen `from the outside', one may say that such 
creation implies a differentiation within the `domestic group'. The problem is that to see 
it as such, one has to apply a whole Western metaphysical notions of sociality to 
Mebengokre reality. My own attempt here, of course, is quite the opposite. I want to 
discuss Mebengokre's own metaphysics of sociality, to convey some of its sense and 
meaning. Thus, instead of hypostasising a supposedly universal metaphysics of sociality 
as group- and duty-based, I will delve at the end of this chapter on the very nature of the 
relation between people according to the Mebengokre. This, I think, reveals itself also in 
the ceremonial mourning. 
What is the nature of the bond between people in ceremonial mourning? There 
is clearly an intimacy issue here, as the Mebengokre state themselves. O'amak is the 
performance of longing for an intimate one who is, or has been, absent. Ceremonial 
mourning, the public sharing of o'amak, also creates a bond between those who 
participate in it. It is the nature of such bond that I want to analyse here. In order to do 
so, I'm going to rely on the Wittgensteinian notion of family resemblance. 
Wittgenstein's idea of family resemblance was developed against the notion of an 
`essence' hypostasised as the basis for determining the elements of a logical class, or 
kind. The German philosopher, Karl-Otto Apel (1980: 18-19) maintains that, for 
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Wittgenstein, the idea of an `essence' shared by all elements of a logical class or kind is 
superfluous to the understanding of class/kind terms: 
It is quite sufficient that a family resemblance' exists between the numerous 
`ways of using' a word [in this case, a term describing a class or kind], which are 
determined by the situational context. 
Thus, family resemblance' is a way of determining a class/kind, which denies the 
hypostasation of an `essence', the similarity with which is an attribute of its 
individuals. In Wittgenstein's words: 
67.1 can think of no better expression to characterise these similarities than 
family resemblance'; for the various resemblances between members of a family: 
built, features, colour of eyes, gait, temperament, etc, etc, overlap and criss-cross 
in the same way. And I shall say: `games' form a family... 
In the same vein it can be said that the people gathered at the men's house that 
afternoon had a `family resemblance' in this sense, that a togetherness was built 
amongst them as the outcome of individual mourning enacted collectively. Those that 
were mourned were either friends or `brothers', `sisters' `uncles/grandfathers', 
`aunts/grandmothers', or formal friends (krabdjwy), or those with whom one grew up. 
The relationship between those wailing and those being wailed is based in the emotional 
ties linking them, and not in any `social role'. In this sense, these relationships are pretty 
much individual, that is, they depend on the emotional state shared by any two people. 
It is important to note here that this does not imply a notion of `group', or of 
`duties/obligations/social role' as the metaphysical stuff behind such notion. In the same 
way as those being wailed were linked to the wailers in a variety of (individual) ways, 
those that wailed them were not what received anthropological wisdom would call a 
`kin group', or even a `group'of any sort, both terms ('kin' and `group') being highly 
ineffective to characterise them. But they were `of a kind' in the Wittgensteinian sense. 
Or rather they were being made `of a kind' by collective mourning. A `kind' whose 
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individuality is not based upon a shared essence (as genealogical relations would 
determine the essence of a `kin group', for example). They were made `of a kind' by 
means of the continuous overlapping and criss-crossing of individual emotional links to 
people remembered by the collective mourning. 
O' amak acts here as a way to creating a similarity among people mourning 
together. It is not an idex of relationships among the living, although it is an index of 
individual relationships with those that are mourned. The sharing of o'amak among 
those mourning together constitutes itself into an icon of the very same intimacy that 
obtained between individual mourners and those mourned by them. By mourning 
together they produce among themselves a quality of togetherness that resembles, in a 
positive way, that which obtains among people with whom one is (individually) 
intimate with. It is this production of togetherness through collective emotional 
performance that, in my opinion, is deemed `good/beautiful/useful' by the Mebengokre. 
By collectivelly acting out an emotion that indexes their individual intimacy with the 
deceased, they create among the living an icon of this very same intimacy, and this is 
morally and pragmatically good, as well as aesthetically beautiful, because it creates by 
means of performance a desirable state of togetherness among the living. O'amak, as 
experienced/expressed in performance, is thus simultaneously an index of intimacy 
(with the dead) and an icon of it (among the living). There is no need to postulate an 
individual `desire for sociability', of which wailing is an index, as Urban does, as 
0 'amak in fact creates something that is similar to that intimacy between mourner and 
mourned. Its authenticity comes from this iconical relation, that is, from the wailing's 
success in creating a suitable similarity to such intimacy in terms of collective 
togetherness. This is why Fisher (in the quotation above) insists - correctly, in my 
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opinion - that the feelings of the participants may impede the successful realisation of a 
ceremony. Where he is wrong, I think, is in viewing feelings as indexes ('symptoms') 
of social order. Ceremonies can be seem as `tools' to transform feelings, from 
individual indexes into collective icons of intimacy. When they fail to produce such 
iconicity, the ceremony has failed (that is, the collective emotional state is not 
'legitimate'). One sees here how the moral, aesthetic and utilitarian aspects of 
ceremonies cannot be distinguished. This is one of the meanings of Mebengokre's 
statement that the ceremonial wailing, and ceremonies in general, are mex. 
I meant this chapter as an effort to make more concrete the descriptions of 
`social groups' for the Mebengokre, which, at this level, finds similarities in many other 
Amazonian peoples, and possibly elsewhere. The very assumtion of `social groups' as 
the basis of sociality, among the Mebengokre as well as among other Amazonian 
peoples, is so over-charged with Western metaphysical assumptions - mainly with the 
assumption of an `essence' as the defining element of such `groups' - as to render itself 
suspect, at the very least, of misrepresenting what it purports to describe. For the 
Mebengokre, emotion links between people create similarities among them, conducting 
to togetherness, to their being-in-the-world together. This similarity itself resembles that 
which exists among people that are in the most intimate terms with each other - 
primarily (but not exclusively) those that were brought up together. Ceremonial, in 
several different ways, produce and enhance such emotional states, thus creating a state 
of sociality. That is why ceremonies - and the ceremonial mourning itself - are held to 
be »Pex, a notion that, as we have seen, implies an aesthetic appreciation as well as an 
ethic/moral one. It is moral, moreover, because it has usefulness, and this utility is the 
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very creation of the social state among those who wail - and who are made happy - 
together. 
What has been widely called, in different ways, the `fluidity of social 
structures' in Amazonia can be attributed, I think, to the misrepresentation mentioned 
above. That is, that there is an `essence' behind sociality, and that it is a `kin' one 
(usually meaning 'genealogical'). When confronted with such metaphysical 
assumptions, Amazonian worlds of relatedness yield poor results, being thus described 
as 'fluid'. One needs here to give concrete expression to such realities of relatedness, 
which in the Mebengokre case are based in the creation and enhancing of emotional 
states and sentiments. Mebengokre relationships are very much individual-based, in the 
sense that one relates to another not because they pertain to `social groups', but because 
of the context of the individual history of their personal relationships. But emotions are 
very much social. They are `the social state' itself. 
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Chapter Four 
It's All a Bit Fishy: An Aesthetic of Collective Production, or 
How to Get Fish with Dancing 
Song before speech 
Verse before prose 
Flute before blowpipe 
Lyre before bow 
William Golding, Clonk Clonk 
Love is joy [laetitia], with the accompaniment of the idea of an external cause 
Spinoza, Ethics, prop. 6 
This chapter concerns the distinctive ways in which the Mebengoke organise 
collective production (primarily) of foodstuffs. During the ceremony of ngöre kam me 
toro, the Mebengokre move into a forest glade close to a small river (by Amazonian 
standards) and use the poisonous vine akro to gather large amounts of fish. These fish 
are later consumed back in their village as part of the ceremony, the culminating point 
of which is the reason for the fishing. As will be seen, Mebengokre do not conceive of 
this as `work', but as me toro, or a `collective 167 dance', and ngrer, a song, which are 
conceived and experienced primarily as a way of having fun. 168 As I will argue, joy is 
an essential, defining component of collective endeavours among Mebengokre. It is the 
element that binds people together. This is in keeping with a `political' theory - which, 
as will be seen, cannot be distinguished from their morality - which holds that people, 
in the sense of individuals, should not be submitted to any sort of authority, but must 
individually find it agreeable and enjoyable to work (and live) together. 
167 The particle me is an all-inclusive collective. This does not mean, though, that every single person 
participates in the activities thus characterised, but that everyone sharing a similar quality does so, or 
tends to. 
168 I refer especifically to the ngore kam nie toro here. After its occurence each year, men bash several 
times the akro , either collectivelly or 
individually (the latter on a smaller scale, in ponds and small 
streams). In 1999, in Catete village, men did the akro ka'oinh in groups (of younger and older people) 
in different places in a sort of friendly `competition', several times each. 
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Furthermore, I will argue that their idea of the ngore kam me toro (the specific 
ceremony of the akro ka' oi, or fishing with akro poisonous vine) as producing fish 
poses a problem to some anthropological theories on ritual, which posit a radical, 
analytical distinction between `technical' and `ceremonial' aspects of social action. 
Thus, in keeping with my title, I will argue that there is something distinctively fishy 
about this analytical distinction when contrasted with the way that, I believe, the 
Mebengokre conceive their ceremonies. In what follows I will try to provide an 
alternative account of the specific Mebengokre moral agency as involving the creation 
of joy by being together in a way they call mex. Mex signifies both `the beautiful' and 
`the good', a notion that is reminiscent in some respects to the ancient Greek moral 
standpoint of kalös kägathos, which also signifies `the beautiful and the good'. It is a 
concept that implies that something is both beautiful to look at and manifests goodness 
in action or in use. 169 But the aesthetic element in the Mebengokre case is not 
submerged in the moral one. 170 Me toro, as mex, involves equally the creation of 
beauty and of goodness. 
This chapter relies heavily upon the interpretation of a set of songs, as well as 
the discourse produced by a ceremonial specialist during the me toro. For anthropology, 
much of what was sung and said would usually be called `myth', a term that I prefer to 
avoid, since the Mebengokre do not seem to make distinctions between `myth', `story', 
169 Dover 1974: 41. 
170 For instance, always according to Dover (1974: 42), the abstract term kalokagatia, which expresses a 
moral standpoint; or the addition of `in (bodily) form' to the expression kalos kagatos to give the 
meaning of `handsome', in Aiskhines. But see Yamagata (1994: 225), who in his analysis of Homeric 
morality (and we must keep in mind here that the expression kalos kagatos becomes common in later, 
polls Greece) renders kalos as something that looks good, appealing to the eye, while agatos is what is 
profitable, useful and/or satisfactory (1994: 190). But kalos is also used to describe the usefulness of 
tools (1994: 227): "Persons, animals and material objects described as `kalos' are, all in all, pleasant 
figures to look at, and at the same time expected to function well. In other words, good appearance is 
generally taken as a hallmark of good quality... Kalos denotes primarily agreeable in appearance, and 
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and 'history'. In a sense, all these metumre, or `things of old' (sometimes translated by 
Mebengokre as 'tradition'), could be likened to the Herodotos' notion of historie, as 
`following steps' into the past. But metumre does not restrict itself to the past, being 
realised in the present through the action of (among others) ceremonial specialists, who 
sing their words of old back to present-day life, as will be seen. It is usual in ethnology 
to derive the meaning of events from mythical narratives. The status of such an 
operation, though, is not as frequently made clear as would be desirable. This chapter is 
intended as an ethnography of how this corpus of knowledge called metumre is made to 
relate to present-day events. 
The account I will give here is that of the ngore kam me toro (literally `dancing 
by the small water') performed by the Xicrin-Mebengokre of the Catete village in 1999, 
which I both witnessed and participated in. This me toro was performed at the peak of 
the dry season, when the whole village moved to Kamkukei ('the place of the 
kukei 171' ). A large track had been cleared by the menoronyre, the young, unmarried 
men, for this sole purpose. Much wider than the tracks usually made by men when 
hunting, this one was cleared to allow access to the river for all the villagers, every man, 
woman, and child. In fact, only a few people remained in the village, due to 
sickness. The Mebengokre stressed that all would join the me toro, not out of what we 
would perhaps call `a sense of duty' (a ceremonial obligation or something of the like), 
but because they all wanted to eat the huge amount of fish that would be produced as a 
part of the me toro during the akro ka'öinh, the collective fishing. 
Nurturance, or the act of providing another with food, is a central aspect of 
the indication of quality only to a limited extent". Both senses of the term cohere with the Mebengokre 
use of the term mex, although in the latter case they should 
be taken in equal stand. 
17 1 kukei: a small rodent, the size of a large rabbit or hare. 
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Mebengokre sociality. To provide one with food is an essentially moral act. Food is the 
archetype of human desire, and no individual Mebengokre would conceive of not 
desiring it at any moment. To have one's appetite satiated is, obviously enough, a 
transient state. What seems not to be so obvious, though, is that this is also the model 
they use to represent their relation to other human beings (that is, other Mebengokre'). 
One should never deny food172 to one's bikwa katät (also called bikwa djwynh, or 
bikwä kumrenx), something they render into Portuguese as `real relatives'. However, 
bikwä is also a term also used for 'friend'. This is understandable when we see that to 
be a friend (bikwä) is to act towards a person in a way that, although not identical, is 
suitably similar to that which occurs between a group of people who live together in 
close contact, that is, what is usually called in anthropological theory the `domestic 
group' 173. 
Mebengokre social theory poses that social life is to be constructed in 
accordance to a paradigm of nurturance. In this sense, Me toro is primarily about eating. 
It is about eating together, sharing food with those one wants to be bikwa, 
friends/relative with. Nurturance becomes a paradigm within a moral philosophy that 
poses that people should both be able to give to, and to get from, other people. Indeed, 
not only food, but most things that can be taken as suitable objects of individual desire 
should be so given and gotten. How to live with other people, doing what one wishes 
whilst also not constraining what others may wish, is a central issue in our own, 
172 It is usually stressed that a bikwa kat'at can get one's belongings of any sort (with some important 
exceptions, mostly related to ceremonial life) and not produce any sort of `bad' emotional state in one. 
Food is usually regarded as a sort of `archetypical' stuff of such acts of giving and geting. To be able 
to get something from someone is a basic moral quality. 
1 73 I stress the use of quotation marks here, not because I question its `domestic' quality, but because I 
believe the very idea of a `group', the way we conceive of it, is quite strange to Mebengokre 
philosophy, as argued in previous chapters. 
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Western moral philosophy. The Mebengokre ,I 
believe, would offer a solution to this 
question, posing that one may wish, and get, the objects of one's desire, as long as these 
same objects (and others) remain accessible to other people. The Hobbesian question, of 
why a man should do different than to pursue one's own self-interest, does not pose 
itself as a significant question for the Mebengokre. For them, there is no real opposition, 
in the way we conceive of it, between altruism and selfishness - one can be altruistic 
while pursuing one's own ends. To achieve one's own ends and desires is essential to 
the maintenance of an enjoyable social life, because such satisfaction is viewed as 
essential to individual happiness. 
If we understood Mebengokre morality through such a notion as `happiness' as 
the outcome of moral action (another central concern of Western moral philosophy), we 
would find it resonant with the Mebengokre way of conceiving the morality of personal 
agency. Their notion of `happiness', I think, would share some characteristics with the 
ancient Greek moral notion of eudeimonia, in the sense that it not only refers to an inner 
emotional or mental state, but has also to do with the acquisition of one's own ends. As 
mentioned above, this is not necessarily incongruent with the ends that others may wish 
to achieve. Against the background of Mebengokre moral philosophy, to achieve one's 
ends is to place them in the position of being also achieved by others. Thus, what one 
wishes, that is, the objects of one's desires, is also what one should entitle others to 
legitimately wish for, and even achieve. 
The philosopher Alaisdair Maclntyre (1967: 190) has stated that "... for many 
who have never heard of philosophy, (... ) morality is roughly what Kant said it was". If 
he is right, and the Kantian categorical imperative is today the basic form of Western 
conceptions of moral action, then our way of conceiving moral agency could not be 
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seen as any other than alien to Mebengokre thought. The Kantian notion of moral 
freedom, as the ability to exercise the categorical imperative, that is, of acting 
independent of one's individual desires and of one's appreciation of the probable 
outcome of the action, is not conversant with Mebengokre morality. From the Kantian 
standpoint, a moral action is one that is grounded in individual reason and one 
performed for its own sake. For an action to be moral, it must be represented by the 
faculty of reason as one that can be posed as a universal law, applicable to all human 
beings. For the Mebengokre, on the other hand, `moral freedom' would imply the 
possibility of realising one's own inclinations, and it's `test' would not be conducted by 
the faculty of reason alone, but also by the capacity of creating suitable emotions, that 
is, primarily of those emotions conductive to joy - to having fun. 
Mebengokre moral philosophy is one about how to have fun together, and that 
is what Me toro , as well as collective work, are about. 
Their morality focuses on the 
outcome of actions. Thus, pleasure and individual advantage gained by performing a 
certain action is the essence of their morality. For them, to be able to give and to be able 
to get is `good', or is a good, in the moral sense. They approve of an action as mex - that 
is, as good and beautiful, as opposed to `bad', `ugly' (punure)- not because it is `felt to 
be proper', as many foreign to their moral standpoint would take it, but by its finality 
and by the desire of the one who realises it, as it enhances the give-and-get of the 
dynamics that creates the moral way of living - that which creates `human nature', or 
Mehengokre-ness. Only by being able to realise one's ends (both emotionally and 
materially) is one able to give and to get. Me toro is a way of realising a moral life, 
because of its material side, as well as its communicative and affective aspects. 
After this long preamble on Mebengokre morality, already discussed in 
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previous chapters, let me move on to describe the Me toro as a means through which 
they make manifest moral philosophy in social practice. Because Mebengokre moral 
philosophy is not only about reflection, but also action, it is concerned not only with the 
representation of a moral way of living, but with the active, ongoing creation of it. 
Ingold (2001), in an analysis of the graphic Western representation of relatedness as 
genealogical connections, makes the point that the genealogical model misses the 
dynamic aspect of the relations themselves, freezing them, so to speak. This emphasis 
on the ongoing, dynamic aspects of close relatedness holds true for the Mebengokre, 
and also, I think, for other Ge -speaking peoples. Their most intimate relations, those 
which obtain for people who are in daily close contact with each other are to be actively 
created by nurturance, and through physical, bodily contact itself. The relations between 
people that live together in a village must be created by open individual agency, in a 
way that is not identical with, but suitably similar to the relations between people that 
live close together. Me toro is one instrument through which such ties are created. 
Me toro, and similar ritual manifestations in the social lives of Ge-speaking 
peoples, are usually understood in the literature as intellectual `devices', that is, as 
primarily engendering meanings, or as institutional `devices', producing individual or 
non-individual accomplishments in relation to structural roles played out by individuals 
and groups. I believe that for the Mebengokre, Me toro primarily engender emotional 
states, something that is at the base of their notions of 'social'. The connection between 
sociality and the creation of emotional states has been noted by Fisher (1998) for the 
Pacaja river Xicrin-Mebengokre. I intend to go one step further and propose that Me 
toro is a tool for such creation, and one forthcoming from a form of reflection that is 
also a form of action, that is, moral/aesthetical action. The lived experience of Me toro 
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for the Mebengokre can be conceived as moral/aesthetical philosophy in application. 
Singing their Way to Happiness - and to Fish 
As already developed in previous chapters , the ngore kam Me toro is performed as part 
of a series of Me toro, which are performed every year. These occur in succession, so 
that when one ends another begins, and together those Me toro lasted a total of nine 
months in the first year I witnessed them. The day before leaving for Kamkukei, people 
performed the ngo kadjy Me toro. In this Me toro, they expressed to an audience 
composed of the whole village their intention of going fishing together using the 
poisonous akro vine. This was done by means of dancing ('kadjy' is a term that refers to 
express intention, and thus the name is translated usually as `wanting to go to the 
shallow waters', that is, to go fishing with the akro vine). A row of dancers crossed the 
village circle several times from east to west and back, emitting bird-like sounds, the 
sounds of the macaw, so I was told. The term that translates as macaw, myt, is also used 
to name the sun, which crosses the sky following a path similar to that followed by the 
men during their dance. Such a journey is an expression of the flux of time, and of the 
unfolding of Mebengokre history. 174 Accordingly the next `step' of the me toro 
involved an account of the metumre, the ways of living of people of old, taught by 
means of song and discourse. The row of dancers was led by one of the ceremonial 
specialists, who was afterwards to teach the young men, by singing to them. 
This was done during the ceremony of kore kam me ku'e, a preparation for the 
akro ka'oi, or collective fishing with the akro vine. The term `me ku'e' refers to the act 
of people getting together by the fire, and the event is marked by younger, unmarried 
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men and young people with small children175 spending the night in the centre of the 
plaza, by a bonfire, listening to the stories and to the songs (ngrer), told and sung by a 
ceremonial specialist (the ngrer djwynh, or `the one who really knows the ngrer"). The 
ceremonial specialist spoke and sang the whole night, while everyone else was 
supposed to remain awake listening to him, as me toro is recognised as pedagogical in 
character. In fact, some people did fall asleep there, in the plaza, under the stars that 
night, trying to listen to him. 
He sang songs `of old', accompanied by the story of the song, and by other 
stories relating past fishing expeditions and events connected to it.. His stories told his 
listeners about the details of the ceremony, what they were supposed to do in it, and 
what it means to do it that particular way. This narrative started with the saga of Bep- 
jareti, a warrior who went with several men to attack another people. He was bitten by a 
snake and became a wajanga, a powerful shaman who transforms himself into a bat and 
sings to the men, teaching them the ngore kam me toro. The song was more than mere 
teaching about the practice of the me toro, it also aimed to convince people to change 
their minds about going to war, and to instead go and perform the me toro - that is, to go 
on a fishing expedition: 
Mebakratum Bep-jareti na kube yry me omonh 
Our grandfather Bep-jareti (brought the warriors) all to go after kube [i. e., to fight the 
kube, or `strangers'] 
nhym me aryp nym kanga nidji ne kube^ pongri 
And there was the snake, called pongri 
nidji ne kube ^ pongri 
(Its) name was pongri 
nhym aryp kunganh 
Then (the snake) bit him 
174 Vidal (1977: 191-93) has noticed this relation. 
175 As well as some older men, most of whom retired to their houses at some point during the night, 
returning at sunrise, or shortly before it. 
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kanga nidji ne kube ^ pongri 
The snake's name was pongri 
Bep-jareti na kanga kuna 
Bep-jareti was bitten by the snake 
nyhm kam to amija ngrer jakre jarenh 
Then he sang, all by himself 
ne kam kum aryp we me kube yry monh 
I think they were going after kubenh 
nhym me aryp kango kunha nym me aryp omonh 
Then all were already going (following Bep-jareti) 
aryp ami monhrori to kubeA nhep ne ara o kikre to : tuc, tuc, tuc... anhyry o wajet 
(He fell on the ground and) transformed himself into a bat, and lifted himself up above 
(the place where he was himself), beating his wings in the house (and making noise): toc, 
toc, toc..., hanging on the top 
Bep-jareti became a shaman (wajanga), by being bitten by the snake. One 
becomes a shaman in consequence of this kind of attack, or of some other sort of violent 
physical trauma, which releases one's double (karö, part of one's self, resembling a 
doppelganger of European mythology) to wander in the non-Mebengokre world, from 
whence he usually achieves some sort of knowledge to bring back home. In this case, it 
seems Bep-jareti has created the song he was singing `by himself', that is, without being 
taught 176 
nhyn me me o benget no aryp ne me monhrokumei. Me monhr kumei 
Then, I think, an elder woke up, (and heard) many people crying, crying a lot. 
nhym aryp mebakratum aryp we to pyka be aminh kaba 
176 There is a story related to the origin of the fishing ceremony itself (ngore kann me toro), in which it is 
attributed to a child captured from the bat people (Vidal 1977: 254). The theme of the bat-people is 
widespread among the Northern Ge at least (Wilbert 1978: 325-32; Melatti 1970; Nimuendaju 1940: 
177-78; Lea 1986: 197), and the Apinaye, probably the closest related people to the Mebengokre, hold 
that their very language was taught by this people (Giraldin 2000: 121-25. But see Wilbert 1978: 325- 
28 for different versions). There is a close relation between the ngore kam me toro and the kore kam 
me ku'e, described here. As explained before, they can be seen either as dwo different me toro or as 
parts of of a larger whole, and this link of origin approximates them, establishing a similarity between 
them. 
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and then, I think, our grandfather took himself off the ground . 
Bep-jareti was bitten by the snake and fell on the ground. Many were around 
him, crying, when he transformed himself into a bat and took off from the ground. The 
transformation here is a bodily one, and is expressive of his new condition as a shaman, 
one who is able to transform oneself into animal and, in this form, to communicate with 
them. 
ne aryp, aryp ne me aben kukam nor 
Then all went to sleep, in turns 
The men are on a war expedition against strangers. During such expeditions, 
which could last for months while men made their way to the enemy's village, they 
followed a strict discipline. The camp was never left unguarded, by day or night. Men 
took turns to sleep, or to bathe in the river, etc. 
Kati. Aryp ne me aijkre kumex 
No. They stayed in deep silence 
Aryp umari punu:: re kumex 
(They were) all already thinking really bad /ugly things 
They were thinking bad/ugly things: they were sad, lamenting the 
(apparent)loss of their leader Bep-jareti. Punure, the opposite of mex, 177 is used in this 
context to refer to an emotional/sentimental state, which is seen as opposed to 
amusement, or joy. Being sad (kaprinh) is regarded by the Mebengokre as something to 
worry about, both because the sad person is not well and because (s)he is not bringing 
joy to others. To be sad is, in this sense, to be anti-social. During a Me toro, it is held 
that people should always feel gay, that is, should be engaged in making others 
177 the ':: ' are used here to indicate the elongation of the vowel, expressing intensity or duration. 
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joyful. 178 
Aryp ab-up monhr mä amimp kri onhy 
(They were) already inviting (themselves) to return [that is, they were all seated, talking 
to each other, already thinking of going back to the village] 
abu p ami kra onhy, nhym aryp Bep-jareti k'ai ma monh 
(they were) inviting themselves (that is deciding between them) to return, and then Bep- 
jareti went upwards [he flew, taking off from the ground, as a bat] 
me aer be we ami monhrore: pu, pu, pu... anhyry o wajet 
And I think they were astonished, (because Bep-jareti) took off the ground and hung 
himself up there (beating his wings): pu, pu, pu... 
Nhym me o benget kum amu wa-ai aryp am'ainget nAere ku'a t'o { 
Then some elder told someone (to go) there and make fire beside `your father-in-law' 
Am'ai nget is the indirect reference term used by a person speaking to his/her 
kra (children) about the former's father-in-law179. At this point, the ngrer djwynh, the 
ceremonial specialist telling the story, begins to talk in indirect speech, assuming the 
role of the elder in the story. This is a recurrent rhetorical device in story telling, which 
resembles that of the `collapsing' of the ancestor's experience of persuading people to 
go to the Me toro. 
nhep dj'a akatanh ta' 
`The bat is going to suck (the blood of) your brother' 
178 W. Crocker (1990: 186) describes the Canela (an Eastern Timbira people) in similar terms: "Sadness 
and introspection is the opposite of amusement. An individual is not allowed to sit alone and worry 
about her- or himself or to think introspectively (... )The Canela value a constructive, outgoing 
disposition that is involved with others. To be inward-thinking is associated with being stingy, angry 
(... ), and selfish (... ), all anti-social characteristics from the Canela point of view. " See also Overing & 
Passess (2000) on `being sad' as a non-convivial state (specially articles by Lagrou, Gow, and Ales), 
and, more generally, on the management of high morale to produce conviviality. 
179 The term implies a relation between the speaker and those to whom he addresses himself, made 
explicit by means of the person referred to. The ceremonial specialist addresses the audience using 
different such terms, sometimes in succession, in a way resembling that, more stylised one, of 
ceremonial discourse(ben diri ). An `air de familie' obtains among people here, through the use of the 
vocal form of storytelling. 
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Akatanh is the indirect reference term used by a nget talking to his tabdjwy 
180 
about the latter's brother. The terms are used when the ceremonial specialist changes to 
indirect speech. The character here addresses more than one person, as in his first 
intervention he addressed a kra 181, not a tabdjwy. Elder people speaking in public are 
always keen to use indirect reference terms in profusion, addressing themselves to 
several people and at the same time making explicit their relations to them, as indirect 
reference terms express a relation between both the addressed and the referred persons, 
in relation to the speaker. 
Nhym me aryp nhym am'ainget kum ku' Aa a ma kAo 
Then (there was) already someone blowing the fire (beside) your father-in-law 
Nhym me aryp me o ku'Aa a t'o buw nhym por nhym por nhym, mebakr-atum kam 
am'ainget 
Then already someone was blowing the fire, blowing, and blowing and blowing (the fire 
beside) our grandfather who is your father-in-law 
* nhym my-re pongri:: -re 
(The snake) is called pongri 
* te:: ne box 
(Bep-jareti, turned into a shaman) is going to come 
* Nhym my-re pongri:: -re 
* Te:: ne box 
* kruwa djwa my dj'a 
The (place where) the arrow `s [i. e., the snake's] teeth (have bitten, has a) scar 
* kam myna:: 
(The place (where he was bitten, there was) the scar 
* ngo rarara kam apox 
The noise of the water is coming off [that is, people can hear the noise made by the 
running water in the river] 
The song, quite simple in terms of melody, depends mostly on the rhythm of 
180 Nget: usually described genealogically as MB, MF, FF, FZH, MBS, MBSS, etc. Tabdjwv nh: 
reciprocal term to the previous, described genealogically as ZC. FZC, SC, DC, WBC, etc (Vidal 1977: 
52). But see chapter 2 for a description of the usage of such terms. 
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the enunciation of the parts of the words. The last sentence incorporates a metaphor. or 
`other words' (me kaben ödjwy : words other than those usually deployed to name 
things and events). The snake is called kruwa, arrow, and its teeth (the arrow's teeth, a 
dead metaphor) left a scar where they bit Bep-jareti. Different from the dead metaphor, 
of the kruwa's teeth (arrow's ends are called so), the transformation of the snake into an 
arrow is made to the amusement of the audience, due to the introduction of an element 
of beauty in the speech. Noise (and song) is represented as emerging from the thing or 
person producing it. In this way, when a person is heard singing one says aryp ngrer 
kator, `the song is already emerging from (him)' 
* kruwa djw'a mudj'a kam myna 
A scar remained at the place (where he was) bitten, a scar remained 
* ngo rarar kam apo:: x 
* na me a^e:: ne 
All were startled 
* na me a Aa:: 
They were going 
* na me a ^a: ne monh ne 
All were going 
* monh w^ara-ri g'a me monh 
what are you all going to do (asks Bep-jareti to the men)182 
*guwaj kuby monh 
Lets go back [Bep-jareti stood up and called the men to go back with him] 
* ij'a t'a bary 
I'm already going 
183 
*i'a t'a bary my ba gu me 
I'm already going, come all with me 
181 Kra: usually described in genealogical terms as S, D, BC, FBSC, etc (Vidal 1977: 52). But see 
previous footnote. 
182 War-ri, I was told, is actually a form of rnvr-ri or nrv ivr -re ('what do you want? ff 'What have you 
come to get? ") The particle -vry denotes intention, or purposefulness in the accomplishment of an 
action. 
183 ba, -i": ba aovp, 'I (am) already'. The normal order of the elements of the sentence is altered here, 
mainly for reasons of metric . 
This is another beautifying procedure, associated with rhythm. 
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An important element of morality is expressed here. Bep-jareti sings to the 
men, in order to induce them to accompany him back to a place where the fishing with 
akro vine, akro ka'oinh is going to happen. His persuasion here is based on singing, on 
the beautifying of speech. His persuasion is seductive, inebriating the senses by the 
song. This is a sample of the `decision-making' process. Bep-jareti firstly set himself 
into action, and then invited all to follow him. The song expands his agency vis-a-vis 
the other men, as it not only poses them a choice but actually makes them do something 
- it inducts agency into them. 
* kruwa nimr^o kra jak'ar-'a-re ja 
The arrow's tail (is like) the head with the hair cut short 
The snake's tail is short as the hair in a recently-shaved head. That is, the snake 
is small. Mebengokre describe snakes as having only a head and a tail as their external 
parts. This is a highly elaborate mixed metaphor, which the translators found 
exceedingly beautiful. Curiously, mixed metaphors are held (by Western scholars) to be 
universally of bad taste. In this case, the beauty of it comes from the rhythm it allows, 
as well as from the meaning, I was told. 
* me wa kut^ep-^e 
I'm waiting for you all [me wa: me ba; me ba kut^ep: I wait for you] 
* imonhr t'o wajet-^e 
I'm hanging (up here), crying [i. e., singing] 
Ami monhr-ri jet ngrerjakr'e 
(He stood there, ) above (the place he was) himself, hanging (from the ceiling), and tried 
the ngrer 
ami a ngrer jakre jarenh 
(He) sung himself, counseling (the men) 
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Bep-jareti `tried' the song, that is, he wanted to see whether it 'worked. He 
sang it to see if people would be seduced into doing what is proposed in the song. The 
translator commented, about this expression: `he sang the song, to see whether it was 
right, whether it was mex (good/beautiful)'. Jakre can be translated as `to counsel'. Bep- 
jareti wanted to convince people to go on a fishing expedition, instead of going to war. 
He tried the song of the fishing ceremony to see if it was right/good/beautiful, that is, if 
it could convince the men. The moral character is dependent on the outcome of the 
action of singing. If he succeeds, both his singing and his song are mex. The quality 
described here by the term `mex' is purposefulness or usefulness. This is part of the 
moral/aesthetical judgement itself. To be good/beautiful is to have a certain type of 
agency - or a certain type of effect - in the world. 
The ceremonial specialist then sings the whole song again, and concludes: 
Nhym me... w^o:: 
Then all went ... w^o:: [sound of people rushing] 
That is, all went to the fishing ceremony. The song 'worked'. `Song' (ngrer ) 
here is portrayed as an agency-inducer for collective activities. If the song is mex, is 
right/good/beautiful, it makes people do something together. A song is also mex because 
it is morally correct, and it is so also because it works. Addressed to an audience, song 
purports to move it into action. Songs not only persuade, for they also create the 
disposition to perform the action. The whole process here is less one of `decision- 
making' than one of `agency-inducement, and the `mex-ness' of the song has to do with 
this `inducement' purpose. 
Nhym at'e na am'ainget-^e Beprinpa 
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There is also (the episode of) your father-in-law Beprinpa 
Beprinpa is the ceremonial specialist's father-in-law. There is a transition here, 
between (the `mythical') Bep jareti, who wasn't personally known by any of the living 
Mebengokre, and Beprinpa, who died a generation ago. Beprinpa had taught the 
ceremonial specialist who recorded the song for me. 184 
na umari a djwy kute 
Something else Beprinpa knows 
kAore kam me ngrerja 
It is the k^ore kam me ngrer [another song, sung by the fire] 
jarenh `o ku'Ae me kraix `o ku'^e 
(He) spoke by the fire (and) all began (to come) by the fire [that is, people would gather 
by the fire to listen to him] 
k'ot b'ar'am mebakr-atum me na Aant me kraix `o ku'^e 
I think maybe our grandfathers [Bep-jareti and Beprinpa, that is] (sang) together and all 
(people) would come by the fire 
nha kam adjwydjwy k'ai ma bat 
now, he is also standing (by the fire) [that is, Beprinpa also stands by the fire, together 
with Bep-jareti, and sings to people] 
adjwydjwy k'ai ma bat 
(He is) also standing (by the fire) 
ngrerja, kore kam me ku'^e ja jarenh 'o'^e 
This is the song, this is the kore kam me ku'Ae (which he is) singing 
adjwydjwy jarenh 
(he is) singing too [both sing their respective songs together] 
There is here a `collapsing' of the experiences of Bep-jareti into those of 
Beprinpa, as they are represented as singing each other's songs. 
184 The teaching of ngrer, as well as the transmission of other ceremonial elements, can be done from 
father-in-law to son-in-law, something quite common. according to my informants. Also Vidal (1977: 
1 14-1 15 [footnote 38]; 141) has described the same, something which is held by Lea (1985) to be 
highly incongruent with her data on the Southernmost Mekragnoti-Mebengokre. This could be 
understood as a result of the drastic depopulation of the 
Xikrin-Mebengokre of the Catete River, two 
generations ago. But I would suggest that, given their 
importance, the transmission itself of songs 
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* nhym mydj'a ngradj'a k^o nhiaru mu (2X) 
Who is coming from the place where the ngradj'a k^o (grows)? 
Ngradj'a k^o is a kind of palm tree typical of the fields, and not of the forest. 
The Mebengokre hold that they came from the East, from a region of fields beyond the 
forest. The reference to ngradj'a k^o, as well as several other references to both 
vegetable and animal species in their songs and stories, relates to this past. In this way, 
their oral literature constitutes a historical narrative. 
* kukryt tam^a-re ja pymj^ar tam^a to monh kukryt k-ijabje 
Carry the tapir, leave (it to rest, and then carry it again), the tapir (with the) long hair 
* ne ja pymjar to monh ne kumanh wajetje ne 
Go (resting along the way, not all at once) carrying (the tapir) for you, hung (on your 
back) 
That is, the singer tells someone to carry the tapir that has been hunted. When 
game is hunted in the forest by a hunting party, it is never carried by the one who killed 
it, but passed to another of the party to do so. This is in itself an attitude related to the 
moral standpoint that, although one should give, `giving' is not an unqualified act. To 
let another one participate in an activity is to find a way to give them something. Also, 
activities should not be tiresome, but on the contrary should not involve a great effort to 
execute. So, men carrying heavy game (and loads in general) never do so in a single 
stage, but stop to rest at regular intervals. Two of the central aspects of the mex-ness of 
an activity can be seen here: it should be done with others in order to allow for giving 
and getting; and it should be done in a leisurely way. A moral action involves 
participation while at the same time excluding drudgery. This is even more stressed in 
through the generations 
accomplished. 
is far more important than the ways in which this transmission is 
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ceremonial hunting expeditions (for naming ceremonies and some others), when those 
who are - or become - brothers (kamy, in this case referring to `classificatory' brothers, 
that is, to people one has grown up with in the same house) of the celebrated child's 
father will carry all game back to the village for him. 
Such consideration for workload is something that obtains for other collective 
activities as well. For example, during my fieldwork, I participated in four clearings of 
garden spots, made collectively in each of them by friends of one of the participants. At 
any moment during it, men would stop in order to hunt an armadillo, a paca or any other 
game that presented itself to them. Short periods of work were followed by long 
moments of rest, when chatting and laughter (and occasional singing and story telling, 
mostly in the case of older men) would fill the time. Men participating in such activities 
are usually of the same age, and thus are long-time companions 185, and the general 
atmosphere during such activities is extremely relaxed'86. As the new garden plot is 
commonly cleared close to the old garden, fruits and manioc or sweet potatoes are given 
to the participants by the `owner' of the garden (actually, the husband of the `owner', as 
gardens are `owned' by women). The `owner', and those that live in the same household 
as he does, do not eat such food themselves, something that has led Fisher (1991: 145) 
to describe it as a `transaction', a `payment' made by the garden's `owner' to those 
working in it. Actually, what is stressed here is, I think, the moral form of the act of 
giving, by which one makes that which is his own accessible to others. In the same way, 
it is the joy of being together, and not the work itself (i. e., what we would isolate as 
`labour'), which is highlighted in these collective tasks. This was easily seen in the 
185 Not all men of the same age participate in them, but only the closest friends of any man who needs to 
have a spot cleared for a garden. 
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outcome of two of the `working parties' I participated in. They were being held by 
mekrare, men with children (but without grandchildren, that is, men roughly of the 
same age as myself). After working some three to four hours (including long periods of 
rest), both parties ended at the river beach close to Catete village by mid-afternoon, 
when it was deserted. There they played football and bathed in the river until sunset. 
This made their day much more `fun' than `work', as they actually spent more time 
socialising than working. These two aspects are actually not distinguishable, and 
collective activities are primarily conceived of as fun, an important moral point among 
the Mebengokre. 
*nhym mydj'a ngradj'a k^o nhiaru munh 
* kukryt tam Aa-re ja pymj ^ar tam Aa to monh kukryt k- i jabje 
*ne ja pymjar to monh ne k-um-ajetje ne 
* me anikr^e, me anikr^e 
Quiet, all; quiet all 
* bame wa ma 
for us all 
* kukryt-t kak^o-re 
I will sing the song of the tapir 
* ma najerenh ne i-ma 
I will sing 
* me anikr^e 
*bamewama 
* kukryt-t kak^o-re 
* ma najarenh ne i-ma 
* ge ron nhintire dj^o me 
he takes the fruits of the babassu palmtree with long spines 
There is here once again, a reference to the fields region beyond the forest. 
186 See Overing (2000) and Pases (2000) on the rhythm of work among, respectively, the Piaroa and the 
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Babassu palm trees are typical of that region. Also, the hummingbird (nhuinhinti) is 
said to be typically at home in the fields. 
* ge nhui nhintijar'a me 
he takes the feathers of the nhui nhinti [a type of large hummingbird] 
r yp yre dj^o me 
(he takes) the fruit of the r'yp yre [the tree from which the Mebengokre extract the resin 
to paint the sides of the children's shaved part of the head] 
* dj^o krikrit-ti ne 
(and the) fruits (collide with each other making the noise) krikrit, do they not? [that is, 
one takes the fruits of the r'yp yre into a basket, and they collide with each other while 
one is walking back, carrying the basket] 
O wa ne! 
So it is! [expression used to end of a story or song]. 
This description tells of a trekking expedition to the region of the fields south 
of their present site. In these treks, men used to gather (and still do, to a lesser extent) 
things such as resin and babassu, both used in me toro. Babassu is used to make the oil 
that men and women spread on their bodies to fix the red anatto body painting, as well 
as to make their hair and body shiny, something that is held to be extremely beautiful. 
mebakr-atum Kr-ajakatingre, Tuktukre, Bekr-adj^opre 
Our grandfather Kr-ajakatingre, Tuktukre, Bekr-adj^opre 
He quotes here the several names of the grandfather. It has been noticed (Lea 
1986) that women act as repositories of the stock of personal names. Here is an example 
of how the memory of names, embedded in oral literature, is also kept by men. In this 
case, the enunciation of the personal names of the grandfather has a legitimising 
character: the ceremonial specialist shows he was intimate with the one who taught him 
the song. Clearly, `learning' here is not simply a cognitive process. Knowledge 
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transmission presuposes a certain intimacy between the participants involved. Some 
form of intimacy is a precondition for the giving or getting of knowledge. One may be 
fully aware of the content of a song, for instance, but that does not qualify one as 
`knowing' that song It is only through a process of transmission, which involves giving 
and getting as, for instance, specific types of food to the person who is teaching, that 
knowledge becomes legitimately present in the recipient. 187 This becomes easily 
understandable if one considers that knowledge is mex only when it is acquired in mex 
ways, that is, by means of giving and getting. This is not a sufficient condition to 
acquire legitimate knowledge, but it is a necessary one. 
ne umarijanh 
he knew (the song) 
`ok'Ae me kraix o ku'^e 
all began to come by the fire and to stay there (while he sang) 
The men begin to gather by the fire. This is an statement concerning the mex- 
ness of Bep-jareti's song. It actually moved people to gather together in order to listen 
and to enjoy it. Due to their persuasive nature, songs are listened to by people both in 
the sense that they make an effort to hear it, and in the sense of them allowing 
themselves to be persuaded by it. Enjoyment is crucial in both senses 188, as will 
become clear in what follows. 
187 Verswijver (1985: 140) remarks that the status of `having knowledge' must be acquired through a 
suitable transmission. One may know the words of a song, for instance, and yet not be the bearer of 
that knowledge; in this case, one will be said not to know the song, or to have a `mock knowledge', 
mari bitxaer, of it. 
188 Overing (2000) makes very much the same point when she stresses both the role of play and the ludic 
in the constitution of native Amazonian conviviality, and the fact that such conviviality has to be 
actively created by means of individual agency: "It is my argument that it is precisely through these 
ludic skills that the leader enables collectivity among an otherwise vehemently anarchic people. It is 
the leader who, in large part through his skills for merriment, for jesting, clowning, and dancing, 
provides the impetus, and even possibility, for these people to fulfil their desire for collective 
togetherness, or union. " (2000: 08. her italics) 
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Nhym at'e na... 
Then, (there is) another (story) 
mranhnh am'ainget- ^e Beprinpa na adjwydjwy kute 
your father-in-law Beprinpa was also together (with Bep-jareti, singing) 
* aj'a:: h'i:: 
[no meaning] 
* aja ja Ae aja mmmm... 
[no meaning] 
* aja Ae aja ^e aja ja... 
[no meaning, just rhythmical sounds] 
* ra: g^e djuninh 
He (is my) father [djuni: djunwa] 
* box:: ga:: 
you have come 
* kumanhjarenh 
tell him 
* ge: box-'o-box ne ipy Va 
he really came, (and) did not let (the enemies get close) 
* ra: ge djuninh 
*box:: ga:: 
*ge:: k'ot-'o-box 
he came after [something? ] 
* ne ipy t'a 
owane 
* 'Ak ng ^oanh -i kriti:: -re 
The bird ['ak ngoanhinh: a species of large bird, with many different feathers] 
* 'ak ngoanhinh kriti: re na kute im -a 
The bird has taught me [passed me'] (the song) 
* mry: re kamr^o 
meat's blood 
Another story has begun here, related to the transmission of a song from the 
'ak ngoanhinh bird. The last sentence describes visually the bird attacking its prey, by 
216 
means of a metonymy where the blood stands for the whole scene of the hunting. 189 
* t'o amin ^e dj'a kam ^a 
(The bird takes its prey) to its place 
r'yp yr-ri 
[the tree described above, from which the resin is taken to delineate the contours of the 
children's shaved part of the head] 
* kutxer n-e 
(It is) behind [the bird's place is behind the r yp yr tree] 
* 'Ak ng^oanh-. i kriti:: -re 
* 'ak ng^o anh -i kriti: re na kute im -a 
* mry: re kamr^o 
* t'o amin ^e dj'a kam ^a 
*r yp yr-ri 
* kutxere n -e 
* on -i nh-a ng^o koror kam^a 
Far away, (where the) river is not deep [this is the place where the 'ak took its prey] 
* mry n-o 
(the) game (is) laying [or `laying game', that is, hunting] 
ba amainget-^e n-a kute kore kam me ku'Ae iaj anh ngrer o wanhynhr: 
Our father-in-law sings the kore kam me ku'Ae this way: 
* 'Ak ng^oanh-i kriti:: -re 
* 'ak ng ^o anh ~i kriti: re na kute im -a 
* mry: re kamr^o 
* t'o amin ^e dj'a kam ^a 
*r yp yr-ri 
* kutxere n -e 
* 'Ak ng^oanh-inh kriti:: -re 
* 'ak ng^o anh-inh kriti: re na kute im--a 
* mry: re kamr^o 
* to amin ^e dj'a kam ^a 
189 I was not able to verify whether there is a word, or expression, to designate such a trope in 
Mebengokre language. 
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*r yp yr-ri 
* kutxere n-e 
* oninhjanh ng^o koror kam ^a 
*mryn-o 
Mebakr-atum kute kore kam me ku "e Aant kute me kraix djwynh 
Both our grandfathers always began (to sing) the kore kam me ku'Ae [that is, it was 
really they who sang it] 
nhym me me kraix, me kraix o ku'e 
and then all, all began to gather by the fire (to listen to them) 
anh kore kam me ku'Ae ija, me kraix o ku'Ae 
for the kore kam me ku'Ae, they all gathered by the fire 
I was told at this point that men gathered by the fire to listen to the kore kam 
me ku'e, because it is mex. What the ceremonial specialist is stressing here is the 
capacity of both his antecedents to promote the gathering of people to listen to them. In 
this case, mex as a predicate refers both to the content of the song and to the success 
achieved by it in bringing people together. `Effectiveness' and `seemliness' are fused in 
this moral/aesthetical judgement. 
nhym mebakr-atum Bep-jareti na adjwy kute: 
Then our grandfather Bep-jareti also sang this way190 
The two ceremonial specialists sang each other's songs by the fire and they 
were mex, as all came by the fire to hear them. This action was mex because of its 
outcome, that is, because it moved people to hear - and to listen. A parallel is traced 
here between the situation of the audience in the story and the situation of the audience 
in the me toro, listening to the story. Both are coming to the fire to hear the song and 
stories of the ceremonial specialist. In both cases, they will head to the collective fishing 
190 The ceremonial specialist sings Beprinpa's song 
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afterwards. This parallel is emphasised by the ceremonial specialist himself, who tells 
the men his own relationship to the knowledge acquired through his father-in-law. The 
knowledge is mex because it is efficient, that is, because it does make people gather 
around the fire to listen to the song. Both points, the connection of the specialist with 
the one who produced the song (and, through the later, with Bep-jareti himself) and the 
efficacy of it, are stressed in the ceremonial specialist's speech. 
nhy ate we, am'ainget-^e wa -anwe t^am na kruwajabjeti, prenobakati, 
Then, there is another story, (that of) your fathers-in-law Kruwa-jabjeti, Prenobakati, 
n-am am'aing^et-^e kam, bakr-atum, atuk^a, 
There was your father-in-law, our grandfather, your father, 
kam aminh m yr- ri j^et anh na ngrer `o waijet 
he lifted himself (off the ground) and sang, hovering (above the place where he was 
before) 
anh na ngrer odja 
(he) sang the song, standing up ['odja' marks the bodily position of the person 
performing the action, in this case, standing, that is, not seated or lying down anywhere] 
ne kam arinhk kute kruwa-jabjeti 
(it was) similar (to that of) Kruwa-jabjeti 
nam aminh m yr, kubenget na aminh m'yr jabje 
Then he lifted off the ground, the elder lifted off the ground 
aminh m'yr-ri pr--o to -am anh na ngrerjakre 
(he) lifted off the ground and flew fast, trying (teaching) the song 
ne me a kub y monhr -i -na anh ngre 
he tries (teaches) a song for them to come back, happy/laughing 
nhym -a Bep-jareti djumari a ne 
Then (thus) Bep-jareti conceived (the song) 
a by me aryp mebenget-^e aryp kumex 
Back they went, and already the elders were crying so much 
ne aryp nh-iarop wabe aryp a by mör m-a am--ip kr^a onhy kumex 
already they had runny noses [that is, they were crying], and (were) all inviting each 
other to come back 
ain'ainget-e me a^er be ngrerj-a kaba 
No one knew (that) your father-in-law were going to sing 
n -e ... ngrer 
kato 
... and 
he sang [Beprinpa's song `came off' him] 
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Nhym me ... w^o:: ! 
And then, all ... (got ready to leave) [the sound is that of people standing up to leave. Men 
are coming back, to the fishing expedition] 
Song is portrayed here as bringing joy. This is also an example of `decision- 
making', and I would like to call attention to its form. Song (ngrer) is seen as a tool to 
move people to action. It is an agency-inducer, and it makes people act in `right ways'. 
Bep-jareti `tries' the song on people and it `works', both in the sense that it made 
people happy, gay, and in the sense that it persuaded them - or actually, seduced them, 
as it involved a play with desire, rather than rational argument, inducing them to 
perform the akro ka'oinh, the collective fishing expedition. These meanings are not 
dissociated: the way to move people to act is to make them happy, gay. They become 
moved to act in that way. Agency-inducement is synonym to gaiety-inducement. 
Persuasion here becomes essentially the inebriation of the senses with joy and with the 
promise of joy. 
nam -a mebakr-atum umari j-a ngrer jakre jarenh am -i monhr-ri kub Ae nh ^ep n -e 
pr-o t'o: o, to, to, to, ... 
Then the grandfather conceived of trying the song, and then he lifted off the ground (as) 
a bat, and (flew) fast: to, to, to, to, ... [sound of the bat's wings] 
nhym me o benget n'o t^ox ranh anh a monh arimanh mranhmebakr-atum n Aer kuto 
And then an elder, not yet asleep, (told someone: ) `You go (there) for me, to make fire, 
beside the grandfather'. [the fire is lit in order to shoo the bat away] 
aryp na nh ^ep dj'a ib ^e kuta 
There is a bat here, and it wants to bite me [says the elder who asked for the fire to be lit] 
nhym me ku'Aa -a to: b^o:: 
then all lit the fire: b^o:: [sound of the fire]. 
nhym am'aing^et ibe ngrer kaba 
Then your father-in-law sang the song (took the song from within him) 
-a ngrer j-a jarenh o ku'^e 
(then he) sang this song by the fire 
nhym me -o -a aryp ajte kinh ne 
Then they all changed their minds, becoming again gay/happy/liking 
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aryp ne mebakr-atum ajte nhym mengrer kaba nhym me aryp kinh ne 
our grandfather sang again the songs (took them from within him) and people became 
gay/happy again 
-o -o alte... wo, wo, wo ... (then they) changed their minds again, (going) wo, wo, wo ... [they shout, happily]. 
The song speaks of the feat of Bep jareti, who created it and also induced 
people to like it, that is, he brought happiness, joy to the people, by making them want 
to go on the fishing expedition. People are moved in consequence of their being made 
joyful and happy (kinh), by the song. As stated, to create joy -a suitable emotional state 
- is to move people into action. Bep-jareti performed the action of singing, but it was 
the song that made people joyful, and moved them, in consequence, to the action of the 
fishing expedition. The capacity do induct agency is in the song, not within the people 
singing it, although Bep-jareti was only able to create it because he was made into a 
shaman, a wajanga, through the biting of the snake. But the whole story unfolds as an 
stochastic process, whose outcome is dependent on more than the art of singing itself, 
that is, on the correct, and appropriate utterance of the song. This is because a song, or a 
singer is mex only if he acquires its ends. Thus we can see that the notion of ngrer 
involves a conception of social agency that is both moral and aesthetic. 
Song, desire, agency 
This complex of song, desire and agency does not sit well with the bulk of speech act 
theory, which is usually centred around notions of discursive statements and rational 
persuasion. However, M. Rosaldo (1982: 203) strongly made the point that speech 
utterances cannot be understood apart from notions of human agency and personhood. 
This was the critique of Searle's view of speech acts as the embodiment of universal 
goals and needs present in human speakers (1982: 211). In Rosaldo's view, Searle tends 
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to reify a metaphysical model of the Western autonomous individual, acting out of 
his/her own volition. Searle's example of `promise' as a speech act, according to 
Rosaldo, "... leads us to think of meaning as a thing derived from inner life. A world of 
promise appears as one where privacy, not community, is what gives rise to talk" (1982: 
211). Searle would thus be generalising culture-specific notions of human agency, and 
in so doing missing the point that local practice shapes both agency and its meaning 
(1982: 212). 
Whereas I entirely agree with Rosaldo's conclusions, the Mebengokre context 
of 'doing things with (sung) words' goes in a different direction from the Ilongot case. 
For the Mebengokre, songs come from within an individual and play with people's 
desires, creating interest in the action proposed by the song. It is what we would call 
their aesthetic quality that is effective, i. e., that has illocutionary force, as it seduces 
people into acting together by making them enjoy it. Rhythm, the central mex aspect of 
Me toro, is stressed by the Mebengokre as equally beautiful and good. The first sense is 
stressed in the very teaching of a Me toro to young people, a process that involves the 
collective coordination of bodily movement in dance. The second sense involves the 
collective coordination of bodily movement in what we call productive activities. 
Behind this picture, there is a conception of being both as autonomous and in search of 
its own ends. It is against such a background that ngrer must be understood, as a tekne 
191 for harmonising ends and means among autonomous individuals (as opposed, for 
instance, to Rosaldo's `community'. 
191 I use he term here in the sense it is deployed by Ingold (2000: 356), following Aristotle's 
classification. 
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Upon finishing the story, the ceremonial specialist sang a part of Beprinpa's 
song again (its last part), as a means of holding people's attention to the sequel to his 
narrative. He followed the song with this narration: 
Itabdjwy na arib^e: `ng^et^e go pa ar-ik---i me kukr'adj'a jarenh' 
My tabdjwy [grandson, ref. ] came (and said): ng^et^e [grandfather, int. treat. ], tell us a 
story 
ba kum--e: kr-any godja me djam idjwy a-piaap ket ne me kute ang^et ant--o kute ibe 
ngore kadjy am -a ngrerjarenh ga je idjwa odjam m -a 
and I said: kr-any [grandson, ad. ], if you have no shame (to sing) together with your 
ngAet [grandfather, ref. ] (then I will tell you the ngore kadjy me ngrer [the song of those 
wanting to go to the small water] for you to sing like I do 
nam anget aribe -im monhr kati jarenh -a ba o iba 
then your grandfather came and sang the monhr kati (song) for me 
ne im-a: ba kwatyi an monhr kati dja ba am--a jarenh ba kum aj! 
(then he said) TO me: I'll tell you the song of our grandmother 
nhym anget ibe im -a: 
Then your grandfather told me (the song): 
The ceremonial specialist told the men about his learning of the songs, i. e., 
how they were transmitted to him by his grandfather (nget), who taught not only his 
own song, but that of their grandmother (kwatui). Mebengokre songs are gender- 
specific, but the Catete Xicrin have seen times when those songs had to be transmitted 
inter-gender, in order to preserve them for future generations, as I was told by several 
older men in the village. This is probably the case here. A point that must be stressed is 
the reference to shame (piaap, piaam). Piaap is a sentiment of `restraint- 
unseemliness' 192, related to the performative aspect of Mebengokre sociality, that is, to 
its way of performing for an audience. Piaap, in a sense, opposes performance. 
* ba djore kangro:: 
I (am) a hot bee [djore: a particularly ferocious bee] 
*nlz ytomonh 
(the bee (I) take/go [nh -. y: `bee'] 
192 I mean `unseemliness' here as 'impropriety', related to a strong visual (and audictive) component. 
See Riviere (2000) for a description of a similar concept among the Trio of the Guiana region. 
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* ikrapri am --i wyr 
I'm sad, paying attention (to the way) 
* r--iti to 
watching (the way I walk) 
* am --i wyr 
* ba djore kangro 
* r-iti to 
* ami wyr 
Dajm mengrer godga ar-ik arenh o t-e 
You try yourself to sing the song 
akro owakjer ne me kumpr-. i mei no oba 
all sing the akro o'akjer (dj'akjer) slowly, (and it is) beautiful 
Akro djakjer means literally `carrying the vine (akro)' 193. It is sung when men 
return from the gathering of akro in the forest, when they bring it to the outskirts of the 
forest camp. The ceremonial specialist instructs the young men about the me toro, 
stressing the aesthetic character of the activity. 
* adjyma mrym ma ^e 
wait, (there is an) ant nest t(here) 
* adyma mrym ma ^e j 
* be:: --un-ukw-a-re ngr^aninh 
(whose) house (the ants') (we) put down 
* m-a m-o:: 
(we) go (put down the ant nest) 
Mrym ma'e is a kind of ant-nest that is built in trees, very common in those 
trees where the akro is found. When one pulls the akro vine down a tree that has such 
ant nest, one is likely to find oneself under a `rain' of ants, whose bite is mildly painful. 
193 Djakjer is used for the game load brought to a ceremony by the hunting party, when it can be 
specified according to the ceremony being performed. Thus, `bep dj'akjer', for instance (which is also 
the name of a song performed on the occasion of the corresponding ceremony) is the 'akjer for the bep 
ceremony, and so on. The same name is given to the 
food produced in a garden, which is to be destined 
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This song instructs people how to recognise and avoid such dangers of collective 
fishing, and to pull down an ant nest is unfortunately something one frequently does 
when gathering the akro vine. 
* adjyma mr-ym m-a Ae 
* b^e:: un-ukw^a ngr^aninh 
* he:: ma monh:: 
* adjyma mr-ym m-a Ae 
* b^e:: un-ukw^a ngrAaninh 
* he:: ma monh:: 
me kute ngore ok'Ae kam ne me 
all are at the ngore dance (ngore ok'Ae) 
meokre, menoronyre 
[older children and unmarried men] 
me -a itepor-a narinh na 
all (are in a) long queue 
nhym me akro ok jer oba 
then all (are) bringing the akro on (their) backs 
o aben kokjer omranh 
(all are) walking, mixed up (i. e., alternate) 
mekratum me, mekrany me 
[i. e., older men and men with young children 
ngrer o me ma monhr kati oba 
all go singing and carrying (the akro) 
nhym me aben kojer omranh 
they are all walking, mixed up 
When people finish making their large akro packs, they bring them to the atyk, 
the small clearing outside the camp. People of all ages walk in a single queue, `mixed 
up', that is, with an older man in the first position, followed by a younger one, who is 
followed by an older one and so on. The men wait in the track for others to come, and 
all go back together to the camp, singing the akro songs. The insistence upon the 
for a ceremony. These gardens are grown by those sponsoring such ceremonies, that is, those whose 
children will undergo the ceremony. 
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`mixed up' aspect of the activity is due to its conspicuousness. During most of their 
lives, Mebengokre men have as companions people of the same age when performing 
collective activities. Dances are also performed by men of all ages, but either the queue 
of dancers is sorted out by age, the older going in front (or beside) of it, or they oppose 
people of different ages, as in the dance of the manioc's juice (kwyr kango me toro). 194 
People of different ages will gather at the men's house, but will talk mainly with those 
of the same age. Hunting and fishing expeditions195 are planned and executed by 
people of the same age, that is, those they feel more comfortable with. The akro ka'oinh 
actually teaches people that there can also be joy in `mixed up' gatherings, as will be 
shown below: 
Me ma akro o'akjer jarenh onhy nhym me -a aben nory itep oba 
All (older men) stay seated singing the akro o'akjer song, (while) all (young ones) are 
bringing (the akro), mixed up in the queue. 
*O:: jao:: 
Narratives of a formal sort always interpose some rhythmical divide, a singing 
without words between parts of the speech, to beautify it. It makes people pay attention 
to it, I was told. 
ne o aben nhory nhym me... 
(the younger ones are) at the queue, mixed up... 
be: me o aryp ngrer oba 
and already (there is) someone bringing forth the song: 
* o:: wo-o:: ngo nor nhiarymunh 
o:: wo-o:: the river sleeps far away 
* na ba tep-e kaak-re... 
I (got) fish as if.. 
* to ikukryt-ty 
carrying (a) tapir 
*ne me wa wyr by miaAa-a to monh 
194 Kwvr kango me toro: `dance of the manioc's juice'. 
195 With the exception of those all-inclusive (male) ones, meant for the culminating point of a ceremony. 
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(and) all (are) taking, carrying, going, stopping 
* o:: ngo nor ma rym munh 
going to the river that sleeps far away 
* naba tep-e kaak-re 
I got fish as if 
* to ikukryt ne me ba wyry 
we were taking tapir 
* by mi ^ar to monh 
stopping, taking and going 
This passage describes how men get loads of fish back to the village. The 
reference to tapir is because it is the heaviest game in the forest. It means that men will 
bring back such heavy loads of fish, which are to be compared with the tapir: to get fish 
as if it were tapir. The term used, kaak, implies here a likeness in weight. Men take their 
heavy loads, carry it for some time and then rest for some time, something done 
particularly when the load is heavy and the destination far away. 
Angrer ma aprinh mex ne omonh 
You (should) sing slowly, well/beautifully, as you go 
djam inc ngrer mrenh godga? 
is it not really for yourself, this song? 
mranhnh akro ok jer na me kumprinh mex no ba 
all are walking, slowly singing (the song), carrying the akro (and it is) good/beautiful 
o wa ne k'ai ma oa ^e monh 
This way, pick it up, they go saying [I. E., the older men tell to the young ones, explaining 
how to do it] 
k'ai ma im-ok---a o'a^e monh 
(and they) go, (bringing the akro pile) upwards, up to the top 
*djam apijet-to-ti-re kudjy-re 
and (about) this smelly large armadillo? 
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*djam apijet-to-ti-re kudjy-re 
*dja, n apijet-te-ti-re kudjy-re 
* meba wa jabe je to irAo toky:: wy 
running in zig-zag, looking for us all 
196 Apjeti: A species of large armadillo, whose meat is held to be smelly (an opinion that I agree with). 
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* kum abikrenhj-a iry 
stay quiet, far (from the armadillo) 
*djam apijet-to-ti-re kudjy-re 
*djam apijet-te-ti-re kudjy-re 
*djam apijet-te-ti-re kudjy-re 
* meba wa jabe je to it "o toky:: wy 
* kum abikrenh j-. a iry 
*u ja wo:: 
owane 
[and so it is] 
Nhym ate dja ga... 
And now you will (arrive)... 
nhym me arup no ok ar-ik no kamrek ne 
then all (women) will have painted their eyes red 
na arup ngo kadjy ami ja ik n-o kamrek 
(all) already want to go to the river, painting red around their mandibles... 
ne aryp aben me no krax aka me omunh txo kumex 
and already begin to look insistently at each other's whites of the eyes 
The right way to carry the akro is singing, slowly, at the same pace that the 
queue enters the camp. This is held to be extremely beautiful, and this is what the song 
emphasises. The older men show the younger the way to do it. The akro pile, made by 
the bank of the river, will grow fast when the men bring their load of akro. On the way 
back to the camp, men may stop to hunt some game that presents itself to them, or to 
fish in some stream - for the whole activity is performed quite leisurely. There is a 
general atmosphere of celebration about, and men, especially the younger ones, are 
quite enthusiastic about it. It is this joyful atmosphere that is evoked by the ceremonial 
specialist's remarks on the slowness of singing and walking, on the opportunity of 
doing some hunting with one's mates. The women would be all beautifully painted, and 
so would the men, who will paint around their mandibles, all anxiously expecting the 
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me toro. The mention of looking into each other's whites of the eyes refers to this 
anticipation. 
Nhym ate at-o djwynh, 'akjaj ngore... 
Then your brother, 'akjaj ngore... [the ceremonial specialist assumes again the voice of 
the character of his story] 
godja adjwydjwy 
he too... 
inget ant monhr kati 
(from) my nget the song (I will sing) 
rop monhr kati j-a omunh 
the song of the jaguar is (the song your are about to) hear197 
Mrenh akro uja o:: 
bringing the akro: (Older men shout like that when they are close to the camp, bringing 
the akro) 
ka, 1w, 1w 
[this is not a ngrer, a song, but and ungr-or, a `shout'] 
ne menorony na me tuw kyr -a katat 
and the unmarried men [menorony ] shout in a simpler way 
hu-wa:: [again a ungr-or] 
nhym mekrare na me ... o wa ne 
Then the married men [mekrare ] (shout) in this way: 
ka, ka, ka 
nhym menorony ma me... 
then the unmarried men all (shout)... 
hu-wa:: kakakakaka:: 
o wa ne. Nhym mekrare na me be kyr--a kat'at 
so it is. Then the married men all shout in the simpler way 
na o wa ne 
and so it is 
ajte me aryp akro kumex ne 
and all (go) gathering a lot of akro [that is, after these stories are told all night, the men 
go gathering akro for the fishing ceremony] 
197 This song, and others whose content is not directly related to the ceremony, will not be transcribed 
here for reasons of space. They are all sung one after another, always interpolating something of the 
description of the incoming me toro between the songs. These will be retained in this description. 
These songs, like the others, are sung and a story is told, about the origin of the song. The story as well 
as the song is meant as a form of amusement. The reference to `seeing' the song seems to be usual in 
the Mebengokre language. It could be because songs are not thought of as distinct from their actual 
performance; it could also be because the expression has no particular ambiguity in their language. I 
have not got enough linguistic data do decide which alternative should be the case. 
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aryp w-a ab^e nhym aryp... 
already all are seated. Already... 
aryp akro onhy djam meba kukam-a kije kute ng^o-'o kr-i ka, kam k-i kati, ket ne jam 
-o aben by- -a monhr got... 
already seated beside the akro, did our older ones [meba kukam -a kije: `those that were 
beside our first born'] not seat by the water, so happy, no one leaving (the place)? [a 
rhetorical question, a device frequently used in formal speech] 
na me arek akro kam ngryk-'o 
already all had become serious, by the akro 
kuka kamrek-re kute me -ojak'ar 
a fish [kuka kamrek; a species offish that eats raw meat, bit someone 
we mex na me -o odja nhym we kukakamrek-re we nox ne 
I think someone was taking honey, when the fish jumped 
nhym k'ai m -a monh nhym tedjek to ... prik! 
then he stood up (that is, stood up in the river) and had his heel... prik! (bitten by the 
fish) 
kunh y nhym k'ai ma m-o nhym tedjek t'o ... prik! 
(he) was seated and when (he) stood up (he had his heel... prik! 
tam na m-a me aben m-a jarenh, angmer! 
all remember it (and) tell (the story), young ones! 
kr^a, ikr-atum, ikra-ri, idjuwydjwy-ari, tam na me m -a aben in -a ngo kam ngryk... 
(my) kra'abdjwy [formal friend, add. ], my grandfathers, my sons, my brothers-in-law, all 
remember how everybody became serious by the water (when that happened) 
aben jam kaikep, na aminh kam tep djwa mex pyma 
nobody left (for the water), all were afraid of the fish with good (sharp) teeth 
p-i krax. Ngo kam p-i krax kaminh 
stick. Afraid of (sharp) sticks under water (i. e., sharp sticks where people can hurt their 
feet) 
kang-a kute me -o kungrinh na me aben m-ajarenh 
all remember, and tell when a snake did wind around someone 
ngo kan ngryk-'o abenjanh ngo kam ngryk `o kr-i 
(all were) serious by the water, all (stayed) together, serious, seated by the water 
nhym be ate na gari at-oi-re me a kanga mranhnh 
(and) you and your brothers played all the time 
am -imp ngo jadjyr kat-a a kanga 
we fenced the river to bash (the akro) (and) you played 
ngojadjyr kat'a akanga inranhnh 
we fenced the river, and you played 
kikre kot akanga mranhnh 
you played by the shelters 
nhym kati nam kukam-a tuw ngo kam ngryk 
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then the ancestors said they really became serious by the river 
nhym be ate na gar at'o-re me a kanga mranhnh 
(and) you and your brothers played all the time 
am -ip ngojadjyr kat-a a kanga 
we fenced the river to bash the (akro) (and) you played 
ngojadjyr kat-a a kanga: mranhnh 
we fenced the river, and you played 
kikre kot a kanga mranhnh 
you played by the shelters 
nhym kati nAam kukam'a kije tuw ngo kam ngryk 
then the ancestors said they really became serious, by the river 
ne aryp we mewwe aryp ngo, ngo me ngo -o onhynh 
then all were already coming to sit by the river bank 
nhym aryp me o ant kadjy ku'^e 
then some of them wanted (to gather by) the f ire 
mebakr-atum ant kukr'adj'ajanh dja me gume ngo kadjy to nhy ant -o 
this is the custom of our ancestors, we dance the ngo kadjy ('wanting to go to the water', 
lit. ), and then, seated, and then ... [he didn't finish the sentence] 
akat-a ibe idjwa odja 
your brother is doing (becoming) like me 
n-e k'ai ma monh 
standing up, right? 
The seriousness of the ancestors is said here to make people come and sit by 
the water, and listen to the songs of the ceremony, by the bonfire. To adopt the same 
attitude of the ancestors is to become like them. Me toro is meant to produce such a 
likeness. The term ngryk actually has a visual referent, being used to describe these 
`shut' facial expressions, which may convey a myriad of sentiments ranging from plain 
formality to anger. The use of the expression in the passage above conveys more, I 
think, than simply the `seriousness of the matter'. Usually people, when amongst only 
those similar to themselves, are not ngryk. `Open' faces and smiles are the rule on such 
occasions, and it is usually then when good laughter can be heard. This is not so say, 
though, that they only enjoy themselves when segregated from the rest, as the 
boundaries of such intimacy, always contextual, are set in many different ways. Thus, 
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people will enjoy themselves when dancing, for instance, as those of the same age 
dance together in the same dancing row, create a togetherness of similars that is at the 
base of fun and enjoyment. 198 The teaching of the older men in this passage is, I think, 
that of the appropriate199 attitude that is properly used when in presence of those who 
are not similar to oneself 
It could be said, thus, that in the same way that Mebengokre laughter is 
`ethical' 200, in the sense that it indicates the similarity of those embraced by its range, 
while the absence of laughter can also be ethical, indicating a `mixing' of different 
qualities of people and thus laughter's unseemliness in such environments. It should be 
noted that this is an essentially male issue, as throughout their life men face more 
changes of social environment, engaging with non-similar people, in a way that is not so 
much experienced by women. Interestingly, there is a story related to the fishing 
ceremony201, which tells how the first human laughter was produced. It is a variation 
of the story of the origin of the fishing ceremony, taught by a captured child of the bat- 
people. It tells how a man remained working in his garden while the others had gone 
hunting, and met a kuben-nhepre, a creature with the body of a man, and the wings and 
feet of a bat. This creature, who did not know human speech (i. e., Mebengokre kaben), 
tickled the man in a friendly way, making him laugh, which was the first laughter ever 
expressed by a human being. The man was taken by the bat-man (kuben-nhepre) to a 
198 According to Vidal (1977: 123), "... the individuals of an age-group call themselves `companions', 
'ne ro anh abatori (those who grew together) or aben p)ydji (those that for a single one, that is, an age 
category). The `companions' are those with whom one can speak freely; they have no shame (piaam) 
of one another. The one ro anh abatori are like relatives (ombikwa), because they are together every 
day, work together and have fun together. " 
199 Again, 'seemly' would be the appropriate term here, because of its strongly visual character. One of 
the meanings of mex is `proper to look at'. 
200 I use the term here in the same sense that it was used by Beaudet (1996). 
201 This story was collected by Banner (1957), among the Mebengokre-Gorotire. I have not heard it 
myself in the field, neither have I specifically asked them about it. 
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cave where it lived, and there he was tickled until exausted by it, at the hands of his 
captor and other batmen. He thus was unable to run away. The other Mebengokre, 
learning the fate of their companion, rescued him, along with a small bat-boy, from the 
cave. From this day, the story goes, the Mebengokre do not appreciate laughter, 
considering it undignified for men and, like tickling itself, appropriate only for women 
and children. 
There are some elements in the story which would render it more intelligible if 
taken into consideration. Firstly, it should be noted that the tickled man was among non- 
similar people. It would be unseemly for a Mebengokre to laugh in such a situation, as 
one should then be ngryk, that is, bear a `serious' face. In the same way, this assertion 
only makes sense in relation to men, as women (and children) do not usually face the 
problem of producing togetherness while among non-similar people. Thus the story, as 
well as the one told by the ceremonial specialist (above), tells of the ethical character of 
the gathering of non-similar men on friendly grounds. It tells of how different qualities 
of people can co-perform an activity, while at the same time being able to produce a 
type of togetherness, that is, being able to have fun among dissimilars in the midst of an 
all-inclusive task. This helps to understand the stress put by the ceremonial specialist on 
the `mixed' quality of those performing the akro ka'oinh. It is the ethical, as well as the 
technical and the aesthetic character of the activity that is being taught by him. Many 
strangers not acostumed to Mebengokre ways have the distinct impression that they are 
a people that do not laugh, the very epitome of seriousness. To anyone who sees a 
Mebengokre outside his or her own ambiance (especially among non-Indians), the idea 
that laughter can be a common sociality device among them may sound quite strange. 
But the mistake is in taking such laughter as a non-contextualised expression of mood, 
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as if it had to do solely with an individual's disposition. Laughter here is a social device. 
and a very important one indeed, as it brings people together and makes possible a 
whole series of activities that would not be feasible otherwise . This is not to say that 
laughter in these contexts is not an expression of joy; only that it is something that is 
consciously, explicitly used to create togetherness among non-similar people. It is an 
element of a highly developed technology of conviviality. And it is far from being the 
only element of such technology. For instance, there is also an active need for being 
ngryk, `serious', among non-similars in certain contexts, and this is also part of the 
Mebengokre ethics of conviviality. After all, it is only on some occasions that non- 
similar people should gather together to realise the same activities. 
* Iweru k'ai-WA e we:: 
the akro, slowly [k'ai we: k'ai be. Slowly, softly. That is: `the akro (is to be beaten) 
softly'] 
* iweru, iweru, iweru:: 
* iweru ma ma tx'a he:: hum:: 
going to the akro, (startled? ) 
* iweru: iweru ma k'ai w^e we:: 
* iweru, iweru, iweru 
* iweru ma ma tx'a h^e: hum:: 
* iweru:: 
* wewe to je wowe to jank 
These are the butterfly's legs (? ) 
* wewe to je wowe tejanh 
* omunh janh omunh janh, ky re: 
going, going, running (the fish `run' because of the akro? ky: to run, used for large 
bodies) 
* omunhjanh, omunh jank, ky re: 
* omunh janh, omunh janh, ky: 
* omunh janh, omunhjanh, ky-re: 
* omunh janh, omunhjanh, ky: 
*p Aan p' an re by by re, hy, hy re: 
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small fish (pacu, a species of fish), burn, burn [the akro's poison `burns' the fish that 
looks like the female sexual organ. This specific part is sung turning front and 
backwards in short jumps, shaking the body up and down, as the fish is supposed to do] 
* by re a'^e 
*p Aan p ^an re by by re, hy, by re: 
*hyrea'^e 
*p flan p flan re by by re, hy, by re: 
* by re a' ^e 
Nhym ate mranhnh g'atenk ... 
Then I think (it was) your son ... [g'atenk: your son, who is my tabdjwy (`grandson', 
`nephew)] 
ibe am'ainget- Ae ngrerjanh gop ja idwja 
this is the song that your nget [my father-in-law] showed me 
kujwa gopja odja. N-e ... 
as I showed you. E... 
* w^a kam m-a it^om-a je 
jump, right there 
*w ^a kam m -a it"om ~a je 
*w ^a kam m -a it"om ~a je 
* w^a kam m~a it^om-a je 
* adjy-wy-re, adjy-wy-re ... 
Afterwards! afterwards! [one speaks like that when one is angry] 
* in -a w'a kam iranh 
is it clear there? 
* djam w-a kam m-a iranh m-a dj'a 
let's go there, where is clear? 
Nhym ate dja' m -e ... 
then all go ... 
onhonh ngo dja gu m-e onhynh 
then all (of us) go to the akro me toro [onhonh ngo: the akro me torn] 
The instructions related to the `technical' aspect of the activity are given to the 
young men as suggestions. This coheres with the passage above, where young men are 
portrayed as doing what they want - i. e., `playing' by the shelters, instead of being 
engaged in the activities related to the ceremony. The activity is portrayed as 
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aesthetically pleasurable: it is a song to be enjoyed, not a task to be executed. The whole 
idea being expressed here to the young men is that the activity is not a duty, but a 
pleasure. 
nhym me aryp me o ant ... 
then people ... 
k'ax m -a ba 
standing up (to dance) 
o'^e:: nenh owak'a 
dance (until they) stop 
nhym aryp gume ngo 
then (we) all go to the river 
aryp mytjanh t-e, nhynh. Gume aryp ngo -a 
then the sun is already going [i. e., the sun has already risen]. (The men) sit [i. e., they 
stop dancing]. We are all already in the river 
aryp nhym me akro o' box pa 
then (they) finish bringing the akro 
nhym m -e -o k'ax m -a toro dj'a nojaret 
then someone stands up dancing, inviting all (to go to the river) 
* h-a m-a na ba im-a kinh im-aja be 
I like (the akro ka'oinh) for me [this literal translation actually means that one wants the 
akrb ka'öinh for oneself. `To like', in this sense, is equivalent to want something for 
oneself because one likes it. It is an expression of desire. ] 
This part is a straightforward description of the me toro to come. The whole 
activity is represented as an aesthetic one, incorporating dance and song into the 
gathering of akro, its preparation, transport to the camp, and the actual bashing of akro 
in the water. The ceremonial specialist's song describes the activity and men's attitudes 
towards it: they participate in it on their own accord, because it is beautiful/good. As 
stated in the last sentence, what is important here is to like it, to be happy with it, to 
want it for oneself. 
This passage must be understood from the viewpoint of some elements of 
Mebengokre morality that are embedded in it. One central element is that men do it 
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because they like, because it makes them happy. The idea of happiness, or something 
equivalent to it, is expressed by the term kinh, usually translated as joy or contentment. 
In the transitive form ma kinh, it is rendered in Portuguese as `gostar', `to like, 202. But 
there are some specificities to this liking. When applied to things or events, it indicates 
a desire to possess, to get hold of them. Thus, ba inhma kinh is usually rendered as `I 
like (this) for me'. It is an expression of desire, rather than volition, and is used to 
express that the speaker wants to have the object or event for himself. Another verb, 
pram, is used to express want, but this, to my knowledge, expresses either volition or 
necessity. Thus, inhma pram, `I'm hungry', that is, `I need food', is different from 
inhma omronh kinh ('I want some food'). In our own way of thinking, we oppose 
volition and necessity as central concerns for our moral philosophies (or for most of 
them, at least). But desire is singled out as the focus of Mebengokre philosophy, as an 
element both moral and aesthetic, and as such is opposed both to volition and to 
necessity (thus necessarily lumping the latter two together). When one says, in relation 
to a thing or event, ba inhma kinh kumex (the last word here being an intensifier, 
making the expression an hyperbolic one), or, literally, `I like it very much for me', one 
is actually telling the person one is addressing that one desires that thing/event for 
himself. 
This becomes clear when we consider the expression kinh kaigo, used to 
denote what we would call a `purely aesthetic' appreciation of something. Kinh kaigo is 
a simulacrum of kinh, something that purports to be like kinh, but isn't. And it isn't 
because it is only appreciation, suggesting a lack of desire to possess the thing to which 
it refers. Kinh, similar to the ancient Greek notion of eudaimonia (which is also usually 
202 The postposition marks the subject and the object is prefixed to the verb. Thus, i-ma a-kinh, "I like 
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translated as 'happiness'), refers to the acquisition of material, concrete things, as well 
as to inner emotional states. Actually, they are one and the same thing for the 
Mebengokre, as to acquire the objects of one's desires is to become content, satiated, 
and happy. 
It has to be stressed here that the logic implied in the song described above is 
one of desire. The object of desire itself is invariably qualified as mex kumrenhx, as 
`very/truly good/beautiful'. The same logic applies to the description of the me toro 
above. It is not volition that is stressed here, but desire. People are portrayed as moved 
by their desire, that is, as made to like something `for themselves', and to feel 
irresistibly attracted by it. This desire is individual, and the very art of the song - and of 
me toro as a whole - is to create such desire. The description of the whole activity by 
the ceremonial specialist reveals itself as a moral/aesthetic pursuit, one that seeks to 
realise a state where people's individual desires are to be collectively achieved. 
* ar rereja my 
[no meaning] 
* manh nibum k'ai monhr to 
going beating in the back (of the akro? ) 
* bep-e kw ^ai w'arix 0 re 
pulling/taking akro [`bep kw^ai `is a name for akro] 
* amunh aryp 
(It's) going 
*nAa ba pa w'arix o re 
I took it myself 
* nibum kaingor ti 
the back very designed [the heavy akro load leaves deep marks ON people's backs] 
* bep e kw^ai warix o ni ro:: 
taking (collecting) the bent akro 
* ge areketi re t^o 
he is going (to gather) trees' bark [arerekti is a name for trees' bark J 
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* t^o kadj^o kadj^o 
to tear, to tear (the bark from the tree: to peel off) 
* monhrinh kapran n--a re n-a 
look at the land turtle! 
* bep e kw^ai w'ari pari be kwyr 
walking under the akro 
ge arink inh kwyr to abe 
it (the land turtle) keeps walking 
* ba kumrenhx -txi bep e kw^ai w'ari xo niro 
I'm firstly going to take the akro 
ge arink inh ti re: to kadj^o kadj^o-o: 
he is going to tear, to tear the trees' bark 
* monhre kapran na re bep-e kw^ai w'ari pari be kwyr ge aring inh kw'y: 
there are deer and land turtle running around, non-stop, under the akro 
Land turtles are among the favourite foods for the Mebengokre203, while deer, 
formerly an object of dietary restriction for men, are today very much appreciated. 
There is an expression of plenty in this passage, as it was explained to me by the 
translator. The situation is portrayed as a wholly pleasurable one, where one can have 
the opportunity of achieving more than a single object of desire (food is the paradigm 
for such objects). The description as a whole refers to the technical steps of bending the 
akro, which is then beaten to peel off its outer bark, and then folded into `packs' tied 
with strips of tree's bark. 
* pydji ranh re ti m-a na kang^o mex i n-e 
only the akro with lots of juice is good to make foam [the usual order of the sentence 
would be: pydjy ranh re ti imanh kango mex. J 
* manh ne ga-i wir-re-e 
did you understand? [usual order: djam ne ga ma? ] 
* ranh re txi manh ne kango prek-e-re 
the akro that has juice has a stronger flower [flower': a metaphor for the foam exuded 
by the akro] 
203 They are in fact more than that, being the food consumed during most ceremonies, because they can 
last for a long time without needing any care. They are a ready supply of meat for periods when people 
cannot go hunting everyday. 
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* manh ne ga-i wir-re-e 
did you understand? 
* ngoja katanh me wadja w^a k'a 
in the banks of the river, we walked/walk 
* dja k'ak hinh-inh ngoja k'a tanh 
at the bank of the river, we shout 
*n Aa ba dja k'ak 
yes, I shout 
* ngoja katanh na ba dja k'ak dj'a ka'k ^e:: 
I shout by the bank of the river 
*n Aa rax i manh ne ga ngo prek-e nenh manh na ga 
you really went to the deep river 
* wir re ngo nhy re dj^a na ni tok o re 
got it? (when one stays) in the cold water, the belly swells 
* kruwa ni kanhinhx re ngo nhy re 
the arrow bends in the cold water 
* dja na ninh to ko re kruwa ninh kanhinhx - re-e: 
in the place where the belly swells, the arrow bends 
* dja na ninh to ko re kruwa ninh kanhinhx - re-e: 
* ngo nhy re dja na aninh to ko re kruwa ninh kanhinhx i re 
the cold water fills your belly, bends the arrow 
* ngo nhy re dja ne ga ninh to ko re 
the cold water fills your belly 
* adja adja bep e kw^ai w'ari na bep e kw^ai w'ari kudj^a: y nenh 
the roots, the roots of the aw'ari [Buriti palm tree] smell strongly 
* adja, adja 
the roots, the roots 
* adja adja bep e kw ^ai w'ari na bep e kw ^ai w'ari kudj ^a: y nenh 
the roots, the roots of the aw'ari [Buriti palm tree] smell strongly 
* adja, adja 
the roots, the roots 
adjy manh me i monhnhr 
they are going, afterwards 
* adjy manh me i monhnhr 
* w'ari ti dj^o na bep e kw^ai w'ari kudji 
the aw'ari tree left a large fruit 
* Ao nenn txa adja adja 
leave it now, leave it 
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*n abep e kw ^ai w'ari na bep e kw ^ai w'ari kudji :e 
the aw'ari tree smells a lot 
* nenh adja adja: 
leave it now, leave it 
* adjymanh me i monhnhr 
they are going afterwards 
*o nenh dja monhnh: to dja ga me monhnh tdjori omonhnh nenh: 
going now, again you go. Are you going? [i. e., the akro's foam, going to the middle of the 
river] 
* monhnh tx^a ka na 
(the foam) is going (to the) fish [tx ^a ka na: a kind offish] 
* nibum anh txo ti amonhnh nenh 
(there is) the dorsal fin, going [a metonym for the fish, here] 
* djam i pyma, djam i pyma ri 
is there anyone afraid? Is there anyone afraid? 
* to djam na me monhnh 
are they going? [referring to the fish] 
* to djam na me wa monhnh 
* minh k'a k'a ti re anhu ti re ja 
this is the alligator with long tail 
* minh k'a k'a ti re anhu ti re ja 
* dja biri dja aminh panh txi tanh 
by the place to go up [i. e., the place where one leaves the river; the river bank] you will 
pay me [in the figurative sense here: the peb e kw ^ai w'ari tells the fish that they will set 
up scores by the bank of the river] 
* bep e kw^ai w'ari to kupranh ranh manh monhr manh 
the aw'ari (tree) is going to exterminate the fish 
* apari manh monhr manh 
(it) is going down (the river) 
to djwa b^o nenh ik'ak'a nhinh re 
the bee ik'ak'a [kind of native bee] goes slowly 
* nhy re dja t^o:: re 
a few bees 
* nh Aa jarenh nhinh to 
telling [the aw'ari tells the bees? ] 
* nh ^a jarenh nhinh to 
* nh ^a jarenh nhinh to 
* onh b'ari txe txo prank rank nenh 
the fruit of the tree is high above 
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* onh b'ari txe txo ni: ronh onh nenh 
the tree is loaded with pending fruits 
* djam na renh ni to 
are you taking? 
* djam na renh ni to 
* djam na renh ni to 
* onh aw'ari txe txo pranh ranh nenh 
(until) (you) take all the aw'ari's fruits? 
* onh aw'ari txe nironh : onh nenh 
the aw'ari (tree) has many fruits 
* djam na renh ninh to 
are you picking? 
* djam na renh ninh to 
* djam na renh ninh to 
* onh aw'ari txe dj^o pranh ranh nenh 
(until) picking all the fruits from the aw'ari tree)? 
* onh aw'ari txe nironh i onh nenh 
the aw'ari (tree) has many fruits pending (from it) 
* t^o o' tok^o re dj^a na renh ninh tok^o re 
(the fruit is) falling down, are you picking? 
* t^o o' tok^o re dj^a na renh ninh tok^o re 
* t^o o' tok^o re dj^a na renh ninh tok^o re 
* onh aw'ari txe djo kupranh ranh nenh 
the fruits in the aw'ari (tree's) branches have finished 
The song goes on, talking of the bashing of akro into the water. It is sung by 
men while actually doing it, and goes on for several hours, the whole duration of the 
fishing. While the reference to the roots of the tree seem to imply a comparison between 
it and the akro itself, the reference to the tree's fruits is reminiscent of the `picking' of 
fish during the activity. 
Songs have a twofold significance for the Mebengokre. By listening to a song, 
one is seduced into desiring what is proposed in the song, as it continuously stresses the 
joy and the plenty that are created through it. The Me toro is thus portrayed as a model 
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moral action, allowing both for the creation of joy among different qualities of people 
and for the realisation of the prototypical individual wish, that is, to acquire food. 
Moreover, the food acquired is also destined to be collectively eaten in another Me toro 
back in the village, thus fulfilling all the prerequisites of moral action, that is, the 
creation of an emotional state conductive to the possibility of people giving and getting 
food. 
As the teaching went on, the ceremonial specialist began to sing the song 
created by his father-in-law, Beprinpa, who had taught him. The song is accompanied 
by a description of the activities that the younger men would perform for the first time. 
These activities include looking for the akro, pulling it down from the tree and 
preparing it, and afterwards bringing it back to the fishing camp, singing the akro 
djakjer, the song of the akro, and finally beating it in the water. The ceremonial 
specialist also spoke of events that happened during past Me toro, of the dangers of 
being stung by sting-ray fish, of cutting one's foot on sharp tree trunks under the water, 
of being attacked by piranha fish, alligators and other such dangers. People were 
instructed in what we would call the `technical' aspects of fishing at the same time as 
being seduced into performing it by the expectation of the great fun and the massive 
amount of fish to be had, that is, by me toro's beauty and goodness. 
Beprinpa is represented as having sung together with the shaman Bep-jareti. 
They sang together and people came around the fire to listen to them. A link is thus 
provided between ancient happenings (Bep-jareti is called mebakratum, or `everybody's 
grandfather/uncle') and the personal experience of the singer. Both Bep-jareti's and 
Beprinpa's individual experiences become song through their capacity for moving 
people into moral agency. The song stresses the individual agency of the singers in 
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shaping people's morality, that is, both teaching them the ways of realising it and 
moving them to actually doing it. Ngrer , `song', becomes thus an agency-inducement 
for collective activities. As stated earlier, it is mex , that is, beautiful and good, because 
it moves people to do things together, because it both creates the possibility and places 
people in the position of giving and getting food from each other, and because it does 
all this by means of making people joyful. What moves people is not a notion of duty or 
social rule, but rather the expectation of joy. They are seduced to gather together by the 
beauty and goodness of the activity - that is, by its efficacy and seemliness. People 
should not be constrained or imposed upon, as this would be punure, bad/ugly. 
Mebengokre social philosophy is one of autonomous individuals who create a social 
state by having fun together. 
Enjoying Oneself in the Water: the Ceremony and its Outcome 
People started leaving for Kamkukei, `the place of the cotia' (where the fishing 
ceremony was performed), at sunrise. The men sang once again one of the songs of the 
incoming me toro by the river. They started leaving the village around 9 a. m., each 
family going individually. Some of the older children, or mebengodjyre, went together 
with their nget and kwatui ('uncle/grandfather'/aunt/grandmother'), who were 
transporting manioc meal, (and also the raw, pressed manioc paste to prepare the tep 
kupu, or fish `wrap', made in the same way as with game), potatoes, pans, electric 
torches and batteries, plastic covers for provisional tents at the camp (provided by the 
leaders, who brought huge rolls of thick, black plastic to cut to the size of reasonable 
individual tent covers to distribute among the men), all taken through the clear, large 
track opened by the unmarried men (menoronvre ) to the spot close by the river. Before 
long, many shelters had been carved out of the forest. The track was well-made and the 
village was close, easily reached by a two to three hour walk at a steady pace. This 
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made it easy for many men to go on a second trip to the village to fetch more of such 
things as coffee, sugar, rice, manioc, potatoes, packs of crackers ... An amazing amount 
of food was brought to the `dry river' camp, mainly in the expectation of a large yield of 
fish. Much of it was to be consumed on the spot, cooked in pans on the fire, or hot- 
smoked over the bonfires made in every shelter especially for this purpose. 
At the spot along the curved bank of the river, several shelters of thin, soft 
wood had been erected by the men of each family individually, while the women 
prepared fires to make coffee and earth ovens to cook potatoes. Most people had left the 
village between 9 and 10 in the morning, and they kept arriving at Kamkukei throughout 
the whole afternoon. Most people were decorated with body paintings, beautifying 
themselves for the me toro. It was a high time, as some friends told me, to eat as many 
fish as one could, and to bring back loads of them to the village as kupu 'pies'. The 
adornments that the young, unmarried men (menoronyre) would wear later during the 
dance could be seen hanging in the branches of trees by the shelters or on the stakes of 
the houses themselves. This sight was meant to make people joyful in the expectation of 
the dance, and of the fishing itself. 
That afternoon, the young menoronyre and the newly-married men 
(mekranyre) danced and sang in the morning as they had been doing during the Me toro 
at the village, but now at the plaza that had begun to be cleared the day before by the 
unmarried men and the younger married men, a job to be finished by several 
women204. The plaza was made close to the banks of the river, which at that point turns 
sharply to the left, while shelters were scattered along the banks of the river and 
204 I was told that they were the mothers of those celebrated at the bep-hiv me toro, the ceremony whose 
culminating point would be performed back in the village. I have not been able to check such a 
statement myself. 
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between the plaza and the forest. The place itself, Kamkukei, was chosen because there 
the river runs slower, a necessary condition for this type of fishing. In timbo fishing, 
huge amounts of the vine have to be beaten in the water, so that the quantity of poison 
released is enough to affect the fish's respiratory system. Fish then come to the surface, 
where they can be speared or caught by hand or by net. 
I stated above that the men danced and sang. But it was not song and dance in 
the way they had been performing in the village. Indeed, it could scarcely be called 
more than the creation of a rhythm by means of sound and movement, and the creation 
of harmony, by synchronisation between them. Men shouted rhythmically, producing a 
series of three short cries, followed by a long one, in the `descending' tune that is 
common to the finale of their songs. The sequence was followed by another, similar but 
produced in a higher pitch, then followed by a third series, in the same pitch as the first. 
The dance, different from the usual dance in the village, displayed a different series of 
`steps' 205, while the men did not actually move from their places. After the dance, Beb- 
djare, one of the leaders of the village and the one who is knowledgeable in this me 
toro, talked for a long time to the audience of men gathered at the centre of the plaza. 
He spoke about what would follow once the fishing started. The men listened to him in 
a cheerful mood, the excitement of the me toro visible on their faces while they chatted 
to each other. 
205 One of the `steps' had the right leg stomping on the ground, to the front and slightly to the side (as 
men were not to move from their positions), followed by a short step with the left foot and by the right 
one stomping strongly on the ground again. This latter is followed by a large step with the left foot, to 
the front and back again to the same place. Another `step' was composed by a series of very short 
'-jumps' to the side (3-4 jumps), and back in the same way to the original place. Both `steps' are used 
in the ceremony prior to their going to the river (the ngo-vr-\ nie toro), as I was explained. The 
directional particle -N'r v indicates an action performed with an specific intention. To dance and get 
something from the water, that's an adequate description of the dance. 
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Around a quarter to seven, the menoronyre covered the ground of the centre of 
the plaza, or ngobe, with rik inaja palm leaves, as they had done the day before, and sat. 
They all had short (60-100 cms) sticks that were going to be used the next day to beat 
the akro vine. One elder, Kenpoti, who is a ngrenhondjwynh, a ceremonial specialist, 
addressed the men for some time. After his harangue, the men prepared to dance. They 
moved in a compact group to the left and to the right, four steps each side, turning to the 
opposite side after the third step and stomping the right foot on the ground on the fourth 
step. An old woman accompanied them, her privilege (kukradja). The `dance' lasted for 
a few minutes, after which the men performed the ben diri, which is not sung, but 
spoken. The men made a circle, the circumference of which was divided in sections 
according to their age. These groups of younger and of older men remained opposite to 
each other in the centre of the plaza, and a man from the younger group detached 
himself from it and came to the older men, addressing them in a formalised way, the 
words spoken emphatically while the man kept his eyes turned to the ground. The older 
mekratumre men answered his words with a long vocal sign of agreement, while 
another young man went to the middle of the plaza and spoke in the same formalised 
way. The younger men circled him, all turned inwards to him, now in the centre of a 
circle, and `danced', moving circularly around themselves, brushing the ground with 
their feet. They then sat again, and were addressed by Bemoti, the old ngrenhodjwynh, 
who for a while harangued them on the ceremony. 
People slept early that day, scattered through the area occupied by the 
temporary shelters, using their poles and the larger trees between them to tie their 
hammocks. Fires were made under the hammocks, to keep them comfortable in the cold 
of the night. 
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The day after, in the middle of the morning while the younger married men and 
the unmarried ones were enlarging the karer, or clearing that was being used as plaza 
for the me Coro, older men left for the forest to gather akro. Akro is a long, thick vine, 
divided in three tubular sections. It is pulled down in long pieces from trees, it is then 
folded two or three times over itself, until the resulting `pack' is between 1 and 1,5 
metres long. Men usually took the care of folding each piece of the liana down to the 
same approximate size, as they were going to be bound together to form a huge pack of 
roughly the same length. The more homogeneous the packs the easy to carry, and some 
of them were fairly heavy. They were to be transported in the traditional Mebengokre 
way, by means of a strip of tree's bark tied to both ends of the pack and crossed over 
one's forehead. 
After being folded, each bunch of akro was beaten against a fallen tree trunk, 
with the short sticks that the men had fashioned for themselves, until the akro's 
external, green bark was peeled off. The result was a semi-flexible heap of fibrous, red- 
brown vine, bound together with others, forming a pack of some 20 kg. 206 These were 
left in some chosen spots, while men moved elsewhere to gather more akro. The 
gathering was done mostly individually, the men scattering themselves over a wide tract 
of forest up to one hour's walk from the camp. While men were gathering akro, women 
were preparing food, which they brought to the men by mid-day. 
The packs of akro were brought back to the atyk, a small clearing some fifty 
metres away from the sheds and the plaza. The men sang while they walked back. As I 
was told, every one (or most people, by any account) has their own song, to be sung 
206 Older men take pride in making larger `packs', which are more beautiful, as they say, and they can 
easily be recognised from those made by younger men. 
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while carrying the akro back to the camp. In the old times, the use of another person's 
song is reputed to have usually ended up in fights. These are the akro djakjer, a term 
used also to refer to the food that is brought back to the village in order for a me toro. s 
culminating point to be performed. 
The akro was left in different spots near the plaza (atyk), covered by rik inaja 
palm leaves. It was still before mid-afternoon, and many men went back to their 
shelters, some of them to prepare adornments for their `nephews'/`grandsons' 
(tabdjwy), or their children. Several were making bows out of red, semi-soft wood. 
These djudje kamrek are quite fragile, as my `father' Roma, who was making one for 
his son-in-law, explained to me. Feathers of macaw (myt) and kaingoroti bird were 
used to fashion the arrows, which would be used for the fishing. Nowadays, the 
Mebengokre rarely use bow and arrow, but a me toro is always pedagogic, and so 
several men were preparing bows and arrows to be used by young lads during the actual 
fishing. 
By the end of the afternoon, the menoronyre had cleared a place in the plaza 
(atyk), close to where the akro had been deposited. Men painted their faces red with 
anatto around their mouths, and gathered at the atyk, where Bemoti started singing. He 
was soon to be abruptly interrupted by Beb-djare, who addressed him in the same 
formalised way that was used in the ceremonial speech ben diri. All men stood up, 
picking up as they did so a piece of rik-o, or inaja palm leaf, that was covering the floor 
and using it as if it were a `tail', circling Bemoti - who remained seated - and making 
`monkey-like' sounds, leaving then for the centre of the plaza. There they repeated the 
same performance as previously, dancing around the small plaza, using the three 
different `steps' as before. This is called me ungror oba (me ungronr monhr, when 
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people are already dancing). Ungror means 'cry', 'shout'. The staging is a part of the 
ceremonial speech (ben diri). 
After the dance, people divided again in two groups of men in the clearing 
outside the main part of the camp (which they call ngobe) . There really was an 
audience: the eyes of all the village were focused upon the dancers, from the edge of the 
clearing to the hammocks in the shelters nearby, all seemed to be watching them. 
Again, one of the younger men's group came in front of the line of older men and 
repeated the same kind of formalised discourse, followed by a collective sign of 
approval from the latter: 
baikranh tum ge arinhk ngore ne ja be 
grandfather (baikratum), he does not want to leave the water 
n Aa. Na ga ngore amanh uja be no kati 
Yes, The water is doing him no harm. 
nonhr kam ga gubaje ngore kam ba ngryk ga ngore kam angryk onhynh kam aben diri 
We are by the water, and you said [ben diri] that you are seated, serious, by the water. 
onh wa nenh 
That's it. 
n Aa. To na ba ngore kam ngryk onhynh ba iben diri 
Yes. I said that I am here, seated by the water, serious 
onh wa nenh 
that's it 
This was the ceremonial speech ngo anh ben diri, or ben diri of the water. But 
it did not finish then, as the young man went on repeating the same discourse, changing 
the relationship term used, from `uncle/grandfather' (baikratum) to `father' (djunu), 
`father-in-law' (idumrenget), `formal friend' (kra), `brother-in-law' (both idumre and 
idjudjutit'y), brother (kamv), `nephew/grandson' (tabdjwy). It is a formalised 
`consulting' : men are asking each other whether they should go fishing or wait. Each 
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speaker addressed the opposite line several times, using different relationship terms. 
Several speakers did the same, contributing to and creating an atmosphere of 
overarching and encompassing relatedness, as the same `question' met always with the 
same collective assent of the men of the opposite line. The different groups of men 
stood as individuals to each other, stressing the manifold relations between them. It is 
relatedness itself that seems to be stressed by the ben diri ceremonial speech. These 
statements are made so that people will go fishing. The next two ceremonial statements, 
kube ne otenh and kutanh no jaret., are said so that, after fishing, they will return to the 
village. The last ceremonial expression, as I was told, can be understood as `looking 
deeply into each others' eyes207. Both speeches, the kube ne otenh and the kutanh no 
jaret, are said at the same time, by four men in the middle of the plaza, their backs 
turned to each other. The kutanh no jaret goes as follows: 
baikranh tum ge arinhk ngore nonhrja be 
Grandfather, he does not want to leave the water 
tam na ja. Ngore kam ngryk onhynh ba kutanh inojaret 
so it is, we are seated by the water, serious, staring at each other's eyes [kutanh nojaret] 
O wa nenh 
That's it 
To stare into each others' eyes is an image used to describe a group of people 
that do not know what to do next, and who are in a state of expectation about what to 
do208. The structure of the two ceremonial speeches is similar, a comparison that holds 
equally well for other ben, such as the ceremonial speech, amiy anh 
ben diri, spoken 
when the young menoronyre (unmarried men) go to chop 
down a wasp's nest. The ben 
diri speech announces to an audience what the men are going to do next. It is a marker 
207 Jaret means to bury in a hole on the ground, while 
kutanh is a term implying movement coming to a 
point from opposite directions. 
208 For this same reason, it is also translated as to invite', as 
in the end of the kore kani me kw'e 
ceremony transcribed above. 
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of action, and precisely because of that, it also beautifies action, making it an aesthetic 
act. 
Another me toro followed the ceremonial speech. The panh me toro is a 
confirmation ceremony for female names that have the prefix panh-, and people in 
Catete and Djudjeko have not made it for many years. This was a short ceremony. 
where panh- women (that is, women, one of whose personal names has a panlr- 
ceremonial prefix) fully adorned (but not wearing the huge krokroktire head 
adornments, nor the atoroti eggs' shell's facial make up) congregated in a double line 
(with the older women at the back), squatting within the plaza by the river, facing the 
spectators - that is, away from the river - and sang a short song, which lasted no more 
than ten minutes. This ceremony is always performed during the ngore kam me toro 
ceremony, being yet one more in the string of me toro that forms what I am calling here 
the Mebengokre ceremonial season. As I was told, it is but a part of a longer female 
panh- ceremonial cycle, which has not been performed for many years in these villages. 
This (short) ceremony was conducted by Nhak-py, the the old ceremonial specialist's 
wife, who also bears a panh- name. 
Upon finishing, the men brought the akro vine packs to the plaza, placing them 
in a huge pile by the river. Each man would carry a pack - any pack, not necessarily the 
one he himself beat in the forest. Men stood awake the whole night at the plaza, talking 
and sometimes singing. Two men, wearing kruwapu head adornments, and standing at 
the borders of the plaza, facing the akro pile, sang for some time as an introduction to 
the bep-vry nie torn ceremony, which was to be celebrated when the men got back to the 
village. Then the men gathered at the plaza and listened to one of the ceremonial 
specialists, who addressed the men several times during the night. Once again the men 
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were supposed to stay awake all night, and most of them did, talking excitedly to each 
other about the events of fishing the next day. 
Before sunrise, at around 5 a. m., the men closed the section of the river 
immediately in front of the plaza. They did this using palm leaves loosely tied together 
in a structure of light palm branches. The men sang again and got into the water, each 
one embracing an akro pack, and started to bash it. In order to do so, one stays at the 
bank of the river, with the water reaching a little above the waistline, and bends one's 
knee, placing the foot over the opposite leg, holding the akro pack over the bent one, 
while simultaneously holding it against one's body with one arm around it. The pack is 
then beaten with the stick in the other hand. The beating is done rhythmically, to 
correspond to the song they sing while beating. After it is beaten some time, the akro 
pack - held more or less on the water line - is washed, as they say, being immersed into 
the water four times. The last time the pack is immersed, it is pushed gently towards the 
middle of the river, to make the foam that exudes from it gather there. It is the 
concentration of poison in the middle of the river, achieved through the coordination of 
people's movements by means of singing, which makes the whole scheme operational. 
Rhythm acts here as a powerful coordinator of collective effort. 
The men divided in three groups, one in front of the plaza, more or less 
midways between both barriers in the river, and another close to the barrier upriver. A 
third group, smaller, stood in the opposite margin to the camp. They bashed steadily 
from 5: 50 until around 7: 20, observed by the women and the children, who did not go 
into the water. The three groups of men were quite far away from each other, but the 
song could be heard even from people further up the river. At specific parts of the song, 
men washed their akro packs in the water, and the dark, reddish foam coming from 
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them could be seen gathering slowly in the middle of the river. After some forty 
minutes, fish started to come to the surface. The women, who stood on the river banks, 
bringing coffee, milk, and some food to the men, were given the fish the men could lay 
their hands on while at the same time beating. The older men, who were out of the 
water, sang to teach those in the water, while warning them, all the time, that they 
should synchronise their beating. Fifteen minutes later, fish started to come up to the 
surface in larger amounts, and many men stopped beating and began fishing, or 
gathering fish, as they put it. For nearly one and a half hours, fish came to the surface in 
large amounts, and many men gathered substantial amounts of them, which they handed 
over to their wives, sisters and mothers. Many a young woman, and also children, came 
into the water, taking fish out of the nets that had been placed in the river, and with their 
own hands from the river, as the concentration of the poison in the water made the fish 
easier to gather. 
Fish do not die with the akro: they stay half-paralysed, floating on the surface, 
belly up, but as soon as they are touched, they can submerge again, eventually floating 
in order to gulp some air. Men fished them with nets, arrows, the sticks themselves, or 
simply caught them with their bare hands. Outside the water, women collected the fish 
and prepared the `fish pies' that were to be consumed back in the village. Much of the 
fish was cooked, dried or smoked over the fire, and consumed on the spot. 
The ceremony is thus a very effective tool for fishing, but that is not all. 
Fishing with poison (akro ka'oinh) means, above all, a great time for all those 
participating. The joyous mood created by the activity is an integral ASPECT of its 
meaning, as the men stress themselves. Fishing with poison is inex, beautiful/good, 
because it generates joy, as well as fish. As proper moral action, it is inex both because 
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it creates joy among people, and because it has the efficacy satisfying one's appetites in 
the most literal sense. 
As the day went on, some people, mainly the younger ones, continued to bash 
the vine packs, while others left their akro packs to gather fish. Some people would 
came back to the fish poisoning activity for a while, which diminished steadily. By 
11: 30 a. m., the remaining ones beating the akro gave up. Fish-gathering went on until 1 
pm, by which time most men had stopped. Men, and in fact all the people, then 
dedicated themselves to eating, something that was leisurely done until night time. But 
they did not only eat. Women would send chosen bits of fish to other, bikwa (that is, 
relative, friend) women ; men would go from house to house, eating at all of them. The 
cheerful atmosphere of eating rivalled that of the akro bashing itself. Again, this was 
mex action, as many spontaneously expressed to me that evening. `One eats here, and 
there, and over there as well', a friend explained me, `everybody has fish'. This 
statement probably sounds strange to the reader - after all, if everybody has plenty of 
the same thing, what meaning would there be in going about eating each others' food? 
Such on-going commensality is, however quite paradigmatic of Mebengokre morality. 
Because one has a lot, one is able to give, and if everybody has plenty, then one is also 
able to get from others. This `generalised giving and getting' is sharing in its purest 
form, where everybody has plenty of the same thing, and this thing is highly desirable 
to everybody. 
Within the agency of akro ka'oinh the ethic, the aesthetic, and the technical are 
indistinguishable. In this way, this agency may be identified with the arts of conviviality 
itself, of how to live together with others in a moral way. It is a moral endeavour for 
individuals who pursue their own ends, and it does not restrain these ends, but, on the 
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contrary, it has their realisation as a basis for itself. It is because it creates sociality. not 
by imposing any sort of external limit, but by harmonising individual ends in a complex 
whole, through rhythm, through song and spoken word. There is no contradiction 
between individual liberty and social life, this old philosophical problem of Western 
society, as Mebengokre philosophy connects these as essential conditions to each 
other's realisation, through the joy of being together. There is no place in Mebengokre 
philosophy for such notions as manipulation of manpower, and the ceremony of ngore 
kam me toro definitely does not fit into the picture of a ritual expert utilising rites as 
`triggering mechanisms for the sustained conduct of practical operations' 209. 
These seemingly innocent, leisurely moral activities of the Mebengokre 
actually pose a serious problem for those anthropological approaches based on a radical 
distinction between action and reflection, reason and emotion, between the moral and 
the utilitarian, the technical and the aesthetic. One such approach is that of Tambiah 
(1990), and as he discusses issues that are closely connected to those I describe here, I 
will try to speak to his interpretation of human agency and show the problem of 
applying it to Mebengokre moral agency. 
In one of his Morgan lectures, Tambiah (1990: 111-139) poses himself the 
traditional questions of rationality and relativism, and commensurability and translation 
between cultures (Tambiah 1990: 111-139). Discussing the possibility of comparison 
between cultures, Tambiah comes to `... the vexed question of how to achieve a 
satisfactory translation between cultures in order to make a meaningful comparison' 
(Ibid: 132). At this point, he finds a problem in relation to what he calls `matters moral 
and social'. Systems of morality yield more commensurability problems in 
comparisons, because they do not deal with the relation between man and nature, but 
209 I take the sentence from Tambiah's (1990: 73) comment on Nlalinowski's interpretation of kula 
canoe-building as related to magic. 
256 
with the relations between people. Technique relates men to nature, whereas ritual 
relates man to man. Different sets of opposed terms are derived from this distinction: 
the instrumental versus the performative, in relation to finality of social action: the 
causal versus the communicative, in relation to the logic behind the action: the 
technical-causal versus the expressive-performative features of action: and causality and 
participation, in relation to modality of action. 
The world of agency thus becomes split between two poles, one related to 
man's action upon nature, and the other related to man's action upon man. These 
spheres of agency seem to hold in common only the bodily movement which constitutes 
the physical basis for all human agency. What becomes then of such activities as the tile 
toro described above, which are both efficient and expressive, actions that involve both 
causality and participation? Tambiah's response is to state that, although moralities, as 
dealing with man-to-man relations, are more incommensurable, the `technical' side of 
ritual (when it is there) is more easily commensurable, because it involves relations 
whose efficacy, or truth, can be measured in a form that makes it comparable to other 
techniques. 
Tambiah is speaking here of transcultural judgements, but the same issue 
applies to transcultural understanding in general. As I have said before, in the 
introduction to my thesis, my aim is to produce an interpretation of `the social' that is 
conversant with the Mebengokre view on the subject. To do so is to promote a dialogue 
between anthropological conceptions and what I could learn with the Mebengokre about 
their own conceptions. What would a Mebengokre philosopher, if one could be bothered 
to deal with such foreign intricacies, say about Tambiah's conception of social action? I 
believe that the first remark of such a hypothetical philosopher would be that Tambiah's 
notion of two distinct analytical types of action an empty, kaigo one, that is, it is a 
simulacrum. They are clearly meant to be comparable but they lack similar qualities to 
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be compared with each other. Moreover, both types of action are punure. bad/ugly. as 
one lacks goodness, in the sense of the possibility of satisfying one's desires, and the 
other lacks beauty, in the sense of conducting to joy. 
In fact, Tambiah's ritual theory implies assumptions regarding human action 
that are based in Western metaphysical notions of morality. If we now return to his 
definition of ritual, as implying "... formality (conventionality), stereotype (rigidity), 
condensation (fusion), and redundancy (repetition)", we are left with the strong 
impression that its form is that of a deontology, a doctrine of duties and obligations as 
the base of moral action, regardless of its consequences. But it is a form devoid of its 
content, an empty shell that disguises itself in the form of a set of analytical concepts. 
As such, it is not conversant with Mebengokre moral philosophy, which is based not on 
duty and obligation, but on the creation of joy. Mebengokre philosophy is one about 
how to have fun together, that is, about how one can be happy (kinh) through the 
acquisition of the objects of one's desires (kinh). This is accomplished through me toro, 
that is, through the collective production of rhythm and harmony. Herodotos, in a 
passage of his work, describes the island of Naxos as kalos kagathos, meaning both that 
it is good to look at and productive. The same reasoning applies to Me toro. It is both 
beautiful, involving dance, song, body adornments and painting, etc, and productive. 
And here lies another difference between Tambiah's and Mebengokre's conceptions of 
morality. For the latter, the stuff itself of what we would call `technical activity' is 
moral, to the extent that it yields material goods and as such is capable of satisfying 
people's desires, of achieving their individual ends. 
In fact, Tambiah is prey to the peculiar configuration of Western (modern) 
moral philosophy, according to which the world of instrumental agency, as concerned 
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with the acquisition of practical ends, remains outside the realm of moral agency. Moral 
judgements can be issued on matters involving technical action, but the stuff of which 
such agency ias made is itself strange to the moral world. Such a conception would not 
be capable of capturing the meaning that me toro has for those who live it, as to 
understand me toro in this way implies understanding it against the background of the 
morality that it expresses, teaches and realises. Ingold (2001: 416) seems to be trying to 
overcome similar problems when he writes, about the relation between tool-use and 
speech, that 
By and large, discussions of the relationship between tool-using and speech 
have adopted the unequivocally `logocentric' perspective of cognitive 
science and structural linguistics, whose ontological baseline postulates a 
rational subject positioned vis-a-vis an objective world. The aim has been to 
demonstrate a parallel, overlapping or even identity between cognitive 
structures involved in generating representations, on the one hand, of object 
assemblies (for execution as tool-using behaviour), and on the other, of 
word assemblies (for execution as speech). The former are glossed as 
`technology', the later as `language'. The argument sketched above, 
however, suggests the possibility of a diametrically opposed approach, 
which takes as its ontological starting point the inescapable condition of 
human beings' engagement in the world, and that foregrounds the 
performative and poetic aspects of speech and tool-use that have been 
marginalised by rationalism. From the vantage point of this approach, the 
relationship between tool-using and speech, far from being the surface 
manifestation of a more fundamental deep-structural connection between 
technology and language, is really one between the vocal artistry of speech 
and song, and the technical artistry of craftsmanship. (... ) One thinks, for 
example, of the harvester at work (... ), swinging his scythe in a constant, 
rhythmic, dance like movement and singing as he does so: that, to my mind, 
is the archetypal situation of human tool-use, not the puzzle-solving 
scenarios beloved of cognitive psychologists. 
The pleasure and leisure to be had from what we would call an `economic 
activity' has already been noted elsewhere in Amazonia (Goldman 1966; Overing 1989; 
Passes 1998). But, in the same way as Passes (2000: 98) has stated for the Pai'ktivene of 
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French Guiana, for the Mebengokre `leisure' is not only leisure: it also performatively 
creates and re-creates the social state itself, as it is conceived of by the Mebengokre, that 
is, as the possibility - and the effectiveness - of being together in a mex way, one that 
involves the production of collective joy as well as the production of material goods. 
That is, one that is kinh, in both senses of the term. As I expect to have shown in this 
chapter, me toro is explicitly concerned with the creation of such a state, and as such it 
can be said to be both vocal and performative tekne or artistry, very much in the sense 
used by Ingold. 
Ingold's conception of the relation between speech and tool-using - between 
communicative and technical action, as Tambiah would put it - is one that makes it 
possible to feel the flavour of Mebengokre social agency. Artistry is at the base of the 
relation between ngrer and akro ka'oinh, between singing and fishing. And this artistry 
is an essentially moral endeavour: it is the art of conviviality, of creating enjoyable 
states of mind as conducive to enjoyable living, whose distinctiveness can only be 
captured through what Overing (1996) has called the everyday, and Ingold (2001: 416), 
the dwelling perspective. That is, in the context of actual, practical engagement in the 
world. 
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Chapter Five 
Word, Agency, and Togetherness: On Speech 
as a Sociability Skill or, a Mebengokre `Theory of Language' 
Every sign (... ) is a construct between socially organised persons 
in the process of their interaction. Therefore, the form of signs 
is conditioned above all by the social organisation of the participants 
involved and also by the immediate conditions of their interaction. 
V. N. Volosinov, Marxism and the Philosophy of Language 
In the conclusion of his essay "Beyond Anthropology", Bernard McGrane 
(1989) puts forward a powerful critique of anthropological description. In assuming the 
relativistic stance, he proclaims, anthropological description fundamentally mis- 
represents what it purports to bring to light, precisely because it takes it as being not a 
discourse on the world as it is but a representation of the world. This discursive 
strategy is one fundamental characteristic of modernity, and amounts to silencing those 
people the anthropologist seeks to understand in order to produce an understanding that 
is, first and foremost, a modern (that is, Western) understanding of "the other": 
Anthropology never listened to the voices of `alien cultures', it 
never learned from them, rather it studied them; in fact, studying them, 
making sense out of them, making a `science' about them, has been the 
modern method of not listening, of avoiding listening, to them. The Other's 
empirical presence as the field and subject matter of anthropological 
discourse is grounded upon his theoretical absence as interlocutor, as 
dialogic colleague, as audience (... ). In order for modern anthropology to 
sustain itself, its monologue about alien cultures, those cultures must be 
kept in analytic silence. The moment %t'hen an alien culture is allowed to 
speak its language, the moment the anthropologist seriously plays with the 
possibility of the truth and authority of that alien culture, the monologue- 
based language of anthropology bursts. (1989: 127-28) 
McGrane's critique addresses the core of anthropological description as 
fundamentally a discourse on the `other', rather than a dialogue with others. And, as 
such, a fundamentally Western representational strategy. It seems to condemn the whole 
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of the anthropological enterprise to be compulsively closed in upon itself, as a specific 
`language-game' that is not, and cannot be, shared by others, in the same way that, if 
one actually `goes native', one ceases to be an anthropologist, as anthropology '... is 
not within the parameters of membership, not within the form of life (... ) of that alien 
`culture"' (1989: 126). 
McGrane's argument seems here to oscillate between two distinct lines. 
Anthropology is ab definitio unable to realise its purported (epistemological) task of 
understanding others because it is a Western language-game which is not shared by 
those which are its `subjects', that is, is not part of others' forms of life. But he seems to 
equate `understanding others' with `becoming other', as his quotation from Riesman 
(1972) on that most famous literary example of an anthropologist `going native', Carlos 
Castaneda, implies: 
Our social sciences generally treat the culture and knowledge of 
other peoples as forms and structures necessary for human life that those 
people have developed and imposed upon a reality which we know - or at 
least our scientists know - better than they do. We can therefore study those 
forms in relation to `reality' and measure how well or ill they are adapted 
to it. In their studies of the cultures of other people, even those 
anthropologists who sincerely love the people they study almost never think 
that they are learning something about the way the world really is. Rather, 
they conceive of themselves as finding out what other people's conceptions 
of the world are. (Mcgrane 1989: 128, quoting Riesman 1972: 14) 
Although I entirely agree with McGrane's critique from the epistemological 
point of view, it seems to me that his setting of anthropology's dilemma in grounds that 
constitute the very core of one's form of life is not helpful. By this I mean that even 
though I find his critique of the lack of dialogy in the anthropological approach quite 
refreshing - and also acknowledge 
it as a central problem of the discipline, due to its 
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project of understanding other peoples' worlds -I do not agree with what he seems to be 
proposing, that the only way out of this epistemological cul-de-sac, the only way to 
actually understand other peoples' worlds would be to become an `other' oneself - an 
ontological `solution' for an epistemological 'problem'. 
McGrane's turn of the screw of the hermeneutic circle in relation to `relativity' 
is hardly new. Karl-Otto Apel has expressed it in almost the same terms: 
One frequently hears that they have reached the objectively valid 
factual judgement that the norms which human beings either recognise or 
follow in practice are, to a large degree, relative to the particular culture of 
the time, LE., they are subjective. " (Apel 1980: 229) 
McGrane's reading of the paradox of relativism - as Apel puts it, of the 
paradox of the universality of the relativistic outlook - could actually be turned against 
himself: if McGrane's view of the inherent `modernity' (again, in the sense of 
`Westernity') of the relativistic point of view can only be understood as an inherent part 
of modernity (or post-modernity, for that matter), how closer is it to other peoples' 
worlds? Granted, McGrane himself is the first to stand against relativism, which he sees 
as a trivialisation of other peoples' worlds. But if there are such thing as other peoples' 
worlds, then forcibly there are such things as our (anthropologists') worlds, and if these 
constitute forms of life closed in on themselves, then McGrane's view of the dilemma is 
also closed in on his (our, anthropologists') own (disciplinary) world, and the 
hermeneutic wheel is given another turn... and so on and so forth, ad infinitum. 
It seems clear to me that McGrane's critique is hampered here by his view of 
cultural worlds as closed in upon themselves, as monads that do not touch each other, 
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permanently shut and set apart from each other. McGrane's great merit is to provide a 
refreshing critique of the simplistic notion that `our' (anthropologists', or Westerners'. 
or liberal society's) worldview, being capable of seeing worldviews as relative, is thus 
superior to others, being able to encapsulate them within our own more or less in the 
same way that Western societies are seen as expanding and encapsulating others within 
its (conceptual, if not geographical) boundaries. As he has amply demonstrated, this 
view is in itself a characteristic of modernity, and as such is inherently Western. But 
what he seems to fail to realise is that the very notion of the `closed in-ness' of 
worldviews - `forms of life', if you will - is itself part of the modernistic scene. 
Apel (1980), dealing with similar difficulties in relation to Wittgenstein's 
thought, has used the notion of language-game communication as a way out of this 
dilemma. According to him, `dialogy' - the very aim of McGrane's effort - is an 
entering into a language-game communication with the `object' of understanding, even 
if this may be a reflectively detached one (1980: 185). He deals with a matter quite akin 
to that dealt with by McGrane, namely, the question of whether the rules used by the 
social scientist to describe behaviour are really followed by those whose behaviour is 
being described? 
Apel is commenting here on the possibility of a social science, but one could 
read `anthropologist' here, as this concern with `the other' is the hallmark of the 
anthropological discipline more than of any other. Apel goes on: "The answer to such 
questions can only be derived from a language-game communication with the object, no 
matter how reflectively detached and indirect this might be. "210 (1980: 185). For Apel, 
210 (1980: 185). Apel follows here Wittgenstein's notion: "[T]hese language-games can be characterised 
in their heuristic conception as units of linguistic usage, life-form and world (situational) interpretation 
that are constituted by a behavioural rule. [... ] It is not only so-called "linguistic usage" in the 
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it is a fundamental characteristic of the ability to play/perform a language-game, the 
capacity of critical distancing and sovereign creativity in relation to one's own 
language-game (1980: 208), that is, the very capacity to engage in dialogue from within 
one's language-game. 
How could these remarks be brought into the discussion of the issue of 
anthropological description? McGrane's point is that anthropological descriptions of 
`others' are prey to an inescapable modernistic bias, synthetised in the relativistic 
stance. I agree with his critique of the modernist bias expressed in relativism, but I 
suggest that its supposedly `inescapable' character is part and parcel of the same bias. 
One needs here to radicalise McGrane's stance, and assume the possibility of dialogy, 
of critical distancing from the language-game of anthropological description, as part of 
the anthropological task - something that he actually does himself, albeit not 
acknowledging it, in his critique. 
Describing the Description 
This chapter is intended as an experiment in such critical distancing, and I expect to 
produce it by means of a relatively unusual (for anthropological descriptions) device. I 
will present a description of a ceremony, made by a Mebengokre ceremonial specialist 
to young men about to perform it, and use it as a counterpoint to discuss by contrast the 
character of anthropological descriptions. I will thus not produce a description of the 
ceremony being described, but a description of a description of a ceremony: a 
metadescription. My intention is to access some of the characteristics of ceremonies (or 
traditional sense that belongs to the "language-game" but also all thought and action which is 
"interlaced" in some way with linguistic usage. The context of the Philosophical Investigations makes 
it clear that this includes all human behaviour that involves an "understanding" of "meaning" and is 
(therefore) itself intelligible. [... ] the model of the language game implies both the immediate world 
(situational) understanding which is an aspect of "meaning something" and, in the narrower sense, the 
"hermeneutic" understanding of the intentions that reside in the immediate understanding of the world 
and are expressed in the actions and deeds of human beings. " (Apel 1980: 22-4). 
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the ceremony being performed, at any rate) by means of its description by the 
ceremonial specialist, through the medium of song. What is the specific relation 
between song and ceremony, vocal forms and bodily performance for Mebengokre? As 
will be seen, songs do more than describe ceremonies in a purely representational sense. 
Ceremonial vocal forms, the very epitome of language for Mebengokre, are actually 
sophisticated technologies (in the sense of the Aristotelian tekne') of agency inducement, 
and their moral and aesthetic value comes from this capacity. It moves people in an 
harmonic way - `harmonic' in many senses, from the coordination of bodily movement 
in dance to the performance of `technical' tasks in a collective way. What 
anthropologists would call its ceremonial character is essentially a beautification and 
`moralisation' of agency, and songs are sung (and stories told) primarily about this 
fundamental fact. Now, this act of beautification/'moralisation', exerted over 
autonomous agents, is the supreme achievement of Mebengokre language: the 
ceremonial vocal forms - essentially, the songs (ngrer) and ceremonial discourses (ben) 
- are considered as the highest form of speech. Mebengokre `theory of language' is a 
theory of agency. 
It is something of this specific quality of Mebengokre `theory of language' (or, 
more specifically, `theory' of vocal forms) that I want to unveil in this discussion. It 
could be said that such 'theory' is a theory of language as serving the foundation of 
Mebengokre `social state', but for the fact that this `state' is in fact a process, part of a 
continuous effort put forward by Mebengokre to remain social, a continuous struggle to 
keep oneself as a human being. Language skills are technologies to produce acceptable 
forms of living together with others - others who are, in some measure different from 
oneself and who become not similar, but acceptably different, and who have, in a sense, 
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their difference domesticated by those skills that embody the individual experience of 
several people in their dealings with the non-Mebengokre world. Songs (or some of 
them, at any rate) tell about the experience of those who created them, and this 
experiential character makes them a repository of knowledge that is also a technique to 
make such knowledge effective. This is in fact a single character, as Mebengokre 
(specialised) knowledge is not only highly individual but also determined by the 
experiential character of its `come into knowing'. Ceremonial songs and discourses (the 
highest form of speech), like any sort of specialised knowledge, are `right' when they 
create what they describe. Performances of songs are `right' also when they (among 
other things) are performed by people who have some sort of experiential connection 
with those who had created/sung the song. A song will be kaigö, a counterfactual, when 
its performance does not make it happen. The performance will also be kaigö if (among 
other things) it is performed by someone who, besides knowing the words, has not 
achieved such knowledge by means of a special relationship with someone who sang it 
before (and, by extension, the one who originated it). To describe, here, is not only to 
represent the world in words, but to strive to create what is described. Description is 
project, as well as the tool for its own realisation. It is this quality of the ceremonial 
specialist's description that I want to convey in my own description below, which will 
be a description of how language creates agency and how Mebengokre's conceptions of 
language (of Mebengokre kaben, the speech/language/discourse of the Mebengokre) as 
aesthetic technology entails an ethics of living together. 
As mentioned before, a ceremonial discourse (and, in some cases, a song as 
well) is inex, goodibeautiful both by its form and its content, as well as its efficacy. The 
Homeric undifferentiation of this triad - the good, the beautiful, and the efficacious - 
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can be understood from the viewpoint of the fundamentally agential character of these 
vocal performances. It is not the description/statement of the song/speech that is 
morally good, or the performative aspect that is aesthetically appealing. It is the act 
itself of singing/speaking. The act is a project whose performance means the actual 
striving for the realisation of itself as morally good and aesthetically beautiful. This is 
why, I think, efficacy is the just measure of the songs/speeches' goodness/beauty. It is 
the agency of those performing that is the object of aesthetic and moral appreciation, 
their capacity to actually realise the project present in the songs/speeches. In the songs 
and speeches analysed in this chapter I show how this agential character is evidenced in 
the appreciation of ben ceremonial speeches as the highest form of Mebengokre 
language, both morally and aesthetically. This is despite the speeches having neither 
harmony nor rhythm, elements that beautify language in Mebengokre `theory of 
language'. 
A Tale of Agency, Beauty and Joy 
The description below was recorded during a ceremonial hunting party, when all (or 
almost all) men in the village went into the forest in order to hunt game (specially land 
turtles, the staple food of ceremonies) to be eaten during the ami aprä, the culminating 
point of the ceremony, which would take place as soon as they returned. These 
expeditions are, however, more than hunting trips. It is during them (although not only 
then) that men are instructed in the ceremony in which they would take part as dancers 
and singers. It is also an occasion when ceremonial specialists create an interest in the 
young men for performing the ceremony, as no one is obliged to do so. Young men 
have to be moved into performing it, and this is part of the argument of the ceremonial 
specialist, who sings and tells stories that are both pedagogic - in relation to the 
`technical' (as well as the moral and the aesthetic) side of the ceremony - and amusing 
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(which is part of the persuasiveness of the argument). The description, in this case, is 
actually a song, the Kaprä ka "yr 5 me ngrer or "song of [those] carrying the land 
turtle". This song describes the gathering of land turtles for the ceremony, and it is in 
itself part of the ceremony being performed. It is intermeshed with discourse, the 
content of which is intended to make men interested in performing the ceremony. It is 
an explanation of the ceremony. 
Seen in this context, the first point of divergence between the anthropological 
description of a ritual and the Mebengokre description becomes immediately clear. 
Anthropological descriptions (especially of `ritual') tend to be characterised as purely 
representational devices. There is an ingrained tendency in anthropology to describe 
textually, as if the description were simply the picturing of `something out there', more 
or less in the same way that a text is usually seen as an aggregate of words representing 
`something out there'. This tendency bears a strong link to what McGrane criticises as 
the silencing of the other in anthropological description, because, as Gadamer (1988: 
279) remarks in relation to historical understanding, 
A person trying to understand a text, whether literary critic or 
historian, does not, at any rate, apply what it says to himself. He is simply 
trying to understand what the author is saying, and if he is simply trying to 
understand, he is not interested in the objective truth of what he says as 
such, not even if the text itself claims to teach truth. 
The fundamental character of the description/song being described here - as, 
for that matter, of all other (or most other) Mebengokre ceremonial lore/teaching - is 
one of persuasiveness/pedagogy. Actually, these notions do not seem to be 
distinguished in actual practice. The addressees are not supposed to simply `understand' 
intellectually what the song/description brings to them, but to actually be moved by it. 
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Its force involves a play with emotions and sentiments, rather than with `mere' 
reasonings211. Thus to understand the specificities of the description below one must 
focus upon its content. Mebengokre ceremonies should be seen as evoking depiction, 
suggestion, and seduction intertwined, and these in rather specific ways. To uncover 
these ways is part and parcel of the understanding of its character as description. I will 
delve into the content of the description, and try to bring to light the character of both 
depiction and suggestion as it is involved in the act of singing the `song of [those] 
carrying land turtles' to those listening to it: 
* to rire 5 
This is said to be `another language', that is, not understandable. It is sung 
when hunting is to begin, to tell people at large what sort of game is going to be hunted. 
It is also sung when a land turtle (kapran) is caught in the forest during the hunting 
process, thus showing what has in fact been successfully hunted. 
* Kutu no ngrere mo 
carrying and singing 
kapran ka "yr öm -e ngrere 
the song of the woven kapran 
Kutu means to carry on the head, something that is usually done by means of a 
strip of tree bark crossing the forehead. The speech describes how one brings land 
turtles, in bundles, back to the village for the ceremony, singing all the time when 
carrying them. Ka "yr means `woven thing', referring to artefacts woven. Here the 
ceremonial specialist describes how the collected land turtles (kapran) are `woven' into 
211 As developed in previous chapters. 
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a neat pile tied with tree bark strips that weave together the animals' carapaces, so that 
they can be carried back to the village. 
* Ö:. ö:: ö:: 
These shouts (me ugrör) warn people at the village that men are coming back. 
It also warns women (when sung as the returning hunting party approaches the village) 
that it is time to start preparing the food, to paint themselves with annato, etc. The male 
sponsors of the ceremony (mekrareremetx m'y) go ahead of the other hunters to tell 
women to prepare bananas, and the kupu `packs' of cooked manioc paste, etc, as the 
hunters are coming back with their load of game. The sponsors go regularly back and 
forth between the village and the forest camp, bringing to the camp the women's food 
(fruits, vegetables, manioc meal, kupu, etc, all of which are garden products) to feed the 
hunters212. On the day when the men are to come back to the village with their load of 
land turtles (and other game), they paint themselves after eating in the morning, and 
start to the village so that they can arrive there around noon. This time, noon, was called 
by my translators me kinh djä akamät, or `where the sun of joy/happiness stays' (a 
reference to the time of the day), referring the joy to be achieved from the dance, and 
also from the food brought back to feed the village. When on the edge of the village 
circle, the young me ok're ('the painted ones', children being celebrated in the 
ceremony as well as others of the same age) go ahead of the men carrying the land 
turtles, entering the village before them. 
* Ikökö tinare 
taking the spine off 
2112 They also act as messengers, bringing news from the forest to the village and vice-versa, as well as 
bring small game to their wives (and a land turtle or two, even though they should ideally be given all 
to their 'fac-similar brothers' to be consumed only during the culminating point of the ceremony). 
271 
The translators mentioned about this passage that "it is almost Mebengokre 
kaben", that is, almost intelligible, referring to this form of poetic speech that is not 
easily translatable. The passage describes the heavy load carried by men, the long `pile' 
of land turtles `woven' around two poles that are carried by men on their backs along 
the spine, which is unloaded upon arriving to the village. 
* Wo:: wo:: tinanare 
These were called by the translators `the sounds of joy', describing the reaction 
of people in the village to the arrival of the hunting party. 
Nh ym ate ö ninhari ngrere kaba 
And then people also sing on the other side 
People waiting in the village for the arrival of the hunting party also sing to the 
hunters when they arrive. It is a song that emerges from several points of the village 
circle. The expression ngrere kaba means `to take the song out of [oneself]'. The song 
goes on: 
* Ijö wo riwä jö mö 
* Ijö wo riwä jö mö 
* Ijö wo riwä jö mö 
* Ijö wo riwä jö mö 
This is also unintelligible speech. Kapran ka "yr 5 me ngrer has several parts 
that are not meaningful as words. 
On iii -e nö! On ne rnö! 
272 
They are coming! They are coming! 
ö:. ö:. ö:: 
People at the village warn everybody that the hunting party is coming back. 
This is done usually by children, who stand at the outskirts of the village waiting for the 
men. And then they are the first to hear their song as the hunters approach. The 
ceremonial specialist does both voices here, those of the people at the village and those 
of the men in the hunting party, describing to the men what is going to happen upon 
their return. The song is not only descriptive but also pedagogical, and it aims to teach 
the men the technical and ceremonial skills necessary for hunting and dancing. 
1Vym kubengei! 
... and the old woman! 
tabdjw'y omö... 
she is going with her nephew/grandson... 
ari kum t yr y norokotp-i! 
to get banana leaves or wood! 
P-i kokijer! 
to cut wood! 
Tuiwa! Tuiwa! 
Grandmother! Grandmother! 
U:: ü:: ü:. 
[the grandmother shouts to the child] 
Me o' (y? ] mrajamd! 
listen to peoples' shouts! 
Djam mebokti kam kute kwatui mä okijer pram ngri godga 
When one is a bokti [that is, a child] one likes to warn one's grandparents, by means of shouts, that 
something is happening 
Nh'ym kum arek idje odjä! Aryp ne ba me ä (y? ] mra ma! 
then [the grandmother answers]: `stay where you are! I have already heard the shouts! 
The description here is that of a dialogue between a child and his/her 
'grandmother' (or 'aunt'), who go together to fetch wood and banana leaves to prepare 
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the kupu `packs' (which are cooked, wrapped in banana leaves, over the fire), and to 
prepare the meat brought back to the village by the hunting party. The characters of this 
description play an important part within the ceremony itself (and in most other 
ceremonies as well). 
* Nh ym'yre kon tono tono re 
[no meaning] 
* Ono köno okbnb ... mö 
[no full meaning. Describes people going (ma), presumably to the village] 
* On kukr'y ne ye a 'yr y 
[no clear meaning, probably `this is a tapir (kukr yt) that we fetch (yr y, a particle that indicates 
purposefulness in movement)] 
Am -i ba kinh adbr mö 
I walk joyfully 
The passage above describes people making each other joyful when carrying 
the land turtles back to the village. It is in the reflexive first person (making oneself 
happy), and is sung by the ceremonial specialist in order to make the men happy. The 
song shows itself here to be an interactive tool: the suggestion of making oneself happy 
is taken by those men walking back to the village, and is expected to make them joyful. 
Desire and Difference 
N ym ngi -n -i ari aryp am -i krä kbi om -e am -i ape 'y guba kamama kon y 
then your women are already adorning their foreheads, and painting (around) their lips, to wait for 
you 
Kuben Krdti ö ami kati kbt kum-e ar yp mräi 
Wild cacao leaves have already been thrown in the middle (of the women's group) 
Djam mem'y bä kam meni kute am-i obikijeinh godga 
When men go to the forest (to hunt) women adorn themselves and become really beautiful 
Arä ka, n kadjät dje t yk ne 
(they adorn themselves) with black strings/stripes (crossing) their elbows 
Djam meni metx kam ap nü 
When women (adorn themselves, they become) beautiful 
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The mention of wild cacao leaves refers to the leaves worn in the middle of the 
forehead by those women who are not sponsors of the ceremony being performed. The 
two sentences beginning with djam are rhetorical questions, a frequent discursive device 
in ceremonial speech. 
Ar'yp na me kuben kä ä na me ba gu me abdjw 
Now we all have clothes, and hide ourselves (within them) 
1Vh'ym iräri me ba kam na me kute meprinti p yrak 
When they (women) go about in the nude, they look like m -eprinti (that is, they look like young, 
unmarried women) 
Märäm ngini ant kram djwaynh txe (a)pingej 
I think they are your wives 
Some men see women, all beautifully adorned, and think that they are young, 
unmarried women, but then they say, addressing their husbands coming from the forest: 
"I think they are your wives". Obviously, the song being sung by the ceremonial 
specialist has a strong erotic appeal, which is seen as an essential aspect of the joy to be 
experienced during the ceremony. 
An n'y wa närajgopkadjätdjet yk djupije kam ham am-ikraj mä kadjät m-e 
The young ones place black strings crossing their chest and over the hips 
Aminh kam 'yr y djä kam no kre kam py kam... 
Then they wear grass armbands and paint around the eyes with annato... 
ga räinh omunh na r ym räinh ga ate kube m'yj a ga ije o wabib djuru pram ije... 
and you want them to be something you can hide (only for you)... 
kube katönk-'y gage moky kam ärä a ije aminh me b yr ya ije wa to pram ije 
... and you want them to 
be like bullets that you can carry in your purse and have close to you 
This highly poetic passage plays with men's desire for women and explicates 
an important point about the moral background of ceremonies (and Mebengokre life in 
general): what moves people is the possibility of achieving what one desires for oneself 
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as an individual. It is the idea that what moves people to action is the expectation to 
satisfy one's appetites (in the case of the above passage, sexual appetites) that is made 
plain during the teaching of ceremonies as the driving force behind people's willingness 
to perform it. 
ich'ym kati amrenhbe ne me ba kukamä kije kukradä metx. Djori me kam me prinh ö me ö me nä nicö 
me jodjä an kati 
In the old days our ancestors [`those beside our first-born'] had a good/beautiful heritage [kukradjä]. 
And children did not go about watching other people's mother's private parts, no they didn't 
Me ate krä nh'ym me abatäri djwynh me kwä no ma na me kwä prinh ne me omunh... 
And (children) did not watch. But some of the grown-ups wanted to watch everything (women's parts, 
that is)... 
... kute me arenh kadj y 
with the intention of telling (everybody) afterwards 
Nnh ym ate ne guba no ma ket ijä 
None of us (here, now) watch (nowadays) 
ap yj na guba amijö baba 
Each one of us has one's own way of being 
iVh'ym ate na me kute apät mä amijänh ma ije krä ija 
Some stay with their heads bowed down [as when sitting in the men's house] 
kute me omunh i kit 
They don't glance sideways 
Nnh'ym m -e iräri bari na in -e djwä ne apät-mä kadjät äpyö am -i nicö ijape ija rärärä 
When they (the women) bathe in the nude, the annato (painting) runs from their belts onto their 
genitals, which as a result become orange-coloured [the kadjät `belts' painted with annato, a 
traditional woman's attire, which they don't take off when bathing in the river] 
Ne kam metx an-e djam kam äpnü gop. Kati. 
And they are beautiful, not ugly at all 
kam metx kumrentx 
They are very beautiful 
Ga kwä m -e kwä na m -e m -e ba be m'yj ija ijä ijapr y obä 
Some of you, some of them also talk badly about[poke fun at] us [about our ways, our (men's) affairs] 
Ö in -e ba ijoäpnü obä 
And this is bad for us all 
M-e ba kwä ne gu m-e ba no obit m-e om-u 
Some of us just look, with the eyes [that is, some watch and say bad things, whereas others only watch 
and say nothing] 
M- eä ba piaam 
We all have respect [piaam, piaap: shame/respect] 
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Nh'ym m--e kwä kam tü kam piaäp kit metx ne m'yi a ninh jarenh otä. Kati. Gwaij baije m'yia marl 
kit kam ne gwaj ä an -e. Na. 
Some (people) have no shame/respect and tell everybody (the) things (they see). No. We do not know 
their (women's) affairs. Yes. [that is, some watch women and tell others about their doings. But men do 
not really understand women's issues] 
At this point the ceremonial specialist is haranguing men on how to relate to 
women in a convivial way. The discourse, which adopts what we might call a Socratic 
`dialogical stance', is punctuated by remarks on women's beauty and desirability, as 
well as on the dissimilarities between women and men. Again, the theme of similarities 
and dissimilarities appears as a central issue for conviviality. An interesting aspect of 
his harangue is related to the sociability of the senses: sight is pictured as a most 
sociable sense, whereas the spoken word is potentially harmful to the `quality of life' 
among different people. To see and keep what one sees to oneself is sociable because it 
is a purely individual act, this passage suggests. The aesthetic pleasure of seeing (and 
desiring what one sees for oneself, as mentioned in the previous passage) is a moral 
good213. To talk to others about what one sees is bad/ugly, as the one who talks in this 
way does not know what he is talking about. The lack of knowledge is opposed here to 
moral/aesthetic ways of being. To talk about things one does not know is a childish 
behaviour (as shown above), a remark specially significant in the context of this 
narrative, which is meant for people who are about to become grown-ups (that is, to go 
through a ceremony that will make them unmarried men, who sleep in the men's house, 
and thus no longer children). 
It can be said that the teaching about what is specifically female and male, and 
how to relate them, is effective both for creating a frame of meaning and a sentiment 
with regard to (male, in this case) people who undergo the ceremony. The teaching also 
113 As discussed in chapter 4. 
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provides material grounds for instances where the possibility of exercising such 
relations happens. Both senses are included in Mebengokre conceptions of speech and 
humanity. Speech, the word and its beautiful forms - ceremonial ben, songs, stories, all 
performative forms which imply the creation, in a sense (of realisation) of what is 
sung/told - are actively engaged in the creation of humanity in the people that use them, 
and, by the very nature of the forms, in those that hear them (and respond in the way 
suggested). But being human, a condition allowing for the multiplicity of distinctive 
forms of Mebengokre-ness (for different sexes, ages, but also different experiential 
histories, for individuals and collectivities), is a moral and aesthetic, rather than 
ontological issue. 
The content of the ceremonial specialist's discourse is explicitly moral: what 
matters here is to teach young people the first steps towards adulthood. Discourse and 
song, interwoven with moral teaching, describes a state of affairs that is also a blueprint 
for people's behaviour. Not in the sense of being normative, but of being seductive: 
men are being taught that morality is individually desirable and aesthetically appealing, 
because it appeals to one's desires and appetites, and because it creates opportunities for 
their realisation214 
*Torire ö:: 
*Torire ö:: 
*Torire ö:: 
*Torire ö:: 
[no meaning] 
0 botx ne kudä 
2 14 This picture of a sense of sight that is essentially sociable shows that the attribution of moral (and 
aesthetic) qualities to the senses is far more complex than as discussed by Seeger (1980b, 1987) for the 
Suvri and other Ge. 
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Carrying and unloading [men carry their load of land turtles until close to the village, where they stop 
to adorn themselves] 
1Vh'ym m-e ö bam abatäri gop ate krä ija be ije rinh on"'y 
Then, some of the older fathers are looking for their son [that is, among those that are coming to the 
village] 
1Vh'ym be ne atö kute ömörö 
Where is your brother, who is arriving? 
1Vh'ym kum oninh ija amrenh omd 
He is already coming, bringing (the land turtles, answers the son) 
Häj. M-um imä atö kutä t- e 
All right. Go meet your brother for me (says the father to his other son) 
The expression kutä t-e is used when one is going to meet another who comes 
from the opposite direction. Atö means `your brother', an indirect term of reference that 
associates the speaker to the persons he is addressing by means of a third person, 
marking their mutual relation to that person ('your brother who is my son'). 
Ar'yp atö kute ibe ö ngrere kator 
Your brother (who is my son), the song is already coming from him 
The father already hears the song sung by his son, announcing that he is 
coming. Songs are indexes for people, telling both (in this case) that they are arriving 
and also what they are bringing; the song of the land turtle, sung in this particular 
ceremony, tells people back in the village that men are bringing this game to them. 
Ga amrenh imä atö-mä ö ar'ya 
You go for me where your brother is and carry (the heavy load of land turtles for him) along the path 
(the father sends the son to help his brother) 
Kute amijä kapran kamaä ket 
He never before felt (the weight of) land turtles (that is, `he is not used to carrying such A heavy load', 
says the father to his son) 
Godjä omö n"h'yin to bam abeje ne 
(lie) is coming, carrying (the land turtles) and the father is looking for him 
Haj. Main imd atö kutd kraije kute kapran ont 'yr'y kute kamad ket 
All right. Go meet your brother for me, (he) never carried (such a heavy load) 
Ar ym atäitx dja ga t-e 6t-e ninhari atö-mä djä 
You are already strong, you go there and bring (the load all that distance for him, that is, carrying it 
for hint for a distance) 
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ich'ym m--e kwä prö-ne m -e kutä prö-ne 
Then some people run to meet (the men coming) 
As a description of what is going to happen in the ceremony, the narrative sets 
the moral context of it: a young man should help his brother in such exhausting tasks. 
Such help is given by the `fac-similar brothers' (kaäk) of the sponsors of the ceremony 
(who bring the land turtles back to the village) along the way. To help one's kamy kaäk 
who is bringing a load of game for the ceremony is one of the tasks of `fac-similar 
brothers' during ceremonies (in which this `fac-similarity' is created - see chapter 2). 
The teaching here is directed to those brothers-facsimilar who are supposed to help the 
sponsors of the ceremony. It directs them on how brothers should behave. The song 
seems to suggest the overcoming of the distinction between `real' (katät) and 
`facsimilar' (kaäk) brothers, as the context of its performance clearly refers to the `kaak- 
ship' (to be) established among those going to the ceremonial hunting party. 
In a certain sense this `assimilation' - that is, the stressing of the `kaäk-ship' as 
a suitable simile of the katät relationship that it purports to be iconically associated 
with215 - is the realisation itself of the song . As discussed in chapter 2, this realisation 
(which involves the creation of a village-wide state of affairs which is suitably similar 
to that which obtains within circles of people who are on the most intimate terms with 
each other) is equivalent to the creation of a polity that is iconically related to houses216, 
the smaller-scale units that are part of it. 
215 That is, an icon of relations that obtain between people on intimate terms with each other, as 
discussed in chapter 2. See chapter 3 for a discussion of the social aspect of iconicity in Mebengokre 
performances. 
216 Or clusters of neighbouring houses, related through female inhabitants, as discussed in chapter 1. 
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One could also say that houses themselves are elements of the (visual) iconic 
representation of such a polity, as villages are pictured only though the houses that 
compose it. But there is, I think, a deeper shade to such a motif. Stories tell of the 
creation of the Mebengokre after a deluge flooded the entire earth. One man survived 
and, from the top of a tree, he throws stones in a circle around himself, creating the first 
village, as each stone turned into a house (see also, for detailed versions of this myth, 
Wilbert and Simoneau 1978). The story reflects well what I perceived as a feeling of 
the `ontological precedence' of the village over the houses, ever-present, it seems to me, 
in Mebengokre everyday life. Such `ontological precedence', if I am right, would make 
of houses elements in the iconic depiction of the polity. This is not only in the visual 
sense, as houses, through their intricate ways of differentiating from each other in a 
complementary way (mainly in ceremonial matters, which means much), would be seen 
as parts of a larger whole, which at the same time resembles each other in specific ways. 
The ceremonial teaching goes on, stressing the aesthetic side of the 
performance, the beauty of the `technical' (to our view) task being performed: 
Mranh dja ga m-e ämkäm dja ga karikwaijnh ga ano katoro ket 
(the place) where you stay, one shall not go to in a hurry 
Dja ga kapran-mä aprinh me na omö 
You will carry the land turtles slowly (and this is) good/beautiful 
Toc... ngäj... ngäj... ngäj... 
(onomatopoeic construction) 
Karikwiaijnh ga aminhbej kit m-e no kam, aminhbej ket 
You shall not go in a hurry, all eyes are upon (you), don't go in a hurry 
Angmer, djam na ga aben no waikejnh godga! 
Men, you are not going to play! (that is, they should take it seriously) 
Mire no kam ar-ik at-e tie at yin nh ym m-e aijanh kangä kadj y 
All eyes are upon (you), (if you) slip and fall down, people will want to talk a lot (about it) 
Djam gäm kumaprinh metx ne o, nö 
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You must go slowly, beautifully 
M ya wä ne bitxajler kit 
These things are no play (that is, they are serious) 
When they come to the village, the men gather at the men's house, where they 
remain for a while, singing, before going to their own houses. Men should carry their 
load in an aesthetically appealing way, calculated to please the eye of the observers in 
the village. One should go slowly (and the onomatopoeic sounds described above 
actually show the rhythm of their pace), lest they might slip and fall down, and be the 
object of people's laughter. This is a highly performative task, aimed at aestheticising 
one's behaviour (in the sense that it should please the eye), which is tantamount to 
endowing the performer with moral capabilities (to follow the song's suggestion, as 
songs are moral instruments par excellence). The connection between moral and 
aesthetic ways, as shown above (and discussed in the previous chapter), continues in the 
following passage. The sense of sight carries both moral and aesthetic value - in fact, 
the distinction is not present, morality and the aesthetic are facets of the same 
phenomenon. 
The ceremonial specialist goes on, stressing the beauty of women during the 
ceremony: 
* Ö:: ijä ö:: 
*Köö:: kö yrä w'y 
*0:: 
[a series of rhythmical sounds, not easily intelligible] 
Nh'ym ge printi. Printi katät godga amijö. Hum! 
Then she, the young woman, the real young woman, adorns herself. Hum! 
[Printi katät, `the real young woman', is an adult (that is, non-child) woman who is still a virgin) 
Neinh ate täitx djam m-e kangb apetx keter 
her flesh becomes firm, her liquid does not work (her breasts have no milk, as she is a virgin) 
Kam 'yr y dja kam indjnh ijakrd-ne 
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(women wear the) kam 'yr y dja (adornment to be worn on the wrists), which makes her arm look short 
(the arm, tight as befits a young woman, looks short when the kam 'yr y dja is placed on the wrist) 
Djam m-e -i kute täitx-i-re kä metx ngri godga. Na. 
Does their flesh not become really firm, (does) their skin not become really tight? 
The passage is obviously an appeal to men's sexual desire. Interwoven with 
moral/aesthetic teaching, it provides the basis for people's desire to act in a 
moral/aesthetic way. One notices here that the ceremonial specialist's teaching aims at 
creating in people, individually, the desire to act towards others in a seemly manner 
(both morally and aesthetically). His aim is not to impose a normativity, or rules of 
behaviour sanctioned by custom. `Custom', kukradjä, is presented to people as 
essentially appealing, rather than compulsory. The narrative teaches people not in the 
sense of imposing a `collective rule', but by creating in people the drive (quite libidinal, 
in the passages above) to act morally/aesthetically. Morality is displayed as beauty, and 
also as a way to achieve one's objects of desire. Again, the description of the ceremony 
by the specialist not only creates (and enforces) in men a desire, but also promises its 
fulfilment through the means of moral/aesthetic behaviour. In this sense, ceremonies 
must `succeed', as Mebengokre put it: they must make people happy while harmonising 
their efforts within the ceremony itself. At the same time the gains are material, as 
material fulfilment is deemed an inherent aspect of individual moral agency. 
The description ends with the ceremonial specialist stating his legitimacy as 
such, by saying he has had a personal experience of the traditional lore: 
Ba na Ba je in -e kukradjä in - einh ö ari bäri 
It is I that (know) the heritage (`culture', `tradition '/'wealth') 
Na. N ym mäj 
Yes. It is true. 
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Ba na ba m -einh ö an bäri m -e kukradjä m -unh amä ä idju jarenh odjd. Na. Djam m --e kukradjä 
djwynh kam apnü. Na. 
It is me who saw personally the heritage (kukradjä), (and I am) telling it to you. Yes. Is the real 
heritage bad/ugly? This is it [the last sentence is a rhetoric question, meant to be denied]. 
As shown in chapter 3, this legitimacy is established as a link with the personal 
experience of the one who created the song/lore being transmitted. This link is 
important because to have knowledge is not simply to keep its content in one's memory, 
but to actually have experienced - in some sense or capacity - the events described in 
the song. Many people know different songs, but their knowledge is seen as `false' 
without such a link. As I have shown in the case of the songs of the fishing ceremony 
(in chapter 4), the ceremonial specialist actually sings/describes the way in which a 
previous ceremonial specialist, the one who taught the song to him, had `sung it by the 
fire' along with the mythical shaman who created the song. The experiential link thus 
established enables the present ceremonial specialist to re-create the events described in 
the song, making people desire for themselves an experience similar to that described in 
the song. To have the words of the song in memory, in short, does not necessarily mean 
that one possesses the skill to sing it, that is, to produce the expected reality one 
describes. To be able to sing (and to make ceremonial speeches) is to have the skill to 
reproduce (or create) not only a vocal production but a fully human one, as these forms 
of speech are `good/beautiful' precisely because they do establish (at least in potentia) 
a link between word and agency (or, more precisely, between vocal forms and agency, 
as rhythm and harmony are essential tools for the harmonisation of individual 
movements and actions). 
Speech as Agency: A Semiotic of Being 
What is the status of description in ceremonial songs? They are most obviously 
performative statements, in the classical Austinian formulation (Austin 1962), but their 
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perlocutionary effect resides in the ceremonial specialist's capacity to entice people's 
appetites. Ceremonial descriptions like the one above, through which young men217 are 
taught about the ceremony being performed, effect a production of experiences by 
means of an "economy of desire". In this sense the description above can be counted as 
a native interpretation with regard to the specific Mebengokre ways in which such 
`force' is created, a point that Austin himself was rather vague about. But it is much 
more than an interpretation, as it fuses a model of the ceremony with a model for it. In 
the description, representation is not distinct from instruction. It is a blueprint for action 
as well as a body of representation. There is here no distinction between reflection and 
agency, or rather between reflective and practical thought. One could say that 
Mebengokre lore is, in Aristotelian terms, at once theoretical (since metaphysical), 
practical (since ethical and political), and poetic (since both technical and aesthetic). By 
means of skilled narration memory becomes project (that is, becomes a blueprint for 
human moral/aesthetic agency in the fuller sense described here), and description is the 
vehicle for such metamorphosis. Rather than creating a normativity, description of the 
`ways of old' seduces people individually into re-creating such ways218. 
217 I have no data concerning women's ceremonies in this respect, as most of the activities related to 
them were performed by women only. In fact, the idea that one can get a `total' picture of (gendered) 
society by adding `women's views' to `men's views' is a rather western one. It departs from the 
principle that the everyday world of people is non-gendered, in the sense of being a shared space for 
both genders to exercise ungendered tasks, activities, etc, together or otherwise. I think that for 
Mebengokre this would be a highly absurd conception, as men cannot share in the specificities of 
women's lives, and vice-versa. This is not only `worldview' but practice: I was never welcome 
whenever I tried to follow what women were doing collectively for a ceremony. 
218 Re-creation is here a continuous transformation, as knowledge (as well as other, material elements, 
both kukradjä) in the form of song and speech, is continuously being brought into the Mebengokre 
world from the outside. One example is that of the shaman (tivajangä), who enters in contact with other 
worlds (of the fish, wild pigs, etc) as well as with the worlds of other beings (the Batmen's world, etc) 
and brings from these worlds lore (songs, speeches) and names which they bestow usually upon their 
grandsons (tabdjw ý) and in this way get inserted into an ever-changing semiotic system which 
attributes different qualities to different people, creating similarities between them as well as 
'domesticating' their differences by making them complementary to each other in ceremonial life. An 
analysis of the dynamics between the production of suitable differences (from the point of view of 
individual family groups) and the production of suitable similarities (from the point of view of village- 
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Mebengokre state that language is one of the distinctive features of 
`Mebengokre-ness', or human-ness. This statement should not be taken naively as if it 
were the establishment of `cultural boundaries'. As the song above shows, language is a 
tool for social agency, meaning here the production of conviviality between people. 
Conviviality, the creation of a social state amongst people, implies a morality that is not 
distinguishable from a polity, and whose concrete aspect is seen in Mebengokre 
technologies for the production of similarities between people (meaning here different 
forms of iconic relations). Now, it seems to me that this production of similarities - 
which is a lifetime process, a continuum rather than a moment - is more than simply the 
building up of so many covers, masks superimposed over one's basic being. They are 
one's being, in the sense that `Mebengokre-ness' is the actual result of this ongoing 
process of establishing similarities: to be Mebengokre is to live in round villages (with 
specific characteristics), to have (certain) ceremonies and songs and ceremonial 
speeches, to speak the language, that is, to take active part in this process of producing 
the social state while producing oneself as capable of establishing similarities with 
others. `Being' is a semiotic issue rather than an ontological one, as the establishment 
of similarities presupposes iconicity rather than analogia entis. Furthermore, `being' 
would be a moral and aesthetic process rather than an ontological state, as Mebengokre 
morality/aesthetics is the foundation of this process of establishing similarities between 
people. Since the production of such similarities is what we would call `the social state' 
for the Mebengokre, and since language (vocal forms, rather) is a self-acknowledged 
tool for this purpose, one could say that Mebengokre theory of language is a political 
theory, one in which polity is not distinguishable from the issues of morality/aesthetics. 
wide life) is beyond the scope of this work, where I 
limit myself to the description of the complex of 
ideas involved in the latter. 
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Skilled ceremonial descriptions are thus political, as well as moral/aesthetic tools, as the 
emphasis is on moral/aesthetic skills rather than values, so to speak. 
In fact, Mebengokre hold that ceremonial songs are one of the highest form of 
language, precisely because their descriptions possess this character. This is even 
clearer in the ben diri ceremonial discourse, which is said to the very epitome of 
language skill. It is not sung but stated219, some of them by a ceremonial specialist, 
others by some of those performing the ceremony. In the event described above, those 
returning from the forest with land turtles for the ceremony pronounce the ben diri upon 
arriving in the village, at the place in its centre where people gather to perform songs 
and dances of a specific ceremony. It goes: 
ba ijej kikre me ba ije kum-ba-ni-rere 
we are going to deliver our cargo in our houses... 
kub'yt aben w'yr y ba kator 
... and return where the others are gathered 
ba ije ba kinh-re mokraj kadjy 
[and] we are going to start our happiness/contentment/enjoyment [that is, their celebration] 
kad y ne ba amä i-bendiri. Owan-e 
This is what I wanted to tell you. That's it. 
As said before, ben diri is a sort of `chancel', or an announcement, of what is 
going to happen next. From the point of view of information, it is most obviously a 
pointless one, as everybody knows what is going to happen next. From the performative 
point of view, it is not intended to move other people to action, as the description of the 
ceremony in the song, but to declare what those who are speaking will do next. It thus 
provides a curious inversion in relation to the song: while the latter is a (performed) 
description of events long past (themselves beautiful/good as 'lore'), the former is a 
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(performed) declaration of what is going to happen immediately after its performance. 
While the song is speech beautified by rhythm, tune, and melody, the ben diri is simply 
stated. Seen from this point of view, ben diri seems to contradict Mebengokre theory of 
language as an aesthetic activity since, at first sight, it is less `beautified' than songs. 
The contradiction fades away, though, when one considers the content of the 
description provided by the ben diri. Men bringing their load of land turtles arrive at the 
village and state that the happiness/enjoyment/contentment is going to begin. As 
described before, ceremonies have to do with the satisfaction of one's appetites, not 
least their appetite for food. The announcement of the 
happiness/contentment/enjoyment that is to obtain from the men's arrival in the village 
creates its own truth and relevance, as the land turtles (and other game) will be eaten by 
all people in the ceremony. The announcement in the centre of the village, in the me 
toro djä (the place where people gather to sing and dance, to one side of the men's 
house) of the satisfaction of the conditions of possibility for the fulfilment of people's 
appetites is a highly moral/aesthetic one, as it is meant to be seen by all (that is, it is 
seemly, a primary meaning of `moral/aesthetic' for Mebengokre'), as well as serving to 
satisfy the desires of a11220 
One can see here the difference in the description provided by the song and 
that provided by the ben diri. The first proposes a project, and the skill of the one who 
sings is confirmed by the outcome of the song, that is, by his ability to entice people's 
desires so that they perform what is proposed by the song. The description provided by 
219 Some specific ben are stated in a falsetto voice. Many others are just spoken loudly or shouted, 
sometimes by more than one person, as in the case of the ben above. It is however never sung. 
220 As shown above, the arrival of the party into the village carrying their load of land turtles for the 
ceremony is one which is highly stressed in the ceremonial specialist's description. It is deemed a 
particularly beautiful moment that must be performed the best men can. 
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the ben diri is the public confirmation of the realisation of such a project. This 
realisation, the concrete, visible confirmation of the ceremonial specialist's skill, has the 
effect of producing, automatically so to speak, the content of the utterance. It is in this 
sense that ben diri can be understood as the epitome of speech, embodying in the 
highest degree the moral/aesthetic qualities (which are also efficacious ones, let's not 
forget) which are seen by Mebengokre as the central element of speech/language. 
Speech/language is not generally conceived of as representation only, but 
fundamentally as action. If songs are moral/beautiful because they open up the 
possibility of shaping people's desires through a description of the distant past, and in 
so doing producing in the present what they describe, ben diri are doubly beautiful 
because they announce the immediate future not as a possibility but as certainty. Ben 
diri are always performed at key moments of ceremonies, and its character is clearly 
that of an announcement of things to come. If songs have perlocutionary effects (Austin 
1962), ben diri has pure illocutionary force. It is this transit between the (potential) 
perlocutionary effect of the suggestions embodied in song to the illocutionary force of 
the certainty embodied in ben diri which shows the crescendo of moral/aesthetic worth 
between both vocal forms. 
We are dealing here with what Goodman (1967) calls exemplarity, the 
capacity of singling out certain properties or qualities as representative of the whole that 
is being described. But not only so. Both songs and ben diri are ways to transform 
knowledge in collective performance, of making a sample into the whole it samples, 
and not only representatives of that whole. In fact, it would be more precise to say that 
knowledge (kukradja, a term that involves both songs and ceremonial discourses, 
among other things, including ceremonial adornments) presupposes its own realisation 
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from content into agency, from memory of past experiences into actual contemporary 
experience, this being its central condition of felicity in Austinian terms. It is in making 
explicit how this transit is to be achieved - through the skill of the ceremonial specialist 
- that Mebengokre `theory of language' reveals itself as political theory, based upon the 
seduction of individual desires and appetites toward the end of achieving village-wide 
conviviality. The achieved `social state' is seen here as process and agency, as moral, 
aesthetic and pragmatic, creating Mebengokre-ness as a social state, a `being-in-the- 
village'. And, above all, a process that works through suggestion rather than directive, 
through seduction rather than commandment, a process that is effected upon 
autonomous beings, seduced by the power of words and the promise of 
happiness/joy/contentment to harmonise their drives and appetites with those of other 
people, thereby making themselves, through their shared experiences, similar to each 
other. 
Many recent descriptions of native Amazonian ways of life have insisted on 
the importance of conviviality, of the plethora of social skills that create easygoing-ness 
among people, for the understanding of the social organisation of Amazonian 
peoples221. As these works focus almost invariably on life amongst people that live in 
the most intimate terms with each other, they are frequently criticised as reducing social 
life to the `domestic level' (Viveiros de Castro 1995b, 1996; Taylor 1996; Vilaca 2002) 
I, as others, have already (in chapter 2) criticised this analytical distinction between 
`domestic' and `public' `spheres of social life'. The present chapter is meant as a 
description of the role of language in the process of creating a polity out of so-called 
`domestic' values, out of intimacy and conviviality, of togetherness as the central issue 
22 1 See Overing and Passes (2000) on this issue. 
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in social life. I have shown how `polity' is created as an extension, rather than as a 
break so to speak, of the form222 of intimate relationships through the use of language. 
Mebengokre `Polity', then, can be understood as moral and aesthetic practice that 
creates icons of intimacy through performance, and thereby talks social beings into 
existence. 
222 That is, iconically. 
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Conclusion 
Into Behemoth's entrails 
I have tried to show in this thesis a picture of Mebengokre and of Ge ethnology 
that is quite different from that usually found in studies on the subject. The final result, 
as the reader may appreciate, bears little resemblance to the blend of social organisation, 
kinship, ritual, and mythology, which characterises much of Ge studies. My intention 
has been to address an issue that nevertheless fits well into that mixture, but provides it 
with an alternative, and I hope productive, twist. My argument has been that the 
perspective and intent of the anthropologist are crucial to any judgement he or she 
might make with regard to those characteristics to be deemed significant to the blend. 
And, indeed, the blend does take on a completely different configuration once one 
simple question is stressed, time and again, namely, just what does it mean to live 
together for the Mebengokre? It is because of this particular question that I have dealt 
with matters concerning ceremonial kinship, ritual, emotion and affect, and language. 
But how does it all fit together? I intend here to give a picture of my argument, that (not 
altogether visible) thread that connects all this within a coherent whole. But first of all a 
word about this whole and that connection 
The reader will have noticed that despite the different themes of each chapter, 
much of the argument repeats itself, although always with the stress on different 
aspects, nuances, and facets. Perhaps I could say, parodying Levi-Strauss' metaphor in 
the Mythologiques that my thesis, like a dodecaphonic composition, goes through the 
whole spectrum of the discussion in each of its parts. This is not due to aesthetic fancy, 
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though, but is a result of my trying to gain some insight into Mebengokre ways of living 
by discussing Mebengokre ways of thinking rather than looking at those units which, 
anthropological wisdom has it, constitute the cornerstone of social life among "tribal" 
peoples: domestic groups, kinship structures, etc. 
Basically, I have taken seriously what Mebengokre say: to be Mebengokre is to 
perform certain ceremonies, to possess certain songs and other ceremonial elements 
(kukradja); it is to speak a certain language, to live in a certain type of village, to feel 
towards others in an specific way. I have tried to unveil the significance of some of 
these elements that are involved (and highly valued) in the creation of a social state for 
the Mebengokre, and in this process I have tried to show something of the specificity of 
what it is to perform a ceremony, to sing a song, to speak, to have friends and relatives, 
to have sentiments towards others. And, mainly, how these aspects of Mebengokre form 
of life actually create a space where a specific sort of sociability can be exercised by 
specific human beings. In this sense, my thesis has several discussions along similar 
lines in terms of my interest in each one, but loosely connected in terms of the concrete 
issues at stake. Like threads that interweave without necessarily following the same 
direction but leaving behind them a pattern which, I hope, allows one to have a glimpse 
of my original glimpse of what it is to be, to live as, Mebengokre. I want here to discuss 
some implication for Mebengokre and Ge (and Amazonian, generally) ethnology of this 
glimpse of a glimpse. I will do so by unfolding the main points of each chapter. 
In the first chapter, I have shown how Mebengokre villages are born, grow and 
eventually split, sometimes vanishing completely. This exposition was meant to show 
something of the historical character (and importance) of this process. Moreover, I also 
wanted to indicate how the focus on villages as ready-made entities is not helpful to 
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understand Mebengokre village life, as villages are in fact dynamic processes of making 
and re-making. This processual character, I suggested, must be part and parcel of our 
understanding of Mebengokre social life. But where to look for it? In the rest of the 
thesis I focus on several facets of this process, suggested by Mebengokre themselves as 
relevant, all related to ceremonies and their preparation and performance. In any case, 
village life is the very centre of Mebengokre sociality, and to understand the latter one 
has to focus on the significance of living with each other in a village. Different from 
what seems to happen in other regions in Amazonia (especially the Orinoco region, 
where communities are small), village life is qualitatively different from, yet similar in 
certain ways to family life, implying different qualities of relationships that are 
exercised on a daily basis. It is this qualitative difference that I set on to explore in the 
rest of the thesis. Village life seemed to me to have a distinctively moral and aesthetic 
character, self-evident in its pervasive ceremonial and ceremonial-related character. 
Each chapter can be seen as an argument of why village life should be seen as a moral 
and aesthetic issue. 
In the second chapter, I discussed the significance of becoming a brother to 
others in the context of ceremonies. The focus here, as in the rest of the thesis, was on 
the moral aspects of the process, and the significance of it for village-wide conviviality. 
My argument was centred around the idea that the building of a polity - that is, village- 
wide social life - is conceived as a moral issue which is similar to the morality of 
domestic life, but is not to be taken as identical to it. Morality is centred on the notion 
that people should be free to get things from others without causing ill feeling among 
people. Sharing, as a paradigm of the proper form of relationship, is most commonly 
seen as obtaining (potentially, at least) in domestic life, but not in village-wide life. The 
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latter is seen as an icon of the former, keeping a resemblance with it in the form of what 
we would call reciprocity as the state-of-affairs between people. This is similar to 
sharing because it propitiates the opportunity to get things from other people without 
causing ill feeling - with the addendum that one has to return something for what one 
got. In sum, this state-of-affairs is morally good in spite of reciprocity, not because of it. 
I also stressed the iconic character of this model of polity, and the peculiar 
relation that it keeps with the units that compose it: Mebengokre polity is a fractal of 
domestic life, a whole that iconically resembles the units that compose it. Finally, I 
showed how ceremonies, creating opportunities for people to act towards others in a 
highly moral way (the whole idea of having brothers is set in a context where 
ceremonies feed people that act towards each other in this way), actually create a polity. 
This is when ceremonies are `successful', as Mebengokre put it, which is conceived as 
an ongoing process. This process is something that has to be continuously re-created, 
which cannot be taken for granted. This, I argued, comes together with an idea of being 
a human being (Mebengokre-being, that is), which is posed in moral and aesthetic rather 
than ontological grounds. To be human is to strive continuously to keep oneself so, and 
this is a moral/aesthetic process. Ceremonial life, I suggested, is one way (a very 
important one) to keep oneself human, albeit in specific ways (according to age, sex, 
origin, etc). 
I have stressed similarities in ethnographic descriptions of other Ge peoples, 
suggesting that some sort of pervasive pattern, or rather similar topographies of 
relevances, obtain in these peoples' social philosophies concerning the `processual' and 
moral character of Mebengokre 'being'. These qualities echo what has been written for 
other ethnographic areas in Amazonia (esp. Overing and Passes 2000). Here however, I 
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have endeavoured to show the specificity of a process of polity building through the 
creation of similarities, which involves a refined semiotic. The creation of iconicities 
seems to me to be central in this process of creating an ongoing `fractal polity', both in 
theory and in practice. 
In chapter three, I described the ceremonial lament for dead relatives/friends223, 
using it as a window to the emotional aspect of Mebengokre social life. I described how 
individual feelings of loss, expressed during that specific part of the ceremonial cycle, 
are woven in a tapestry of emotional attachments to dead people that creates a family 
resemblance between the living who are experiencing the lament. This could be 
expressed in a diagram which is almost the symmetrical opposite to that proposed by 
Levi-Strauss for totemism, i. e. as a series of indexical relations (between each 
individual and his/her deceased ones) that implies the creation of an iconic resemblance 
between the mourners. I concluded by proposing that, although relationships between 
individuals are very much individual matters (as shown in the process of creating kin- 
like ties between people, highly dependent on one's personal relationships), emotions 
are very much a collective affair, as they create communality between people. 
Ceremonies are enacted with this objective in view, that is the creation of collective 
emotional states suitable for life in the village. It is not surprising that the Xikrin- 
Mebengokre, who are rather affluent by Indigenous Amazonian standards, have striven 
to extend the `ceremonial season' to encompass some 9 months out of 12 every year - 
precisely the months in which they live together in the village. 
I have used my data to criticise a certain Durkheimian-minded tendency to split 
emotion into an intimate, psychological experience and a public, `sociological' 
296 
expression, making the latter an index of something - namely, `society' as a 
metaphysical entity - which is above and outside individuals. This metaphysical entity 
would be ab definitio forever divorced from the (also ab definitio) individual experience 
of emotion. Mebengokre emotion, I contended, is to be seen through the lens of an 
aesthetic and a sociology rather than of a psychology. This, not only because it is to be 
performed for other people's eyes, but also because it involves the creation of 
resemblances which are valued as such, rather than as indexes of 'society'. The 
collective (or supra individual generally) experience/expression of emotions (and I 
would subsume both under the term performance) gains the contours of a sophisticated 
technology of sociability which creates similarities, and thus affinities (in the more 
general sense) between people. Emotion here is not a symptom (that is, an index) of the 
social state but its own creation, the `social state' itself realised as process, so to speak. 
Mebengokre state that ceremonies are made in order to produce certain 
pervasive collective emotional states. I show the significance of this statement for the 
understanding of Mebengokre emotions by means of a critique of the tendency of some 
of the current anthropological approaches to emotion, to essentialise the inner 
experience/outer expression split characteristic of our ('Western', in a broadly general 
sense) understanding of emotions. I have argued that assumptions of authenticity, which 
can only make sense within such parameters, tend to taint anthropologists' approaches 
to the matter. I also showed how for the Mebengokre that the authenticity of emotions is 
one and the same with the authenticity of its performance, understood here as a 
conflation of experience and expression. The collective performance of longing in the 
ceremonial lament transforms individual indexes into collective icons of the intimacy 
223 As mentioned earlier, the events described in chapters two to five are in chronological order according 
with the ceremonial `season' that I was 
describing. 
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felt by each individual performer towards the one being lamented. The authenticity of 
the performance is in direct relation with its success in achieving such transformation. 
To successfully perform the ceremonial lament is to trail over the divide of experience 
and expression. 
Furthermore, the successful performance produces an appearance - an icon - 
of intimacy which is not meant to be confounded with the intimacy to be obtained 
among those who actually have shared their lives. It is in fact meant to be an 
appearance, a positive, suitable one, but not `the original'. We are dealing here with 
another facet of the process of polity building, as production of resemblances by means 
of induced collective elation. As I have argued before, the whole process dispenses with 
any Durkheimian-like idea of a supra-individual metaphysical notion such as `society', 
of which the lament would be the index. Polity building is seen here, again, as an iconic 
process in its own right, the emotional state created being `the social state' itself rather 
than the index of something. Here too, the whole is made to resemble, in some specific 
ways, each individual component part of it. This is, I believe, an important aspect of the 
significance of the Mebengokre's insistence that to live together with others is to feel 
toward them in specific ways. This process is morally and aesthetically good/beautiful, 
as well as efficient (the three senses of moral/aesthetic judgement), as it creates suitable 
similarities through performance. In a certain sense, to show the social significance of 
the aesthetic character of emotion is to expose the fallacy of the a priori assumption of 
the indexical character of emotion (or of its ceremonial expression) as denoting the 
ascendancy of `society' over `the individual'. 
This Homeric conflation of moral, aesthetic, and pragmatic qualities of agency 
is analysed in detail in chapter four. I show it to be related to the transit between theory 
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and practice and what is involved in it, as well as with the relation between individual 
goals and collective life. This latter, most sensible issue for many a ('Western') moral 
theory, is in fact a relatively tranquil issue for Mebengokre moral agency, which is 
based on the very satisfaction of one's appetites and drives by means of their 
harmonisation, and of the collective mobilisation to cater for the multitude of individual 
appetites and drives thus harmonised. The teaching and performance of the ceremony 
described in chapter four reveals the ceremonial specialist as a moral/aesthetic agent par 
excellence, whose greatest quality is to be able to induce agency in other people by 
means of seduction - that is, by playing with their drives and appetites in order to 
harmonise them towards a common, collective goal. 
It is interesting to note that, in what concerns one's claims to ceremonial 
knowledge, it is important to stress an indexical relationship with the creator/original 
holder of such knowledge which amounts to an indexical relationship with the original 
experience which created the knowledge at issue, rather than the (iconic) appearance of 
similarity with the knowledge itself224. To transmit knowledge means, primarily, to 
share something of the original individual experience of its creator/holder, which gives 
Mebengokre knowledge, like pre-academia European knowledge, a certain hue of 
individuality and, in a sense, incommunicability as a corpus of data/information that is 
autonomous and distinct from the experience of its creation/appropriation. If the 
experience of ceremonial knowledge re-creates an original experience225, the effect of 
such indexicality (in the audience) is the creation of (iconic) likenesses between 
224 By this I mean that it is not, say, the ability to reproduce each song and story to the letter which 
makes one authentically knowledgeable in ceremonial lore, but the claim to a connection with the 
original experience and/or the original producer of the knowledge 
being displayed (both connections in 
fact amount to the very same thing in the ceremony that I analysed). 
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dissimilar people (through the likening of them to the original group of people that 
performed the ceremony). The connection established by the ceremonial specialist's 
agency between the original performance and the contemporary one produces a likeness 
between people performing it today and those that originally performed it; the 
production of the latter likeness - that is, the contemporary performance - in itself 
creates a similarity between performers, who are sharing the experience of being 
likened together to others. The production of togetherness amounts to a production of 
likenesses between people. 
Again we have here another aspect of a wider, pervasive process of polity 
building that departs from individual relationships and experiences to propose, not a 
different entity/state but a state of affairs which is similar to, but not an extension of, the 
original individual relationships and experiences. As in the previous chapters, what can 
be seen as polity building, in accord with this specific facet, amounts to a transit 
between individual indexicalities and collective iconicities. What this facet makes clear 
is the moral character of such transit, and through it the configuration of the moral agent 
itself. It is a being which is moved by its drives and appetites, but the latter being 
amenable to being seduced into harmony with other drives and appetites, so as to 
achieve them individually through collective means. It can be said that, in the same way 
that Mebengokre emotions reveal aspects of what we would describe as rationality by 
being amenable to being `moulded' by ceremonial lore into collective likenesses, 
Mebengokre drives and appetites also reveal a `rational' aspect under similar 
circumstances. Indeed, as with emotional states, the `right' (I mean, 
good/beautiful/efficient) drives and appetites are in fact created through ceremonial 
"5 That is, establishes an indexicality between the present performance of the ceremony and its original 
performance, through the agency of the ceremonial specialist. I do not mean here an indexicality 
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performance (that is, through efficient ceremonial performance), and their satisfaction is 
accomplished through the creation of a general state of joy - or `happiness', or even 
`satisfaction' itself, which would sound redundant in English. This redundancy mirrors 
another, the one proposed by the ceremonial specialist and accomplished (if he is 
successful) in the performance itself of the ceremony: People are seduced into agency 
through the creation of (individual) harmonic drives and appetites, for whose 
satisfaction the tool of joy/happiness is needed. Such satisfaction, of course, produces 
(or rather, is) joy/happiness. This not only shows that the achievement of one's private 
goals is the appropriate form of the moral action; it also shows that such achievement, 
in its highest moral form (that of ceremonial agency), is accomplished only through 
collective endeavour. The split between egoistic and altruistic agency does not thus taint 
the moral agent in what concerns morality. The `Common Good' is not part of the 
moral scene here: were it present, it would not be distinguishable from private aims. 
How does it leave my polity-building argument? Can polity exist without a 
`common good'? The ceremonial teaching that I analyse in this chapter actually 
addresses itself to this philosophical problem, and gives it a rather unusual - and 
efficient - solution. A Mebengokre moral agent is an autonomous being who does not 
give up his autonomy in order to achieve a `social state'. No `common good' is 
acknowledged above individual interests. But the likeness - again- of a common interest 
can be created, based upon the enjoyable character of the collective endeavour involved. 
Indeed, the very get-together is enjoyable in itself: different qualities of people having 
fun collectively, becoming like each other (in some respects) through sharing the same 
moral/aesthetic activity. In order to learn to have fun together in such a way, people 
learn sophisticated ways of co-ordinating technical tasks (that is, `technical' as seen by 
between contemporary performers as a group an30f1ose of the original performance. 
the anthropologist) by means of song and dance, of harmony and rhythm. The `technical 
task' itself, `moralised/aestheticised' through the agency of the ceremonial specialist, is 
efficient precisely because it makes autonomous, unrestrained agents get together for 
the fun of it, to co-ordinate their bodily movements for the sake of pleasure in a task 
that otherwise (that is, individually) would not be feasible. In producing food, this 
joyful togetherness also (re-)produces the moral/aesthetic paradigm of nurturance as the 
archetypal form of conviviality. 
Again, what is produced here is a likeness, under carefully controlled 
conditions, so to speak: people having the same appetites, freely giving and getting the 
same thing to, and from, each other in an atmosphere of plenty, and crucially of 
merriment. The realisation of the moral agency (and it is moral, that is, 
`good/beautiful/useful', mex only if it generates practical, `useful' results) gives to the 
togetherness involved a powerful likeness with the most intimate relationships one may 
have, those involving feeding each other through mutual sentiments of fondness present 
in the relationship. This is, nevertheless, a likeness, and not an identity, as indicated by 
the suppression, under the `controlled conditions' of the performance (which produces 
one result, fish), of dissimilarities between what is given to and received from other 
people226. It is significant that commensality is the central aspect and general paradigm 
for conviviality (that is, for moral/aesthetic life), and as such no ceremony can be `real' 
226 As an afterthought, I suspect that `exchange' (the `placing of something in the place of something 
else', as Mebengokre would have it) is a rather complicated matter for Mebengokre, both 
philosophically and practically, because the idea of an abstract equivalence between the things coming 
and going, as well as between those giving and getting them, is a problematic one. Things and persons 
have distinct qualities, which are related to those of other things/persons in complex ways. I have 
heard several times from my Mebengokre friends veiled comments about things received by them as 
kaigo, as `counterfactuals'. I believe now that they were referring not to the thing itself but rather to 
the comparison proposed by the transaction, between qualities of the things being given and received. 
Elizabeth Ewart (2000: 167-74) describes similar `exchanges' among the Ge-speaking Panara in a 
way that echoes many of my concerns with `exchange' among the Mebengokre, as discussed in chapter 
two. 
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(kumrentx, katät), that is, is not what it is supposed to be as a moral/aesthetic tool, 
without a collective meal associated with the performance. In this commensal process, 
seemliness (the aesthetic and moral quality of agency) realises itself as effectiveness, as 
people do get nurtured by means of the production of iconicity. 
What is it, this power that creates these likenesses among autonomous, 
unrestrained agents, by means of which they find it both enjoyable and desirable to live 
with each other, and through which they can actually satiate their appetites? This is the 
query that I address in the fifth (and last) chapter, where I analyse speaking/language as 
a moral and aesthetic tool. Language reveals itself as an instrument of agency, and 
valued as such. `Power' here - the power of language - is less a capacity to control than 
a capacity to bring agency about, to produce in people a drive to perform certain actions 
(and to acquire certain specific kinds of appetites, even in the literal sense as seen in the 
fishing ceremony). I show how ben diri, or ceremonial discourses, are seen as forms of 
language higher than ceremonial songs due to their possessing illocutionary force, 
whereas songs only suggest certain desirable perlocutionary effects (and as such may 
'fail'). It is clearly a question of a gradient of agency `bringaboutness' that is being 
valued here. Language/discourse brings things about, makes things happen. For it to be 
effective, it is necessary that those with the linguistic skill for engendering agency in 
others to have some connection with the primeval experience which originated the piece 
of linguistic lore in question. This indexical connection is important in bringing about 
the iconic likeness among people, that is, of creating an appearance of communality 
among the present-day people who are undergoing the ceremony. This appearance, one 
can realise by now, is actually `the real thing', the communality itself, an agency 
enveloped in moral/aesthetic seemliness. Such seemliness is itself the social state, as I 
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have striven so far to show. It is people showing themselves to be able to live with each 
other by the most explicit means at hand: by reproducing in their everyday relations the 
very appearance of an intimacy which is the ideal way to relate to others. Linguistic 
skill brings about this togetherness - in the beautified and `moralised' form of 
ceremonial collective agency, which creates enjoyment in the association of people 
different from each other - through the creation of likenesses among people, likenesses 
which are moral and beautiful in themselves precisely because they make things and 
people look like other things and people. Language is a skill to produce sociability (and 
in fact to produce human-ness itself), and as such it is hardly surprising that 
Mebengokre state so vehemently that language is one of the distinctive features of 
Mebengokre-ness. This does not `mean' the establishment of an `ethnic boundary', but 
the very means to create people as full human (that is, Mebengokre) beings, able to lead 
a seemly (that is, aesthetic) life among non-similar beings. 
`To look like' has been the general theme of this thesis, as becomes evident by 
now. To make relations between people that are not intimate with each other, look like 
'as if they were in fact intimate, this is the stuff polity is made of for the Mebengokre. 
It is the creation of an appearance of communality, whose realisation is communality 
itself. A polity which is built as a fractal, a `lookalike' of family intimacy where people 
retain their individual autonomy in their social intercourse - in fact, where people are 
able to keep their individual autonomy precisely because of this social intercourse. It is 
a polity where people harmonise their private aims through the linguistic skill of some 
of them. A polity which is not Hobbes' Leviathan but his Behemoth of anarchy - only 
that it reveals itself to be an organisational form in itself, rather than the negation of a 
sociality, the war of all against all. 
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Amazonian ethnology has been marked since its inception by a tendency to 
look for the `stability' of a possible social contract that might lurk beneath the `fluidity' 
and `chaos' of everyday life presenting itself to the anthropologist. Confronted with this 
`fluidity', the poor ethnologist turned to wherever s/he could find the (supposedly) 
familiar signs of hierarchy and authority - of 'society'. Chercher la structure has been a 
sort of diffuse but pervasive modus operandi for much of Amazonian ethnology. It 
looks like Levi-Strauss' ethnological conjectures about the social contract (mostly 
evident in The Elementary Structures of Kinship) as the universal cornerstone of human 
sociality had left an indelible mark on the minds of the Amazonian ethnologists. I hope 
to have shown how unsatisfactory a tool this approach constitutes if one is interested in 
understanding the specificity of Mebengokre agency. I also hope to have shown how 
relevant the following are for the building of social life are (apparently `unstructured', 
`formless'): the creation of `fictive kinship', individual emotional/affective attachments, 
the satisfaction of one's private appetites, and the practice of linguistic skills. I have 
striven to show how the very notion of `structure', tainted as it is by an indelible 
('Western') moral bias, is as little applicable to Mebengokre - and, following Overing 
and Passes' (2002) argument, probably to Amazonian Indigenous peoples as a whole - 
as the notion of a universal rational individual who is the source of universally human 
forms of agency. By unfolding the `informality' of Mebengokre ceremonial life, I 
intended also to show that such `informality' is anything but 'formless': it is in fact the 
very form of social life. Life among others does not need to 
be understood as an 
inescapable choice of the Leviathan of the social contract over the Behemoth of chaos 
and anarchy. And this, not only because the 
former is not necessarily present in social 
life, but also because the latter is not necessarily 
`chaos'. Mebengokre social life shows 
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how `Behemoth' can be a very viable option for a social life without the social 
contract227. 
Following again Overing and Passes' (2000) reflections on Amazonian 
sociality, one could say that it is time to change from Leviathan to Behemoth, from the 
endless search for `structures' that are so elusive because they are probably not there in 
the first place, to the appreciation of the significance and relevance of forms of creation 
of sociability in Indigenous Amazonia. This thesis was meant as a guided tour, so to 
speak, within the Behemoth's entrails. Overing and Passes' approach (and those of the 
authors participating in the volume organised by them) focuses upon the creation of 
intimacy as a social process. The authors focus on community intimacy and issues 
related to it, something which has rendered them amenable to critiques (Viveiros de 
Castro 1995b, 1996; Vilaca 2002) that understand it as a reduction of social life to `the 
domestic sphere'. As I expect to have shown, Mebengokre polity building can be 
understood as a fractal built out of personal intimacies, thus involving itself the creation 
of forms of intimacy. I believe that what the critiques mentioned above do not 
apprehend is the radical inappropriateness of the distinction between `the domestic 
sphere' and `polity' (or `social life') for the understanding of Indigenous Amazonian 
everyday practice of being-in-the-world together with others. 
Considering what I have discussed in this chapter (and in this thesis) so far, 
the reader will hardly be surprised by the conclusion that an anthropology of moral (and 
aesthetic) agency for the Mebengokre can only be understood as an anthropology of free 
227 A perception of this lack of `the social contract'. 
I think, is behind Fisher's (1998) statement that 
Mebengokre living in a same village do not think in terms of 'community'. What he calls `community' 
here is what I have called `the common good' throughout this thesis. 
Problems related to the use of our 
notions of 'community' when 
describing Indigenous Amazonian social organisation have been noted 
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agency - with all the difficulties that Laidlaw (2002) has already pointed out for such an 
enterprise. This anthropology of Mebengokre free agency involves an anthropology of 
the specific forms of Mebengokre egalitarianism(s) and individualism(s). This thesis, in 
a certain way, complements Laidlaw's critique of the Durkheimian moral bias of (much 
of) anthropology. It also proposes a way out of the theoretical conundrum represented 
by a discipline so deeply tainted with the specificity of its own moral outlook(s), which 
purports to interpret other peoples' ways of acting freely. What I have wished to unfold 
in my thesis is the point that if one is to understand the morality and the aesthetics of 
Mebengokre agency, one has to re-organise one's understanding of both `society' and 
`individual' according to the cultural context in which both notions (or notions which 
can be taken as suitably similar to them) arise. A specific configuration of the self 
(involving for instance `reasoned' drives, appetites and emotions) composes the 
background to such forms of social agency that are based on the aesthetic inebriation of 
the senses, in seduction rather than reasoning, in harmonisation of individual appetites 
and creation of collective emotional states rather than authority and power. On the other 
hand, social agency is `social' not because it implies `society' as an abstract 
metaphysical entity, but precisely because it does not contain such an implication: it 
does not imply renouncing to one's `egoistic' interests (or to one's drives and appetites) 
in order to live with others. These others are not in fact `one's pairs', or `one's equals' 
in the political theory sense - not because of disparities in `power' but because people 
are non-similes. Issues of `power', `rank', or `hierarchy' are not relevant in Mebengokre 
political thinking. Rather, what is relevant are the differences between concrete people, 
and the process of creating similarities between people, both individually and 
collectively. It is this which comprises 'the social state' 
itself. This theme has a 
before (Riviere 1984; Overing Kaplan 1977; 30 ig 1993: Thomas 1982). 1 am here trying to push 
relatively long history in Amazonian ethnology (Goldman 1963; Overing Kaplan 1975; 
Clastres 1977; Thomas 1982; Riviere 1984). 1 hope to have given a contribution to this 
longstanding debate. 
These reflections may help us to appreciate critically some of the recent 
approaches in anthropology concerning the relevance of one or the other of the 
metaphysical entities above - `society' or `individual' - for the understanding of social 
life. I think here specifically of the critique of (mostly French) anthropologists, 
sociologists, etc, inspired by M. A. U. S. S., the Mouvement Anti-Utilitariste dans les 
Sciences Sociales (Anti-Utilitarist Movement in the Social Sciences). According to 
Alain Caille (2002: 12), one of the representatives of M. A. U. S. S., the movement is a 
reaction to the contemporary predominance in the social sciences of such approaches, as 
methodological individualism and the theory of rational action, which propose that the 
model of the Homo Oeconomicus (based in a reformulation of old liberal economic 
ideas) as a `universal' of human agency, capable to explain all forms of human 
behaviour (and not only economic life, as in its previous version). Against such an 
assumption, intellectuals linked to M. A. U. S. S. have proposed the universalisation of 
Marcel Mauss' model of the gift - the `obligation of freedom' to give, to get, and to 
replicate - as the basic form of human sociality228. Although I agree with Caille's 
the critique a little further, by analysing the moral and aesthetic aspects of life together with others. 
228 Caille's argument is actually more refined than what I discuss here. He defines Mauss' gift, with its 
ambivalent moral dialectics between altruism and self-interest, according to an opposition between 
four great general motives ('universals', as far as I can understand his argument), obligation and 
freedom, the interest for oneself and the interest for another (Caille 2002: 17): "I retake the first lines 
of the The Gift', when Mauss states that (... ) the gift is obligatory, to give is an obligation, but this 
obligation to give is at the same time an obligation of freedom. He uses this rather curious sentence 
frequently: one has to know how to give as an obligation and at the same time with freedom (... ). To 
mix obligation and freedom. This is a first opposition 
between two motives for action: obligation and 
freedom. (... ) But Mauss sees clearly that in the gift relationship there is also interest, obviously, even 
economic interest, material interest, but this private 
interest can only be satisfied if one satisfies the 
interest of the other. To put it in a nutshell: there is a second opposition between two motives for 
action, an opposition between what I would call an 
`interest for oneself', and an 'interest for the 
other'. The interest for the other, which 
I propose to call in French aimance, something that can be 
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critique of methodological individualism, I believe that his solution is hampered 
precisely by the same fundamental mistake of the other approach. Both purport to 
establish theoretically the universal basis of human life among others without taking 
into consideration the profound moral bias of the notions involved. Taking the 
Mebengokre case as example, I would contest the relevance of 1) the idea of an 
individual as a rational entity as defined on ontological grounds ('being'), and, 2) the 
idea that giving and getting things from others implies a `common good' distinct and 
above the limited individual interests. These notions cannot encompass the multitude of 
practices involved in the ongoing moral and aesthetic process of creating sociability and 
humanity (both are in fact the same) in people. Which is how Mebengokre create their 
being-together-in-the-world. 
I would like to finish this thesis - which is very much about stories told by 
people to other people and the effect they produce - with a story. It is not a story of 
mine, but one of the Mebengokre stories that are part of the cycle narrated by the 
ceremonial specialist during the fishing ceremony. As other stories told during this 
specific part of the ceremony, this one is meant to be enjoyed by people listening to 
them, who at this point stay awake the whole evening (or at least are expected to do so) 
until sunrise, when the actual fishing begins. This particular story tells of an event that 
happened in some unspecified past, during a fishing ceremony. It tells of an ancestor229 
who was a shaman, and how he made a fool of a young man. It was received as 
hilariously funny by those listening to it. It was narrated by Roma, one of the 
translated as amity, solidarity, love, etc". Caille's 
discussion is in fact a moral discussion - the 
opposition between altruism and egoism, and 
between freedom and obligation as the determinants of 
the morality of agency. The reader, who 
has followed an essentially similar discussion along this 
thesis, will note that what I have purported to 
do was precisely to show the specificity - that is, the 
non-universality - of this moral configuration. 
Nevertheless I do strongly agree with Caille when he 
states that the issue of the place of each one of 
these determinants of the morality of agency in concrete 
actions is an empirical, rather than speculative, question 
(2002: 18). 
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ceremonial specialists who have the knowledge of this specific ceremony, and I have to 
confess that I could not see the point of the joke when it was told (and translated to me 
afterwards): 
- "Let's climb the tree", said the ancestor, "let's climb it". 
- Then the ancestor tied a vine to the tree. 
- "Someone go up there for me (in my place) to see if there is some sign of smoke to be seen" [he asks 
someone to go up there, using the vine he had tied to the tree] 
- And, as he said it, there was already someone climbing up the tree, when the ancestor cut off the vine. 
- And (the person) fell down the tree. 
- And he faded, but soon was standing again. 
- He went around, limping. 
- He was limping around. 
- He went to and fro, limping. 
- He went again to the ancestor, and the latter produced a kukei230 for him to capture. 
- `Let's see if you are fast enough, let's see", said the ancestor. 
- "Kill that kukei for me to see". 
- "Let's see if you are fast". 
- Then the young man chased the kukei. 
- And he ran, chasing the kukei, going round and round himself. 
- But the ancestor kept moving the kukei here and there, and the young man could not reach it. 
- Every time [that the young man was about to reach it] he hid the kukei. 
- And the young man went round and round himself, until he gave up. 
(the story goes on, to the general amusement of all - the whole audience roars with laughter). 
This example of apparently pointless humour started making some sense to me 
when I was analysing the transcriptions of the songs and stories told during the fishing 
ceremony. As I said before, the central concern of the ceremony, told - literally - in the 
songs and speeches that are part of it, is how to harmonise individual ends and desires 
towards a single goal, so that everyone achieves what one wants, and at the same time 
has an enjoyable time with others. The songs and stories explain to younger men that 
they should join older people and have a good time fishing (something to be stressed, as 
people usually spend most of their time with those that are similar to them in age). 
Songs and stories act toward inducing people to act together. Rhythm and harmony are 
229 I use the term here in the loose sense. 
230 'Cotia' in Portuguese. sort of rodent, somewhat larger than a hare. 
310 
the all-encompassing paradigms for such effort. Ceremonies create emotional/affective 
states, which are `the social state' itself, through creating and directing people's desires 
and drives. 
The remarkable thing in this story, when considered within such a context, is 
that it tells explicitly about the realisation of desires. In this case, about the realisation 
of another person's desires. It tells about issuing and following orders, about people 
`doing things for' others. That is, it tells about states of affairs which are the opposite of 
the whole complex of ideas and practices that are learned and enacted during the fishing 
ceremony. In fact, the whole story appeared to me in retrospect to revolve around the 
hilariousness of such contrast. To realise another person's desire is essentially absurd 
and pointless, the story seemed to say. 
In a ceremony where individual ends, appetites and desires are met through 
joyous concourse with others who are essentially `non-peers' of one, the idea of the 
exercise of authority precisely in the context which concerned most the ceremony (the 
togetherness of younger and older people), reminded me immediately - through one of 
those curious mental associations which only afterwards can have some sense squeezed 
out of them - of Mauss' statement (1925: 77, already quoted elsewhere in this thesis), 
that "the brutish pursuit of individual ends is harmful to the ends and the peace of all, to 
the rhythm of their works & joys - and rebounds on the individual himself'. The reason 
for such an association was obvious in retrospect: here was a piece of a statement that 
contained, inverted, most of my argument and that of the stories told during the fishing 
ceremony (and in others). The Mebengokre's was a moral philosophy where the pursuit 
of individual ends was not brutish but the very 
form of the moral act: a political 
philosophy where the ends and peace of all equalled the sum of the ends and peace of 
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each. It was a moral and aesthetic philosophy which actually posed that collective 
works and joys could and should become conjoined in people's agency through rhythm 
and harmony, and that people could actually achieve their (private) ends and the 
(individual) peace of each through such agency. All these were part of the very process 
of making oneself human - of making oneself into an autonomous individual able to 
exercise togetherness with others. 
I had actually inverted Mauss' argument, point by point, and that struck me as 
having an odd parallel with the story of the authoritarian shaman inverting the point of 
the whole fishing ceremony by ordering people about. It dawned on me that the story- 
teller was reciting Mauss' argument as a joke, as if it were a sort of dystopia where 
some hilariously funny relations obtained between people. Relations were being 
depicted that were not immoral but rather un-moral, cutting the plane of morality 
perpendicularly, so to speak. In the morally and aesthetically heightened context of the 
ceremony, such agency was significantly devoid of sense. As such, it was also devoid of 
any efficacy, as the poor victim of the shaman's eccentricities discovered for himself 
again and again. 231 It was poking fun at Leviathan: an exposition of the absurdity of 
giving up one's pursuit of one's own private ends, of submitting oneself to another's 
authority. An argument that, were it couched in the terms of Western moral 
philosophies, would be a critique of the notion of the `Common Good' as the necessary 
affirmation of interests above and outside individuals in order that life together with 
others may exist. The Mebengokre, who do not seem to think 
in terms of any such 
231 In fact, this story resembles strongly the behaviour of a man towards the children of 
his female formal 
friend (krabdjtii'v). This sort of banter (which is not restricted to children but performed also with the 
young adult offspring of one's 
formal friend) is performed for the amusement of the audience present, 
as in the story above. It is interesting to notice that when a mother wants 
to threaten her children with 
punishment, she usually says that she 
is going to call her formal friend to discipline them. Here, as in 
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notion as `Common Good', represent it simply as another's desire, another's aims. 
another's authority over one. One is reminded here of Clastres' (1977) argument of the 
Society against the State, as well as of the manifold critiques addressed to such 
conception as presupposing what it 'denied', that is, the presence of a `State' against 
which `Society' permanently mobilised itself. Although Clastres can be criticised, in the 
terms that I develop above, as implying a `Common Good' which is the basis of 
`Society' itself, the story of the authoritarian shaman seems to suggest a way out of the 
former critique, by implying that `State' - or rather authority - is actually known and 
actively, explicitly rejected by Mebengokre thinking. 232 The story thus seems to echo 
wider philosophical concerns, among different Amazonian peoples, related to personal 
autonomy and freedom of agency. These are concerns that seem to be an expressive part 
of the weaving of the very fabric of their social lives. 
The discovery of Indigenous American peoples by Europeans has left an 
indelible mark upon Western moral and political philosophy: first in the 16th century 
where one is immediately reminded here of Montaigne's dialogue with that celebrated 
Tupinambä in the port of Rouen, and later, precisely by the confrontation of the 
freedom of `the savage' with the constraints of the rigid European morality and forms of 
polity. Perhaps Montaigne did find out something highly significant from his 
Tupinambä interlocutor after all. It is something that seems to retain its centrality and 
importance in Amazonian philosophies. It is time for an anthropology of the specifically 
Amazonian forms of personal freedom. I have tried in this thesis to provide a few initial 
the story of the authoritarian shaman, we 
find the conjoining of (potential) authority over, and the 
humorous licence to poke fun at, someone. 
232 I owe this last remark to a comment by Peter 
Gow on a paper presented by me where I told this story 
and developed a somewhat extended 
form of the argument that I provide here. The paper was given in 
the workshop `The Absurdities of the 
Human Condition', in St. Andrews, May 2002, organised by 
Joanna Overing. 
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steps towards such an anthropology. 
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TABLE 1: MEBENGOKRE TERRITORIAL OCCUPATION DURING THE 19TH CENTURY 
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TABLE 4: RELATIONSHIP TERMINOLOGY (MALE EGO) 
The following table was meant only as a tool for the reader to follow some passages of the 
thesis. The "meaning" of the Mebengokre terms is in fact highly unsatisfactorily rendered in 
genealogical terms, as one may see in chapter two. I have used the genealogical rendering only 
to help the reader. The sign "-#", which appears in the genealogical rendering of some of the 
terms below, indicates that speakers may use personal names instead of relationship 
terminology for that specific person. Terms between brackets following a hyphen ("- 
krabdjwy") indicate alternative terminological uses. 
TERMS 
" " 
ADDRESS REFERENCE 
MEANING 
djü-nhö udjwy (idjudjwy) ZH, DH, FBSW 
djunwa, djuny, papai bam, papai (young F, FB MZH 
(young children) children) , 
Ikamy (-#) Kamy B, MZS, FBS 
ikanikwynh(-#) Kanikwynh Z, MZD, FBD 
imäj, imäjre (when 
umre (idjumre) WB, WZS, WFBS, WMZS 
child) 
Imäjnget umrenget WF, WFB, WMZH 
(idjumren et) 
itabdjwy, krä-ny 
(when younger than Tabdjwy ZC, CC 
speaker) (-#) 
-# Kral D, S, BID, BS 
ngetwa, nget-e nget 
FF, MF, MB, FZH, WFF, WFZH (-#, -bam 
(children) kaäk, -krabdjwy), WMB (-#), MBS, MBSS 
nidwa, mamäe (young nä, mamäe (young M, MZ, FBW, MBD 
children) children) 
o Binh u äijnh (id'upäinh) BW, FBSW, WZ, WMZD, WFBD, DH, SW 
popdinhgeij 
upäinhgeij WM, WMZ, WFBW 
(idjupäinhgeij) 
Tuiwa, tui (when of kwatui FM, MM, FZ, MBW, WFZ (-#), WMBW (-#) 
similar age) 
Nenh (-#) prö W 
1 Kutiam-ýi: Elder; kutapure: younger. Vidal (1977: 52-53) gives kutewa as 'elder', konetn as the `intermediary' 
one, and kutapure for the youngest. 
TABLE 5: RELATIONSHIP TERMINOLOGY (FEMALE EGO) 
i i. 1.1ris7 
"MEANING" 
AD1)RF'CC 
ibianö udjwy (idjudjwy) ZH, DH, HB 
djunwa, djuny, papai bam, papal (young 
(young children) children) 
F, FB, MZH 
Ikamy (-#) Kamy B, MZS, FBS, MBDS 
ikanikwynh(-#) Kanikwynh Z, MZD, FBD 
pomre umre (idjumre) HZ 
pomrenget umrenget HZ (idjumrenget) 
itabdjwy, angmel 
(when younger than Tabdjwy SC, BC, DC 
speaker) (-#) 
-# Kra D, S. BC, FBDC, MBDD, MZDC 
ngetwa, nget-e 
raget 
FF, MF, MB, FZH, WFF, WFZH (-#, -bam 
(children) kaäk, -krabdjwy), WMB (-#), MBS, MBSS 
nidwa, mamäe (young nä, mamäe (young M, MZ, FBW, MBD 
children) children) 
djwoy Djwoy (idjudjwoy} BW, SW 
pomrengey 
Umrengeij 
(idjumrengeij) 
HM 
Tuiwa, tui (when of kwatui FM, MM, FZ, MBW 
similar age) 
Nenh (intimate) (-#) mijet H 
Angmý: Young man. The term is also used by older men to refer to younger men in general in ceremonial 
contexts (including collective activities such as ceremonial 
hunting expeditions and collective fishing 
expeditions, described in this thesis. 
TABLE 6: INDIRECT REFERENCE TERMINOLOGY 
Indirect reference terminology is used when the speaker (a), the person (b) whom (a) is 
addressing, and the person (c) referred to by (a) are related. In the example below, the speaker 
(a) refers to (b) as kamy, and to (c) as kra (which, in this case, is also the term used by (b) to 
refer to (c)): 
kamy 
krd 
When talking to (b) about (c), the speaker (a) refers to (c) as akanlre, a term that could be 
"translated" into Western (genealogical) terminology as "your male child who is my child". 
TERM SPEAKER (in relation ADDRESSED (by MEANING to addressed) relationship terfn) 
djwyje H/W9 F, M, B/Z rö/mijet, krd, your male in-law (who 
amy/kanikwynh ism in-law)' 
kadjwynh (all) B, Z, H, W 
same sex 
amy/kanikwynh; 
"your female children 
' 
rö/mijet 
(who are my children) 
kamre (all), B, Z, H, W 
same sex 
amy/kanikwyhn; 
`your male children 
' 
rö/mijet 
(who are my children) 
katä B, MF, FF, FZ tabdjwy 
`your sibling(who is 
' my tabdjwy) 
kotkijel H, W r52, mijet 
your sibling (who is 
' my in-law) 
mädjwyntxe (all) F ra 
`your kwatui (who is 
' my in-law) 
mäjnget (all) F, M, H rä, prö 
`your raget (who is my 
in-law)' 
`your male in-law 
mre (all) F, M, B /WF rä, kamy /udjw'y (DH) (WB) (who is my in- 
law/my kra)' 
`your mother-in-law 
fnrengeij (all) F, M, H rä (fem. ), prö 
is my in- (who 
law)/(who is my 
mother)' 
`your father-in- 
nrenget (all) W, WM ijet, udjw'y (DH) law/umrenget (who is 
my bam/mijet)' 
ntkram F, M, B rt (fem. ), kanikwynh 
'your husband (who is 
)' m in la w y - 
ntkrämdjwynhtxe F, B rä (male), kam V 
your wife (who is my 
' . in-law) 
I Literally, the one at your side'. 'Kije' means 'thigh'. 
2 When spoken by pr5. means your brother (who is my sibling)'. 
TABLE 6: INDIRECT REFERENCE TERMINOLOGY 
öihn (all) F, M3 rd your sister 
(who is my 
i"a ) 
püihn (all) F, M, B /W rä (male), mijet 
your upaihn (who is 
' my in-law/my sister) 
`your mother-in-law 
päihngeij (all) W, WF ijet, udjw'y (DH) (upäihngeij) (who is 
my näl my rö) 
paridjwynh same as above same as above 
`your female tabdjtit'v 
(who is mtabdjtiýýV)' 
am/nä 
`your male tabdjwy 
Z, S, W , 
amy/kanikwyhn 
(who is my tabdj%ti_v) 
parije4 male 
krd 
,H (more distant) female krä, prö 
`your male tabdjut'h 
S (? ) (who is my kra) am 
tö (all) F, M5 ra 
`your brother (who is 
my kra) 
tukä , 
MB, MM, MF, H rä, tabdjwy, prö, `your 
father (who is my 
idjumre in-law)' 
Gädjwynhtxe H pro, päihn, amre 
`your mother (who is 
' (ngädjwynhtxe? ) my in-law) 
Gatenk (ngatenk? ) 
F, M, B/Z (of opposite ra' 
amy/kanikwynh(of 
`your krd (who is my 
' ' sex) 
opposite sex) 
tabd wy) 
ginhij (all) F, M, B, Z rd, bam, kamt' 
`your wife (who is my 
in-law) 
3 Bann and na always use this terms when talking to their children; other, `classificatory' kin, may or may not use 
it. 
4 Literally, your foot'. 
5 Bain and na always use this terms when talking to their children; other, classificatory' kin, may or may not use 
it. 
TABLE 7: GLOSSARY OF MEBENGOKRE TERMS 
Ak're: `bird' ceremonial society 
Akro ka'öinh: collective fishing ceremony 
Ami aprä: culminating point of a ceremony 
Apijeti: `large armadillo' ceremonial society 
Apinaye/Apinaje: northern Ge Indian people (usually classed as `western Timbira', despite being closer, 
in linguistic terms, to the Mebengokre) 
Apaniekrä: Eastern Timbira Indigenous people (The Apaniekrä and the Ramkokamekra are also called 
Canela) 
Arawete: Tupi-Guarani Indian people 
Aruanä: Karajä ceremony, also performed by the Mebengokre 
Atykbe: men's house, traditionally built at the outskirts of the Xikrin village. 
A' 'ykre: Mebengokre village 
Bekwynh-yr m-e ungrör: naming ceremony for the `holders' of Bekwynh names. 
Bep-yr m-e torolBenp-yr m-e toro: naming ceremony for `holders' of Bep names. 
Ben/ben diri: ceremonial discourse 
Bororo: Indian people (of the Umutina linguistic family, part of the Macro-Ge larger linguistic family), 
sharing many cultural and social traits with the Ge. 
Canela: Eastern Timbira Indian people 
Djöre: extinct Xikrin-Mebengokre group 
Djudjekö: Xikrin village in Catete Indian land. 
Djwy-kupu: `bread' made of manioc paste. 
Gaviäo: Northern Ge (Eastern Timbira) Indian people. 
Ge: linguistic family to which Mebengokre language belongs. 
Gorotire: Mebengokre group (also village of the same name). 
Gradahus/Gradaus: name given to an Indian group in the 19th century (possibly a Mebengokre group). 
Ira amräire: extinct Mebengokre group, which 
inhabited the confluence between the Araguaia and the 
Tocantins Rivers. 
TABLE 7: GLOSSARY OF \IEBENGOKRE TERMS 
Juruna: Tupi Indian people. 
Kaäk: `fac-similar' (see thesis for more details) 
Kaben: `words'; discourse; Mebengokre language ('Mebengokre kaben'). 
Kaigö: `false' (see thesis for more details) 
Kaingang: Southern Ge Indian people 
Kakrit: `false' (see thesis for details) 
Kamayurä: Indian people inhabiting the Xingu region 
Kamkrokro: old village site of the Xikrin 
Kamkukei: `place of the kukei'; site of Catete village collective fishing ceremony 
Kapöt: `clearing'; `savannah'; site of an old Mebengokre village 
Karajä: Indian people of the Macro-Ge liguistic family, inhabiting the margins of the Araguaia River. 
Kararao : Mebengokre group 
Kayapo/Caiapö: name by which the Mebengokre are usually known. 
Kikretum: old Mebengokre village site; present-day village in Mebengokre Gorotire Indian Land. 
Kokorekre: name of an extinct Xikrin group; ancient village site of the group of the same name. 
Kokraimöro: village site (and also name of a group) in Gorotire Indian land. 
Kräbdjwy: `formal friend' ;a non-'kin' relationship 
Krahö/Kraho: Northern Ge (Eastern Timbira) Indian people. 
Kren-akrore: Name given to the Mebengokre to the Ge-speaking Panarä 
Kri: the village circle. 
Krikati: Northern Ge (Eastern Timbira) Indian people. 
Kubenkrankegn: name of a Mebengokre group (also a village in Gorotire Indian land) 
Kukradjä: `whealth'; `tradition' (see thesis for more details) 
Kumrentx/djwynh/katät: 'true', `real' (see thesis for more details) 
Kwyry kango: the manioc ceremony (adopted from the Juruna). 
TABLE 7: GLOSSARY OF NIEBENGOKRE TERMS 
Mba"y: name of one of the Mebengokre Indian lands; site of an ancient Mebengokre pillage 
M-ebenget: `the elders' (see thesis for more details) 
M. ebengokre/Mebengokre: self-denomination of the Kayapo ('those who came from the hole in the 
middle of the waters' ; `those who came from the place between the waters'). 
M-e bi'ök: `The painted ones'; name given to the children celebrated in a ceremony. 
M-e kot to: `All dancing together'; party; ceremony; festival. 
M'-ekragnoti/M- ekrängöti: name of the southernmost Mebengokre group. 
M-ekranyre: `Those with small children' ; Mebengokre 'age-grade'. 
M-ekrareremex: `Those with beautiful children'; name given to the sponsors of a ceremony (that is, to 
the parents of those children being celebrated in a ceremony). 
M-e kutop: Mebengokre ceremony for young adult men. 
M-enokane: Mebengokre group last seen in the 1940s 
M-enoronyre: `Those who sleep in a new way'; Mebengokre `age-grade' composed by older children 
(after the begin to sleep in the men's house - hence the name). 
M-. e reremex/M-ereremei: `those who are beautiful'; naming ceremony in which names beginning with 
any ceremonial prefix can be celebrated (see thesis for more details). 
M-e toro: `All dancing'; ceremony; party; festival. 
M-etoro dj'a: `place of the m-e toro'; `conceptual' place at the centre of the village (to the side of the 
men's house). 
M--e tumre/m -e turn jarenh : `words of old' ; 'tradition'. 
M-. e ungrör: `the cry/shout'; vocal form deployed in some ceremonies (see thesis for more details). 
Mex/mei/metx: `good/beautiful/useful' (see thesis for more details). 
Mr 'Y kadj y dj'a: `Place of those who want to hunt/who want meat'; `conceptual' place in the centre of 
the village, where people gather for ceremonial hunting expeditions (see thesis for more details). 
Ngö: 'water'; `river' 
Ngö ratz: `Large river' 
Ngöre kam m-e toro: `Ceremony/party at the place of the small water/river'; collective fishing 
ceremony. 
Ngre nhö djwynh: `Those who really 
have the songs'; ceremonial specialist 
TABLE 7: GLOSSARY OF MEBENGOKRE TERMS 
Ngrer: song 
Ngrer djuwynh: `real singer'; one who is knowledgeable in ceremonial lore. 
Norocajes/Nhyrkwaye: name of a 19th century Indian people (probably the present-day Mebengokre). 
O'amak: `longing' 
Ombikwä: `relative'; `friend' 
0 wa ne: `And this is it'; formula that closes a narrative in Mebengokre traditional lore. 
Panarä: Ge-speaking Indian people. 
Panh m -e toro: ceremony where people (mostly women) with names beginning by the ceremonial prefix 
`panh' are celebrated. 
Pia'am/piaap: 'shame'; 'respect'. 
PP Y djam: `The place of the Brazil nut [tree]'; ancient village site of the Mebengokre 
Porori: ancient village site of the Mebengokre 
Punure: `bad/ugly/useless' (see thesis for more details). 
P'y: annatto 
Pykany: name of a village in Mekragnoti Indian land. 
Pykatingrat: `beach'; name of one of the two Xikrin villages in the Catete Indian land. 
Pykatöti: name of the first village of the Mebengokre in the Xingu region. 
Pyrkataje: self-denomination of the Gaviäo (Northern Ge, Eastern Timbira) Indian people. 
P'yt kargt: extinct Mebengokre group 
Ramkokamekrä: one of the Canela groups. 
Shavante/Xavante: Central Ge Indian people 
Sherente/Xerente: Central Ge Indian people 
Shokleng/Xokleng: Southern Ge Indian people 
Suyä: Northern Ge Indian people 
Taktik-nhäk: ceremony in which people 
bearing names beginning by these two ceremonial prefixes are 
celebrated. 
TABLE 7: GLOSSARY OF \IEBENGOKRE TERMS 
Timbira: Name of a group of Northern Ge Indian peoples, all speaking the same language (or highly 
similar ones at any rate). 
Txukarramäe: name of one of the southernmost Mebengokre groups (denomination given by the 
Juruna). 
Xikrin/Shikrin: name of a Mebengokre group. 
